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ABSTRACT 
This research has studied bank risk management in relation to efficient bank regulation 
in the form of optimal bank financial reorganization. Efficient banking regulation can be 
achieved only if it includes closure policies which prevent moral hazard behaviour; in 
turn, they should enhance bank regulators' accountability. Yet, Basel II gives more 
discretion to domestic banking authorities and focuses more on the implementation of 
best practices of risk management. This creates a gap between the needs of efficient 
banking regulation and the objectives of Basel II, on the one hand, and Indonesian bank 
regulation on the other. To fill the gaps, the Fries, Mella-Barral, Peraudin (FMP) model, 
under a robust regulatory regime concept, is used to provide a framework for banking 
regulation. 
Optimal bank reorganization aims at achieving efficient bank regulation, where bank 
regulators are assumed to act as social planners. In this thesis, optimal bank 
reorganization is analysed within the concept of a "robust regulatory regime". Optimal 
bank reorganization comprises closure rules and bailout policies arising endogenously 
through the interaction of two factors, namely regulators' attempts to minimize 
discounted, expected bankruptcy costs, and equity-holders' incentives to recapitalise 
banks. The shareholders will be allowed to continue to control the bank if the bank is 
well capitalized. The cash flow approach to optimal bank financial reorganization is 
adopted. The subsidy policies for financially ailing banks consider the implementation of 
socially-optimal closure rules at minimum financial cost to regulators and which reduce 
moral hazard. The FMP model implies that optimal bank reorganization requires a 
deposit insurance scheme. The FMP model involves capital and risk management as 
crucial factors. 
This research includes an empirical study of the implementation of the FMP model in 
Indonesia using the American call option approach. Maximum likelihood estimates in 
VAR and GARCH are applied to monthly data on the market return and equity and 
deposit values for relatively-large Indonesian banks, including regional banks and 
foreign banks. The results indicate that the authorities can establish an optimal closure 
rule for each bank, levy fair deposit insurance premiums that can be adjusted to take 
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account of quantitative and qualitative factors, estimate optimal subsidies at different 
deposit insurance premiums, and identify the banks' imminence to bankruptcy. 
This study also adopts the Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) framework, which is an 
optimal combination of strategy, process, infrastructure and environment, which helps 
banks make intelligent, risk-taking decisions prior to committing limited resources and 
then helps them monitor the outcomes of these decisions. This represents a complex 
attempt, through the use of a top-down approach by agents at a bank, to enhance and 
sustain shareholder value. Theoretical and practical aspects of the structure of bank risk, 
risk management, enterprise risk management, bank regulation, and optimal bank 
corrective action (reorganization), are analysed using the literature and an empirical 
survey of relatively large Indonesian banks respectively. The empirical survey of risk 
management, covering the elements of the ERM, was designed and applied to 
Indonesian banks via a questionnaire. The descriptive analysis and statistical significance 
testing for the survey reveal that the main risk faced by Indonesia banks is credit risk. 
Additionally, the results indicate that the current state of bank risk management in 
Indonesia is merely at a beginning, and banks' attitudes toward the required elements of 
enterprise risk management are diverse. The implications of Indonesian banks' actual 
risks for risk management and optimal bank reorganization are also examined using 
dummy variable techniques. The results show that Indonesian banks are only at the 
initial stage of implementation of risk management; a positive impact on optimal 
reorganization has not yet emerged at most banks. 
In these respects, this thesis adds to the theoretical literature on risk management and 
bank regulation and to the empirical literature on the state of risk management and bank 
regulation, in particular in developing countries' banking systems. It also highlights how 
(sub-optimal) banking regulation in Indonesia can be improved with a view to 
enhancing social welfare and preventing future financial instability. 
Keywords: Banking Policy, Bank Closures, Bailouts, Deposit Insurance, Econometrics 
for Finance, Regulation, Risk Management. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background to the Research 
Financial institutions play a vital role in every economy. Their roles have increased 
mainly due to changes in the financial environment, the rapid development of 
information technology, financial globalisation, financial instrument innovations, the 
emergence of financial conglomerates, the development of new management 
techniques, intensified financial competition and the focussing of financial regulation to 
accommodate social needs (Greenspan, 1996; Kelley, 1996; and Dewatripont and Tirole, 
1999). There is also widespread agreement that the development of financial markets 
and institutions plays a crucial role in economic growth and development. However, 
Arestis and Demetriades (1997) provide evidence that the causal link between finance 
and growth is determined by the nature of the operations of the financial institutions 
and policies in place in each country. 
In contrast, the last fifteen years have shown that financial systems have been very 
fragile, as indicated by the costly and large scale banking sector problems experienced in 
many countries. An International Monetary Fund (IMF) report (Lindgren et. al., 1996), 
reveals that more than two thirds of member countries have experienced significant 
banking sector problems at some stage. The outcome of such problems was worse than 
the Great Depression of the 1930s (Goodhart et. al. 1999, Llewellyn, 1999a and 
Kaufman, 1996). Demirguc, Kunt and Detragiache (1998) found that banking crises 
emerge when the macroeconomic environment is weak, and that indicators of financial 
liberalization are positively and significantly related to the probability of banking crises 
occurring. Whilst, Williamson and Maher (1998) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998) also 
found an empirical link between financial liberalisation and financial crises. 
Financial crises throughout the world exhibit two common characteristics: weak internal 
risk analysis, management and control systems; and weak (or even perverse) incentives 
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within the financial system generally and financial institutions in particular. Almost 
always and everywhere banking crises are a complex interactive mix of economic, 
financial and structural weaknesses (Llewellyn, 1999c). 
Llewellyn (1997) states that sound economic development requires two factors: an 
efficient financial system; and a stable, robust financial system. An efficient financial 
system requires substantial liberalization, that is, a general policy that increases the 
market's role and allows for autonomous financial institution decision-making. A robust 
financial system requires additional properties, such as proper decision-making and 
control within financial institutions with effective risk analysis, management and 
control systems, an efficient regulatory and supervisory regime for financial institutions, 
and a sound incentive structure for all parties in the financial system. 
These findings would appear to be valid for Indonesia, as financial liberalisation was 
started in the 1970s by launching capital account liberalization whereby Indonesia re- 
embraced an open capital market regime. In the 1980's, bank regulators in Indonesia put 
into effect banking deregulations, concerning the abolition of banks' credit ceilings, and 
deposit interest ceilings, and of the liquidity credit facility of the Central Bank. 
Indonesian bank regulators also deregulated the banking system further in October 1988 
by widening access to the financial markets and easing the controls on banks' 
establishment. Moreover, bank regulators removed the ceiling on foreign commercial 
borrowing by banks in 1989, followed by the introduction of a swap facility through 
Bank Indonesia in 1994-1995. Accordingly, the number of banks soared, competition 
was fierce, and capital inflow surged, in particular in the 1990's due to Indonesia's 
integration into the world market. The deregulation, however, was not supported by a 
well-developed institutional and regulatory framework [see Goeltom, (1999), and 
Dendawijaya (2000)]. As a result, Indonesia started suffering a financial crisis in mid- 
1997. Goeltom (1999), a Deputy Governor of Bank Indonesia, also noted that the 
weaknesses stemmed from the following factors: (1) inadequate regulation and 
supervision, a tradition of implicit and unwarranted government guarantees to industry, 
and significant governmental withdrawal from the financing of the infrastructure and 
other projects; (2) growth in large, unhedged and short term liabilities in foreign 
currencies, whereby banks and private corporations expected that, under the managed 
floating rate regime adopted in the 1980's (after the fixed exchange rate regime of the 
1970s), the Indonesia government would not allow a significant depreciation of the 
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rupiah; and (3) lack of information making it difficult for lenders to assess the riskiness 
of borrowers in Indonesia. These problems led Indonesia in 1999 to enact a new law, 
whereby Indonesia embraced an open capital account and a free flow of capital. To 
fulfil the purpose of the law the government also suggested: (1) strengthening the 
domestic financial system, including the risk management system, through direct 
regulation of risk exposures, and enhanced risk reporting and disclosure requirements; 
(2) establishing a system of resolution for poorly performing banks, including bank 
closure rules to enhance the efficiency of banking regulation; (3) supporting the capital 
account liberalization with a consistent macroeconomic framework, including a 
consistent money and exchange rate policy, accompanied by good public and private 
sector governance (in particular, risk management); and (4) questioning the role of the 
IMF as an international lender of last resort, since the IMF's modest financial support 
when Indonesia bailed out its ailing banks without any deposit insurance in place failed 
to inspire market confidence. 
The cost of these crises was quite high, amounting to 45 percent of GDP in the case of 
Indonesia, 15 percent in the case of Korea and 40 percent in the case of Thailand 
(Llewellyn, 1999). The crisis forced the Indonesian government to bail out the ailing 
banks (the majority) at a cost of Rp164,536 trillion (Kompas, 11 January, 2000), as noted 
by Dendawijaya (2001). Llewellyn (1999a) points out that these figures include the costs 
of meeting obligations to depositors under the blanket guarantee introduced by the 
authorities to handle systemic crises, and public sector payments to finance the re- 
capitalisation of insolvent banks. It has been noted that these financial crises were 
caused by a combination of dynamic factors, such as unsustainable capital flows, poor 
macro policies, and weak financial and corporate sector institutions. 
As a matter of fact, the IMF's financial support to Indonesia ended in 2003, so that 
Indonesia's bank regulators now need to focus on the efficiency of the banking industry. 
As suggested by Freixas and Rochet (1998), and Fries, Mella-Barral and Perraudin 
(FMP) (1997), efficient bank regulation requires bank regulators (inter alia) to establish 
optimal bank reorganization rules, which include optimal closure rules, optimal subsidy 
rules, and the operation of a deposit insurance system involving fair deposit insurance 
premium rates that diminish the moral hazard problem. 
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The implications of bank failures are more serious than those of other firms, because: 
(i) their roles in the clearing and payment systems are such that economic agents need 
assurance that they can provide such services continuously; (ii) individual bank runs 
resulting from failures of liquidity insurance might spread to the others (Bryant, 1980) 
1981 and Diamond and Dybvig, 1983); (iii) fractional reserve banking systems are 
inherently unstable. This depends very much on the behaviour of depositors, which, in 
turn, depends on their views about the safety of their banks (Von Thadden, 1995; 
Anderlini, 1989; and Diamond and Dybvig, 1983); and (iv) moral hazard and adverse 
selection issues are associated with safety net arrangements. Consequently, the banking 
system needs cost-effective safety net arrangements which address the implications of 
bank failures. Forms of safety net arrangements are the lender of last resort, a deposit 
insurance system and an optimal bank regulatory and supervisory framework. 
When a bank becomes insolvent, uninsured depositors will only receive their funds after 
the liquidation of the bank's assets. The depositors' perception about the bank's viability 
also relies mainly on the level of bank capital which, in turn, can maintain the systemic 
stability of the banking system and public confidence. In contrast, under a deposit 
insurance scheme, small depositors are protected by deposit insurance funds. According 
to Dewatripont and Tirole, 1999, the absence of bank runs in these recent years of large 
shocks is the outcome of depositors' trust in the deposit insurance systems. 
Deposit insurance schemes are complex mechanisms and there is no model which fits 
all situations. There are two polar types of deposit insurance schemes which have been 
adopted by both developed and developing countries, i. e., schemes providing either an 
implicit guarantee or an explicit guarantee. Under an implicit guarantee, it is assumed 
that full deposit protection will be provided by governments after banking crises and 
thus they are ad-hoc in nature. Garcia, 1997, however, argues that the implicit deposit 
guarantee scheme entails negative effects, since the lack of a well-designed system of 
deposit insurance results in depositor uncertainty that can worsen bank runs, and 
involves, in the end, greater resolution costs than otherwise would have been incurred. 
Under an explicit guarantee, there is a formal deposit insurance scheme, usually 
administered by a deposit insurance corporation - either a public or private company - 
and established by government. Systemic risk is, however, still inherent in the deposit 
insurance scheme. A private system cannot assure that a solvent insurance company can 
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handle the risk associated with the possibility of substantial losses arising in bank panics. 
Consequently, the roles of explicit deposit insurance scheme and the Central Bank as 
the LLR are still needed to cover the payment claims of depositors (Kaufman, 1996). In 
the absence of systemic risk, the linear insurance premium of a private tariff system can 
also induce adverse, risk-taking behaviour. A well-managed bank will reduce risk-taking 
when its solvency is low. 
The current deposit insurance scheme in the UK came into effect on 1 December 2001, 
with the establishment of the Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS). Hall, 
(2002), notes that the FSCS acts if an authorized institution is unable to repay its 
depositors or is likely to be unable to do so, and goes out of business, either as a result 
of insolvency, liquidation or administration. 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision's consultative paper on capital adequacy 
in 1999 (Basel II) suggests a three pillared approach (i. e., market discipline, improved 
minimum capital standards and risk-based supervision) to bank capital regulation. This 
means that risk management will play a crucial role in future risk-based bank regulation, 
where regulators would reward a bank if the bank' performance is good and punish 
those whose risk management is poor. In addition, banking regulations can be efficient 
only when they include closure policies (Freixas and Rochet, 1998), There, however, is 
no mention of an optimal exit policy (closure rule) supporting efficient bank regulation 
in the BIS document nor in the publications of Indonesia's bank regulators. Regulators 
must take corrective measures if a bank experiences financial difficulties. In practice, 
many countries have implemented different closure policies. There are two polar 
approaches in handling a troubled bank, i. e., the early closure approach, and the late 
closure approach. Under the early closure approach, the regulator takes actions to 
generate the fairly-priced deposit insurance premium and the optimal closure rules for 
the troubled banks (Acharya and Dreyfus, 1989). In contrast, under the late closure 
approach, involving the well-known regulatory forbearance, corrective measures are 
taken by regulators because there exist significant bankruptcy costs so that bailouts may 
actually reduce the regulators' liability in the form of the value of the authorities' deposit 
guarantee liability. 
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Empirical evidence suggests that, in the USA under the 1991 FDIC Improvement Act 
(FDICIA), the FDIC normally assumes a fixed interval (e. g. annually) between bank 
audits and forces a reorganization if it finds insolvency or negative net worth; it will also 
shut a bank down if a bank's net worth is below a threshold point, as stipulated in the 
guidelines for "prompt corrective actions". Otherwise, it lets them continue to operate. 
Academics supporting such practice include Pennachi (1987b). He also suggests using 
audit-based deposit insurance, which relies on an assumption that the authorities 
periodically audit banks and conduct reorganizations if the banks' net assets are found 
negative. There are some drawbacks to such a system, however. First, a flat premium 
rate system results in cross subsidies from the safer banks to the riskier ones (Benston 
and Kaufman, 1997). This, however, has now been abolished and was replaced by a risk 
based insurance system - see Appendix 6.1. Second, the use of capital ratios in 
controlling bank failures are questioned and there is also the problem of the `book' 
rather than the economic value of capital being used. Early studies by some authors, 
such as Kahane (1977), Koehn and Santomero (1980), Kim and Santomero (1988), and 
Dewatripont and Tirole (1999) found that higher compulsory capital ratios imposed by 
the regulators increase risk-taking by banks (the FDIC Act itself requires that risk-taking 
can take place only in well-capitalized banks). In contrast, Furlong and Keeley (1989), 
and Gennottee and Pyle (1991) took the opposite view. In between those two schools 
is the finding of Calem and Rob (1999), which is that well-capitalized banks tend to 
assume more risk than the moderately well-capitalized banks. Third, the value of deposit 
guarantees depends crucially on the period between bank audits. The frequency of 
audits empirically is unobservable even if the authorities can monitor more or less on a 
continuous basis; as a result, the value of the deposit guarantee is very sensitive to the 
parameter of audit frequency. 
In view of this, Fries, Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997) (FMP) developed the Dynamic 
Contingent Claims Model to study the optimality of different closure policies as policy 
parameters and their impacts on deposit insurance, in particular on deposit insurance 
premiums and subsidies. The model is based on a cash flow approach and does not rely 
on audit frequency. This thesis adopts the FMP model and the analysis is conducted 
using the concept of a "robust regulatory regime", as suggested by Llewellyn (1999c). It 
also links with the banks' state of risk management 
6 
It involves a study of a series of different possible closure rules and subsidy policies 
through the interaction of (i) regulators' attempts to minimize discounted, expected 
bankruptcy costs, and (ii) equity-holders' incentives to recapitalise banks. It considers 
subsidy policies for distressed banks that implement socially-optimal closures rules at 
minimum financial cost to the regulators and which reduce moral hazard. It covers two 
types of model: (i) the endogenous closure rule models, and (ii) the endogenous bail out 
models. 
Theoretical analysis of risk management and the FMP model are presented, followed by 
two empirical surveys, namely analysis of the implementation of risk management in 
Indonesian banking and of the financial reorganization of Indonesia banks. Accordingly, 
parametric and non-parametric statistical techniques and econometric techniques are 
used (e. g. significance testing, maximum likelihood estimates, and VAR, ECM and 
GARCH methods). I analysed the empirical surveys with the help of the SPSSII and 
Eviews 4 software packages and the related commands are presented. 
On the other hand, the massive losses incurred in banking systems around the world, in 
particular in the Indonesian banking industry, have highlighted the need for bank 
regulators to establish optimal bank reorganization policies within a robust regulatory 
regime in order to support a robust and stable financial system. 
The problem is how, when and using what criteria should the regulatory bodies 
intervene? What are the socially acceptable practices and optimal closure policies? If a 
deposit insurance scheme is used, what is a fair deposit premium? If a government 
ought to subsidize ailing banks, what is the optimal subsidy that avoids the moral hazard 
problem? For countries without such an insurance scheme, such as Indonesia, can an 
optimal corrective action policy/or bank reorganisation fill the gap? 
Holliwell (1998) states that risk is the "lifeblood of business and the test of 
entrepreneurs and managers". Like any firm, banks are subject to various risks, but the 
consequences of the risks are much more dramatic for banks than for the other sectors 
of economy. This has led bank regulators in many countries to put into effect complex 
regulatory systems. Accordingly, the management of risks can be seen as the major 
activity of banks. Authors, however, propose diverse classifications of banks' risks 
according to their analytical purposes. As a result, bank risk should be classified into 
7 
some general categories to provide a context for establishing the scope of a firm's risk 
management function. In addition, the principles of sound risk measurement and the 
use of internal models should be reviewed, as suggested by the BIS (1999). 
This research sheds important light on the role to be played by risk management. In 
theory and practice risk management has developed dramatically in many countries in 
the last 20 years because of the volatile economic environment, I. T. Developments, the 
growth in banks' trading activities, developments in derivatives and recent banking 
distress. If we focus on the risk management disasters discussed above, there are some 
lessons that can also be drawn. Bank management and bank regulators should be aware 
of them. Bank management is searching to achieve its objective of maximizing 
shareholders wealth (Naik, 1998; Koch and MacDonald, 2000), which is interpreted as 
trying to maximize the market value of a firm's common stock. Bank managers should 
evaluate the present value of cash-flow returns under uncertainty with an evaluation on 
a risk-adjusted basis. 
Risk management is a process to identify, measure and control various risks. Santomero 
(1998) argues that risk management is optimal when it allows the business to obtain the 
highest expected shareholders' value. Risk management, however, should be viewed 
from both a business unit level and a firm business level using an integrated Value at 
Risk (VaR) measure. Modem risk management approaches should be complementary 
and not a substitute for the traditional ones. Various bodies have produced guidelines 
for banks on how to implement more sophisticated risk management models and 
provide sound risk management systems. 
Past studies on the integration of risk management systems focus on the integration of 
risk measurement of market risk and credit risk. Typically, a fragmented approach is still 
adopted by most banks since the risk management process is not undertaken on an 
integrated basis. It is important to note that firm wide risk management can ensure the 
integration of risk management for risk factors (i. e. market risk, credit risk, operational 
risk, legal risk, and operational risk) across business lines, as suggested by Crouchy, 
Galai and Mark (2001). Venkat (2000), however, suggests a more comprehensive and 
more integral framework, the so-called Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) approach. 
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This study adopts the ERM approach to analyse the state of Indonesian banks' risk 
management. 
To my best knowledge, this is the first study to explore the optimal bank reorganization 
policy and the state of risk management of the Indonesian banking industry. 
1.2. The Aims and Objectives of the Research 
The aims and objectives of this research are as follows: 
1. To develop an understanding of bank regulation, bank risk, risk management, and the 
resolution of financially-ailing banks (in particular, optimal financial reorganisations) 
from the literature. 
2. To identify elements and instruments of a bank regulatory framework 
3. To identify and propose an ERM framework for banks. 
4. To analyse and develop the use of FMP model to design optimal resolution policies 
for financially-ailing banks in Indonesia. This involves studying optimal closure 
policies, the design of a deposit insurance scheme (in particular, derivation of a fair 
deposit premium), and derivation of the optimal subsidy that avoids the moral hazard 
problem. 
5. To investigate the state of Enterprise Risk Management (ERM), an important 
component of an optimal regulatory regime, in the Indonesian banking industry, by 
applying qualitative and quantitative evaluation measures with the help of the SPSS 11 
software package. A survey is used to investigate the effectiveness of ERM as a tool 
of bank management and to identify standards ("best practices") in risk management 
in banks and groups of banks operating in Indonesia 
6. To implement the optimal bank reorganization (FMP) model empirically using 
Indonesian bank data, involving the calculation of the banks' equity values, the 
government's liabilities, the fair insurance premium, the optimal closure rules and 
subsidies, and the banks' imminence of bankruptcy. 
7. To study empirically the relationships between the state of risk management and 
optimal bank reorganization in Indonesia. 
8. To provide key policy advice to Bank Indonesia drawn from the empirical surveys of 
both the bank reorganizations and the state of risk management. 
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The main purpose of this research is to provide policy advice on how to achieve optimal 
bank regulation and an efficient banking industry in Indonesia. Accordingly, a robust 
risk management framework and optimal reorganization policies are identified and the 
relationship between the two is analysed. 
1.3 Research Approach 
To achieve the research objectives, the following research tasks were carried our. 
1. A comprehensive literature survey was undertaken to: 
" Develop an understanding of bank regulation, the structure of bank risk, enterprise 
risk management, and the optimal resolution of financially-ailing banks. 
" Highlight the elements of an enterprise risk management framework. 
" Analyse and identify rules for optimal bank reorganizations. 
2. An empirical study of the state of Indonesian banks' risk management was 
undertaken using a postal questionnaire and interviews at selected banks and Bank 
Indonesia. Relatively-large Indonesian banks were targeted. The questionnaire was 
designed to elicit the current state of the art of the Indonesian banks' risk 
management and their operational preferences. The study included a pilot survey of 
two Indonesian banks operating in London to get feedback concerning the design of 
the questionnaire. 
3. An empirical study of bank reorganizations was undertaken using Indonesian bank 
data. It utilized a number of econometric techniques, namely maximum likelihood 
estimates, VAR, ECM, and GARCH to estimate the FMP model with the help of the 
Eviews 4 software package, involving an analysis of the banks' equity values, the 
government's liabilities, the fair deposit insurance premium, the optimal closure rules 
and subsidies, and the banks' imminence of bankruptcy. 
4. A study of the relationship between the state of risk management and optimal bank 
reorganization in Indonesia was undertaken using the dummy variable technique. 
1.4 Achievements of the Research 
The research set out to investigate the structure of bank risk in Indonesia, the nature of 
an enterprise risk management framework, the state of Indonesia banks' enterprise risk 
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management, the nature of optimal bank reorganization, and the relationship between 
enterprise risk management and bank reorganization. The main achievements of the 
research are summarized as follows: 
1. The structure of bank risk in Indonesia, the state of risk management, and the policies 
used to resolve financially-ailing banks in Indonesia were all identified. 
2. The key elements and instruments of an optimal bank regulatory framework were 
identified 
3. An ERM framework (and its elements) for banks was identified. 
4. Using the FMP model, optimal closure policies, the fair deposit insurance premium 
and the optimal subsidy that avoids the moral hazard problem, were all derived. 
5. The relationship between the state of (credit) risk management and optimal bank 
reorganization in Indonesia was identified. 
6. Key policy implications, drawn from the empirical surveys of both the bank 
reorganizations and the state of risk management, were presented 
1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis comprises four parts, which are divided into seven chapters. A structure of 
the thesis, as a guide to the research undertaken, is depicted in Figure 1.1. A brief 
summary of each chapter is provided below: 
Part 1 Introduction 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
This chapter explains the background to the research, and the aims and objectives of the 
research. It also sets out the research approach adopted and the work undertaken. The 
main achievements of the research and the structure of the thesis are also presented. 
11 
Part II Literature Review and Current Practices of Enterprise Risk Management 
(ERM) and Evaluation of ERM in Indonesia. 
Chapter 2 Bank Regulation 
This chapter reviews the rationale for financial regulation, possible safety net 
arrangements, bank activities and bank regulation. It also analyses regulatory 
instruments with a focus on approaches adopted towards solvency regulation (in 
relation to market risk and credit risk), and deposit insurance systems. A discussion of 
bank resolution techniques is also provided, leading to consideration of the FMP model, 
which is analysed in detail in Chapter 5. 
Chapter 3 Enterprise Risk Management 
This chapter reviews the relevant literature describing the types of bank risks that can 
arise, the possible classification of such risks, the principles of risk measurement, and 
the implications of risk management for both bank regulation and bank management. 
This chapter also reviews the background factors affecting the development of risk 
management, the rationale for risk management, and the approaches that can be taken 
to risk management. Risk management guidelines issued by domestic and international 
bodies are also discussed. An integrated risk management framework is derived from 
the modem theories of risk management and performance measurement. It describes a 
proposal for an ERM framework to be embraced by bank management and bank 
regulators, reviews the theories underlying the ERM approach, and analyses the 
elements of an ERM, and how they interact. 
Chapter 4 Evaluation of ERM in Indonesia 
This chapter discusses the survey carried out, outlining the objectives, model 
specifications, and empirical methodology including the sampling, data collection 
methods, questionnaire design, data preparation and data analysis techniques used. It 
provides findings on the current state of risk management in the Indonesian banking 
industry. It presents analysis of the responses received with the help of the "SPSS 11" 
software package. It also highlights efforts that can be undertaken to promote a more 
effective risk management system in Indonesian banking. It also discuses the statistical 
techniques used to analyse the questionnaire responses. In addition, it describes the 
problems that can arise in implementing risk management, the shortcomings of the 
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current methodology used to analyse risk, and the elements of risk management that are 
missing in the current procedures. Key policy implications drawn from the empirical 
survey of the state of risk management in Indonesian banking are presented 
Part III Literature Review of Optimal Bank Reorganization and Empirical Study 
of Optimal Bank Reorganization in Indonesia 
Chapter 5 Optimal Bank Corrective Action: the dynamic contingent claims 
model under a robust regulatory regime 
This chapter reviews the need for government intervention, the approaches adopted 
toward resolution of ailing banks around the world, and the past studies of closure 
models. The FMP model, including its assumptions and derivations, is explained in 
detail. It also demonstrates how a dummy variable model can be used to estimate the 
shifting in a determinant factor of the FMP model caused by the introduction of credit 
risk management. 
Chapter 6 Empirical Study of Financial Reorganization of Indonesian Banks 
This chapter presents the results of an adaptation of FMP's optimal bank reorganization 
model using Indonesian bank data. It also describes the empirical methodology adopted, 
and the data and estimation techniques used. In addition, it describes the econometric 
techniques used to estimate the FMP model with the help of the "Eviews 4" software 
package. The banks' equity values, the government's liabilities, the fair deposit insurance 
premium, the optimal closure points and subsidies, and the banks' imminence of 
bankruptcy, are all identified. The relationship between the state of risk management 
and optimal bank reorganization in Indonesia is also analysed. It also outlines the key 
policy implications to be drawn from the empirical survey of the optimal financial 
reorganization policies. 
Part IV Conclusions 
Chapter 7 Strategic Conclusions of the Research 
This chapter discusses the research findings, conclusions and limitations of the research, 
and makes recommendations for further research in this area. 
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Figure 1.1 Guide to the Research 
Part I: 
Introduction 
Introduction (Chapter 1) 
This chapter gives the 
background to the research, its 
hypotheses, aims and objectives 
and the research approach. It 
also presents the achievements 
of the research 
Bank Regulation (Chapter 2) 
This chapter investigates the rationale for bank regulation, 
the incentive theory of bank regulation, the elements of a 
bank regulatory regime and bank reorganizations induced 
through the use of capital thresholds. 
Part II: 
Literature 
Review & 
Current 
Practices 
Optimal Bank Reorganization 
(Chapter 5) 
This chapter discusses the development 
of bank reorganization models. 
Formulation of 
research objectives 
/hypotheses 
Part III: 
Explorato- 
ry work 
Evaluation of ERM in Indonesia 
(Chapter 4) 
This chapter presents the results of a 
survey of a sample of banks using the 
ERM framework to investigate its state 
and weaknesses. The results of this survey 
are also linked to bank reorganization. 
Part IV: 
Conclusions 
Enterprise Risk Management (Chapter 3) 
This chapter explores the rationale for risk management and identifies 
different risk management frameworks. This chapter also examines different 
definitions of risk and identifies the types of risks that are relevant to the 
banking industry. The structure of risks and risk measurement techniques 
suggested by many academics are also reviewed Risk management functions 
in bank organizations and what constitutes a robust risk management 
framework are discussed. The elements/characteristics of robust risk 
management are derived and summarised in a strategic risk management 
framework. Finally, this chapter defines the ERM framework and reviews its 
existing application in financial institutions and Bank Indonesia's regulation 
Evaluation of Bank Reorganization 
in Indonesia (Chapter 6) 
This chapter presents the results of an 
empirical study of financial reorganiza- 
tion of Indonesian banks and the policy 
implications for bank management and 
Indonesian bank regulation 
Conclusions (Chapter 7) 
This chapter consists of two parts: (1)Conclusions and 
limitations of the research ; and (2) Recommendations for 
further research 
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CHAPTER TWO 
FINANCIAL REGULATION 
2.1 Introduction 
Financial institutions play a vital role in every economy, as intermediary agents between 
surplus spending units and deficit spending units, interacting closely in the 
financial 
market, conducting payment systems, and affecting the quantity of money and 
economic growth (Dewatripont and Tirole, 1999). Increased roles 
for financial 
regulation have occurred because of changes in the environment of the financial market 
place, the rapid development of information technology, financial globalisation, financial 
instrument innovation, mushroomed financial conglomerates, the development of 
management techniques, financial competition and the more complex focuses of 
financial regulation required to accommodate modem social needs (Greenspan, 1996; 
Kelley, 1996; and Dewatripont and Tirole, 1999). 
In contrast, the costly and large scale banking sector problems in many countries during 
the last fifteen years have shown that their financial systems have been fragile. An 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) report (Lindgren et. al, 1996), reveals most member 
countries have experienced significant banking sector problems at some stages. The 
outcome of such problems has been the worst since the Great Depression of the 1930s 
as noted by Goodhart et. al. (1999), Uewellyn (1999a) and Kaufman (1996) '. 
Demirguc, Kunt and Detragiache (1998) found that banking crises emerge when the 
macroeconomic environment is weak, and that indicators of financial liberalization are 
positively and significantly related to the probability of banking crises occurring. 
Llewellyn (1997) states that sound economic development requires two factors: an 
efficient financial system and a stable, robust financial system. An efficient financial 
system requires substantial liberalization, that is, a general policy that increases the 
market's role and allows for autonomous financial institution decision-making. A robust 
financial system requires additional properties, such as proper decision-making and 
control within financial institutions with effective risk analysis, management and 
1 For example, for the four countries worst affected by the 1997/1998 East Asian Crisis (Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand), the cost of bank recapitalization have been estimated at between 19% and 30% of GDP respectively (World Bank, 1999). 
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control systems, an efficient regulatory and supervisory regime for financial institutions, 
and a sound incentive structure for all parties in the financial system. There is also 
widespread evidence that the development of financial markets and institutions plays a 
crucial role in economic growth and development (Levine, 1997). King and Levine 
(1993) found that finance seems importantly to lead to economic growth. However, 
Arestis and Demetriades (1997) provide evidence that the causal link between finance 
and growth is determined by the nature of the operations of the financial institutions 
and policies in each country. 
Financial crises throughout the world indicate very powerfully two common 
characteristics, weak internal risk analysis, management and control systems, and weak 
(or even perverse) incentives within the financial system generally and financial 
institutions in particular. Almost always and everywhere banking crises are a complex 
interactive mix of economic, financial and structural weaknesses (Llewellyn, 1999a). 
Williamson and Maher (1998) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998) found an empirical 
link between financial liberalisation and financial crises. They show that almost all of 
their sample of 34 economies that undertook financial liberalisation between the 
beginning of the 1980's and mid 1997 subsequently experienced some form of systemic 
financial crisis. These findings would appear to be valid for Indonesia, as a financial 
liberalisation was launched with a packet of deregulation measures in October 1988 
(Bank Indonesia, 1988) and it started suffering a financial crisis in mid-1997. 
In this chapter, an introduction to the chapter is first provided. The rationale for 
financial regulation is discussed in the next section. Safety net arrangements are 
presented in Section 2.3. Bank activities and regulations are described in Section 2.4. 
Bank regulations and regulation instruments are presented in Sections 2.5 and 2.6 
respectively. Whilst, due to the crucial roles of banks' capital, Sections 2.6 through 
Section 2.10 describe possible approaches to solvency regulation, risk-based solvency 
regulation, the new capital adequacy proposal, and the pre-commitment approach. 
Internal credit and market risk models and their implications for capital regulation are 
analysed in Sections 2.11 and 2.12. Deposit insurance schemes are discussed in Section 
2.13. Resolution of bank failures as a form of financial regulation is outlined in Section 
2.14. The chapter ends with conclusions. 
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2.2 The Rationale for Financial Regulation. 
There has been a widespread rethinking of financial regulation and supervision. Many 
"free banking" economists, such as Dowd (1996a, b) and Benston and Kaufman (1996), 
argue that these crises and problems are due to the effect of regulatory efforts. In 
contrast, Freixas and Rochet (1999) argue that advocates of free banking prefer an 
imperfectly competitive market to an imperfectly regulated banking sector. Coase (1988) 
emphasizes that a free market requires a considerable internal infrastructure and self- 
regulation to function efficiently with minimal transaction costs. We do not rely solely 
on private self-regulation, reinforced by common, commercial and contract law because 
public pressure may not allow that to happen (Dewatripont and Tirole, 1999). 
There are three main reasons for public sector regulation (Goodhart et. al., 1999), and 
another reason suggested by others. First, there is a need to protect the customers 
against monopolistic exploitation. Second, there is a need to provide smaller, retail (or 
less informed) clients with protection. Third, there is a need to ensure systemic stability. 
Systemic regulation is necessary when the social costs of a financial firm failure exceed 
the private costs, and such potential social costs are not incorporated in the decision 
making of the firm. The regulators' concern is systemic risk, that is the risk that the 
failure of one or more troubled financial institutions could trigger a contagious collapse 
of otherwise healthy firms [the well-known "domino effect"](Dale and Wolfe, 1998). 
Systemic risk threatens the payment system, and bills taxpayers for any cost resulting 
from the losses arising from the safety net arrangements (Kelley, 1996). Fourth, there is 
another reason for financial regulation as, argued by Kelley (1996) and Kane (1996); that 
is to promote an efficient and effective banking system that finances economic growth. 
According to Llewellyn (1997), regulators should recognize four general properties 
before setting the economic rationale for regulation in financial services. Firstly, there 
are distinctions between regulation, monitoring (observing whether the rules are 
obeyed), and supervision. Secondly, regulators supply regulatory, monitoring and 
supervisory services to various stakeholders that might have different demands. Thirdly, 
regulation imposes a range of costs, and regulators are risk averse. Regulators should 
avoid the misperception that regulation is costless. Fourthly, regulators may change the 
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behaviour of regulated firms by imposing external rules or through creating incentives 
for firms to behave in a particular way. The regulated institutions should behave in a 
way which is consistent with the representation theorem, systemic stability and social 
objectives, which create a "contract" between the regulators and regulated firms'. He 
suggests there are seven components of the economic rationale for regulation and 
supervision in banking and financial services: (1) the systemic risk of bank runs might 
trigger a contagion effect that creates bank panics; (2) regulations are needed to 
counteract market imperfection and failures; (3) depositors are unable to monitor the 
financial firms and or the cost and volume of monitoring activity is prohibitive (i. e., not 
in economies of scale); (4) consumers need confidence in the financial institutions with 
which they deposit; (5) there is the potential for gridlock for two reasons; adverse 
selection problems and moral hazard problems; (6) safety net arrangements in the form 
a lender of last resort, or a deposit insurance system compensation scheme can create 
moral hazard problems for both consumers and banks; (7) consumer demand for lower 
transaction costs requires regulation. 
Goodhart etal. (1999) and Llewellyn (1999b) suggest two types of financial regulation: 
(i) prudential and systemic regulation; and (u) conduct of business regulation. Prudential 
regulation is slightly different from systemic regulation. Systemic regulation is created 
when the social costs of the failure of a firm exceed the private costs. This is the "safety 
and soundness" of financial institutions objective, for purely systemic reasons. 
Prudential regulation is about the safety and soundness of financial institutions for 
consumer benefits, because a bank failure may result in consumer losses. Conduct of 
business regulation is associated with financial firms' behaviour in dealing with their 
customers. 
The root theory of the traditional public benefit justification for government 
intervention into financial institutions is the theoretical welfare economics of A. C. Pigou 
(1932) and Paul Samuelson (1947), as noted by Kane (1996a). There are two approaches 
to regulation (Freixas and Rochet, 1999), the regulation design approach and the 
regulation analysis approach. The objective of design approach is to design bank 
regulation policy that prevents excessive risk-taking by banks yet avoids moral hazard, 
through the use of instruments such as cash reserve requirements and bank disclosure 
2 The representation theorem is adopted widely by, for example, Dewatripont and Tirole (1999); Fries et. al. (1997). It requires 
regulators to represent the depositors by intervening in the troubled banks when they hit certain capital thresholds. 
18 
policy (Bhattaacharya, Boot, Thakor, 1998; Dewatripont and Tirole, 1999). Banks are 
subject to moral hazard and adverse selection, which can put their depositors at risk 
(Stiglitz, 1994). The regulation analysis approach is aimed at analysing the consequences 
of a given regulation that either exists or is under study by the regulatory authorities. 
2.3 Safety Net Arrangements. 
The implications of bank failures are more serious than those of other firms, because: 
(i) their roles in the clearing and payment systems means users need assurance that they 
can provide services continuously; (ii) individual bank runs resulting from failures of 
liquidity insurance might disperse to the others (Bryant, 1980 and Diamond and Dybvig, 
1983); (iii) fractional reserve banking systems are unstable, that is the banks may be 
unable to fulfil their contractual obligations. This depends very much on the behaviour 
of depositors, which, in turn, depends on their perception about the safety of their 
banks (Von Thadden, 1995; Anderlini, 1989; and Diamonnnd and Dybvig, 1983); (iv) 
moral hazard and adverse selection issues are associated with safety net arrangements. 
Consequently, the banking system needs safety net arrangements to address the 
implications of bank failures. Forms of safety net arrangements are the lender of last 
resort, deposit insurance system and banking regulation and supervision. 
2.3.1 The Role of the Lender of Last Resort. 
The risk of contagion effects is a concern of the government because market 
mechanisms cannot insure against liquidity shocks due to market failures. Bagehot 
(1873), as noted by Freixas and Rochet (1999), was the first one to state that the Central 
Bank can prevent the risk of contagion by implementing the policy of a lender of last 
resort (LLR). The evidence of the role of the LLR for avoiding bank panics has been 
ambiguous, as noted by Miron (1986), Bordo (1990), and Eichengreen and Portes 
(1987). The lender of last resort can lessen the systemic risk by way of monitoring the 
banks' solvency and payments system (Aharony and Swary, 1983; Humprey, 1986; 
Guttentag and Herring, 1987; Herring and Vanhundre, 1987, and Saunders, 1987)'. 
3 For instance, Miron (1986) found that, in the period after the founding of the Federal Reserve in the US with its role as a lender of last resort, the frequency of bank panics tended to be less than prior to its founding (i. e. 1914). He makes a simple test by using a Bernouli distribution. He estimates that, prior to the founding of the Fed, the probability of having a panic during a 
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In implementing the role of lender of last resort a central bank should recognize certain 
principles, so-called classical school of Bagehot principles, comprising: (i) the LLR plays 
its role by lending to illiquid but solvent financial institutions; (ii) these loans must be 
subject to a penalty rate to prevent the financial institution from using the loan for other 
purpose; (iii) the loans are backed by good collateral (i. e. valued at pre-panic prices); (iv) 
the LLR must announce to financial institutions in advance that the central bank may 
lend any amount to eligible financial institutions that fulfil the solvency and collateral 
(credibility) requirements. On the other hand, Goodhart (1997) warns the classical 
school of LLR that the distinction between iliquidity and insolvency is often blurred, 
because the banks that need liquidity support from the Central Bank are close to the 
condition of insolvency. Besides, liquidity support to rescue an illiquid bank may induce 
the systemic rescue of any bank. Other opponents, Goodfriend and King (1988), also 
view that the LLR must be conducted only by the use of open market operations. 
Another issue about LLR policy is that the LLR behaviour should be clearly stated. In 
practice, the Federal Reserve System states that the liquidity support is a privilege and 
not a right. This can enhance market discipline. If the LLR behaviour is disclosed to the 
public, then it might have a destabilising effect on the payment system. The differences 
among these views can be analysed by way of, among other things are, focusing on the 
social cost of individual bank failure, bank panics, contagion effects, and the moral 
hazard issue. The moral hazard issue can induce banks and depositors to take excessive 
risks. 
2.3.2 Deposit Insurance Schemes 
Financial regulation is created to provide assurance of financial stability, to mitigate to 
bank panics, and to avoid social costs. A true risk-based scheme for deposit insurance is 
often an alternative to bank prudential regulation as a way to meet the objectives of 
regulation, but its effectiveness partly depends on political and practical issues (i. e. moral 
given year was 0.316. This implies that the probability of having no bank panic during the fourteen years 1914 -1928 was only 0.005. He rejects the hypothesis of no change in the frequency of panics at the 99 per cent level of confidence. However, the 
period 1929-1933 in the US economy shows the adverse results of the in appropriate use of the L LP- Friedman and Schwartz (1963) and Meltzer (1986) stated that the Central Bank neither conducted the open market operations necessary to provide liquidity insurance for illiquid banks nor followed the Bagehotian Principles. In the UK, before 1866, the Bank of England was 
reactive to protect its own gold reserves, which could worsen panics. After that year, by adopting Bagehot's principles, the UK was able to prevent crises in 1878,1890, and 1914 from bank panics, by timely announcements and corrective measures (Bordo, 1990). 
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hazard problems and government liability) so it should be limited (see Mingo, 1998). 
Analysis of deposit insurance schemes is presented in more detail in Section 2.13. 
2.4 Banking Activities and Regulation 
It is clear that systemic issues are central to the regulation of banks as banks are always 
threatened by a bank run, dangers that can spread to other banks causing large scale of a 
bank panic'. Moral hazard problems arise because of the safety net arrangements and 
need to be suppressed by regulators and Central Bankers by balancing banks incentive 
to measure and manage risks where every single bank has a specific structure of its 
financial conditions. In this regard, advances in risk management theory and practices 
are a challenge for regulators to improve their regulation, monitoring and supervision 
(Kelley, 1996). 
Banks, however, function in a modern economy because of four reasons (Gurley and 
Shaw, 1960; Benston and Smith, 1976; and Fama, 1980). Firstly, banks are involved in 
the transformation process of financial contracts and services in two ways, that is term 
transformation and the payments system, which leads to a lowering of costs. Secondly, a 
bank is regarded as a pool of liquidity that provides depositors with a liquidity insurance 
against idiosyncratic shock and the customers' needs can be satisfied by the banks. This 
is the basis of a fractional reserve system in which some portion of deposits can be used 
to finance profitable but illiquid investments that contain a source of fragility when 
depositors withdraw their deposits for reasons other than liquidity needs (Bryant, 1980; 
Diamond and Dybvig 1983). Thirdly, a bank functions as a delegated monitor for 
depositors. The basis of delegated monitoring is asymmetric information and the moral 
hazard problem as introduced firstly by Diamond (1984). Fourthly, a bank functions as 
an information-sharing coalition. Leland and Pyle (1977) argue that borrowers can 
obtain benefits (i. e. better financing conditions) when they form a coalition, provided 
they are able to communicate truthfully the quality of their projects within the coalition. 
4 In theory, bank runs are distinguished from bank panics. Bank runs happen when depositors observe large withdrawals from 
their banks, they fear bankruptcy and respond by withdrawing their own deposits. The excessive withdrawals can generate an 
externality for the bank suffering; the liquidity shortage, since they imply an increase in the bank's probability of failure. But they can also generate an externality for the whole banking system if the agents view the failure as a symptom of difficulties 
occurring throughout the industry. Bank runs affect an individual bank, and bank panics affect the whole banking industry. S Goodhart etal. (1999) quote Governor Kelley of the Federal Reserve Board: "It is probably fair to say that there is 
considerable agreement among Central Bankers and other economic policy makers that (bank's) unique balance sheet structure 
creates inherent potential instability in the banking system. Rumours concerning an individual bank's financial condition (can spread) if the distressed institution is large or prominent. the panic can spread to other banks, with potentially debilitating consequences for the economy as a whole". 
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On the other hand, regulators and supervisors face problems in achieving the objectives 
of regulation for three reasons: (i) the players of the banking system (i. e. regulators, 
financial intermediaries, borrowers, and depositors) are always faced with asymmetric 
information problems. Free-riding depositors need to be represented by external bodies 
i. e. regulators". The true condition of the banks is difficult to ascertain because of 
accounting lags; (ii) difficulties in ensuring that banks meet the set regulations. Not only 
regulators but also the market can monitor the compliance level of banks; (iii) the nature 
of finance is necessarily risky. Risk management and measurement have evolved 
significantly since the Basel Accord (Basel I) was adopted in 1988', as noted by Basel II 
(1999). Risk (2003) notes that Basel II proposes a three-pillar approach to bank 
regulation, namely improved minimal capital requirements, market discipline, and 
supervisory review. Three distinct methods for the calculation of minimal capital were 
proposed. A standardised approach geared towards smaller banks was proposed. 
Exposures to different counterparties would be quantified in terms of risk weights based 
on assessments by external rating agencies, which are more sensitive to risks than in 
previous risk-bucketing plans. For more sophisticated banks, two internal rating-based 
approaches to credit risk have been devised - the foundation and advanced - that allow 
greater use of a bank's own internal credit risk models. The Basel Committee intended 
to tailor regulations so that banks are encouraged to migrate towards the more 
sophisticated approaches, and these new approaches allow bank regulatory capital to 
follow more closely economic capital calculated using the banks' internal models. The 
final Accord should be released by mid-2004. However, the first result of the 
development in bank regulation was the role of market discipline, where bank regulators 
and banks should focus on the implementation of integrated or enterprise risk 
management (Risk, 2003). There, however, is no guarantee that all risks can be removed 
by the regulators. Therefore, banks have responsibility to identify, measure and control 
the risks using the enterprise risk management framework. Fifthly, banks function in 
managing risks. Regulators, on behalf of depositors, limit the idiosyncratic shocks to 
reduce the probability of macroeconomic shocks that can threaten the payment systems 
and bill taxpayers with substantial amounts of losses arising from the safety net 
arrangements (Kelley, 1996; Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Bhattachrya and Gale, 1987). 
6 The free-riding problem and asymmetric information associated with regulation lead to the 
representation hypothesis. The representation hypothesis is an idea of banking regulation, which is 
explored in depth by Dewatripont and Tirole (1999). 
7 For further analysis see a comprehensive discussion provided by Hall (1989). 
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2.5 Bank Regulation 
The policy justification for banking regulation principally encompasses three main 
principles: (i) to ensure the safety and soundness of banks in order to prevent systemic 
risk, and to maintain payment systems. Merton (1979) and Edwards and Scott (1977) 
note the soundness of individual banks provides assurance to depositors and borrowers 
that promotes the public welfare; (ii) to promote an efficient and effective banking 
system that finances economic growth, (iii) to protect small depositors who do not have 
incentives to or lack experience in monitoring banks. As a result, depositors need a 
regulator to represent their interest as financial institutions play a major role in capital 
formation and distributions. Vojta (1973) however noted that their performance, 
operations and decision-making have been seriously distorted by arbitrary regulations. 
Regulators, however, should bear in mind two factors: (i) that banking regulations 
appear to involve diverse issues and cover heterogeneous firms so that no one model 
can suit all circumstances; (ii) the banking regulation is viewed being fully evolved, 
although many issues remain unsolved (Bhattachrya, Boot, Thakor, 1995). One of the 
evolutionary factors affecting banking regulation has been the evolution of risk 
measurement and the management approach, in particular since the Basle Accord was 
adopted in 1988 (McDonough, 1998). 
According to Llewellyn (1999c), external regulation is only one of seven components of 
a "regulatory regime" necessary to create a safe and sound banking system. The 
regulatory 
regime should comprise seven components: (1) the rules established by regulatory 
agencies (the regulation component); (2) monitoring and supervision by regulatory 
agencies; (3) the incentive structures faced by regulatory agencies, consumers and, 
most especially, regulated firms; (4) the role of market discipline and monitoring; (5) 
intervention arrangements in the event of compliance failures of one sort or another, 
(6) the role of corporate governance in financial firms, and (7) the disciplining and 
accountability arrangements applied to regulatory agencies. He, furthermore, provides 
a more detailed analysis of the components, which can be summarized in 25 principles, 
as illustrated in Table 2.1. 
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The seven components of the regulatory regime should be combined in to create an 
optimum overall regulatory strategy and all components are necessary; none is sufficient. 
Should regulatory agencies emphasize only one component, it may weaken one or more 
of the other components that may reduce the overall impact. The key factor to 
optimising the effectiveness of a regulatory regime is the portfolio mix of the seven core 
components, and the optimum combination of the components would change over 
time. 
2.6 Regulation Instruments 
The safety and soundness instruments of bank regulations comprise five broad types: (i) 
deposit interest rates ceilings; (ii) restrictions, such as entry/exit policy, branching, 
network restriction, narrow banking, merger restrictions and portfolio restrictions; (iii) 
risk-based capital requirements (iv) a deposit insurance system; and (v) regulatory 
monitoring, including closure policies and accounting policies (Freixas and Rochet, 
1999; Battacharya, Boot, Takhor, 1998; Dewatripont and Tirole, 1999). 
2.6.1 Deposit Rate Regulations 
The objective of this regulation is to maintain a certain level of profit for banks. This 
regulation is based on the premise that a decreasing cost of resources for a bank will 
lead to a decrease in the loan rates. The impact on loan rates of imposing a maximum 
deposit rate is determined by the properties of the cost function of the banks. If this 
cost function is separable between deposits and loans, the pricing of loans is 
independent of the deposit rates (Chiappari, Perez-Castillo, and Verdier, 1995). In this 
case, the regulation is effective when it leads to decreasing credit rates. The problem 
with this regulation is, it is sometimes not consistent with the monetary policy, 
moreover it is making uncompetitive and misallocates resources. The USA and many 
European Countries (excluding German and France) have abolished this regulation in 
the last 15 years. 
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Table 2.1 The Principles of a Regulatory Regime 
I. Regulation 
1. The objectives of regulation need to be clearly defined and circumscribed. 
2. The rationale and motivation of regulation and supervision should be limited. 
3. Regulation should be viewed in terms of a set of contracts. 
4. The form and intensity of regulatory and supervisory requirements should differentiate between 
regulated institutions according to their relative portfolio risk and efficiency of internal control 
mechanism. 
5. In some areas the regulators could offer a menu of contracts to regulated firms requiring them 
to self-select into the correct category. 
6. Capital regulation should create incentives for the correct pricing of absolute and relative risk. 
II. Incentive Structures 
7. There should be appropriate incentives for bank owners. 
8. There should be appropriate internal incentives for management. 
III. Monitoring and Supervision 
9. Official agencies need to have sufficient powers and independence to conduct effective 
monitoring and supervision. 
10. Less emphasis should be placed on detailed and prescriptive rules and more on internal risk 
analysis, management and control systems 
IV. Intervention 
11. The design and application of safety-net arrangements (lender-of-last-resort and deposit 
insurance) should create incentives for stakeholders to exercise oversight and to act prudently so 
as to reduce the probability of recourse being made to public funds. 
12. The extent and coverage of deposit insurance schemes should be strictly limited 
13. There needs to be a well-defined strategy for responding to the possible insolvency of financial 
institutions. 
14. There should be a dear bias (through not a bar) against forbearance when a bank is in difficulty. 
15. Tune-inconsistency and credibility problems should be addressed through pre-commitments and 
graduated with the possibility of over-rides. 
16. Intervention authorities need to ensure that parties that have benefited from risk-taking bear a 
large proportion of the cost of restructuring the banking system. 
17. Prompt corrective action should be taken to prevent problem institutions extending credit to 
high risk borrowers, or capitalizing unpaid interest on delinquent loans into new credit. 
18. Society must create the political will to make restructuring a priority in allocating public funds 
while avoiding sharp increases in inflation. Use of public funds in rescue operations should be 
kept to a minimum and, whenever used, be subject to strict conditionally. 
19. Barriers to market re-capitalization should be minimized. 
20. Regulators should be publicly accountable through credible mechanisms. 
V. Market Discipline. 
21. Regulation should not impede competition but should enhance it and, by addressing information 
asymmetries, make it more effective in the market place. 
22. Regulation should reinforce, not replace, market discipline, and the regulatory regime should be 
structured so as to provide greater incentives than exist at present for the market to monitor 
banks. 
23. Whenever possible, regulators should utilise market data in their supervisory procedures. 
24. There should be a significant role for rating agencies in the supervisory process. 
VI. Corporate Governance 
25. Corporate governance arrangements should provide for effective monitoring and supervision of 
the risk-taking profile of banks. 
Source: Uewellyn, 1999c. 
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2.6.2 Entry, Branching, Network, and Merger Restrictions 
No single model for these restrictions fits all economies. In a free competition model 
(no entry and no exit regulation), the absence of these restrictions leads to too many 
banks (Freixas and Rochet, 1999). Regulators, therefore, can intervene in the market by 
imposing an entry barrier. The optimal number of banks can be obtained by 
minimizing the sum of set up costs and transaction costs. In a differentiated product 
model, the result is too few banks at equilibrium (Salop, 1979). 
Bank network compatibility will maximize consumer' welfare because the compatibility 
has no physical costs but benefits them. Switching costs for consumers may induce 
banks not to become compatible. Cerasi (1995) develops a model of branching 
regulations based on a specification of depositors' behaviour inspired by Shaked and 
Sutton's (1982) model of market structure with multi product firms. The model shows 
that the market size may increase if the number of branches increases. The demand for 
deposits services will rise if the number of branches is increased. On the other side, 
Besanko & Thakor (1992) show that the increase in the number of banks may increase 
the deposit rates and decrease the loan rates, and decrease also the equity to debt ratio. 
2.6.3 Portfolio restrictions and narrow banking 
One form of portfolio restriction is the activities limitation imposed on the surge of 
activities undertaken by commercial banks and investment banks. In the USA, according 
to the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, the commercial banks were not allowed to hold 
corporate equity and only the investment banks were allowed to carry out such activities 
and underwrite securities. This restriction was repealed in 1999 and replaced by the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA). This means that, like many European countries, the 
USA has now adopted the universal banking system ° (Smalhout, 1999). 
A second form of restriction is narrow banking. With regard to the fractional reserve 
banking system, this helps to explain the characteristic of banks. A bank's source of 
funds is short term liabilities, low risk and divisible, and the bank's use of funds is long 
8 
. Principally, it allows banks to conduct securities and insurance business under the umbrella known as the Financial Holding Company (FHC). FHC is a new entity that fulfils certain requirements and is established, within which any number of firms 
may engage in all of the permitted financial activities (Financial Regulation Report, 1999) 
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term assets, risky, and indivisible. When the fractional reserve system is stable, the bank 
will be able to fulfil its contractual obligations. Under narrow banking proposals, insured 
deposits can only be invested on short term, riskless securities, such as Treasury Bills. 
2.6.4 Capital Requirements 
In accounting, capital or net worth is defined as the net value of the cumulative value of 
assets minus the cumulative value of liabilities and represents the ownership interest in a 
firm9. In banking, the regulatory concept of bank capital is different from accounting 
capital. This is mainly caused by the difficulty in monitoring a bank's solvency ratio 
through its balance sheet and income statement, since they may create distorted pictures 
due to accounting lags. The regulators have included certain types of debt and loss 
reserves in regulatory capital (Kane, 1996; Koch and MacDonald, 2000). The regulators 
try to estimate the market value of banks' equity when they measure banks' financial 
performance and risk. 
In finance theory, Modigliani and Miller (1958) argue that, in a perfect capital market, 
the market is frictionless in the sense that all securities are infinitely divisible, 
information is costless and available to everybody, and there is no transaction cost or 
tax; the market value of any firm is unaffected by its capital structure as a result of 
financing decision, such as operating and financing activities that are separable. 
Moreover, the risk implied by the operating decision is not affected by the way it is 
financed. The traditional corporate finance view is that capital reduces firm failures by 
providing protection against operating and extraordinary losses. This is less applicable 
for commercial banks because the corporate firms that rely on long-term debt with 
relatively low financial leverage are different from the banks (Koch and MacDonald, 
2000). 
Bank capital acts as a cushion against losses and provides an incentive for bank owners 
and claimholders to restrain excessive risk taking by intervening the bank management 
(Goldstein, 1997; Freixas and Rochet, 1999; and Dewatripont and Tirole, 1999). Capital 
in banking, therefore, functions to reduce bank risk. Koch and McDonald (2000) 
provide three basic ways through which a bank can reduce its risks: (i) it provides a 
9 FASB 115 requires banks to mark-to-market those securities that clearly affect equity capital. In reality, capital on the bank's book is a hybrid between book value and market value. 
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cushion to absorb losses; (ii) it provides ready access to financial markets; and (iii) it 
constrains growth and reduces risk. Llewellyn (1997) suggests a richer concept for 
functions of capital by including the protection of depositors, as follows: (i) it provides 
protection for uninsured depositors in the event of insolvency and liquidation and it 
serves to maintain public confidence; (ii) it is available to absorb unanticipated losses, 
thereby sustaining viability; (iv) it funds the infrastructure and expansion of bank 
services; and (v) it constrains unjustified asset expansion. 
Regulators and banks have different views about capital adequacy. Regulators prefer 
banks hold more capital to maintain the safety and soundness of banks, and the stability 
of the financial system. In contrast, banks generally prefer to operate with less capital in 
order to generate better returns on equity when earnings are positive. Because a bank's 
return depends on the risks the bank takes, then capital adequacy is specific to the 
individual bank. For this reasons, most regulatory agencies conduct off site monitoring 
and on site supervision to assess the unique bank risks". 
2.7 Approaches to Solvency Regulation 
In the theory of bank solvency regulation three approaches have been developed. These 
are the portfolio approach, the incentive approach and the incomplete contract 
approach. 
2.7.1 The Portfolio Approach 
This approach is based on the premise that if the banks play a role as portfolio 
managers when they choose the composition of their portfolios of assets and liabilities, 
then the risks' related weights are important to computing the capital-to-asset ratios. 
This approach was developed originally by Kahane (1977) and Kareken and Wallace 
10 In the USA, on site examinations are conducted to assess bank soundness, which encompass six general categories of 
performance, labelled CAMELS: C- capital adequacy; A- assets quality, M- management quality. E- earnings; L liquidity, S- sensitivity to market risk. A composite ranking of 1 or 2 indicates a fundamentally sound bank, while a ranking 
of 3 through 5 shows a problem bank with some near-term potential for failure. For a comprehensive discussion we Hall 
(1999). 
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(1978), and examined by Crouchy and Galai (1986), Kim and Santomero (1988), and 
Koehn and Santomero (1980). 
The solvency regulations based upon appropriate pricing policy for deposit insurance 
require a complete (and perfect) financial market, as developed by Crouchy and Galai 
and Kareken and Wallace. 
Kim and Santomero (1988) assume incomplete markets and risk aversion. Their study 
shows that incorrect measures of risk in the computation of the solvency ratio create 
adverse affects, such that an increase in risk-taking and the probability of bank failure 
may follow the imposition of poorly designed solvency regulation. 
2.7.2 The Incentive Approach 
This approach is based on the assumption that banks have better information regarding 
their own risks and returns than the regulators do (Giammariano, Lewis, and 
Sappington, 1993). Their studies reveal that (i) inefficient bank activities are based on 
functional separation between deposits and loans activities; (ii) the optimal incentive 
schemes may be decentralized through a solvency requirement that induces banks to 
make self insurance internally; (iii) efficient regulation should be risk-adjusted; and (iv) 
the capital-to-asset ratio should depend on the quality of banks' assets (i. e. as reflected 
in a rating system issued by independent agencies). This approach also assumes that the 
social cost of an insured bank failure is the reason for justifying the bank capital ratio. 
Optimal regulatory schemes can be achieved by mechanism design theory (Freixas and 
Gabilon, 1996). 
2.7.3 The Incomplete Contract Approach 
This approach starts from the premise that the majority of large modern banks are 
owned and managed by different agents (i. e. shareholders and managers). The 
Modigliani-Miller theorem suggests that there is no obvious relationship between bank 
capital, financial structure and the performance of managers; therefore it is more 
difficult to understand the rationale of bank solvency. More specifically, if the complete 
contracts between the owners and the managers of the bank can be written, the MM- 
theorem applies and the financial structure is irrelevant. The contracts between the 
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shareholders and the managers are incomplete because some managers' decisions 
cannot be pre-specified, resulting in the bank's solvency becoming relevant. The 
financial structure of the firm (i. e. the solvency regulation of the bank) determines the 
allocation of control rights among claimholders, and when and how these claimholders 
can intervene in the bank management process (Freixas and Rochet, 1998; Dewatripont 
and Tirole, 1999) 
2.8 Risk-Based Solvency Regulation 
2.8.1 Basic Model 
The probability a bank will become insolvent depends on several factors: (i) the 
volatility of the value of a bank's assets, liabilities, and operating costs; (ii) its ability to 
retain deposits and loans; and (iii) the amount of capital obtained from the shareholders 
and /or earnings generated internally. The bank's value will change as interest rates, 
gross national product, money supply, and the factors change (Dothan and Williams, 
1980). A simple model depicted in Figure 2.1. illustrates the concept of insolvency risk. 
Because of changes in certain factors, e. g. interest rates, the present value of a bank's 
assets and liabilities are Ao and Lo respectively. Its net worth is Ao - Lo = Co. Based on 
its current investments (i. e. chosen activities) and forecasted future events, the value of 
the bank's capital or the expected value of capital is C. The difference between Co 
andC is the expected return, 4, after taking into account expected dividends or capital 
contributions. The distribution function of I is illustrated in the curve centred on the 
expected net worth at the end-of-the period. The probability of insolvency is indicated 
by the shaded area under the normal distribution curve that is to the left of the zero 
point (between -oo and 0). To determine solvency risk requires a measurement of the 
bank's initial net worth (Co), the expected returns in the period (RZ), and the probability 
distribution or variance of the expected return [Var (ß3]. This means that, the greater 
the initial capital and the more capital is generated from returns or new investments, the 
less the danger of insolvency. 
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Figure 2.1 Model of expectation and variance of net worth 
Source: Maisel (1981). 
2.8.2 International Risk-Based Capital Standards. 
Given the twin forces of globalisation and financial innovation operating in financial 
market in recent years, international bankers have accepted the need for greater 
protection of their customers and themselves". G-10 countries deregulated their 
financial markets to accommodate these developments (Cooper and Fraser, 1984), by, 
for example, lifting controls on interest rates and widening permissible range of bank 
activities. These have given banks opportunities but also created new risks, in particular, 
for the new entrants. 12 
There is widespread evidence that there is an empirical link between financial crises and 
financial liberalization (Williamson and Mahar, 1998; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1998; and 
Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998). The Committee on Banking Regulations and 
Supervisory Practices based in Basle at the Bank for International Settlement (BIS), was 
established in 1974 by the G-10, following the failures of the Herstatt Bank in Germany, 
the Franklin National Bank of New York and the British-Israel Bank of London. The 
main objective of the Committee was "to close the gaps in the supervisory net and to 
11 Globalization of finance means; (i) banks increasingly engaged in international activities on both the asset and liability sides 
of the balance sheet; (2) it limited the scope and power of domestic banking regulation; (iii) it also threaten the liquidity and 
solvency of a domestic bank which operates abroad. Innovation or financial engineering appears in the form of securitization 
and off balance sheet activities, such as performance bonds, forex transaction, UC and various instruments devised to buffer 
financial risks, including interest rates caps and swap agreements. By the late 1980s, the contingent liabilities of major banks 
recorded a large multiple of shareholders' equity, in many cases larger than the banks' third world debt exposure. For example, 
by 1987, Citicorp had contingent liabilities of $467 billion, J. P. Morgan had $203 billion, and Chase Manhattan had S 175 
billion. These constituted more than 30 times shareholders' equity for Citicorp and over 40 times equity for Morgan and Chase. 
Speculation in foreign exchange transactions was increasing risks as the volatility of currency values was increasing. This 
volatility can give huge gains or losses for banks. 
12 G-10 countries means G-10 Central Bank Governors of 12 counties Le. Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
Luxembourg, the Nederlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. They established the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision in 1974. It consists of senior representatives of bank supervisory authorities and Central 
Banks from those countries. It usually meets at the Bank for International Settlements in Basel, where its permanent Secretariat 
is located 
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improve supervisory understanding and the quality of banking supervision world wide" 
(Kapstein, 1991). 
The first document issued publicly by the committee is well known as the "Basle 
Concordat" (1975), and this established five principles for effective, cross-border 
banking supervision (see Appendix 2.1 at the end of this chapter). This can be 
summarized into two points; firstly, no foreign banking establishment should escape 
supervision and secondly, the supervision should be adequate, as judged by both home 
and host supervisory authority. As the riskiness of banks' portfolios increased, banking 
supervisors had to refine their capital adequacy requirements 13. 
During the autumn of 1987, a preliminary agreement was reached by the committee on 
two important issues: (i) a two-tiered capital framework, which provided a common 
standard for defining capital while respecting national differences (The composition of 
capital would consist of two tiers: Tier 1 Capital was confined to shareholders' equity; 
and Tier 2 Capital included undisclosed loan-loss reserves, up to 45 per cent of the 
unrealised gain on marketable securities, and hybrid capital instruments]; and (ii) a 
minimum risk-adjusted capital adequacy standard of 8 per cent, at least half of which (4 
per cent) had to be in the form of Tier 1 Capital. 
Having held a series of meetings, a number of minor changes were made. The 
Committee then published (1988) guideline proposals for measurement and assessment 
of the capital adequacy of "internationally active" banks, and this was endorsed by all 
bank supervisors of the G-10 countries. Effective January 1993, all internationally active 
banks operating in the G-10 countries had to implement the "Rules", and since then, 
these have been adopted by most other international banks (Hall, 1994), [see 
Appendices 2.2 and 2.3 at the end of this chapter]. 
Under the accord, all internationally-active banks authorised in G 10 countries have to 
observe a minimum risk asset ratio (RAR) of 8%. In mathematical term, this can be 
written as: 
13 The Bank of England had formulated its risk-based capital adequacy system, not in response to the debt crisis, but in 
response to the secondary of fringe banking crisis that had threatened Britain's domestic financial system in the mid -1970s as 
a result of the collapse of a member of poorly capitalized institution with highly concentrated portfolios in real estate (i. e. it is 
quite similar to the S&L debacle in the US). The BOE issued new regulations on banking capital in 1980 rather than use the Federal Reserve's fixed capital -to-asset-measure, however, the BOE opted for a risk-weighted-system (Wesson, 1994 
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RAR (%) = TOCWRA 
where ACB is the adjusted capital base, 
S 
and TOIVRA (the total of weighted risk assets) _Z (A, W1) 
i=i i=I 
Nvw 
12: Z(B(IkXkWj) i=1 j=1 k=1 
xyz 
+ [(CikXk +M J 
i=1 j=1 k=l 
Au being the value of the Ph asset with risk weight, W i. 
Bý; k being the notional principal amount of off-balance-sheet activity i with risk weight 
W1 and conversion factor Xk, and 
Cfik being the notional principal amount of the interest or exchange rate-related 
activity i with risk weight W1 and conversion factor Xk, 
s the number of different asset components, 
u the number of distinct off-balance-sheet activities (excluding interest rate and 
exchange rate related activities). 
X the number of distinct interest and exchange rate related off-balance-sheet 
instruments, and 
M the `mark-to-market' value of the underlying contract, 
Where x<u<s; vSt=5; y5 t=5; w=4; and z=4 
* Current exposure assessment method employed. 
Source: Hall, 1994. 
More specifically, it assigns different risk weights to various categories of bank assets 
(including off-balance-sheet items), defines the elements to be counted as bank capital 
and establishes capital ratio requirements of 4 per cent of risk-weighted assets for Tier 1 
Capital and 8 per cent for total capital (i. e. Tier 1 plus Tier 2 Capital). 
2.8.3 An Evaluation of the Basle Accord 
The main problem is that more capital does not necessarily mean more safety because a 
bank failure will depend on the behaviour of the bank in managing its portfolio when 
the new capital is introduced (Shah, 1996; Mingo, 2000). Since capital is more expensive 
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to raise (as compared say to pure debt), banks would be under pressure to generate 
higher return from the additional capital, thereby forcing them to take on greater risks 
(john, Saunders, and Senbet, 1995; Dewatripont and Tirole, 1999). 
The purpose of the capital agreement was to strengthen the capital base of the banking 
system. A bank holding riskier assets and operations should have more capital. 
Risk 
management systems become a vital factor contributing to decisions on capital 
requirements. Accordingly, alternative approaches may be created, in association with 
internal risk models, to identify, measure and control risks. 
Hall (1994) demonstrates clearly the significant deficiencies inherent in the assessment 
approaches promoted by the Basle Committee, as follows: (1) the risk asset ratio (RAR) 
methodology sponsored by G-10 supervisors is fundamentally unsound and the 
methodological approach adopted was very weak because it only took account of credit 
risk (ignoring the other risks) and ignored the correlations between risks [The risk 
weights by category of on-balance sheet and off-balance sheet item are given 
in 
Appendix 2.4]; (2) the use of inappropriate risk weights and credit conversion factors is 
likely to distort banks' pricing and other business decisions and also to induce a 
misallocation of resources (i. e. capital and real); (3) the imposition of higher capital 
requirements may create perverse results since banks may increase their risks but 
decrease their returns; in turn, this may increase the probability of failure; (4) there is 
substantial evidence that most bank insolvencies which do not arise because of the 
direct results of generalized financial panic, but arise from fraud, mismanagement or 
misconceived regulations rather than inadequate capital; (5) other deficiencies are the 
lack of enforceability because the G-10 agreement is just a "gentlemen's agreement", its 
limited geographical reach, its implications for contributing to a global credit crunch and 
its failure to achieve the goal of competitive neutrality14. 
From the perspective of developing countries (including Indonesia), and or highly 
volatile developed countries, Goldstein (1997) noted two major pitfalls of the accord: (1) 
it does not provide an incentive for banks operating in the countries with more volatile 
environments to hold higher capital (for instance, by imposing a "safety factor" of 1.5 
times minimum capital requirements); and (ii) the significance of meeting the minimum 
14 Competitive neutrality is a principle widely endorsed where the international competitiveness of institutional types (e. g. 
banks or securities firms) is at stake, but less so when different institutional types are competing in the same product or service 
areas. Hall (1992) conducted studies about its impact on the nature and significance of the inequalities for banks incorporated 
in the USA, United Kingdom and Japan. 
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capital ratio is reduced if the other elements of the prudential/supervisory framework 
are substandard15. 
Keeton (1994) noted that the Basle Accord fails to measure capital adequately because it 
relies on book-value accounting. The book value of assets and liabilities can be different 
from their true market values (as shown by market value accounting or economic value), 
resulting in overstated or understated capital. The Basle Committee was aware of some 
of these deficiencies since the beginning, in particular (e. g.. the other risks inherent in 
an individual bank) and, accordingly invited suggestions on how to reform the accord 
(Shah, 1996). 
2.9 The New Capital Adequacy Proposal to Incorporate Market Risk 
According to the BIS proposal to reform the accord to market risk (BIS, 1993 and 
1996; Hall, 1995,1996), new approaches to defining capital, measuring risk and 
calculating minimum capital requirements would have to be adopted by banks. The 
banks were allowed to hold "Tier 3" capital in addition to Tier 2 to absorb market risks. 
Tier 3 consists of appropriate short-term Subordinated Debt that is subject to 
restrictions. The sum of Tier 2 and Tier 3 capital should not exceed total Tier 1. 
In measuring market risk, banks have an option between two approaches, namely: (i) the 
Standardized Approach using the measurement framework of the Amendment of the 
1998 Basle Accord (BIS, 1998a), and (ii) the Internal Models Approach developed by 
banks to measure market risk derived from their own internal risk management models 
(VaRs). A bank can use an internal model, once bank supervisors have approved the 
model. The new approach promotes a framework consisting of two measurement 
methods, the more advanced (VaR) being subject to quantitative and qualitative 
standards. Bank supervisors can allow banks wishing to implement their models-method 
based on an evaluation of whether the banks have met the two standards. 
15 Goldstein (1997) proposed a framework for International Banking Standards of Supervision, emphasizing the eight elements 
regarded as the main contributing factors to the past and potential banking crises in developing countries. These elements are 
public disclosures, accounting and legal frameworks, internal control systems, government involvement, connected lending, bank capital. an incentive-compatible safety net and resisting pressures for regulatory forbearance, and consolidated 
supervision and cooperation among host and home country supervisors. 
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The proposal has a framework that involves the following. (i) separation of the trading 
books from banking books; (ii) calculation of market risk comprising interest rate risk, 
foreign exchange risk, equity risk and commodities risk, and exposure to specific risk 
associated with debt and equity positions in the bank's trading portfolio; (iii) calculation 
of foreign exchange risk arising from both the trading and banking books; (iv) adoption 
of a building block approach in which the individual market risk is calculated as the sum 
of specific risk and general market risk [General market risk refers to changes in the 
market value of on-balance-sheets and off-balance sheet items resulting from broad 
market movements, e. g. changes in the general level of interest rates, exchange rates, 
commodity prices or stock prices; specific market risk is risk specific to a particular 
security issue, such as the underlying credit risk of the firm who issued a bond]; (v) 
aggregation of the risks in each component in order to get the total risk; (vi) special 
treatment for options derivatives. There are requirements for banks that want to 
implement the internal model (VaR) approach; that is banks should satisfy qualitative 
management standards as well as quantitative standards relating to the modelling 
approach to qualify for implementing the Internal Model Approach (IMA). 
2.9.1 The Standardized Approach 
The standardized approach adopts a building block approach, whereby specific risk and 
general market risk are calculated separately. The measurement of capital based on the 
standardized approach is a set of rules developed by the Basle Committee on Banking 
Supervisions which cover four major component of market risk, i. e. interest rate risk, 
foreign exchange rate risk, equity risk and commodity risk. The rules set out how the 
capital charges for the individual instruments are to be calculated and how they are to be 
aggregated into an overall market risk capital requirement. The capital allocations 
suggested were based on standard tariffs, such as 8% for interest rate risk; 8% for 
foreign exchange risk; 8% for equity risk; and 15% for commodity risk. 
The weaknesses inherent in the Basle Accord of 1998 for setting market risk capital 
requirements are: (i) the standardized approach results in inaccurate estimates of the risk 
exposures that bank portfolios generate; (ii) inaccurate risk measures and hence capital 
requirements can reduce economic efficiency by distorting banks' investment decisions 
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and creating incentives for unproductive regulatory arbitrage activities (Kupiec and 
O'Brien, 1997). 
2.9.2 The Internal Models Approach for Market Risk 
Under the internal models (VaRs) approach, a bank uses its own risk measurement tools 
to estimate a measure of its trading account's market risk exposure. A general market 
risk regulatory capital requirement is set according to a formula, which includes the 
exposure's estimate as the primary input (BIS, 1993; Revised FRB, 1995). Regulatory 
requirements proposed for an institution that opts to use the internal models approach 
must also satisfy qualitative and quantitative standards, as set out below. 
1. Value at risk (VaR) should be computed each business day and should be based 
on a 99 per cent (one tailed) confidence level of estimated maximum loss. 
2. The assured holding period used for the VaR measure must be 10 business days. 
3. The models must measure all material risks incurred by the institution 
4. The model may utilize historical correlation within broad categories of risk 
factors (interest rates, exchange rates, and equity and commodity prices) but not 
among these categories. The consolidated VaR is the sum of the individual VaRs 
measured for each broad category. 
5. The non-linear price characteristic of options must be adequately addressed. 
6. The historical observation period used to estimate future price and rate changes 
must have a minimum length of one year. 
7. Data must be updated no less frequently than every three months and more 
frequently if market conditions warrant. 
8. Each yield curve in a major currency must be modelled using at least six risk 
factors, selected to reflect the characteristics of the interest rate sensitive 
instruments that the institution trades. The model must also take account of 
spread risk. 
9. The capital change is based on the larger of the bank's current 10 days ahead 
risk estimate or the average of its risk estimates over the previous 60 business 
days, subject to a multiplication factor (which is Z 3) set by regulators. 
10. A higher multiplication factor may be imposed by regulators if actual daily losses 
exceed the bank's daily interval 1 per cent VaR loss estimate more than 4 timers 
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in the preceding 250 trading days or the supervisors are not satisfied with the 
accuracy of the bank's risk exposure estimate (Koch and MacDonald, 2000; 
Kupiec and O'Brein, 1997). 
Let VaR, 
_, represent a 
bank's risk exposure estimate for date t-1, and MRCR, 
represent the bank's market risk capital requirement for date t. The market risk capital 
charge at date t imposed by bank regulators in mathematical form is, 
4 60 
MRCR, =M 
RM` 
VaR, 
_, , 
V4-1 + SRt -i 60 ; _, 
where, RMt is a regulatory-determined multiplication factor (>_ 3) 
and SRt -i is an additional capital charge for the specific risk of the trading book 
positions. 
In short, the internal model approach require production of not only the trading 
account's general market risk capital charge, but also the specific risk capital charge 
resulting from the idiosyncratic risk of traded debt and equity positions that are not 
typically measured in risk measurement models. National supervisors can impose capital 
charge for specific risk based on banks model-based specific risk with the restriction 
that it may not be less than one-half of the specific risk capital charge as calculated 
under the standardized approach (this floor was later dropped). 
There are two general approaches to calculating market risk. Firstly, a simplified 
approach where each risk category (e. g. interest rates, exchange rates and inflation rates, 
etc. ) is measured separately and then added up to obtain total market risk (Landskroner 
and Ruthenberg, 1991; Dowd, 1998). Secondly, the portfolio approach, in which the 
covariance among different risk categories is taken into account in the calculation of 
total risk. 
The total market risk measure is defined in terms of changes in net worth (Capital). The 
objective function of the bank, which relates to changes in economic capital, is used as a 
framework for risk measurement. The changes in capital consist of two parts: (i) net 
financial income, which equals the interest margin and the net position in the different 
segments and is affected by changes in inflation rates and exchanges rates; and (ii) 
changes in net worth due to a change in interest rates. The banks are assumed to operate 
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in three segments of intermediation: local currency, foreign currency, and local currency 
linked to a general price index (CPI). 
The estimations of the banks' overall risks are only the first step of the process of 
supervision as a whole. The next step is to impose capital requirements that depend on 
the capital standard criterion set by the banking regulatory agencies. Regulatory agencies 
should determine the two most important parameters namely, confidence interval 
parameter and a scaling parameter that reflects the risk aversion of the bank supervisors. 
The banking supervisors should also determine a maximum allowable rate of decrease in 
capital and a minimum (critical) level of capital is established based on the supervisors' 
attitude toward risk. 
If the capital requirement for overall risk is derived using the Add On Method, which 
adds the market risk measure to the existing capital requirements for credit risk, then the 
capital ratio of the bank can be generated and can be compared to the capital ratio, 
based on the 1988 Basle Accord. According to a study of Landskroner, Ruthernberg, 
and Zaken (1999), the banks' capital ratios based on this model are lower than those of 
the 1998 Basle Accord. This means that the banks are adequately capitalized only when 
credit risk alone is taken into account. 
On the other hand, the internal model approach also has deficiencies, such as: (i) it fails 
to accurately measure the market risk in bank trading accounts; (ii) the internal model 
approach methodology cannot account for a bank management's subjective risk 
assessments that aggravate their model based estimates nor can it account for the 
material effects created by active risk management in determining risk exposure over a 
relatively lengthy horizon; (iii) there is a need to validate each bank's internal risk 
exposure estimate to ensure the accuracy of the models. Statistical model validation is 
inherently problematic; on the other hand there is a significant probability that 
regulators will be unable to detect poorly-performing risk management models (Kupiec, 
1995) 
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2.10 The Pre-Commitment Approach. 
The Federal Reserve System (July, 1995) issued for discussion an alternative approach 
that became known as the "Pre-Commitment Approach" (or PCA) (Kupier and 
O'Brien, 1997). Under the PCA, a bank would be required to pre-commit to a 
maximum loss exposure for its trading account positions over a predetermined period. 
The pre-commitment maximum loss is the bank's market risk capital charge. If the 
trading losses exceed the bank's capital commitment, it would be subject to penalties. 
The objective of the PCA is by utilizing a bank's internal risk measurements, to attempt 
to replace the regulatory capital requirements based on ex ante estimates of bank risk 
with a capital requirement that is endogenously created through the optimal resolution 
of an incentive contract between the bank and its regulators. 
In the PCA, it is assumed that (i) in making investments and deciding financial options, 
a bank always maximises the net present value (NPV) of its shareholders' claims on the 
future bank cash flows; (ii) the managers seeks to maximize the net worth of the bank; 
and (iii) the bank is to pay an ex post deposit insurance premium for every excess loss. 
According to this model, if the NPV of the investments is negative, the bank will 
maximize its non-bank portfolio investments either by choosing risk free securities or by 
undertaking a `go-for-broke' high-risk strategy. Since all of its deposits are guaranteed, 
an optimal go-for-broke high risk strategy under a negative NPV of the loan portfolio 
will lead to using only risky market-traded securities to maximise the value of deposit 
insurance. As a result, the PCA is only effective for a bank that has a positive NPV for 
its loan portfolio. If the NPV of the loan portfolio is positive, a bank will avoid 
excessively high-risk securities to avoid monetary penalties that will, in turn, reduce 
shareholder value. 
2.11 Internal Risk Models and Their Implications for Capital Regulations: Credit 
Risk Case 
The arbitrary capital standard proposal without scientific backing in The Basle Accord 
cannot assure the regulators that a bank with a high regulatory capital ratio has a 
correspondingly low probability of insolvency (Mingo, 2000). Regulatory capital does 
not represent economic capital. Consequently, banks must engage in regulatory capital 
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arbitrage (RCA) in an attempt to lower regulatory capital requirements to avoid 
uneconomic capital standards (Jones, 2000). 
Policymakers should distinguish between regulation and supervision (Llewellyn, 1999b; 
Mingo, 2000). According to Mingo (2000), to achieve the set objectives of prudential 
regulation and supervision, in this case using solvency regulation, there are three steps 
that can be carried out by regulators: (i) determine the goals of prudential regulation and 
supervision; (n) determine the definition and quantification of bank soundness; and (iii) 
set the measurement of the minimum level of bank soundness. 
There are two leading proposals for overcoming the deficiencies of the current Basle 
standard: (i) the modified Basle approach, which modifies the Basle "risk-bucket" 
approach by adding more buckets and/ or by more finely tuning the capital requirement 
for each of the risk buckets, and (ii) the full model approach using bank's internal risk 
models that are subject to supervisory approval. 
2.12 Deposit Insurance Schemes 
When a bank goes into insolvency, uninsured depositors will only receive their funds 
after liquidation of the bank's assets, and so depend on the level of the bank's capital for 
protection. The depositors' perceptions about the bank's viability also rely mainly on 
the level of capital held, which, in turn can maintain the systemic stability of the banking 
system and public confidence. In contrast, under a deposit insurance scheme, small 
depositors are protected by deposit insurance funds net of capital. According to 
Dewatripont and Tirole (1999), the absence of bank runs in these recent years of large 
shocks is the outcome of depositors' trust in deposit insurance systems. Therefore, a 
deposit insurance scheme compensates depositors to some extent should their banks be 
unable to repay their deposits (Ellinger, Lomnicka, Hooley, 2002). 
The rationale for deposit insurance schemes comprises the following- (1) consumer 
protection is necessary due to difficulties in assessing the banks' financial conditions, the 
so-called asymmetric information [In this regard, the market imperfection can be 
resolved by banking supervision and deposit insurance], (2) they can be used to control 
systemic risk arising from bank panics and disruption of the payment system; and (3) 
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they can be used to reduce social costs resulting from bank failures, disruption to the 
payment system, and disturbance in the economy as a whole (Freixas and Rochet, 1998; 
and McDonald, 2003). 
Deposit insurance schemes are complex mechanisms and there is no one model which 
fits all circumstances. There are two types of deposit insurance schemes which have 
been adopted by both developed and developing countries, i. e., one providing an 
implicit guarantee and one an explicit guarantee. Implicit guarantees are often provided 
by governments to end banking crises and thus are ad-hoc in nature. Garcia (1997), 
however, argues that the implicit deposit guarantee entails negative effects, since the lack 
of a well-designed system of deposit insurance results in depositor uncertainty, which 
can worsen bank runs, and results in the end in greater costs being insured than 
otherwise would have been the cost. An explicit guarantee scheme is a formal deposit 
insurance scheme undertaken by deposit insurance corporations (DIC) - either public 
or private companies - and established by government. Garcia suggests that a deposit 
insurance system should: (i) be explicitly formulated in law, (ii) be compulsory, (iii) be 
accompanied by well-crafted procedures for accounting, loan valuation, regulation, and 
supervision, (iv) have a DIC with the authority and necessary information to reform 
faltering banks and deal effectively with insolvent banks, (v) be established only after 
unsound banks have been restructured, (vi) treat large, small, private and state-owned 
banks equally, and (vii) provide for prompt reimbursement when a bank fails. 
Under the deposit insurance schemes, financial institutions pay a premium to a deposit 
insurance agency (e. g. the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in the United 
States and the Deposit Protection Scheme in the UK). 16 The current deposit insurance 
scheme in the UK came into effect on 1 December 2001, with the establishment of the 
Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS). Hall (2002) notes that the FSCS 
comes into play if an authorized institution is unable to repay its depositors or is likely 
to be unable to do so, and goes out of business, due to insolvency, liquidation or being 
placed in administration. Most developed countries have adopted such a scheme, but 
different modalities, such as: (i) insurance may be compulsory or simply voluntary; (ii) it 
may be undertaken by one or by several funds; (iii) it may cover only principal or 
16 In the US. deposit insurance schemes were privately developed prior to the creation of the Fed In the UK, the Deposit Protection Scheme was introduced in 1982 by the Bank of England after the UK experienced a banking crisis, based on the Banking Act of 1979 (see Hall, 1999). 
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principal plus interest, and the limit may differ widely (i. e. ranging from $100,000 in the 
US to the equivalent of $15,000 in Spain); and (iv) most deposit insurance schemes are 
public. 
Because of the difficulties posed by the public regulation of banks some economists 
have advocated a private insurance system (Mishkin, 1998; Capie and Wood, 1991). The 
potential advantage of a private system is that competition between the insurance 
companies may provide incentives for more accurate pricing and the gathering of 
information about bank risk than does a public system. On the other hand, 
governments should consider some important drawbacks which might involve then in 
the private insurance system: (i) the private insurance company might lack public 
confidence which would increase systemic risk. Deposit insurance schemes must be 
backed by the government [to some extent, this could lead the private companies to not 
price the deposit insurance accurately]; (ii) government intervention and the closure of 
financial institutions are public decisions. Private insurance schemes can function only if 
the government establishes contingent exit policies, which is clearly difficult to establish 
(Benston et. al., 1986). 
Systemic risk is inherent in a private deposit insurance scheme. A private system cannot 
assure that a solvent insurance company can handle the scale of losses that might result 
in bank panic situation. Consequently, the role of the Central Bank as the LLR is still 
needed to cover the payment claims of depositors. In the absence of systemic risk, the 
linear insurance premium of a private tariff system can also have adverse risk-taking 
behaviour. A well-managed bank will reduce taking risk when its solvency is low. 
However, Dewatripont and Tirole (1999) argue that an increase in insurance premiums 
induces the bank's shareholders to take more risks for a given level of deposits. Hence, 
an increase in the deposit insurance premium may induce the bank to seek to attract 
more deposits. The increased premium levied on in insolvent banks due to, for instance, 
poor performance will aggravate the perverse effect. It means that private deposit 
insurance scheme have wrong incentive properties that reinforce the incentive to take 
risk in hard times. Given the risk-based solvency requirements of the Basle Accords, 
this drawback might be eliminated providing the risks are measured appropriately as an 
alternate insurance against financial risks. 
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From the discussions above, we can derive some important points: (i) bank risk-taking 
can be controlled by imposing a non-linear tariff insurance premium (i. e. a risk-based 
premium) and by allowing the authorities to intervene banks where appropriate; () 
moral hazard can be avoided by governments by limiting deposit insurance to small 
deposits only because banks are subject to moral hazard and adverse selection which 
can put depositor at risk ((Stiglitz, 1994); (iii) exit policies (closure rules) should be 
addressed as a part of depositor protection and efficient regulation; (iv) the safety net 
arrangements can be conducted either by a central bank or a deposit insurance 
corporation; and (v) a deposit insurance corporation can be either a public or private 
corporation, or a combination of both. 
2.13 Resolution of Bank Failures: Financial Reorganisation 
When a bank experience financial difficulties, regulators must take corrective measures 
or reorganize the bank under a regulatory framework. There are two approaches in 
handling a troubled bank: (i) early closure (Kane, 1986); and (ii) late closure (Saunders, 
1993). Under the early closure approach, the regulator takes actions to generate the 
"fairly" deposit insurance premium and the optimal closure rules for the troubled banks 
(Acharya and Dreyfus, 1989). They suggest the regulators should typically close the 
troubled banks while they still have positive net assets. In the USA, under a US 
Congress mandate (. e., the FDIC Act of 1991), the Fed and the FDIC adopt a "prompt 
corrective action" approach, which requires bank regulators to impose more stringent 
rules on banks when their capital ratios decline and to close promptly the banks with 
capital below critical triggers. In contrast, under the late closure approach, involving the 
well-known "regulatory forbearance", the corrective measures are taken by regulators 
because there exist significant bankruptcy costs that may actually reduce the regulators' 
liability in form of the value of the authorities' deposit guarantee liability. 
Fries, Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997) developed the Dynamic Contingent Claims 
Model to study the optimality of different closure policies and their impact on deposit 
insurance based on a basic equation of total net cash flow available to bank equity- 
holders (the FMP model). They study a series of different possible closure rules and 
subsidy policies through the interaction of (i) regulators' attempts to minimize 
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discounted, expected bankruptcy costs, and (ii) equity-holders' incentives to recapitalise 
banks. They define subsidy policies for distressed banks that implement socially optimal 
closures rules at minimum financial cost to regulators and which reduce moral hazard. 
They developed two models: (i) the endogenous closure rule models, and (ii) the 
endogenous bail out models. The FMP model will be analysed in detail in Chapter 5. 
2.14 Conclusions 
The objectives of bank regulation are to provide depositor protection, to ensure the 
stability of the financial system, and to support the efficiency of the banking industry. 
Banking regulation is only one of seven elements of a regulatory regime, a concept that 
emphasizes that all elements are necessary but none are sufficient. This concept consists 
of rules, monitoring and supervision, incentive structures, market discipline and 
monitoring, intervention arrangements, corporate governance and disciplining and 
accountability of regulatory agencies. These components should be combined to achieve 
the optimum mix of banking regulation through regulatory strategy in which various 
options are created from the combined elements. Bank managements are threatened 
with interference from shareholders and regulators if they perform badly and are 
rewarded when performance is good. The shareholders will be given the opportunity to 
control the bank when performance is good i. e. a well-capitalized bank. The threshold 
for the transfer of control from shareholders to debtors can be interpreted as a 
minimum solvency requirement (or capital) and /or be set by closure rules. Regulators 
try to control the risk behaviour of banks by using this capital requirement. The bank's 
value can be affected to reduce the probability of insolvency, which can limit bank 
failures and externalities which, in turn, will protect depositors and ensure public 
confidence. Capital is clearly a crucial factor in the banking industry. Bank 
reorganization or recapitalization of the banking system has become a primary objective 
of central bankers and other regulators. Risk management has become a vital factor 
contributing to decisions on capital requirements since risk-based capital regulation was 
introduced. The Basle Accord does not distinguish between idiosyncratic shocks and 
aggregate shocks and the arbitrarily chosen 8% risk adjusted capital ratio is not 
appropriate and it creates various perverse effects. Management performance should be 
isolated from the aggregate shocks. There is a need for accurate measurement of bank 
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solvency and risk, and for interference when performance deteriorates, accompanied by 
credible mechanisms for the transfer of control from the shareholders to other parties, 
such as regulators and new investors (the-so called exit or closure policies). Regulators 
should conduct research on the subject of risk measurement and economic capital in the 
banking industry to achieve the specific set of regulatory objectives by way of definition 
and quantification of bank soundness and measurement of a minimum soundness 
standard. There are two main groups of proposals for improving the Basle Accord: the 
modified Basle Accord approach and the full model approach (i. e., internal models- 
based approach). An internal model approach using the portfolio approach can be used 
by regulators and supervisors to examine the capital ratio and it is compared with the 
1998 Basle Accord. The pre-commitment approach can also be used by utilizing banks' 
internal risk measurements entailing the optimal resolution of incentive contracts 
between the banks and regulators. In order to build a robust regulatory framework, 
regulators can adopt the regulatory regime concept with its seven elements. The Fed and 
the FDIC have implemented the Prompt Corrective Action framework to reorganising 
ailing banks in association with the fair pricing of deposit insurance premiums. 
This thesis applies the FMP model within the regulatory regime concept and links it to 
the banks' state of risk management, based on an enterprise risk management approach. 
Discussion of the FMP model is presented in Chapter 5. The next chapter will present a 
discussion of an enterprise risk management framework. 
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Appendix 2.1. 
The Basel Concordat (1975) 
1. The supervision of foreign banking establishment should be the joint 
responsibility of host and parent authorities. 
2. No foreign banking establishment should escape supervision, each 
country should ensure that foreign banking establishment are supervised, 
and supervision should be adequate as judged by both host and parent 
authorities. 
3. The supervision of liquidity should be the primary responsibility of host 
authorities since foreign establishments generally have to conform to 
local practices for their liquidity management and must comply with local 
regulations. 
4. The supervision of solvency for foreign branches should be essentially a 
matter for the parent authority. In the case of subsidiaries, however, while 
primary responsibility lies with the host authority, parent authorities 
should take account of the exposure of their domestic banks' foreign 
subsidiaries and joint ventures because of the parent banks' moral 
commitment in this regard. 
S. Practical co-operation would be facilitated by transfers of information 
between host and parent authorities and by the granting of permission for 
inspections by or on behalf of parent authorities on the territory of the 
host authority. Every effort should be made to remove any legal restraints 
(particularly in the field of professional secrecy or national sovereignty) 
which might hinder these forms of cooperation. 
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Appendix 2.2 
Adiusted Base Ca 
Under the G-10 agreement the Capital of a commercial bank was divided into two Tiers, 
Tier 1 and Tier 2 
Component of Capital 
Tier 1: 
(1) Ordinary paid up share capital/common stock 
(2) Disclosed reserves 
Tier 2: 
(1) Undisclosed reserved 
(2) Asset revaluation reserves 
(3) General provision/general loan loss reserves 
(4) Hybrid (debt/equity) capital instruments 
(5) Subordinated loan 
II. The sum of Tier 1 elements and Tier 2 elements will be eligible for inclusion in the 
capital base subject to limits and restriction as follows: 
(1) The total of Tier 2 elements will be limited to a maximum of 100 per cent of the 
total of Tier 1 elements 
(2) Subordinated term debt will be limited to a maximum of 50 per cent of Tier 1 
elements (i. e. 25 per cent of the capital base) 
(3) Where general provision/general loan loss reserves include amounts reflecting 
lower valuations of assets or latent but unidentified losses present in the balance 
sheet, the amount of such provisions or reserves will be limited to a maximum 
of 1.25 percentage point, or exceptionally and temporarily up to 2.0 percentage 
point, of risk assets *) 
(4) Assets revaluations reserves which take the form of latent gains on unrealised 
securities (see below) will be subject to a discount of 55 per cent. 
III. Adjustment made to the capital base for calculation of the risk asset ratio 
Deduction from Tier I: Goodwill 
Deduction from total capital: 
(1) Investment in unconsolidated banking and financial subsidiary companies (The 
presumption is that the framework would be applied on a consolidated basis to 
banking groups) 
(2) Investment in the capital of other banks and financial institutions (at the 
discretions of national authorities). 
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Appendix 2.3. 
Risk Weights by Category of On-Balance-Sheet Assets Under the BIS Proposals 
0% (1) Cash 
(2) Balances at and claims on domestic central banks 
(3) Securities issued by domestic central governments 
(4) Loan and other assets fully collateralised by cash or 
domestic central governments securities or fully 
guaranteed by domestic central governments 
0 or 20% (1) Claims on IBRD and regional development banks 
(at national discretion) (EC countries would treat 
EC institutions consistently) 
20% (1) Claims on domestic and foreign banks with an 
original maturity of under one year 
(2) Claims on domestic banks with an original maturity 
of one year and over and loans guaranteed by 
domestic banks 
(3) Claims on foreign central governments in local 
currency financed by local currency liabilities 
(4) Cash items in process of collection 
0,20 or 50% (1) Claims on the domestic public sector, excluding 
central government (at national discretion) and loans 
guaranteed by such institutions 
50% I (1) Loans to owner-occupiers for residential house 
purchase fully secured by mortgage 
100% (1) Claims on the private sector 
(2) Cross-border claims on foreign banks with an 
original maturity of one year and over 
(3) Claims on foreign central governments (unless 20%) 
(4) Claims on commercial companies owned by the 
public sector 
(5) Premises, plant and equipment and other fixed 
assets 
(6) Real estate and other investments (including non- 
consolidated investment participation in other 
companies) 
(7) Capital instruments issued by other banks (unless 
deducted from capital) 
(8) All other assets 
source: Hall (1994) 
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CHAPTER THREE 
ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT 
3.1 Introduction 
Like any limited liability firm, banks are subject to various risks', but the consequences 
of the risks are much more dramatic for banks than for the other sectors of economy. 
This has led bank regulators in many countries to put into effect complex regulatory 
systems (Freixas and Rochet, 1998). Bank management literature generally identifies 
three types of bank risk, namely credit risk, interest rate risk, and liquidity risk. During 
the last two decades, however, off-balance sheet operations have been soaring, resulting 
in additional types of risks affecting banks. In this regard, banks have to select and 
control risks inherent in the management of deposits, loan portfolios, and off-balance 
sheet contracts. Accordingly, the management of risks can be seen as the major activity 
of banks. 
Classification of risk, such as business risk, financial risk, systemic risk, market risk, 
credit risk, operational risk etc., demonstrates a lack of clarity as to what is exactly meant 
by risk. This concept of risk regards risk as an adverse outcome. In developing any 
approach to risk management, we rule out this concept since it just limits the scope of 
risk management and does not accommodate Markowitz's principle. They, however, 
need to be made simple to analyse, so that the risks of a bank are broadly categorized 
into just a few categories, such as credit risk, market risk, operational risk, reputational 
risk and legal risk, in an effort to provide a context of the scope of enterprise risk 
management. 
The theory and practice of risk management has developed substantially since 1973. The 
theory has developed in the following ways: (i) risk management has been taught in 
finance courses as a distinct sub-field of the theory of finance; and (u) research in risk 
management has been conducted widely by fmance and other researchers in a way that 
' The word "risk" originally came from the early Italian risicare, which means "to dare". In this sense, 
risk is a choice rather than a fate. 
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matches some of the great eras of science, such as the quantum physics research of the 
1930's as noted by Dowd (1998). 
The practice of risk management has been transformed dramatically due to the 
development of new theory and its rapid translation into practical applications, for 
example, adoption in the 1970's of the famous Black-Scholes (1973) option pricing 
model as a practical tool. Practitioners have used them to price options and guide them 
when deciding hedges against the various risks they face. Similarly, the Heath-Jarrow- 
Morton (1990) framework is used for the analysis of fixed-income securities (e. g., 
bonds) and their derivatives. This model has been used to price fixed-income securities 
and calculate hedges for them. Finally, the development of Value at Risk models has 
altered radically risk management theory and practice. To date, VaR is the most 
sophisticated quantitative model available. The VaR model initially was used to measure 
market risk and it has also been used in investment decisions by adjusting expected 
return for risk, evaluating investment decisions after the transactions have taken place, 
designing rules to remunerate managers and traders, integrating risk measurement 
across the institution in a consistent manner, building a robust new internal control 
system for preventing fraud and human error, and measuring other risks, such as credit 
risk, operational risk and legal risk. 
In the BIS's (1997) Core Principles on Banking Supervision, Principle number 13 states 
that "supervisors should ensure banks have in place a comprehensive risk management 
process, including appropriate board and senior management oversight, to identify, 
measure, monitor, and control all material risks and, where appropriate, to hold capital 
against these risks". Two recent BIS surveys [BIS (2001,2003)] on risk management also 
reveal two important findings: (1) that greater emphasis is now given to risk 
management on an integrated, firm wide basis; and (2) related efforts to "aggregate" 
risks through mathematical risk models have been made. 
Risk management can be defined as a process of identification, measurement and 
control of risk exposures (Jorion, 1997). Risk management is not merely about reducing 
risk - in many cases it is a necessity - but essentially about taking risks in an intelligent 
manner (Cade, 1997). It becomes an essential tool to the survival for all, business 
activity. Dowd (1998) argues that risk management does not mean eliminating risks or 
just accepting risk; rather, it is a process of deciding what types of risk to bear, what 
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risks to accept, how to avoid them and what new risks to take. He states that risk 
management is analogous to buying insurance and controlling the insured activities. 
Risk management, however, should be viewed both from a business unit level and from 
a firm-wide level. A firm-wide level risk management concept in turn can use an 
integrated risk model that integrates market risk, credit risk, and operational risk 
(Crouchy, Galai, and Mark, 2001). Venkat (2000) provides a more comprehensive 
approach with richer features or properties than the others, and this has been 
implemented by many leading financial institutions in the world. It has also been 
endorsed by the Global Association of Risk Professionals. An Enterprise Risk 
Management (EW framework may be defined as an optimal combination of the four 
main elements of risk management, comprising strategy, processes, infrastructure and 
environment. It helps a bank to make intelligent risk-taking decisions prior to allocating 
economic resources and to monitor the outcome of its decisions. 
Historically, banks, whether domestic or international in nature, typically adopted a 
geographical approach, line of business approach, or legal entity-based approach to 
managing their risks. Risks were measured, aggregated, and managed within 
geographical boundaries and product classifications, or business lines - the so-called 
fragmented risk management approach. Under this approach, risk management was 
limited to a risk measurement and risk monitoring function in an effort to meet either 
auditors' or regulators' requirements. In addition, the banks only measured and 
controlled risks; they did not cover all other necessary elements of an effective risk 
management framework. 
We, therefore, need to develop a framework of risk management that underscores a 
firm-wide risk profile, and provides greater transparency through consistent and 
comprehensive risk measurement, aggregation and management to promote the 
likelihood of success and prevent bank failures, as implied by the Basel Accord (Basel II, 
1999). In this study, I adopt the Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) approach 
promoted by Venkat (2000) rather than the traditional risk management approach. 
Nevertheless, very little risk management literature provides a theoretical foundation for 
an enterprise risk management system and policy. This thesis aims to fill the gap. It is 
also worth noting that the successful implementation of ERM is subject to the banks' 
resources, experience, size, and the complexity of their operations. 
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This chapter analyses risk management theory and practice, to shed important light on 
the need for an integrated risk management framework. Accordingly, in this chapter, I 
present various approaches that can be adopted by different banks to accommodate the 
development of the banking industry, with a focus on the firm wide risk management 
principles, as implied by Basel II. Again, given the objective of modern risk management 
to enhance shareholder value, there is a need for a structural change from traditional 
risk management that only covers risk measurement and risk control, to include 
compliance procedures, management controls, and hedging techniques to reduce the 
probability of incurring losses. In Chapters 5 (Section 5.4.7) and 6 (Section 6.3.9) the 
impact of the structural change (or structural break) caused by implementation of ERM 
is tested using a structural break test technique. Meanwhile, in Chapter 4, evaluation of 
risk management in the Indonesian banking industry, using the ERM framework as a 
benchmark, is presented. 
Hence, this chapter describes the previous studies of risk management encompassing 
background factors affecting the need for enterprise risk management (Section 3.2), the 
rationale for enterprise risk management (3.3), possible approaches to risk management 
(3.4), risk management guidelines (3.5), the development of best practices of ERM (3.6); 
Venkat's model (3.7), plus Bank Indonesia's risk management regulation (3.8). This 
chapter will end with conclusions, as outlined in Section 3.9. 
3.2 Background Factors 
The transformation of risk management has a number of contributing background 
factors, namely a volatile environment, I. T. developments, growth in banks' trading 
activities, the development of derivatives, recent risk management disasters, and 
expansion of the scope of ERM, as discussed in the following sections. 
3.2.1 A Volatile Environment. 
The most influential factors contributing to the revolution in risk management comprise 
four key factors. First, exchange rates have been volatile since the breakdown of the 
Bretton Woods System of fixed exchange rates in the early 1970's. A sudden and 
significant change in exchange rate systems and monetary policy also results in exchange 
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rate instability. Second, interest rate fluctuations are associated with changes in funding 
costs, corporate cash flows and asset values, and monetary policies. Third, the extreme 
volatility of stock markets has, in part, resulted from the economic cycle. And fourth, 
there have been other sources of instability, such as commodity price volatility, drastic 
shifts in legal and regulatory environments, the growth of offshore banking, 
globalisation of the financial services industry, the expansion of the European 
Economic Community, and other political changes, (Dowd, 1998; Jorion, 1997). These 
have necessitated an overhaul of traditional risk management practices. 
3.2.2 Informational Technology Developments 
The rapid advance in information technology has been another factor contributing to 
the development of risk management. The major benefits of IT and their implications 
for risk management are: (i) it has increased both computational power and the speed of 
calculations; (ii) IT can be used to tackle more difficult calculation problems; (iii) 
improvement in calculation speeds then make these techniques useful in real time; (iv) 
IT costs have fallen by about 25-30% a year over the past thirty years; and (iv) they 
provided risk management tools to do risk measurement calculations. 
3.2.3 Growth in Trading Activities 
The huge increase in trading activities since the late 1960's has contributed to the 
transformation of risk management. For example, the average number of shares traded 
per day on the NYSE has risen from about 3.5 million in 1970 to around 40 million in 
1990. Foreign exchange activity has grown dramatically from a few billion dollars a day 
in 1965 to more than a trillion per day by 1996. There has also been a massive increase 
in the range and volume of instruments traded by banks (Jorion, 1997). 
3.2.4. Development of Derivatives 
Jorion (1997) and Crouchy, Galai, and Mark (2001) note the development of risk 
management products, as summarized in Table 3.1. Derivative contracts have developed 
since 1972 as a risk management tool. Derivatives are private contracts deriving most of 
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their value from some underlying assets, reference rate or index, such as a stock, bond, 
currency or a commodity. 
3.2.5 Recent Risk Management Disasters. 
Derivatives are particularly effective tools for hedging or speculation, but they can lead 
to huge losses if used inappropriately. The simplest example of a derivative is a forward 
contract on a foreign currency, which is a promise to buy/sell at a fixed price at some 
future date. Economically, a forward contract is equivalent to holding the foreign 
currency (an asset) using a short position in a bill (liabilities) to fund the purchase. The 
outstanding positions of derivatives could be much more than the value of the total 
amount of annual gross national product of the US, and even greater than the total 
value of global stocks and bonds. Accordingly, a bank's total amount (notional value) of 
off-balance sheet derivatives could be much more than the bank's value of total equity 
or even total assets (Jorion, 1997). A 1995 study by the BIS reveals that the replacement 
value, using market values, for all OTC contracts would be only 4.3% of their notional 
amount. As a result, for risk management purposes, the notional outstanding amount of 
derivatives is highly misleading. However, Jorion (1997) noted that the financial 
disasters resulting from poor risk management can threaten every single firm, banks and 
governments. 
3.2.5.1. Corporate Losses. 
Corporate losses in relation to derivatives activities between 1993 and 1995 have 
sometimes led to bankruptcy. There are two Japanese companies (i. e., Showa Shell 
Sekiyu and Kashima Oil), one in Germany (i. e, Mettalgeselschaft), one UK-based 
company (i. e., Barings), one in Chile (i. e., Codelco) and one in the US (i. e, Procter and 
Gamble), which failed or suffered large losses as a result derivatives exposures. The first 
four companies suffered total combined losses of over $1 billion. The main cause of 
these financial disasters was volatility in financial markets. For the private companies, 
the shareholders were ultimately responsible for financial gains and losses, through their 
equity stakes. There was also a series of losses in the US and Indonesia because of 
aggressive investment strategies, interest rate movements and lack of derivatives 
knowledge. Some regulators have put limits on such investments and limited the use of 
derivatives. Nevertheless, these restrictions are imposing additional costs on taxpayers. 
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Table 3.1 The Evolution of Risk Management Tools 
1972 Foreign Currency futures 
1973 Equity options; Equity futures 
1974 T-Bond futures 
1975 T-Bill futures; Future on Mortgage-Backed Bonds 
1979 Over-the-counter currency options 
1980 Bank CD future 
1981 Currency swaps 
1982 Interest rates swaps; T -note futures; Eurodollar-futures; Equity index futures; 
Options on T-bond futures; Exchange-listed currency options 
1983 Options on equity index; options on T-note futures; options on currency 
futures; Options on equity index futures; interest rate caps and floors. 
1985 Eurodollar options; OTC swapoptions; Future on U. S. Dollar and Municipal 
Bond Indices. 
1987 Average options; Commodity swaps; Bond future and Options; Compound 
Options 
1989 Futures on interest rate swaps; Three-months Euro-DM future; ECU rate 
futures 
1990 Equity index swaps 
1991 Differential swaps 
1993 Captions; Exchange-listed FLEX options 
1994 Credit default options 
Source : Jorion (1997) and Crouchy, Galai, and Mark (2001) 
3.2.5.2. Bank Disasters. 
The other remarkable financial catastrophes in recent years, sometimes involving 
Central Banks and governments, were Qorion, 1997): 
1. Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM), Malaysia's Central Bank, lost more than $3 billion in 
1992 and $2 billion in 1993 after bad bets on exchange rates. BNM failed to predict 
that the Bank of England would keep the British pound sterling in the European 
Monetary System (EMS) for so long. Some of the winners were hedge funds, one 
owner of which, George Soros, is reported to have made a profit of $2 billion. 
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2. Banesto, Spain's fifth biggest bank, suffered losses of $4.7 billion due to bad loans 
and a down-turn in the Spanish economy. In December 1993, the Bank of Spain 
took control of the bank, which was subsequently bought by Banco Santander. 
3. Credit Lyonais, French's biggest state-owned bank, was subsidized to the line of $10 
billion - the biggest ever bail-out of an individual institution - in 1994 by the 
Government (i. e., taxpayers) as a result of a large exposure to French real estate 
(which caused huge losses in the 1992-1993 recession) and poor risk management. 
4. The Savings and Loans (S&L) debacle in the US involved losses of $150 billion in 
the 1980's as the S&Ls extended loans for making residential housing funded by 
short-term deposits. When interest rates rose in the early 1980's, the S&Ls failed to 
manage the duration gap. Costs increased by more than their revenues, and they 
started to bleed badly. S&L's subsequently became insolvent. Congress also 
deregulated the banking industry, which led to shifts from housing finance into risky 
investment in commercial real estate and junk bonds. 
5. Japanese financial institutions suffered losses of $500 billion from bad loans. The 
troubled loans originated particularly from housing-loan corporations which had 
aggressively extended loans during the real estate boom which then collapsed after 
1990. 
6. Orange County's trader, Bob Citron, invested the County's funds in highly leveraged 
derivative instruments that were bets that interest rates remained low. An adverse 
movement of interest rates in 1994 inflicted losses of $1.7 billion against the 
County's Investment pool, and resulted in the County's bankruptcy. 
7. Baring Bank's Chief trader at Barings Singapore subsidiary, Nick Leeson, engaged 
in unauthorized futures and options trading, and accumulated huge open positions. 
The amount involved vastly exceeded the bank's capital. Adverse movement in 
these markets resulted in huge losses to the bank, amounting to about $1.3 billion, 
and lead the bank into bankruptcy on February 26,1995 
8. Daiwa Bank's single trader at Daiwa New York, NY, Toshihide Iguchi, concealed 
losses on its books from Treasury Bond trades of over $1.1 billion over an 11 year 
period. The losses were revealed when Iguchi confessed them to his management in 
July 1995. 
9. Sumitomo Corporation, in June 1996 announced a loss of $1.8 billion. The losses 
had been accumulated over 10 years and resulted from unauthorized trades by its 
chief copper trader, Yasuo Hamanaka. He had hidden the losses. 
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Additionally, recent banking crises (i. e. from 1997 until now) in the South East Asian 
countries need to be emphasized, as noted by Llewellyn (1999a). The cost of these crises 
was very high, amounting to 45 percent of GDP in the case of Indonesia, 15 percent in 
the case of Korea and 40 percent in the case of Thailand. The crisis has forced the 
Indonesian government to bail out the ailing banks (nearly all banks) to the tune of 
Rp164,536 trillion (Kompas, 11 January, 2000), as noted by Dendawijaya (2001). Hence, 
there is a need to develop an optimal bail out model, which is discussed in Chapters 5 
and 6. 
Llewellyn (1999a) points out that these figures include the costs of meeting obligations 
to depositors under the blanket guarantee introduced by the authorities to handle 
systemic crises, and public sector payments to finance the re-capitalisation of insolvent 
banks. It has been noted that these financial crises were caused by a combination of the 
dynamic forces of capital flows, macro policies, and weak financial and corporate sector 
institutions. The trigger for many crises originally came from macro-economic sources 
and a sudden withdrawal of liquid, external capital from the country. He also argues that 
in such financial crises, in both developed and less-developed countries, the source of 
the problem arises not only from rules imposed by the regulators but also from other 
common elements. These elements encompass: weak internal risk analysis, management 
and control systems within banks; weak (or even perverse) incentives within the 
financial system generally and financial institutions in particular, inadequate information 
disclosure; and inadequate corporate governance arrangements, both within banks and 
their large corporate customers. More specifically, in the case of banking crises in South 
East Asian Countries, including Indonesia, they have been complex and the causes have 
been multi-dimensional. The main causal factors are: (i) volatility in the macro economy; 
(ii) the inheritance of structural weakness in the economy; (iii) bad banking practices; 
(iv) hazardous incentive structures and moral hazard within the financial system; (v) 
ineffective regulation; (vi) weak monitoring and supervision by official agencies; (vii) the 
absence of effective market discipline due partly to a lack of transparency and 
disclosure of relevant information; and (viii) structurally unsound corporate governance 
within banks and their borrowing customers. All of this induced inappropriate lending 
and risk-taking by banks. 
If we focus on the risk management disasters discussed above, there are some lessons 
that can also be drawn. First, sound risk management is essential. Second, derivatives 
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carefully be used as risk management tools (e. g., hedges), but they may become 
dangerous when they are not used by authorized persons or used by poorly-trained staff. 
Third, sound internal controls, the separation of trading (i. e, front office) from 
settlement, (i. e, back office, concerned with validating trades, reconciling accounts) and 
sound risk management systems (or middle office systems) overseen by an independent 
risk-control unit used to monitor trades and the global risk exposure of the firm and 
corporate governance, are crucial factors in avoiding disasters. Fourth, the shareholders 
must pay any losses which arise. Fifth, regulators must limit risk-taking by regulating 
firms in such a way that shareholders can maximize their wealth whilst social welfare is 
maximized. Sixth, supervisors should cover remote operational units, and coordination 
between host and home authorities is extremely important. And seventh, there is a need 
for corrective action policies, including closure rules and bail out rules which take into 
account social costs, to achieve an efficient bank regulation, as discussed in Chapters 5 
and 6. 
3.2.6 Expansion of the Scope of the Modem Risk Management Approach 
There have been some developments over the last two decades which have lead to an 
expansion in the scope of risk management to the enterprise risk management level. 
First, we have witnessed widespread regulatory arbitrage, unstable financial markets, the 
increasing complexity of financial products, and the growth of the global financial 
market (combined with a number of bank failures and losses). Second, the Group of 
Thirty's (G30) recommendations in 1993 and Basel I have focused on strengthening the 
organizational environment through the segregation of duties, implementing statistical 
measurement methodologies, and analysing portfolio level risk. Third, in practice, the 
USA, the UK, as well as the European Union and the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision have put into effect their initiatives on enterprise risk management. (BIS, 
2001 and 2003a). The Federal Reserve Board (1993) and the Office of the Comptroller 
of the Currency (1993) have also issued comprehensive guidelines on standards of risk 
management. Fourth, Basel II was issued to alleviate the flaws of Basel I, and is 
intended to foster a stronger emphasis on ERM and encourage ongoing improvements 
in a financial institution's risk assessment capabilities. 
These changes will have a significant impact on bank data collection, risk management, 
capital calculations and reporting systems, and can be regarded as a move toward the 
59 
Basel Accord `best practices' of risk management processes (Risk, 2003) or, say the 
"Generally Accepted Risk Principles". Fifth, risk management is not a new discipline 
since the banks have always been in the business of risk management in relation to their 
roles as intermediary agents of financial flows between surplus and deficit units. 
Historically, credit risk has been a significant risk, so that credit officers have become 
important members of the senior management team that is responsible to the Boards of 
Directors of the banks. In this regard, the banks have developed credit policies, 
procedures, and processes. As a result, many elements of risk management have been in 
place for several years. Banks, however, paid little attention to the other types of risk. In 
addition, if the banks had implemented risk management, their systems were still 
decentralized and had a line-of-business orientation. Sixth, even though many banks, 
mainly in developed countries, have implemented risk management, the number of 
losses has continued to rise. Seventh, many banks have become global players and the 
interconnectedness of the global market accompanied by heightened volatility in 
financial markets, has resulted both in uncertainty in cash flow of banks' earnings and 
potential or realized losses, which, in turn, heightens the uncertainty in shareholder 
value. The 1997 South-East Asian crisis affected both the US and European markets, 
healthy countries, and spread across the world at high speed in a relatively short time, 
the so-called Asian contagion The collective result of points 5 through 7 is that a bank 
can be called a "risk intermediary", another function of a contemporary bank. Eighth, 
accelerating product innovation and risk transformation, as reflected by the growth in 
derivatives, structured products and securitization activities, results in financial 
institutions facing many new risks. Ninth, fierce competition within the financial 
services industry continues to intensify and erodes profit margins. On the other hand, 
banks are required to meet regulatory capital requirements leading to a conflicting task 
in terms of maximizing capital returns. Tenth, banks' consolidation - mergers and 
acquisitions - and diversification strengthen the banks' positions, and create new 
opportunities to enter businesses. The escalating risk-taking activities need firm-wide 
risk management. Finally, eleventh, advancing technology helps banks to reduce costs 
by shifting from traditional bank activities to risk-driven and consumer-oriented 
businesses, so that the banks obtain a more comprehensive picture of their financial 
risks across their business. 
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These developments lead to the need for a set of best practices of ERM and increased 
overall awareness of banks with regard to this discipline, in particular for the Indonesian 
banking industry. Venkat (2000), Santomero (1998) and Crouchy, Galai and Mark (2001) 
suggest that an effective and optimal fine wide risk management framework should be 
developed on the premise that the objective of any firm-wide risk management 
approach is to enhance and sustain shareholder value, as depicted in Figure 3.1. 
Figure 3.1 Create and Sustain Shareholder Value 
Internal inputs 
State of the art: 
. Risk assessment 
tools 
. Risk measurement 
tools 
Dynamic decision 
making 
Capital 
. Capital investment. 
. Capital deployment 
1 
Maximize 
shareholder value 
External 
" Leverage Ratio 
" Regulatory Capital 
" Target RAROC 
" Target Debt Rating 
" Leverage ratio 
" Regulatory 
Capital 
Source: Crouchy, Galai, and Mark (2001). 
Given the objective of modem risk management, there is a need for a "structural 
change" from the traditional risk management approach to an enterprise risk 
management approach. In Chapters 5 (Section 5.4.7) and 6 (Section 6.3.9) the impact of 
the structural change (or structural break) caused by implementation of risk 
management is analysed using structural break test techniques. 
3.3 Rationale for Enterprise Risk Management. 
Bank regulation is mostly designed to limit risk-taking by commercial banks (Koch and 
MacDonald, 2000). In a universal bank regime, a bank could engage in activities not 
only associated with commercial banking but also with investment banking, such as 
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investment in commercial stock, underwriting etc .2 Banks operating 
in investment 
banking and commercial banking are named universal banks. Freixas and Rochet (1998), 
however, argue that, theoretically, an estimate of the risk/return characteristics of an 
investment could be made not only for bank loans (as traditional activities) but also for 
any other type of investment, including stock. The USA, finally, also adopted the 
universal banking concept as the Glass-Steagall Act was repealed at the end of 1999. 
Consequently, bank management is searching to achieve its objective of maximizing 
shareholders' wealth (Santomero 1998; Naik, 1998; Koch and MacDonald, 2000), which 
is interpreted as trying to maximize the market value of a firm's common stock. Bank 
managers should evaluate the present value of cash-flow returns under uncertainty with 
an evaluation on a risk-adjusted basis. 
Profit maximization differs from wealth maximization. In profit maximization, a bank 
invests in assets that guarantee the highest gross yield and push costs down. To increase 
the yield, a bank must increase its risk and / or lower operating cost. Greater risk means 
greater volatility of net income and in the market value of shareholders' equity. A 
maximization of profit will generally depend directly on the riskiness of the portfolio 
and operations.. For wealth maximization, the managers should evaluate and balance the 
trade-off between the opportunities for higher returns, the probability of not realizing 
those returns and the possibility that the bank might fail. 
Santomero (1998) argues that risk management is optimal when it allows the business to 
obtain the highest expected shareholders' value. Firm level risk is an important 
consideration that should be considerably thought about. As a matter of fact, risk is seen 
as the major activity of banks' management (Freixas and Rochet, 1998; Cade (1998). 
Holliwell (1998) even states that risk is the "lifeblood of business and the test of 
entrepreneurs and managers". 
There are five possible reasons (or rationale) for the development of risk management 
by bank managers who concern themselves with profit maximization and wealth 
maximization (Cummin, Philips, and Smith, (1998); Santomero (1998)): (1) managerial 
2 The investment banking concept was introduced in continental Europe in the nineteenth century by the 
Socite Generale de Belgique and the Caisse Generale du Commerce et de L'Industrie (founded by Laffitte 
in France). It has a different philosophy of banking, since it involves advancing money to industry rather 
than being a simple lender and getting good guarantees. This has created more risky investments, in 
particular, buying stock. 
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self interest-, (2) the tax structure; (3) the cost of financial distress; (4) capital market 
imperfections; and (5) believe in the theoretical background to enterprise risk 
management. 
3.3.1 Managerial Self-Interest 
Managers are risk averse by self interest. They prefer their employment positions to be 
stable instead of volatile. Stability of returns will be regarded as a good performance by 
their shareholders. Some factors, however, can threaten their positions. Managers thus 
worry about risk because: (i) divestiture that affects the company's performance should 
be hedged properly; (ii) financial distress that disturbs the firm level outcomes could 
lead to the termination of the managers' employment, in turn adversely affecting the 
future value of their employment earnings; (iii) the owners' perception about 
management talent in reducing the volatility of outcomes and protecting company 
profitability also affect employment prospects. 
3.3.2 The Tax Structure. 
Under tax regimes, in particular with a progressive tax structure, it is beneficial to 
smooth the firm's income so that the effective tax rate of the firm in the long run can be 
reduced. Management activities that reduce the volatility in reported earnings will, in 
turn, increase shareholders' value. In addition, generally-accepted accounting principles 
permit tax planning which needs good management of the differences between the 
book and the market value of profits. 
3.3.3 The Cost of Financial Distress. 
As discussed above, financial disasters around the world have led to huge losses for 
banks, depositors and governments (or taxpayers) and finally bankruptcies. Corporate 
viability is influenced by earnings volatility, that is actual earnings that differ substantially 
from the expected ones. Management should run its business in a risk averse manner to 
avoid financial crisis or bankruptcy; in particular, it should avoid increases in costs such 
as legal costs, costs of bankruptcy, loss of licence (or charter), and loss of a monopoly 
position (Smith and Stultz, 1985; Graham and Smith, 1996) since Caprio and Klingelbiel 
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(1996) argue that banking crises around the world result from management taking 
potentially ruinous risk. 
3.3.4 Capital Market Imperfections. 
A firm's volatility of profitability can result in the firm having to raise external funds at a 
higher cost in order to exploit investment opportunities (i. e. when profits are low due to 
investment volatility). External financing is more costly than internally-generated funds 
because of market imperfections. The higher costs of obtaining external financing, may 
be due to imperfect information in the market about the risk of investment 
opportunities, or the high cost of potential bankruptcy associated with a higher debt 
burden. The management should pursue a strategy for reducing the volatility in 
earnings. Consequently, risk management is optimal when it allows the business to 
obtain the highest expected shareholder value. 
3.3.5 Belief in the Theoretical Background to Enterprise Risk Management 
Many proposals that seek to spur the implementation of risk management best practices 
lack a theoretical foundation; see, for example, Venkat (2000), Santomero (1998), Pyle 
(1999), Dowd (1998), and Jorion (1997). Meanwhile, the suggestions of academics (e. g. 
Pyle, 1999; Dowd, 1998; Jorion, 1997; Crouchy 
, 
Galai and Mark, 2001) lack the 
features/properties of a comprehensive enterprise risk management framework. As a 
result, this study aims to fill the gap by combining a strong theoretical background with 
the richer features of an enterprise risk management framework. More specifically, I will 
attempt to do this by embracing, on the one hand, some of the key theories and models 
[following the suggestion of Crouchy, Galai and Mark (2001)], including analyses of the 
development of approaches to risk management in banking, and on the other hand by 
introducing the richer features of enterprise management, as suggested by Venkat 
(2000). 
Crouchy, Mark, and Galai (2001) note that the theoretical foundation of modem risk 
management is provided to help simplify the real life problems that complicate 
predicting the future and decision-making processes (see Friedman, 1953). This includes 
the principles of portfolio selection, the market-based portfolio approach, the 
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continuous CAPM, the pricing of options, and the theory of the relationship between 
the capital structure and the value of a firm. 
3.3.5.1 Principles of Portfolio Selection 
These were originally suggested by Markowitz, in his (1952) paper, concerning the 
principles of portfolio selection. Markowitz showed that a rational investor follows the 
Von Neuman-Morgenstern's expected utility maximization, where alternative portfolios 
should be analysed based on their means and on the variances of their rates of return, 
assuming that capital markets are perfect and that the rates of return are normally 
distributed. Following the model of consumer choice, expressed in terms of two 
parameters only (i. e., mean and variance), portfolio investment can also be presented for 
selection according to these parameters. In addition, these two parameters are valid only 
for well-diversified portfolio, and do not apply for individual securities. As a result, the 
risk of a single investment should be measured in terms of the covariability of its rate of 
return with the rate of return of the portfolio. Markowitz's principles also suggest that 
one could not measure the specific or idiosyncratic risk of a single security by using its 
volatility, as measured by the variance of the rates of return. The principle implies that 
risk and reward are important factors determining a bank's portfolio requiring 
measurement of the correlation coefficients among different bank assets and liabilities, 
which is then directly linked to the portfolio's diversification. The BIS' capital accords 
are developed based on Markowitz's approach. 
3.3.5.2 Market Price-Based Portfolio Approach 
Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965a) developed the portfolio approach by adding an 
assumption that a risk-free asset exists. They suggest that a security is priced according 
to its relative contribution to the total risk of the market portfolio, as measured by the 
variance of its rates of return. The excess expected return above the risk-free rate is a 
function of the systematic component of risky investment times the unit price of 
investment, written mathematically: 
E(R; ) =R+ Qi p; m 
[E(RM) 
- R]/ QM 
where, R, and R. are the rates of return on assets i and the market portfolio, M, 
respectively, and a, and aM are the standard deviations of the rates of return on assets 
iandM. 
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3.3.5.3 Continous CAPM 
The CAPM was developed by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) based on the Portfolio 
Theory, as discussed earlier. This model can be used both for portfolio investment 
decisions and individual security decisions. The risks of asset investments can be 
eliminated by diversification. The investment decision will be made if its expected return 
exceeds a required return given by 
Pj+ (Rm - xj9 Qi 
where, W is the risk free rate of return, Rm is the expected rate of return on the market 
portfolio of risky assets, and ßi is the hypothetical market volatility beta of the stocks. 
Consequently, the real flaw in the CAPM is that it fails to consider the impact on our 
investment decision of the specific portfolio one actually holds. Still, in the real world, 
no one has the CAPM market portfolio and the portfolios people actually hold differ 
enormously from each other. 
Merton (1972) shows that the discrete Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) can also be 
extended to a continuous time framework, under the assumption that trades can be 
executed at any time and that the return-generating process for stock prices is smooth, 
with no jumps in prices (i. e., it behaves like a diffusion process following Brownian 
motion). 
3.3.5.4 Pricing of Options 
Another development of the risk analysis was suggested by Black and Scholes (1973) 
and Merton (1973) in a seminal paper concerning the pricing of options. This is based 
on the theory developed by Markowitz, Sharpe, and Litner, namely, they assume the 
existence of perfect capital markets, security prices are log-normally distributed, and log- 
returns are normally distributed. Besides, they assume that trading in all securities is 
continuous and that the distribution of the rates of return is stationary. The Black- 
Scholes (BS) option pricing model (OPM) for a European call option on stocks (without 
dividends) is given by : 
C=SN(d, )-Ke''sN(d2) 
where C is the premium of a European call option, S is the price of the underlying 
security, K is the exercise or strike price, r is the riskless instantaneous interest rate, z is 
the time period to the maturity of the option, and N(. ) is the cumulative standard 
normal distribution, and where 
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d= ln(S/K)+(r+1/2a2 and 
d2 = d, - Qý 
Here, Q is the standard deviation of the rate of return distribution of the underlying 
security and e is the exponent operation (e = 2.714... ). Note that N(dl) and 
- N(-d, ) are the hedge ratios, known also as the "delta" of the option, of a call and of 
a put, respectively. The hedge ratio measures the change in the value of an option 
resulting from a small change, say a dollar, in the price of the underlying security. The 
hedge ratio indicates how the risk of the underlying security over a very short time 
interval can be hedged dynamically with derivatives assets. A fully-hedged position over 
an arbitrarily small interval of time is often called a "delta neutral" position. 
3.3.5.5 Relationship Between Capital Structure and Value of A Firm 
Another theoretical foundation for modern risk management is the relationship between 
capital structure and value of a firm, as originally suggested by Modigliani and Miller 
(1958), who argue that, in a perfect capital market with no corporate and income taxes, 
the capital structure of a firm has no effect on the value of the firm. A firm's value 
cannot be increased by issuing more debt (high leverage), although the cost of debt is 
lower than the expected cost of equity. This means that greater leverage in the capital 
structure of a firm leads equity holders to face the increase in level of financial risk since 
they will demand more compensation in the form of higher rates of return. 
Consequently, management should concentrate on identifying and' implementing 
investments that will increase the economic value of the firm, rather than re-engineering 
the capital structure of capital. However, the cost of capital - which is equal to the 
weighted cost of equity and debts - is important mainly in the sense that it offers a 
marginal "hurdle rate" for management in their evaluation of new investments. 
Theory is often time divorced from implementation of problems in real life. 
Implementation of the theories of modern risk management needs two crucial 
prerequisites: first, reliable, broad, and up-to-date data bases concerning both the bank's 
transactional positions and the financial rates available in the wider marketplace; and 
second, statistical tools and procedures that allow the bank to analyse the data. 
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One can conclude that the modem risk management approach is developed based on 
the theoretical bases and the two crucial prerequisites described earlier, which implies 
that modem risk management adopts an integrated approach, the so-called enterprise 
risk management (ERM). Hence, ERM is a process of identifying, measuring, managing 
and controlling risks at a firm level. Risk should be analysed in terms of uncertainty, 
opportunity and hazard. Crouchy, Galai and Mark (2001) suggest that risk management 
consolidates the entire field of risk management, from policies to methodologies as well 
as data and technological infrastructure. Risk management covers investment, hedging, 
and management strategies, all business-lines and the geography of a firm. As a result, 
risk management includes organizational structure, methodologies, policies, and 
infrastructure of a firm. An advance in risk measurement, therefore, also integrates all 
the bank's risks across businesses and the organization. 
The next sections will discuss the approaches to risk management. 
3.4 Possible Approaches to Risk Management 
Before adopting any particular approach, decision makers should formulate a corporate 
risk management philosophy to impose some guidelines on risk management. This will 
encompass the types of risks they wish to bear, what risks they want to avoid, and what 
sort of options they will consider to manage their risks. They should assess their ability 
in handling particular risk in their lines of business and other risks that they wish to 
avoid. This philosophy should also identify the various risks which might be faced. The 
exposures resulting from any decision making should be evaluated by tracing them back 
to the philosophy to determine how to manage the risk exposure and, in particular, 
whether to hedge it. There are several possible approaches to risk management that can 
be adopted by banks, such as: (1) traditional risk management; (2) a portfolio theory- 
based approach; and (3) risk management using derivatives models (Dowd, 1998). The 
Enterprise risk management approach combines the three approaches to provide an 
integrated risk management process. 
3.4.1 Traditional Risk Management 
In this traditional approach, risk management quantifies risk exposures using gap 
analysis, duration analysis, statistical analysis and scenario analysis. 
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3.4.1.1 Gap Analysis 
Gap analysis was traditionally used to give a simple or crude measure of interest rate risk 
exposure. The procedures of gap analysis are: (i) determining an appropriate horizon 
period (e. g., one year); (ii) determining how much of one's asset or liability portfolio will 
be re-priced within the period; (iii) determining the rate-sensitive assets and rate 
sensitive liabilities that lead to the gap (i. e, the differences between these); (iv) 
calculating interest rate exposure, that is the change in net interest income that occurs in 
response to a change in interest rates equals the gap times the interest rate changes 
ANII = (GAP) " Ar 
where, NII is the change in net interest income and Ar is the change in interest rates. 
The problems with this approach are: (i) it applies (crudely) only to on balance sheet 
interest rate risk; (ii) it only looks at the impact of interest rates on income, rather than 
on assets /liabilities value; and (iii) it can be sensitive to the choice of horizon period. 
3.4.1.2 Duration Analysis 
This method is better than gap analysis and is based on the assumption that the duration 
of a bond (or any other fixed income security) can be regarded as the term to maturity, 
adjusted for the maturities of interim coupon payments. More specifically, duration, D, 
is defined as the weighted average term of maturity of a bond's cash flow, where the 
weights are the present values of each cash flow relative to the present value of all cash 
flows: 
[i. PVCFi] 
n 
D='=' E[PVCFi]. 
where, PVCFi is the present value of the period i cash flows and is discounted at the 
appropriate spot period yield. 
The duration measure gives an approximate indication of sensitivity of a bond price to a 
change in yield; 
% change in bond price -- -D. DY 
where, Yis the yield and AY is the change in yield. 
The bigger the duration, the more the bond price changes in response to a change in 
yield. The benefits of duration analysis encompass: (i) it is easy to calculate; and (ii) it 
looks at changes in assets (or liabilities) values, rather than just changes in net income. 
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It, however, has a shortcoming, as it still ignores risks other than interest rate risk, which 
means that this method is crude. 
3.4.1.3 Statistical Analysis 
Statistical analysis can be applied for measuring interest rate risk, equity risk, foreign 
exchange risk, commodity risk and other risks. The procedures in using the statistical 
analysis consist of: (i) postulating a measurable relationship between the exposure- 
variables one is interested in (e. g., the loss/gain on a bond or FX Portfolio) and the 
factors that one thinks influence the loss or gain; (ii) estimating this relationships by 
using numerical estimates of their various parameters that normally use some 
econometric techniques, such as logit, probit or normit, and discriminant analysis; and 
(iii) different risk exposures are created from these parameters that enable one to 
estimate the sizes of the hedges to cover the risks. 
3.4.1.4 Scenario Analysis 
Scenario analysis is used by employing different scenarios and by investigating what one 
stands to gain or lose under these scenarios. Scenario analysis can be applied to most 
kinds of risk, and needs less data than the statistical approach does. Under this 
approach, the procedures are as follows: (i) selecting a scenario, i. e., a path describing 
how relevant variables (e. g., inflation rates, exchange rates, etc. ) might evolve over a 
time horizon; (ii) postulating cash flows and/or accounting values of assets and 
liabilities as they would be developed under the scenario postulated; (iii) the previous 
two stages are repeated for any other scenarios one is concerned about, and (iv) the 
results of scenarios will be used to get some views about one's exposures. Scenario 
analysis is not easy to use for some reasons: (i) it depends on the ability to identify the 
right scenarios; (ii) there are relatively few rules to guide us when selecting them; (iii) it is 
difficult to ensure that the scenarios chosen are reasonable and that they contain 
appropriate relationships between the variables involved; (iv) a scenario does not tell us 
about the likelihood of different scenarios actually occurring, so it still needs judgements 
in assessing the different scenarios; and (v) the results of scenario analysis therefore 
depend entirely on the skills or otherwise of users. 
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3.4.2 The Portfolio Theory Approach 
Modern Portfolio theory originated from the work of Markowitzs 3. It focuses on the 
interaction between different risks. The theory starts from the premise that investors 
choose portfolios on the basis of their expected return, on the one hand, and standard 
deviation (or variance) of their return, on the other. The standard deviation under 
portfolio theory is a measure of the portfolio's risk. An investor wants the portfolio with 
a high expected value but a low standard deviation. This objective means that the 
investor should choose a portfolio that maximizes expected return for any given 
portfolio standard deviation or, alternatively, minimizes standard deviation for any given 
expected return. A portfolio that meets these conditions is efficient, and a rational 
investor will always choose an efficient portfolio. Investors must choose a set of 
portfolios among the alternative portfolios. A risk averse investor will therefore choose 
a safe portfolio with a low standard deviation and a low expected return. In contrast, a 
risk lover will choose a more risky portfolio with a higher expected return. As a result, 
under portfolio theory, the risk of any individual asset is not the standard deviation of 
the return to that asset, but the asset risk contributed to overall portfolio risk. A very 
risky asset (i. e, has a high standard deviation) with a return that correlates negatively to 
the returns to other assets in a portfolio may add nothing to the overall portfolio 
standard deviation. A new high risk does not necessarily add to overall risk. This means 
that a new asset's contribution to portfolio risk depends on the correlation (or 
covariance) of its returns with the returns on the other assets in the portfolio. The lower 
the correlation, other things being equal, the less the asset contributes to overall risk. If 
the correlation is sufficiently negative, it will offset existing risks and lower the overall 
portfolio risk if its expected return is sufficiently high relative to the risk it contributes 
to the portfolio. Investors acquire a new asset i if its expected return, ii, is equal to or 
exceeds the risk-free return, if, plus a risk premium, Rpi, 
r, zrf+Rp,, 
The risk premium is equal to the product of two factors: (i) the excess of the expected 
portfolio return over the risk-free rate, and (ii) a risk factor, usually known an the beta, 
ß, is equal to the covariance between the returns of the asset i and the return to the 
portfolio, rp, divided by the variance of the portfolio return: 
3 Portfolio theory is often called the mean-variance framework because investors depend really on the two factors for decision making. Investors do not need to be connected with higher order moments of the 
return probability density function, such as skewness or kurtosis coefficients. 
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Rp=(rp-rf)ß, 
where, ß= Coti(i, p) / Marl p 
To implement this equation, we need to estimate the risk free return, rf, the portfolio 
expected return, rp, and the assets beta, a31. We will acquire the asset if ri ? if + Rpi. The 
benefit of using this portfolio theory lies in the handling of multiple risks and the 
taking into account of how these risks interact with each other. Therefore, it has been 
used widely by portfolio managers, mutual funds managers and other investors. 
3.4.3 Risk Management with Derivatives Models. 
A bank dealing in derivative products can manage the risk which arises by using 
derivatives models to price and hedge exposures. There are a wide range of models to 
choose from, each designed for a particular type of derivative e. g. the Black (1973) 
model for options and futures, the Merton (1974) model, Roll-Geshe-Whalley and other 
models for options on dividend-paying stock, the Garman-Kohlhagen model for foreign 
currency options, and others. Industry professionals have used widely the models 
ranging from the traditional approach (e. g., duration analysis) to the most sophisticated 
ones, such as the Heath Jarrow-Morton (1990) models and others for pricing and 
hedging. 
They, however, should be used carefully, bearing in mind the following factors: (i) we 
should fully understand how to use the models, in particular when using the 
sophisticated models; (ii) they cannot be used mechanically without having some feeling 
for the markets they relate to; (iii) we should understand the limitations of each 
quantitative approach; (iv) quantitative methods should complement the more 
traditional approaches (i. e., the intensive combination of rule of thumb, judgment, 
common sense and other factors we can use); (v) these models play a role as an addition 
to rather than as a substitute for these approaches; (vi) these models do not work for 
major market moves e. g., stock or bond market crashes or a major devaluation; rather, 
they only work for small changes in risk factors and when they are revised on a timely 
basis. The combination of large market moves and sudden market illiquidity can result 
in massive losses, even though they have been fully hedged by dynamic hedging 
strategies (Dowd, 1998). To address these problems, Longin (2000) has proposed 
models for the extreme changes. 
72 
3.5 Risk Management Guidelines 
In the BIS's (1997) "Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision", Principle 
number 13 states that supervisors should ensure banks have in place a comprehensive 
risk management process, including appropriate board and senior management 
oversight, to identify, measure, monitor, and control all material risks and, where 
appropriate, to hold capital against these risks. The BIS has issued several guidelines 
and principles regarding risk management since then (see BIS, 1994c, 1997,1998,1999). 
The rapid development of derivatives contracts and the growth in the number of 
contracts make regulators, accounting professionals and industry professionals very 
concerned. On the one hand, they worry about leverage, risk opacity and disclosure, the 
measurement of risks across different types of position, the management of portfolios 
of derivative risks, and other issues, yet regulatory and accounting systems and even the 
industry itself cannot capture the problems arising from derivatives transactions. 
Various bodies have also conducted surveys and made reports about risk management 
practices. The most significant was a report on derivatives risk management published 
by The Group of Thirty` in 1992. Another report was issued by the US General 
Accounting Office in May 1994, and this was followed by a joint report issued by the 
BIS and by the International Organization of Securities Commissions (TOSCO) in July 
1994. Other reports have been produced by the Derivatives Policy Group, the 
International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA, 1995), and other interest 
parties. Their recommendations became benchmarks for modem financial risk 
management and are used widely by the parties involved. They tend to focus on 
derivative risks and provide guidelines to be used by derivatives providers, investment 
banks, financial institutions and corporates. 
Their main recommendations can be summarized as follows: (i) the need for senior 
management to understand the risks of their business, and the importance of their 
overseeing the risk-taking of subordinates; (ii) the separation of front and back offices 
to help detect rogue trading and other forms of fraud; (iii) the need for an independent 
risk function to help detect rogue trading and other forms of fraud; (iv) the need for an 
independent risk management (or middle office function) that reports directly to senior 
4 The Group of Thirty (G30) is a New York-based consultative group of leading bankers, financiers and 
academics. 
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management; (v) the importance of thorough audit and control systems; (vi) the 
importance of good information systems; and (vii) the use of internal Value at Risk 
(VaR) models for measuring and managing financial risk across the institutions. When 
reviewing the bank's risk management, these principles of risk management of 
derivatives can be used as a benchmark. 
In 1999, the BIS issued proposals (confirmed in June 2004) for a new accord (Basel II), 
embracing, three pillars of bank regulation, including market discipline, improved capital 
standards and supervisory review. Basel II provides guidelines to banks on how to adopt 
a more risk-sensitive framework for measuring credit risk capital, market risk capital, 
and operational risk capital. This also implies that banks' senior executives should re- 
examine their risk management processes, procedures and systems, and implement 
upgraded risk management capabilities so that they can increase efficiency and 
profitability. BIS (2001,2003a) reports reveal authorities in 12 jurisdictions have issued 
guidelines on enterprise risk management. 
3.6 Development of Best Practices of Enterprise Risk Management 
3.6.1 Modem Risk Management 
In the 1980's, financial management was conducted under an assets-liabilities 
management system (ALMA system) using the accrual accounting method. This isolates 
the value of balance sheets from economic values. Forecasting using scenario analysis 
cannot use historical accounting. Losses hidden in balance sheets under the accrual 
method disguise the true condition of institution (e. g., S&L's debacle). Efforts to 
measure risks accurately and to capture positions in securities by marking to market, and 
volatility in market values lead to the concept of Value at Risk. The development of risk 
management has grown rapidly since the introduction of VaR models with VaRs being 
implemented by leading institutions; such risk control systems are widely used to 
evaluate business performance (e. g., VaR used to adjust returns) which, in turn, can be 
used to make business decisions, such as devising a hedging strategy and even 
expanding lines of business. By utilizing Markowitz's portfolio theory, optimisation is 
achieved through forecasting returns against risks to determine the set of portfolios or 
businesses that provide the best trade-off. The development of modem risk 
management is illustrated in Figure 3.2. The modern approach has lead to development 
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of an integrated approach to risk management rather than a fragmented approach, the 
so-called enterprise risk management (ERM) approach, which is analysed in Section 
3.6.4. 
Figure 3.2 Modern Risk Management 
Accounting Measure Economic Measure Risk Control Positioning 
Positions 
1_ 
1 
B/S Information 
Source: Jorion (1997) 
Market Prices 
1 
Economic Values 
Risk and 
correlation 
1 
Expected Return 
1 
Value at Risk Optimal Position 
Table 3.2 provides a comparison between the traditional and the enterprise risk 
management framework in terms of their objectives, theoretical backgrounds, risk 
identifications, risk measurements, risk control and performance measurements. It is 
clear that ERM provides richer properties than traditional risk management, and appears 
valid for the Indonesian banking industry, which has suffered massive losses (as 
discussed in previous sections ) in order to accommodate and promote future 
developments. 
3.6.2 Past Studies of the Integration of Risk Management 
3.6.2.1 Integration of Risk Measurement 
This section analyses the work conducted by academics and practitioners to integrate 
risk measurements, based on the risk management approaches described earlier. It is 
clear that the implementation of principles of the risk management approaches 
described earlier is still fragmented. The analysis uses a framework developed by Dowd 
(1998) and Crouchy, Galai and Mark (2000b), comprising 8 elements, such as policy, risk 
identification, business process, measurement methodology, exposure management, 
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reporting, risk analysis and economic capital calculation. These 8 elements interact with 
each other through a flow, as illustrated in Figure 3.3. 
Table 3.2 A Comparison of Traditional and Enterprise Risk Management 
Features Traditional ERM 
1. Objectives Risk measurement and profit Optimisation of position and wealth 
maximization (shareholder value) maximization 
2. Theoretical 
backgrounds 
a. Portfolio theory- Implemented at the business unit, Implemented at the firm level 
product, geographical, and legal (integrated) 
entity (i. e. fragmented). 
b. Market price based Fragmented Integrated 
approach 
c. CAPM Fragmented Integrated 
d. Pricing of Options Fragmented Integrated 
e. Relationship between 
capital structure and 
value Fragmented Integrated at the firm level 
3. Risk identification - Risk is an adverse outcome or - Risk is opportunity, hazard and uncertainty 
probability of losses - Risks are categorized into a broader 
- Risks are categorized into category (i. e. market risk, credit risk, 
interest-rate risk, equity risk, operational risk, liquidity risk, legal risk and 
foreign exchange risk, commodity reputational risk) to provide context for the 
risk, etc. scope of risk management. 
- Risks are also grouped into different types 
that can be: (t) eliminated by simple business 
practice,; (n) transferred to other 
participants; and (iii) actively managed, at the 
firm level 
4. Risk measurement 
a. Gap analysis To measure B/S interest-rate risk As a complementary technique 
b. Duration analysis To measure B/S interest-rate risk As a complementary technique 
c. Statistical analysis To measure interest-rate risk, 
foreign exchange risk, commodity As a complementary technique 
risk, etc. 
d. Scenario analysis To measure interest-rate risk, As a complementary technique 
foreign exchange risk, commodity 
risk, etc. 
e. Value at Risk To measure probability of losses To integrate all risk measurements, 
of each risk category and to investment decisions, and capital allocations. 
calculate capital. 
5. Controlling risk and Limit and control risk for Limit and control risk at firm-wide level; 
performance individual trader, unit, risk-return compensation systems; risk- 
measurements geographical location and legal return performance measurement systems; 
entity and optimisation of positions 
Source: Dowd (1998); Jorion (1997); Santomero (1999); Crouchy, Galai, and Mark 
(2001) and Venkat (2000). 
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Figure 3.3 Eight Key Elements to Achieve Best Practice of Risk Management 
1. Policy 
8. Economic capital 2. Risk identification 
Best 
7. Risk analysis Practice 3. Business process 
6. Reporting 4. Measurement methodology 
5. Exposure management 
Source: Crouchy, Galai, and Mark (2000b), and Dowd (1998). 
Crouchy, Galai and Mark (2000b) also note that, in practice, the leading banks have 
implemented a set of rules to measure market risk VaR and credit risk VaR and are just 
beginning to develop a third set of rules to measure operational risk that leads to an 
attempt to integrate an operational risk VaR measure, as illustrated in Figure 3.4. 
To date, in practice, there is no consensus on how to measure operational risk. Market 
risk VaR quantification techniques have been implemented by the industry for many 
years and have been proposed by the Basle Committee (BIS, 1993,1996,1998,1999b). 
Credit risk VaR methods are only just beginning to be implemented but have not yet 
been accepted by The Basle Committee. When analysing market and credit risk, many 
institutions take a `Step Wise' approach, as suggested by Wilson (2000), encompassing 
the definition of risk, identification of risk factors, the measurement of exposures to 
those risk factors, and the calculation of risk that relies on a number of assumptions, 
such as the use of risk factors to measure exposures, and determination of the time 
horizon and confidence intervals to be used. Table 3.3 exhibits the steps involved in 
measuring market, credit and operational risk under the VaR approach. 
77 
Figure 3.4. Integrated Risk Model 
Regulatory 
Capital 
Market Risk 
VaR 
Integrated 
F mework 
Source: Crouchy, Galai and Mark (2000b) 
3.6.2.2 The Integration of Market Risk, Credit Risk and Operational Risk 
The idea to integrate the measurement of bank risks, encompassing market risk, credit 
risk, and operational risk, arises for a number of reasons (Jarrow and Turnbull, 2000; 
Dowd, 1998; Wilson, 2000; Crouchy, Galai, and Mark, 2000b): Firstly, economic theory 
tells us that market and credit risk are intrinsically related to each other. If the market 
value of the firm's assets unexpectedly changes generating market risk, then the 
probability of default will be affected, generating credit risk. Conversely, if the 
probability of default unexpectedly changes, generating credit risk, then the market risk 
would be affected, generating market risk. The default probabilities are correlated due to 
their dependence on common economic factors. Secondly, a single and consistent 
measure over all the lines of business units (i. e. VaR measure) will lead to better 
computation of capital requirements, pricing and performance measurement (i. e. risk- 
adjusted return) for different groups within a bank. Thirdly, most models, such as 
CreditRisk+ and KMV that emphasize the accrual accounting perspective and focus 
on only default risk with interest rates assumed to be constant, imply that these 
methodologies cannot assess the risk associated with interest rate derivatives. This 
clearly leads to difficulties in integrating market and credit risk when banks are involved 
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Economic 
Capital 
Table 3.3 Step Wise Approaches to Analysing Market, Credit, and Operational 
Risk 
Market risk Credit risk Operational risk 
Define risk types Interest rate risk C'nterparty default risk Control risk 
Equity risk Concentration risk Process risk 
Commodity risk Credit deterioration risk Human resources risk 
Foreign exchange risk Sovereign risk 
Identify risk factors Basis point values and Incorrect trade details 
curve volatility by time 
Credit rating migration Wrong incoming 
bucket matrix, 
default rates and message 
recovery rates Aging technology 
Fraud/collusion 
Staff sickness /turnover 
Morale 
Culture 
Measure exposure to Net cash flows by time Mark to market, 
Volume of trades 
risk factors bucket IT capacity utilization potential exposure Level of mismatched 
confirms 
Unreconciled items 
Failed settlements 
Degree of segregation 
of duties 
Calculate risk Parametric VaR method Credit VaR method, Operational risk VaR Exposures, risk factors exposure multiplied by Method: exposures and their correlation default less recovery multiplied by 
and their correlation probability. 
Generate loss 
distribution and to a 
specified confidence 
interval measure 
unexpected loss 
Calculate profit Change in risk factors/ Change in risk factors 
and loss and explain exposures intra-day Explain monthly 
Volatility in residual 
sources variation in value of earnings 
after stripping 
out the effect of market, credit credit and strategic 
Compare risk against Parametric VaR method method Credit 
business risk 
return Exposures, risk factors , Exposure posue multiplied by 
Calculation of the 
and their correlation default less recovery 
incremental effect 
and their correlation 
Source: Wilson (2000) 
in derivatives activities. And fourthly, an "Add-On" VaR model that adds the market 
and credit risk VaR to compute VaR's is very simple but unsatisfactory because it can 
result in double counting. Jarrow and Turnbull (2000) developed the first model, the so- 
called "Reduced Form Model", to try to address this issue of full integration of market 
risk and credit risk. 
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3.6.3 ERM Practices in Other Banking Systems 
Two recent BIS surveys [BIS (2001,2003a)] on the risk management practices of 31 
financial institutions operating in 12 jurisdictions (i. e. Belgium, Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, and 
United States) reveals two important findings: (1) there is now greater emphasis on the 
conduct of risk management on an integrated firm wide basis; and (2) related efforts are 
being made to "aggregate" risks through the use of mathematical risk models. The BIS, 
2003 report also suggests that supervisory and regulatory authorities have influenced 
and have been influenced by these trends, by putting into effect initiatives such as the 
Gramm-Leach-Gilley Act (GLBA) in the United States, the Financial Conglomerates 
Directive (FCD) in the European Union, the emergence of a single supervisory body 
such as the Financial Services Authority in the United Kingdom, and Basel II. 
3.7 Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) 
Past studies on the integration of risk management, as described earlier, focus on the 
integration of the risk measurement of market risk and credit risk. The approaches still 
result in a fragmented system, since the risk management process is not integrated. 
The firm-wide risk management suggested by Crouchy, Galai and Mark (2001) 
encompasses not only risk integration - the first stage being the integration of credit risk 
and market risk - but also an integration process of policy, risk identification, business 
process, measurement methodology, exposure management, reporting, risk analysis and 
economic capital calculation. Venkat (2000), however, suggests a more integral and 
richer framework, the so-called Enterprise Risk Management (ERM). 
This section presents the features or characteristics of an ERM framework as suggested 
by Venkat (2000), which involves establishing the scope for firm-wide risk management 
and defining the ERM framework. This will be used as a benchmark to evaluate the 
implementation of risk management in Indonesian banking industry, as presented in 
Chapter 4. 
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3.7.1 Establishing the Scope for Firm-Wide Risk Management. 
Past studies indicate that academics and practitioners developed the nature of risk as the 
potential for loss underlying the value of an investment; see, for example, Jorion (1997) 
and Dowd (1998). Similarly, classification of risk, such as business risk, financial risk, 
systemic risk, market risk, credit risk, operational risk etc., demonstrates a lack of clarity 
as to what is exactly meant by risk. This concept of risk regards risk as an adverse 
outcome. In developing any approach to risk management, we should rule out this 
concept since it just limits the scope of risk management and does not accommodate 
Markowitz's principle. They, however, need to be made simple to analyse, so that the 
risks of a bank are broadly categorized into just a few categories, such as credit risk, 
market risk, operational risk, reputational risk and legal risk, in an effort to provide a 
context for the scope of enterprise risk management 
Accordingly, this section presents diverse definitions and classifications of bank risks, 
suggested by authors according to their analytical purposes. 
Some authors define risk as uncertainty about the outcome. Uncertainty is not knowing 
exactly what will happen in the future. In statistics, the volatility of potential outcomes 
can be plotted on a probability distribution curve, in which the normal measure of 
dispersion would be either the standard deviation or variance. The wider the standard 
deviation, the greater the volatility, and thus the higher the uncertainty and the risk. 
Bank equity capital can also be calculated on a risk-adjusted basis or economic capital 
based on asset risk (Cade, 1997). In finance, risk is defined as the probability of making 
a profit or losing money on an investment. The types of risk to consider in financing 
and investment depend on which analyst one studies (Peterson, 1994). There are many 
possible ways to classify risk. Mullin (1977), and Graham and Homer (1988), for 
example, divide bank risks into management and operational risks. Gardener (1986) 
classifies risk into general risk, international risk and solvency risk. Cade (1997) classifies 
risk into solvency risk, liquidity risk, credit risk, interest rate risk, price risk, and 
operating risk. 
Economists draw a fundamental distinction between microeconomic or idiosyncratic 
risks, which can be diversified away through the law of large numbers, and 
macroeconomic or systemic risks, which cannot (Freixas and Rochet, 1998; 
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Dewatripont and Tirole, 1999). They also make a fundamental distinction between 
liquidity risk and solvency risk. The solvency risk actually represents a summary of all 
the risks listed since risks can be absorbed by adequate capital such that the bank can 
remain solvent. Consequently, in practice, the likes of the Federal Reserve System and 
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency do not list solvency risk separately (Koch 
and MacDonald, 2000). Other economists, (e. g. Flannery and Guttentag, 1979; and 
Guttentag and Herring, 1988) divide bank risk into market risk, and the risks arising 
from economic and environmental changes. Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965a) also 
classify risk into systematic risk (or market risk) and unsystematic risk. Systematic risk is 
in the portfolio investment as a result of changes in stock prices that move with the 
general market. Unsystematic risk is the risk arising from specific changes as a result of 
changes in an industry or specific firm due to internal factors (e. g., mismanagement and 
strikes). Rosenberg and Perry (1981) divide risk into three components: systemic risk; 
specific risk; and extra market covariance. Maisel (1981) classifies bank risk into interest 
rate risk, operating risk, fraud, and economic and political risk. 
Jorion (1997) classifies risk broadly into three types, business risk, strategic risk, and 
financial risk. Business risk is associated with the corporate willingness to create a 
competitive advantage and add value for shareholders. Strategic risks are those resulting 
from fundamental shifts in the economy or political environment. Financial risks relate 
to possible losses in financial markets. He also classifies financial risk into the broad 
categories of market risks, credit risk, liquidity risk, operational risk, and legal risk. 
In practice, the Federal Reserve System (1995) has adopted risk-focused safety and 
soundness examinations and inspections, as noted by Koch and MacDonald (2000). The 
Fed identified six types of risk namely, credit risk, market risk, liquidity risk, operational 
risk, legal risk and reputational risk. The Fed regards risk management as very important 
to the soundness of the banking industry. The OCC's definition of risk is of the same 
general type as the Board of Governors' model except that market risk is divided into 
price risk, interest rate risk, and foreign risk. 
In relation to bank regulations, Kaufman (1996) suggests that authorities face a trade-off 
between two banking problems: first, systemic risk that comes from the failure of one or 
more banks; and second, non-systemic bank failures resulting from excessive risk-taking 
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and inadequate regulatory discipline. The first problem may be solved by introducing a 
safety net in the form of government deposit insurance and having the central bank act 
as lender of last resort. He also notes, that if poorly-designed or implemented, this 
solution is likely to increase the fragility of banks and exacerbate the second problem. 
For these reasons, I conclude that banks are concerned with business strategic risk and 
financial risk, and bank regulators are concerned with systemic and non-systemic risk. 
Financial risk in a modern bank can thus be assumed to encompass market risk, credit 
risk, operational risk, liquidity risk, legal risk and reputational risk, as illustrated in Figure 
3.5. 
Figure 3.5 Components of Financial Risk 
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From an ERM viewpoint, following the suggestions of Puschaver and Eccles (1996), 
risk has three meanings. First, at one level the concept of risk is as an opportunity. This 
view implicitly analyses the relationship between risk and return, whereby the greater the 
risk, the greater the potential for return, but also the greater the potential for loss. 
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Second, at another level, the concept of risk is as a hazard, where risk is perceived as a 
negative event resulting in a financial loss. And third, the definition may fall in between 
these two, where the concept of risk is as an uncertainty. However, a bank cannot 
completely eliminate risk from the business proposition. A combination of defensive 
measures and offensive tactics is required to survive in banking business. If a bank 
strategy focuses entirely on defence, it helps to eliminate risks completely, yet eliminates 
returns too. Consequently, a bank is required to understand all the risks that arise from 
its activities and then manage these risks effectively. Finally, we can derive a concept of 
risk in a firm wide risk management framework, as follows: 
(i) Upside management- Creating and capitalizing on profitable opportunities, where a 
bank has a distinct opportunity to achieve gains with an improved chances of 
success. 
(ii) Downside management-. Establishing control systems and corrective measures to 
prevent or mitigate losses resulting from a changing business environment. 
(iii) Uncertainty management Applying methods and techniques to reduce the variance 
between expected financial outcomes and actual returns. 
Accordingly, the state of contemporary risk management has evolved from the 
traditional approach, which emphasizes a limited set of risks, to embrace all risks within 
a bank, such as interest rate risk, political risk, regulatory risk, credit risk, settlement risk, 
collateral risk, tax risk, accounting risk, modelling risk, equity risk, personnel risk, 
technology risk, concentration risk and foreign exchange risk, to name but a few, within 
a firm-wide approach. For ERM, the bank risks have been made simple to analyse, so 
that the risks of a bank are broadly categorized into just a few categories, including 
credit risk, market risk, operational risk, reputational risk and legal risk, in an effort to 
provide a context for the scope of risk management. 
In the next sections, these bank risks are discussed in brief. 
3.7.1.1 Credit Risk. 
Credit risk is associated with the quality of individual assets and the likelihood of 
default. It arises from the possibility that a borrower or counterpart will fail to perform 
an obligation. Loans typically exhibit the greatest risk, particularly for traditional banks. 
Before giving a loan a bank must perform loan analysis for the prospective borrowers to 
limit the risk and to reduce problem loans. 
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3.7.1.2 Liquidity Risk. 
Liquidity risk is the potential that a firm will be unable to meet its obligations as they fall 
due because of an inability to liquidate assets or raise adequate funding from new 
sources at reasonable cost (so called funding liquidity risk) or because it cannot easily 
unwind or offset specific exposures in a cost effective manner because of inadequate 
market depth or market disruption (so called market liquidity risk). Liquidity risk mostly 
arises when a bank faces unpredictable new loan demand or deposit withdrawals and 
does not have access to new sources of cash. Risk measures must take account of both 
the bank's ability to borrow funds and its liquid assets near maturity or available for sale. 
A bank with the greater equity and lower financial leverage can raise more debt with less 
chance of becoming insolvent. The contagion effect as a result of liquidity and credit 
failures of a bank can lead to systemic risk, the so-called domino effects. 
3.7.1.3 Market risk 
Market risk is the risk to a financial institution's earnings and stockholders' equity 
resulting from adverse movements in market rates or prices. The market risks comprise 
interest rate risk or reinvestment rate risk, equity or security price risk, and foreign 
exchange risk. Jorion (1997) identifies market risk as basis risk and gamma risk. The 
former occurs when the relationship between the products used to hedge each other 
changes or breaks down; the latter arises due to non-linear relationships. Banks with 
large positions in derivatives are affected by both basis and gamma risk, even though 
they are fully hedged. He also argued that market risk can take two forms: (i) absolute 
risk, measured by the loss potential in terms of certain currencies; and (ii) relative risk, 
measured by the loss potential relative to a benchmark index. Market risk capital 
requirements as set out in Basel I and II are analyzed in detail in Chapter 2. 
3.7.1.4 Operational risk 
Operational risk refers to unexpected losses resulting from inadequate information 
systems, operational problems, breaches in internal controls, fraud, or unforeseen 
catastrophes. Jorion (1997) identifies operational risks as the potential losses resulting 
from inadequate systems, management failures, faulty controls, fraud, or human error, 
including execution risk, technology risk and model risk. Execution risk is generally a 
problem of back office operations and results from failure to execute trades resulting in 
costly delays or penalties. Technology risk refers to the need to protect systems from 
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unauthorized access and tampering, system failures, and losses due to natural disasters 
or accidents involving key individuals. Model risk arises when the model used to value 
positions is flawed. 
3.7.1.5 Legal risk 
Legal risk arises from the potential that unenforceable contracts or lawsuits can disrupt 
or otherwise negatively affect the operations or condition of banking organizations. 
According to Jorion (1997), legal risk also includes compliance risk and regulatory risk 
which is associated with the likelihood of violating government regulations, such as 
those covering market manipulation, insider trading, and suitability restrictions. As a 
matter of fact, the regulatory framework affecting banks varies widely across countries, 
and even within a country. A bank can also be subject to legal changes and suffers from 
differences of interpretation of the law. A bank can thus suffer losses due to incomplete 
understanding of the regulations. 
3.7.1.6 Reputational risk 
Reputational risk is the potential that negative publicity regarding an institution's 
business practices, whether true or not, will cause a decline in the customer base, costly 
litigation, or revenue reduction, as proposed by the Federal Reserve System (Koch and 
MacDonald (2000). The risk is not separately identified by most authors, however 
Wilson (2000), for example, classifies it as an element of operational risk (Dowd, 1998). 
3.7.2 Defining an ERM Framework 
Following the suggestions of Venkat (2000), who studied empirically the best practices 
of risk management within financial and non-financial firms around the world, which 
have been endorsed by the Global Association of Risk Professional (GARP)s. It is 
possible to define an ERM framework as an optimal combination of four main elements 
of risk management, comprising strategy, processes, infrastructure and environment. It 
helps a bank to make intelligent risk-taking decisions prior to allocating economic 
5GARP is a not-for-profit, independent organization of over 10.000 financial risk management 
practitioners and researchers from over 90 countries. GARP was founded by Marc Lore and Lev Borodovsky in 1996. GARP members discuss risk management techniques and standards, critique current 
practices and regulation, and help bring the potential risks in the financial markets to the attention of 
other members and the public. 
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resources and to monitor the outcome of its decisions, as depicted in Figure 3.6. 
Having analysed the ERM concept, these elements can be further broken down into 14 
sub elements (which are used in this study as a benchmark to evaluate empirically the 
state of risk management in the Indonesian banking industry, as presented in Chapter 
4), encompassing (1) Risk management philosophy and strategy; (2) Risk management 
environment; (3) Process and control; (4) Types of financial instruments; (5) The review 
system of risk management; (6) Infrastructure; (7) Separation of duties; (8) Financial 
instruments valuation; (9) Credit risk measurement; (10) Market risk measurement; (11) 
Operational risk measurement; (12) Liquidity risk measurement; (13) Limit system; and 
(14) Data and information system. 
Figure 3.6 An Enterprise Risk Management Framework 
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The existence of an ERM ensures the following process: (i) identification and awareness 
of all significant risks faced by a bank; (ii) development of consistent risk measures and 
proper management controls; (iii) incorporating risk management best practices; and (iv) 
ensuring an optimal bank management. This is a complex and dynamic effort involving 
the use of a top-down approach by the agents at a bank. 
It is used to achieve the following objectives: (a) to provide a link between business 
strategy and risk management strategy to ensure consistency with competitive 
advantages to eliminate, transfer, and actively manage risk at the firm level (see, for 
example, Oldfield and Santomero (1997); (b) to institute a risk governance process 
to support the business strategy, (c) to enhance risk management conduct through the 
proper alignment of personnel, organizational guidance, and infrastructure with the risk- 
taking activities; (d) to establish rational and dynamic boundaries across all risk types 
that reflect the business strategy and external environment-, and (e) to institute a risk- 
adjusted performance measurement framework to align individual behaviour with 
business strategies and risk management objectives. Enhanced organizational awareness 
and focus on improving the quality and sustainability of a bank's earnings heighten the 
efficient allocation of capital to optimise the returns on risk, and meet value 
propositions (i. e. shareholder value). 
Meanwhile, Crouchy, Gabi and Mark (2001) also suggest that the best practices of 
enterprise (integrated) risk management can be depicted as in Figure 3.7. The figure 
shows that the ultimate objective of integrated risk management is to manage risks 
actively in a portfolio context. The steps to be taken are as follows: First, a limit 
management process is needed to help identify and select the risks that the firm is 
willing to take. Second, an integrated assessment of market risk and credit risk using 
Value-at-risk (VaR) models for all trading businesses is ideally required to capture the 
bank's risk exposures. Risk analysis should be complemented by stress testing and 
scenario analysis to assess the extent of potential losses during exceptional market crises. 
Third, performance measurement using risk-adjusted returns on capital (RAROC) is an 
important part of an integrated risk management process. Fourth, all parts (as described 
from 1 through 3) should be in place to ensure optimal risk pricing and active portfolio 
management. 
In the next sections, analyses of the five main features of an ERM framework 
comprising strategy, process, infrastructure and environment, are presented. 
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3.7.2.1 Strategy 
A prudential ERM framework begins with a clear business mission, objectives and 
strategies. Best practice balances the opportunity for revenue generation against the 
possibility of losses and offers alternatives for mitigating the impact of these potential 
losses. A corporate strategy is supported by a business proposition, based on some 
aspect of competitive advantage and comparative advantage, which is needed to 
enhance and sustain shareholder value. Robust business strategies clearly define the risks 
to be taken, the levels of risk taking, and the expected risk-adjusted returns. Meanwhile, 
business strategies are linked proactively rather than reactively to risk management 
strategy by incorporating new ventures, products, trading strategies, and customer 
initiatives. A dynamic process of frequent re-examination of the links between business 
purpose, risk-taking capacity, and risk management practices - risk intermediation, risk 
retention and risk transfer (e. g. Santomero, 1999) - will deliver earnings and 
sustainability and ultimately increase shareholder value. 
Figure 3.7 Steps Toward Integrated Risk Management. 
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Setting Risk Appetite 
Having linked the business strategy to the risk management strategy and business 
proposition, an organization has to establish its risk appetite. Risk appetite may be 
defined as the nature and level of risks that are acceptable to the firm and its various 
business units. The linking of risk appetite to risk strategies helps in the assessment of 
business units and corporate performance. Establishing risk appetite involves making 
decisions on the risk level to be taken, a firm's desired mix of risks, (consistent with the 
business strategy and objectives), the level of capital to be held, the risk mitigation to be 
taken, the opportunities to be taken and to be abandoned, and the capital to be used in 
desired ventures. The leading organizations in the world use a decision framework 
involving internal and external factors, such as strategy, capital levels and internal 
constraints. A typical decision framework is depicted in Figure 3.8. 
Figure 3.8 Decision Framework for Setting Risk Appetite. 
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In determining risk appetite, key factors of strategic importance to be considered cover 
competitive and comparative advantages of an organization's market, business/product 
mix, customer base, execution capabilities within risk-taking activities and investors' 
expected performance. For example, many banks in the US in the late 1980s and early 
1990s (the Glass Steagall Act was abolished in 1999) entered new businesses in the 
capital market, which made them universal banks in nature. They, however, 
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underestimated the need for risk management enhancement leading to substandard 
shareholder value. It is vital for banks to disclose to shareholders and investors the risks 
to be taken in their business operations, (i. e. prior to launching any new ventures) and to 
explain how they are managing these risks. More specifically, senior managers should 
measure the impact of any new ventures on earnings volatility, and communicate to 
shareholders if they are willing to raise risk exposure in order to achieve the 
shareholders' expected returns, or indeed, if they adopting a more risk averse approach 
by reducing risk exposure or even dropping some high-risk activities with potentially 
high returns. 
The acceptable risk depends on a number of factors. First, how much risk can it afford 
and successfully manage? Second, how much capital is required by both regulators, due 
to safety concerns, and rating agencies, due to the possible impact of rating 
downgrades? Third, what is the level of economic capital set internally by the bank 
[Economic capital represents the number of standard deviations away from the 
expected losses (i. e. unexpected losses) at a certain significance level that is necessary to 
protect the bank from insolvency in the event of extreme losses in the bank's portfolio 
due to the risks taken]. The higher the risk appetite, the higher the economic capital and 
capital charges necessary. Fourth, a bank should consider what its organization, people, 
methodologies, limit and control system, and data and reporting system can handle. And 
fifth, risk appetite should be consistent with the level of risk awareness and risk culture 
within the enterprise, company skill, company performance, and experience. 
3.7.2.2 Process 
The risk management process should always be related to shareholder value creation; so 
risk management is not merely concerned with measuring, monitoring and reporting 
risks, but should also include links to business missions, strategies, execution of risks, 
and elements of the infrastructure. An integrated approach to managing the risks 
ensures full identification and awareness of significant risks, consistent with risk 
measures and risk management models, including capital consumption and performance 
evaluation at the business unit and the firm-wide levels. The results of risk-taking 
activities are continually evaluated, validated, and assessed and are always related to the 
organization's stated business goals and objectives. 
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Risk Awareness 
This is an important factor, although qualitative in nature, of a risk management 
process. The risk awareness must acknowledge the exposure and risk impact of each 
business activity at a firm wide level. Risk awareness is implemented through 
communicating risks, sharing lessons learned, and implementing industry best practices 
with respect to the firm wide risk management (ERM) framework 
Risk Assessment 
In a ERM framework, risk assessment should be viewed from a risk-return perspective 
at each transaction, portfolio and business level. The process of identifying, quantifying, 
and analysing inherent risks and expected returns should be conducted prior to the 
approval or execution of any transaction, new product or business activity so that 
management can assess the desired concentration of risks within portfolios or 
businesses. The role of risk management in the risk assessment process needs to be 
clearly defined with respect to establishing policies and criteria for approving new 
products or business ventures. 
Operations 
Segregation of duties of front-, middle- and back-office functions for executing, 
capturing, processing and settling all transactions with appropriate procedures should be 
in place for control purposes. The operational aspect can be centralized or specific to 
products, geographical location, or business unit. The most important operational 
element of meaningful risk management is the integrity and accessibility of data. 
Measurement and Control 
Measurement and control are fundamental attributes of risk management. Management 
should ensure that risk measurement and control are consistent across the firm to 
determine that the types and extent of risk being taken are consistent with the 
established risk appetite. Banks, depending on their business needs and their level of 
sophistication, can adopt various risk measurement procedures. Risk measurement 
serves as a basis for control mechanisms, such as the setting of limits and restricting the 
concentration of risk. 
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Evaluation 
Evaluation entails examination of different risk activities to measure whether risk-taking 
activities enhance or reduce shareholder value, and to ensure management can align risk 
activities to economic capital, regulatory capital and rating agencies' constraints. 
Therefore, internal performance measures and compensation practices are closely 
focused on the creation of shareholder value and meeting the customers' needs, so that 
business activities are always in line with the firm's strategy and customers' and 
shareholder' expected risks. 
3.7.2.3 Infrastructure 
The risk management infrastructure forms the foundation for the risk management 
framework by providing structural organization and its people, the policies and 
procedures, the methodologies, the limits and controls, and the operational and systems 
support for effectively executing the risk management process. It comprises the 
following aspects: (a) A central and independent risk management unit with clearly 
defined roles and its participation in the strategic decision-making process; (b) 
Formalized policies and procedures that clearly define and communicate the risk 
management process; (c) Consistent methodologies for risk measurement that capture 
the potential for losses, forgone opportunities and risk diversification effects across 
different risk categories; (d) A limit structure that sets maximum limits in relation to the 
capital and the firm's risk-taking philosophy, (e) Comprehensive management reports 
that reveal risk on a periodic basis; and (f) Information technology to satisfy risk 
information needs throughout the whole organization. 
The organizational model for firm-wide risk management harmonizes the appropriate risk 
culture and processes required, and the risk faced by a firm to make risk management a 
shareholder value enhancing activity. The correct model should be customized to fit the 
company's strategic objectives, culture and personnel. No one model fits all 
organizations. This function requires broad knowledge and experience. Risk 
management organization should meet two requirements: (i) it should reveal the firm's 
stance on risk taking, the goals of risk management, and senior management's 
endorsement of the risk management process; and (ii) it should provide the oversight 
structure to establish the appropriate checks and balances. The oversight of risk 
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management starts and ends with a firm's Board of Directors, which is ultimately 
accountable for the risks assumed by the firm and can delegate its authority in this area 
to the firm's risk management function to carry out the tasks for managing and 
controlling risks. An optimal organisational framework involves the following. (i) An 
organization that enables the Board of Directors to oversee different risks across the 
corporate enterprise; (ii) Ensuring that there are firm wide risk management missions, 
objectives and accountability; (iii) Ensuring that the firm-wide risk management 
missions, objectives, and accountability are communicated and accepted throughout the 
organization; (iv) Ensuring that there is a culture of information-sharing and 
interdepartmental cooperation that is the core of success of a firm-wide risk 
management function; (v) Ensuring that units are responsible for assessing, authorizing, 
taking, and controlling each type of risk; (vi) Ensuring that risk-adjusted performance is 
measured and monitored; (vii) A level of empowerment of the firm-wide risk 
management that involves an advisory role, control-oriented functions and real authority 
to mandate and execute risk reduction; (viii) Firm-wide risk management function 
having the authority to set policies with the objectives to set risk limits and to approve 
exceptions to the rules; (ix) A clear line for reporting; (x) Having an effective 
mechanism for sharing responsibilities among various committees for different aspects 
of risk management; and (xi) Having adequate levels of financial and human resources 
that can be allocated to firm-wide risk management for developing and implementing 
appropriate risk management initiatives. 
The firm wide risk management framework tries to integrate roles and responsibilities of risk 
management functions for market, credit and operational risks under the oversight of one 
organizational unit. In some organizations, this function is done separately for market 
and credit risk by a mechanism whereby the firm's risk managers represent the 
corporate management function with responsibility for identification, measurement, 
monitoring and management of all risks under an integrated risk management 
framework. 
Models of risk management nankation are distinguished by the differences in organizational 
approaches. As a result, there are three main types of risk management model i. e. the 
traditional model, the financial risk management model, as suggested by Haubenstock 
(1999), and the firm-wide risk management model, as suggested by Venkat, (2000). 
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Haubenstock (1999) notes that the traditional risk management organization model was 
adopted by financial institutions where different organizations are responsible for 
different risks, as depicted in Figure 3.9. In this model, there is typically a chief credit 
officer who sets policy and approves exposures, a market risk executive who also sets 
policy and measures and reports risk limits, and various organizations that are involved 
in managing operational and other risks. 
Haubenstock (1999) also suggests that several firms in leading financial institutions have 
implemented the financial risk management organization model with a clear integration of 
market and credit risk, as illustrated in Figure 3.10, the-so-called financial risk 
management organization model. Meanwhile, responsibility for operational risk remains 
split among various organizational units or may be addressed by a separate committee. 
Under this model, market and credit risks are better integrated. Senior managers have 
better risk awareness but operational risk management, as in the traditional model, 
remains fragmented in various organizations and lacks clear accountability. 
Meanwhile, the firm-u de risk management organisation model is constructed based on the 
assumption of an integration of risks and allows a chief risk officer (CRO) to have 
considerable influence over the firm's risk philosophy and strategy. Figure 3.11 
illustrates an example of a firm-wide risk organizational structure, and yet it should be 
regarded as a minimum standard for organizational design. The CRO has close 
reporting links to the chief executive officer, the chief financial officer, and/or the 
Board, in such a way as he or she can provide input to risk-related decisions. The CRO 
may also chair or be a member of various risk governance and approval committees 
within the corporation, among others the market risk committee, credit risk committee, 
operational risk committee, asset/liability committee, etc, , as suggested 
by 
Haubenstock (1999). The main role of 
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Figure 3.9 Traditional Organizational Model for Risk Management 
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Figure 3.10 Financial Risk Management Model 
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The CRO covers integration of market and credit risk, capital allocation, risk-adjusted 
performance measurement or new product and acquisition analysis. An effective risk 
manager is one who can ensure that each employee is a `risk manager' who balances risk 
and returns in the course of day-to-day business. It is critical that the risk manager 
disseminates a risk culture throughout the organization. 
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Figure 3.11 Firm-Wide Risk Management Organizational Model 
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Policies and Procedures 
In developing policies and procedures, the ERM model adopts a top-down approach to 
ensure that they are consistent with one another and reflect the strategic objectives and 
the overall risk appetite of the firm. As a result, corporate risk management policies and 
procedures must be endorsed by senior management who actively put them into the 
culture of the firm. Policies and procedures provide detailed guidance on a firm's risk 
management approach. 
Methodologies 
Methodologies are risk measurements conducted by financial institutions. Under the 
ERM framework, various risk measurements must be interlinked and integrated, so that 
the methodologies support risk aggregation and decomposition within and across 
various levels of organization, including product type, geography, risk type (i. e. market 
risk, credit risk, operational risk) etc. On the other hand, business risk, including 
competition, new regulation, evolving market structure, macroeconomic changes, etc. is 
tackled by setting and executing overall corporate strategy. However, Venkat (2000) 
suggests that, in practice, financial and non-financial institutions have implemented 
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different methodologies for measuring market risk, credit risk and operational risk, as 
discussed in the next sections. 
Measuring Market Risk 
The capital adequacy framework introduced by The Basel Committee in 1988 only 
linked credit risk to capital requirements. To accommodate many criticisms, the Basle 
Committee (1996) proposed an amendment to incorporate market risk in addition to 
credit risk. Banks, at national discretion, were also allowed to adopt internal models 
instead of a standardized approach, to be implemented at the end of 1997. Finally, the 
Basel committee recently issued the New Capital Adequacy Framework (BIS, 1999a), 
which still recognizes the existing standardized approach, but suggests some 
sophisticated banks can be allowed to use internal credit ratings and, at a later stage, 
portfolio credit models in order to contribute to a more accurate assessment of credit 
risk for computing bank's capital requirements in relation to its particular risk profile. 
Market risk models can be boiled down into the regulatory approach (or standardized 
approach) and an alternative approach (or internal models approach). To date, Value at 
Risk (VaR) models have been widely used by academicians and practitioners to compute 
risk-based capital more accurately than if flat based capital requirements were used. 
Wilson (1998) provides a more complete definition of VaR which includes the exposure 
risk that is defined as the maximum possible loss for a given position or portfolio within 
a confidence interval over a specific time horizon. 
A VaR thus has three elements: (i) a position (or asset portfolio); (u) a confidence 
interval; and (iii) a time horizon (or holding period). The internal model approach based 
on the Basle Committee's document (BIS, 1996) defines a 99 percent confidence 
interval over a10-day time period. In practice, many Risk-Adjusted Performance 
Measures (RAPMs), such as Bankers Trust's Risk-adjusted Return on Capital 
(RAROC), use the concept of VaR to adjust return for the amount of risk undertaken 
by each position or business". 
6 For discussion of Risk-Adjusted Performance Measures methodologies from such a practical and 
theoretical standpoint, see Chew (1994), (D. Wilson (2000), T. Wilson (1998) and Dowd (1997). 
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The computation of VaR depends on two assumptions: (i) the sensitivity, AS, of a 
portfolio's market value to changes in market rates, OMTM, is as illustrated in part (a) of 
Figure 3.12; and (ii) the probability distribution of changes in market rates over the 
desired reporting period horizon is normal, as illustrated in part (b) of Figure 3.12, 
which also links the risk measures to capital requirements. 
Figure 3.12 VaR Measures and Risk Capital 
Portfolio sensitivity 
+ TM 
(a) 
Probability distribution 
+As 
0 
_ (b) +es 
>99 o MTM P b , ro . 
Risk Capital 
Max Loss 
. Within 99% 
_ conf 
interval 
Source: Wilson (1998) 
(c) 
+A S 
There are thus two important factors to consider. First, VaR measurement methods that 
assume that market rate innovations are normally distributed are not valid since 
empirical studies have shown that the historical return due to market movements leads 
to a higher peak at the mean than is predicted by the normal distribution, thus leading to 
fatter tails than under the normal distribution e. g., stable paretian and student-t 
distributions. Figure 3.13 illustrates a comparison between the normal distribution used 
to calculate VaR and the empirical distribution based on empirical studies by Chew 
(1994). And second, the parameters, such as volatilities and correlations, of market rate 
innovations assumed to be constant over the pre-specified time horizon are not 
consistent with the market rate volatilities. In connection with the parameter 
assumptions in relation to confidence levels and time horizons, these can be arbitrarily 
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determined by institutions or analysts, and the Basle Committee's recommended 
approach results in problems in using VaR, such as setting the trading limits, planning 
and budgeting. The criticism are illustrated in Table 3.4 
The impact of using this VaR model for bank regulations are: (i) since a bank cannot be 
expected to cover 100% of unexpected losses, the level of this capital cushion must be 
determined within prudent solvency guidelines over a reasonable time horizon needed 
to identify and resolve problem situations, (n) since the Basel Committee allows banks 
Figure 3.13 Normal Distribution Vs Empirical Distribution 
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to use their own internal VaR models, the regulator and supervisor must ensure the 
banks have in place sufficiently-developed management controls and policies, (iii) even 
though the Basel Committee determined the relevant parameters, such as a 99 per cent 
confidence level and a 10-day holding period horizon, in practice they are left up to the 
individual institution because there are a wide variety of different methods available. 
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Table 3.4 Common Critique of Capital Calculations Using VaR 
Portfolio Sensitivity Distributional Assumptions Arbitrary Parameter 
Assumptions Assumptions 
Local measures are not sufficient Stable and exploitable Reporting horizon 
Relationship 
" Correlation " Overnight 
" Delta and gamma do not " 
Volatilities " Liquidity- 
provide good approximations 
based 
for extreme movements 0 
Yearly 
" Delta ignores gamma or 
convexity risk. 
Other risks often ignored Arbitrage relationship Time aggregation rule 
" Volatility or vega risk " Triangular arbitrage 
" Rho or rate risk of spot exchange rate 
" Interest rate 
processes 
Model risk Skewed and unrealistic 
" Continuous re-balancing in 
liquid market 
" Symmetric, diffusion process 
distribution 
" Non symmetric 
distribution 
" Negative rates 
" Independent 
increments 
Source: Wilson (1998) 
Although VaR models entail some drawbacks, as described earlier, to date in practice it 
is the most widely applied model. There are three main approaches to computing the 
VaR (1) Historical Simulation, (2) the Variance-Covariance approach, and (3) Monte 
Carlo Simulation. The objective is to examine the features of every method in order to 
be able to choose the most suitable model that can represent the real expected loss (i. e., 
VaR measure) of the portfolio of a bank. 
Under the historical simulation method, the objective of a VaR system is to determine the 
distribution of end-of-period portfolio values based on potential changes in the market 
risk factors. In general, there are five steps for computing the VaR (i) identify the 
market risk factors that can be priced, such as commodity prices, interest rates or 
foreign exchange rates that affect the value of the portfolio at any given time; (ii) 
generate changes in the market risk factors to simulate the path of market rates over a 
suitable time horizon to look at future scenarios; (iii) calculate the simulated market 
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changes over a pre-specified period of time using the historical price functions and 
applied to the current portfolio (i. e. portfolio weight) to develop a distribution of end- 
of-period portfolio values; (iv) tabulate the empirical return distributions generated from 
these historical rates; and (v) select the extreme values based on the resulting 
distribution to determine the appropriate VaR. Figure3.14 demonstrates the process of 
VaR measurement in this approach. 
Figure 3.14 Simulation Process 
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In the first step, one has to determine the market risk factors that are present. Market 
risk factors are the variables that can change during the time period, such as interest 
rates, equity prices, and exchange rates. 
The benefits of this method are: (i) although the amount of data required for historical 
simulation is much greater than for other VaR methodologies, the procedure is generally 
straight-forward and easy to implement; (ii) the historical simulation approach can 
easily be explained to the interested parties; (iii) the same data can then be stored for 
later use in estimating VaR, (iv) users can choose an appropriate time horizon and can 
reconstruct historical portfolio returns from a time horizon to another horizon; (v) this 
method captures gamma and vega risk, and correlations; (vi) it also accounts for "fat 
tails" and, since it does not rely on valuation models, is not prone to model risk. On the 
other hand, it has some shortcomings, such as: (i) only one sample path is used; (ii) the 
assumption that the historical returns fairly represent the immediate future is not 
consistent with the real world that contains volatility; (iii) the VaR measure is only a 
statistical estimate and may vary, depending on the pre-determined time horizon; and 
(iv) it is difficult to use this method for large and complicated portfolios Oorion, 1997 
and Wilson, 1998). 
102 
The measurement of VaR in Monte Carlo Simulation methods uses the same general steps 
as those in historical simulation. The only differences are: (i) the Monte Carlo simulation 
uses the user's specific models for return distributions; and (ii) the simulation is repeated 
thousands of times (i. e. using a computer) to get a distribution of portfolio values. This 
method is commonly used for calculating VaR for the pricing and risk management of 
complex derivatives portfolio. On the other hand, it is difficult to implement because it 
requires the estimation of non-observable parameters, highly skilled staff, an expensive 
computer programming facility and a sound infrastructure system (Jorion, 1997 and 
Wilson, 1998). 
The variance-covariance method which is also known as the analytic method, is based on the 
assumption that the market movements are normally distributed and the portfolio is a 
linear function of these normal risks. The VaR is just a multiple of the portfolio 
standard deviation. Unlike the other approaches, this method needs an additional step 
called the "mapping" of the assets onto benchmark assets to generate the standardized 
position, as defined by the user. If the standardized position has been created, the next 
step is to translate the standard deviations of percentage changes in the market risk 
factors into the standard deviations of the values of the standardized positions. The 
standard deviations of the standardized positions are then compared to the standard 
deviations of the changes in the market risk factors to determine their sensitivity to the 
market risk factors. The multiple of the standard deviation of the standardized position 
as a characteristic of the normal distribution becomes the VaR of the portfolio. 
The Stress Testing Method usually known as scenario analysis, is a complementary method 
to the VaR approaches discussed earlier. Stress testing methods examine the effect of 
simulated large movements in key financial variables on the portfolio. The scenarios are 
specified subjectively by the users to assess possible changes in the value of the 
portfolio. The effectiveness of this method depends on whether the scenarios can 
represent the typical market movements. If the market movements are greater than the 
simulated ones, such stress testing will not be effective at identifying potential loss. As a 
result, the user should change the scenarios over time, to reflect the appropriate market 
changes. The pitfall of this method is it cannot handle correlations between variables. 
103 
The extreme value approach for VaR has been developed in various articles. Dowd (1998) 
and Longin (2000) have developed a model based on empirical phenomena (i. e. 
catastrophic events), such as the stock market crash of October 1987, turmoil in the 
bond market in February 1994 and financial crisis in emerging markets. From the 
regulators' point of view, the capital allocated by a bank has to cover even the largest 
losses such that a bank can stay in business even after a great market shock. In 
statistics, extremes of a random process refer to the lowest observation (or the 
minimum value) and to the highest observation (the maximum value) over a given time- 
horizon. The VaR affected by such financial crises can be computed more appropriately 
by the extreme value approach for VaR rather than that of the VaR classical method, 
which means capital requirements can be calculated more precisely, both by 
management and regulators. 
Measuring Credit Risk 
Credit risk, in part, can be measured using the description of the institutional context on 
the basis of the risks arising from the loans. Defining and measuring credit risk is 
equivalent to determining how the market players evaluate the probability of default by 
a particular borrower, taking into account all possibilities of diversification and hedging 
provided by financial markets. The riskiness of a loan will be affected by the existence 
of collateral, compensating balances, endorsements, information sharing, and 
bankruptcy procedures (Freixas and Rochet, 1998 and Dowd, 1998). 
In the last 20 years, credit risk measurement has evolved dramatically, both for 
individual loans and portfolios of loans (Altman and Saunders, 1997), in the following 
ways. First, credit risk measurement has evolved through the use of: (i) expert systems 
and subjective analysis; (ii) accounting- based credit scoring systems; (iii) other (newer) 
modes of credit risk measurement; (iv) measurement of the credit risk of off balance 
sheet instruments; and (v) measures of credit concentration risk. Second, fixed income 
portfolio analysis adjusts the portfolio return for risk (Altman and Saunders, 1997). 
According to Dowd (1998), credit risk has three main components. First, the probability 
of default (default risk), or the probability that the counterparty will fail to make a 
contractual payment. The new models are designed to quantify credit risk on a portfolio 
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basis, and thus have applications in the control of risk concentration, the evaluation of 
return on capital at the customer level, and more active management of credit portfolios 
(Gordy, 2000). Second, the recovery rate, that is the proportion of a bank's claim that it 
recovers if the counter-party does default. Third, the credit exposure, that is a measure 
of the amount of financial loss if the client defaults. Credit risk has become much more 
complex in recent years because of developments in the derivatives markets. These risks 
are less transparent and more difficult to assess than traditional credit risks because: (i) 
the exposures depend on whether the contract has positive or negative market value and 
on future changes in contract values; and (ii) the potential for diversification across 
counter-parties and portfolios of instruments. There are several approaches to assessing 
credit risk, such as an accounting approach, the use of option pricing models, and 
statistical models as presented in the next sections. 
The accounting analytic approach used by banks in predicting the expected loss arising from 
credit risk is driven by the expected probability of default and the expected recovery rate 
in default. This approach uses financial ratios (e. g. return on investment, return on 
assets, average turnover ratio and leverage ratio), to estimate the credit quality of 
individual borrowers, by taking into account their cash flows. In contrast, statistical 
analysis may use non-financial variables to estimate the probability of default. 
There are four main statistical models used to estimate credit quality by predicting 
corporate failures, namely the linear probability model, the probit and logit models and 
discriminant analysis (Altman and Nararayan, 1997). West (1985) used a logit model 
along with factor analysis to measure the financial condition of financial institutions. 
Whilst, Altman and Varetto (1994) and Martin (1977) provide examples of the use of 
discriminant analysis. 
The option pricing approach to credit risk was originated by Black-Scholes (1973), Merton 
(1974) and Hull and White (1995). The probability of default is a function of the firm's 
capital structure, the volatility of the asset returns and the current asset values. In 
finance theory, extending a risky loan to a limited liability firm is similar to buying the 
firm's assets and selling a call option to its stockholders. In this model, it is assumed that 
the credit risk arising from the loan, where the only debt of the firm is a loan from the 
bank and the only external source of funds is equity, is equal to the value of a put option 
on the assets of the firm, V, at a strike price of K, with a maturity at time t. The market 
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value of a loan granted by a bank, Do, at date t=0, under this assumption will be Do = 
V- C where Cis the market value of a call option on V. 
The price of the put option, Po (European put option), is given by: 
Po = V. N(ai) + D#-'. a2 where N(a) _ 
/__$e-2 
. 
`2 d: is the cumulative of the 
standard distribution between - oo and d1 or d2, ai =1 log crVT 
QV-T V2 
and a2=di-QN[T- 
A risky loan should be charged a risk premium quoted by the bank and related to the 
market rate. The interest spread, S, between the risky loan, rL and the riskless rate, r is 
given by S= rL -r=- 
-log 
DnOý . 
The yield thus becomes T 
S=-T log Ndal) + N(h2) 
where4 = 
D`_' 
d 
is the "quasi" debt-to-asset-ratio since the correct evaluation of the debt-to-asset- 
ratio 
Do) 
is endogenous, and cannot be taken as a parameter. The theory of 
(F) 
derivatives credit risk is relatively less developed than VaR-based models of market risk. 
The focus of the credit risk management differs from that of market risk management, 
as illustrated in Table 3.5. 
The new BIS (2004) agreement for capital requirements allows banks to use internal 
models to assess regulatory capital related to both general market risk and credit risk for 
their trading book. Current credit risk modeln can be divided into two main groups 
(Crouchy, Galai and Mark, 2000a): first, mark-to-market models, that is the portfolio 
theoretic models, such as JP Morgan's CreditMetrics® (1995,1996) and the Merton- 
Style model implemented by the Consulting firm KMV; and second, default-mode 
models, such as CSFR'S CreditRisk+® and PortfolioView® advocated by McKinsey 
&Co. The mark-to-market models estimate the distribution of portfolio values at some 
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Table 3.5 The Comparison Between Market Risk VaR and Credit Risk VaR 
Items Market risk Credit risk 
Source of risk Market risk Market risk and default 
Unit to which risk limits 
apply 
Some level of trading 
organization 
Legal entity of counter 
party 
Time horizon Short (days) Potentially long (years) 
Legal issues Not applicable Very important 
Source: Jorion (1997). 
future date allowing for credit quality, even if they are short of full default, and thereby 
generate measures of portfolio VaR over a given horizon. Since marking-to-market of a 
series of past returns is difficult to construct, the distribution of the future values of 
loans is estimated using the probabilities of the loan ratings, which will change, but the 
changes of yield curve are assumed as constants. In contrast, the portfolio theoretic 
models are based on default being a discrete time, multi period model, where default 
probabilities are a function of macro variables such as unemployment, the level of 
interest rates, the growth rate in economy, government expenses, foreign exchange rates 
and credit cycles. 
Public rating ystems normally provided by rating agencies have been widely examined by 
many researchers. In contrast, to date, the internal rating systems literature that 
discusses the properties of internal rating systems has been only researched by a few 
individuals. The first article to provide a detailed analysis of internal credit risk systems 
in use at large US banks was written by Treacy and Carey (2000). Their study highlighted 
some important factors: (i) since the rating process always involves the exercise of 
human judgement, banks need to pay careful attention to the internal incentives that 
could distort a rating assignment; (n) there is no clear relationship between the assigned 
grade and actual loss experience; (iii) only a few US banks are moving towards models as 
the primary basis for internal ratings, and many banks use statistical models as an 
element of a rating process (Altman and Saunders, 1997). Most still believe that 
properly-managed, judgemental rating systems deliver a more accurate assessment of 
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risk. And (iv) in association with risk management, internal rating systems vary across 
the sample banks. 
Researchers have only just begun comparing the forecasts from different credit risk 
models. Crouchy, Galai and Mark (2000a) conducted a comparative analysis of credit 
models. Gordy (2000) also provided a comparative anatomy of credit models. 
Evaluation of credit risk models has been more difficult, in particular for third parties, 
such as auditors and regulators, than of market risk models because of their underlying 
time horizons (Lopez and Saidenberg, 2000). As a result, credit risk would take a very 
long time to produce sufficient observations for a reasonable test of forecast accuracy 
for these models. Contrariwise, credit data is generally widely available for use, in 
particular for calculating in a cross-sectional dimension. Due to the limited amount of 
historical data on credit losses available, (certainly not enough to span several 
macroeconomic or credit cycles) an additional number of years would be ideal for 
model valuation. For these reasons, Lopez and Saidenberg (2000), using a panel data 
approach, propose the Cross-sectional Simulation method (i. e. statistical resampling) 
combined with the use of qualitative methods, such as stress testing and sensitivity 
analysis. Under the simulation method, they will generate the additional observations of 
credit portfolio losses needed for model evaluation by resampling the previous 
observations with replacements from the original panel data set of loans. 
Measuring Liquidity Risk 
Liquidity risk is associated with the losses arising from the cost of meeting the 
contractual obligations by liquidating a position and arises where markets are 
imperfectly liquid. Dowd (1998) distinguishes two types of liquidity risk: (i) the normal 
liquidity risk that arises from the banks' normal day-to-day market operations when 
markets are less fully liquid (this can be found in most markets except for the big 
financial market); and (ii) market crisis liquidity risk (this is a systemic and more 
dangerous risk than the normal risk), arising due to a market crisis when the market has 
lost its normal level of liquidity and the position can be liquidated only by taking much 
larger losses than under normal conditions. For normal liquidity risk, liquidity costs are 
not taken into account in computing VaR for market risk. The liquidity cost arises 
together with market risk when the market is less liquid, where the market price also 
depends on the size of the trade to make and how long one takes to search the market 
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to get the best price. The relationship between the liquidity costs and VaR is illustrated 
in Figure 3.15. 
Figure 3.15 VaR, the Holding Period and Normal Liquidity Costs 
VaR 
., VaR (illiquid position) 
Liquidation cost 
VaR (liquid position) 
Holding period 
Source: Dowd (1998) 
There are two approaches for measuring VaR as a measure of liquidity risk: (i) the 
"Add-on" approach, by which the VaR market is adjusted by adding up the liquidity risk 
measures; and (ii) the VaR market models that take liquidity risk into account in the 
models. This model should be traced back into the VaR market model. Market liquidity 
risk is more difficult to handle and more dangerous. The only solution to this market 
crisis risk is making the extreme case assumption about close-out costs (Chew, 1996, pp. 
102-3). 
Measuring Operational Risk 
The concept of operational risk has not been well defined. The academic literature 
generally relates operational risk to operational leverage (i. e., the shape of the 
production cost function) and, in particular, to the relationship between fixed and 
variable costs (Crouchy, Galai and Mark, 2000b). The coverage of operational risk in 
general encompasses all phases of the business process, covering all the functions from 
origination through to execution and delivery and spanning the middle and back offices 
[Hoffman and Johnson (1996); Crouchy, Galai and Mark (2000b); Dowd (1998)]. 
Recent examples of the associated dangers include the case of Barings Bank, which 
collapsed in February 1995, and the recent Asian banking crisis, which was due to a 
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Holding cost 
combination of poor internal control systems and weak corporate governance. In 
September 1992, in the US, The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO) of 
the Treasury Commission produced the Internal Control - Integrated Framework for all 
firms, including financial institutions. All the key concepts of this document have been 
incorporated into American Statements of Auditing Standards (ASAS) (Wilson, 2000). 7 
The BIS, however, has issued (1998) an operational risk management document in 
which the main types of operational risk are broken down into internal control systems 
in a banking organization and corporate governance. The Basle Committee (1998) has 
also issued a proposal about The Framework for Internal Control in Banking 
Organizations. The BIS has also made an effort to incorporate operational risk into 
capital requirements by issuing a New Capital Adequacy Framework Proposal (BIS, 
1999) [agreed in June 2004]. Some developed countries have already adopted elements 
of the operational risk regulatory framework, such as in the RATE process in the UK, 
the CAMEL process in the USA, and the BAK Minimum Requirements for Trading 
Institutions in Germany. Some banks have implemented risk quantification 
methodologies, such as Algorithmics Methodology, NetRisk, RiskOps and Causal 
Model (Wilson, 2000), which can be used for measuring operational risk. Furthermore, 
the Basle Committee (1999a) has also issued a document with the title "Enhancing 
Corporate Governance for Banking Organizations" that provides the definition of 
corporate governance and its coverage. Corporate governance involves the manner in 
which the business and operations of an individual institution are governed by their 
Boards of Directors and senior management. In practice, measuring operational risk has 
been done using one of two approaches -a qualitative approach and a quantitative 
approach; but most of them have been qualitative, since some risk factors cannot be 
quantified. 
Measuring Legal risk 
Legal risk is the probability of a loss arising from uncertainty about the enforceability of 
contracts. Legal risk has been a particular issue with derivatives contracts since many 
derivatives contracts have not yet been legally tested. The handling and measurement of 
legal risk can use either a qualitative approach or a quantitative approach (Dowd, 1998). 
7 For example, SAS 55 states that internal control is a process affected by an entity's board of directors, 
management, and other personnel, designed to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement 
of objectives in the following categories: () reliability of financial reporting; (u) effectiveness and 
efficiency of operation; (iii) compliance with applicable laws and regulations. 
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With the qualitative approach, legal risk can be reduced by: (i) asking for good legal 
advice before important decisions are made; (ii) using standardized master agreements 
to reduce mistakes, misunderstanding and to reflect current best practice and to honour 
contracts; (iii) taking due care to fulfil legal obligations and to prevent legal disputes 
arising; (iv) tightening up operational controls, getting documentation right, and 
following procedures. Measuring legal risk using a quantitative approach is only possible 
for certain legal risks, such as computing legal costs (e. g., lawyers' fees, managerial 
resources allocated in dealing with legal issues, the cost of lost business, and the 
likelihood of disputes arising in the form of customer lawsuits), which is normally 
practiced by insurance companies. 
Transfer Pricing, Capital Allocation and Risk-Based Pricing 
Other best practices implemented by many leading financial institutions in the world are 
transfer pricing, capital allocation and risk-based pricing. The objectives are: to insulate 
business units from risks that are non-core to their activities; to realize the economies of 
scale allowing appropriate business units to hedge specific risks in the firm; to ensure 
that economic revenues are recognized at the corporate centre and within the business 
units consistently; and to prevent internal arbitrage between the units and to align 
actions with the objective of enhancing overall shareholder value. Table 3.6 illustrates an 
application of transfer pricing. 
Table 3.6 Transfer Pricing Applications 
Risk type Transfer pricing 
Franchise risk * Charge branch for use of brand name 
* Charge transactors for use of brand name 
Market risk 
- Funding risk * Charge units for funding costs incurred in funding desk 
- Interest rate risk * Charge market traders for market risk hedging costs 
-Foreign exchange risk * Charge trading desks for centralized currency risk hedging limits 
Credit risk 
- Settlement risk *Charge by credit derivatives desk to transactors for credit risk hedging costs 
- Counterparty risk 
Risk-based pricing aims at calculating the required net revenue on a financial product. 
Table 3.7 illustrates an example of a typical pricing approach at a bank to derive the 
required revenue, in basis points, of the notional value of a mortgage loan. The net cost 
of capital is the residual of the gross cost of capital, or the firm's cost of equity capital 
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less the marginal yield required on financial assets. Capital-at-risk is assumed to range 
from 4 to 14 basis points, depending on the loan type. Required net income equals 
capital-at-risk multiplied by the net capital cost. The marginal tax rate is assumed to be 
40%. Required revenue is calculated by adding expenses, credit costs, and 
funding/hedging costs to the required pre-tax income. The required revenue of the 
mortgage ranges from 3.13 basis points for a fixed 15-year mortgage to 4.92 for a 30- 
year nonconforming mortgage loan. 
Table 3.7 Risk-Based Pricing of a Mortgage 
Notional amount 
Net capital cost 
(basis points of notional) 
200,000 
6.5% 
CF-30 NCF-30 FIX 15 Ballon 7 
Capital-at-risk 10.00 14.00 4.00 6.00 
Required net income 0.65 0.91 0.26 0.39 
Tax 0.43 0.61 0.17 0.26 
Required pre-tax income 1.08 1.52 0.43 0.65 
Expenses 1.50 2.00 2.00 3.00 
Credit provision 0.30 0.40 0.20 0.20 
Funding/hedging costs 0.50 1.00 0.50 0.70 
Required revenue 3.38 4.92 3.13 4.55 
Limits and Controls 
Limits and controls are representations of the mechanism of a firm' risk appetite that 
have been communicated and articulated through senior management, business line 
management risk managers, traders and other risk takers. Each limit represents a 
threshold or acceptable boundary for permissible risk-taking activities. Best practices of 
limits and controls require that (i) they are consistent with the firm's overall business 
strategies; (ii) they reflect the different types of risk-taking activities to execute the 
strategies; (iii) limit setting begins with a bottom-up requisition for limits that are 
defined as revenue and net income budgets set for each business unit, (iv) these limits 
are evaluated and aggregated at the corporate level (i. e. by the firm-wide risk 
management function), and presented by senior management to the Board of Directors 
for approval; (v) approved budgets are sent back to the various business units; (iv) 
within business units these budgets are allocated to specific traders or risk takers; (vi) a 
firm's limit framework includes a combination of volume limits, risk sensitivity limits, 
portfolio level VaR limits, and stop-loss/advisory limits. Best practice for a limit-setting 
process is shown in Figure 3.16, as noted by Venkat (2000). 
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Data and Information Systems 
A data and information system is an element of an effective ERM framework. 
Historically, spending on ERM systems has been a small component of the total 
expenditures on trading technology (Meridien Research, 1998). Spending estimates for 
firm wide risk technology of global banks varies considerably because of the following 
factors: (i) the nature of the risk management function; (ii) overlap with other 
technology initiatives within institutions; (iii) different assumptions; (iv) different phases 
of the implementation life cycle, such as the implementation phase, updating phase or 
maintenance phase; (v) whether the technology is developed internally or acquired from 
external vendors; and (vi) diversity of businesses, financial instruments and locations 
supported by the technology base. Table 3.8 illustrates investment in such systems 
undertaken by banks around the globe. 
Best practices for the data and information system of an ERM system are as follows: (i) 
provision of accurate, timely and comprehensive data along with robust, and integrated 
information systems instead of fragmented risk management systems; (ii) the system 
must capture and measure key risks in a globally-integrated manner, hence ensuring 
transaction and position data, counterparty information, real-time market data, and 
Figure 3.16 Best Practices for a Limit-Setting Process 
Enterprise risk 
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Business 
unit level 
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Table 3.8 Spending on ERM systems at global banks (US$ millions) 
Compound 
Number of banks 1997 2002 Annual growth % 
America 21 80 167 16 
Asia 51 62 301 37 
Europe 78 206 505 20 
Subtotal 150 348 973 23 
Source: Meridien Research, 1997. 
modelling assumptions are appropriately captured in the system; (iii) elements of the 
ERM system existing within and across the front, middle and back offices comprising 
data models and repositories, interface with legacy systems, valuation models, risk 
calculation engines and analytic and data extraction and information reporting 
capabilities. Best practice for the architecture of an ERM system is depicted in Figure 
3.17 (Venkat, 2000). 
Risk Reporting 
A main objective of a reporting system of an effective ERM is to disclose clearly the 
nature of a firm's business, including its major risks, and its risk-reward (profitability) 
measures with respect to the impact of current and future market and internal factors on 
Figure 3.17 ERM Informational System Architecture 
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economic capital. A typical risk reporting framework that can deliver risk reports to 
different target audiences is depicted in Figure 3.18. 
The best practices in risk reporting include: (i) balancing a firm's ultimate risk 
measurement and reporting goals and its current capabilities; (ii) the ERM system 
capturing the risk profiles of different businesses; (iii) balancing ideal information 
content with current data availability and report generation capabilities; (iv) filling the 
gaps between the current reporting system and risk management system; (v) the current 
development system serving as a basis for developing an action plan to address the gaps; 
vi) data visualization improving the benefits of complex risk management information 
that can support business and risk management objectives, in the form of patterns and 
trends, deviations and outliers, and the identity of major sources of risk. 
Figure 3.18 ERM Risk Reporting Framework 
Risk reporting objectives: 
. Heighten awareness and transparency of all risk 
. Provide quantitative and qualitative information 
. Enhance shareholder value generation 
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Key objectives: 
Reaffirm risk appetite, business 
propositions and boundaries by 
assessing: 
- Risk profile 
" Performance 
" Internal and external 
business environment and 
risk implications 
Target audience: 
Senior Management 
Contents: 
- Summary madiet Ask 
- Detailed credit, liquidity, 
valuation and operational 
risk 
- Trend analysis 
- Business and market outlook 
Scope: 
Business unit globally 
Key objectives: 
Promote shareholders value 
creation by evaluating 
- Capital /resource 
allocation decisions 
- Earnings reliability and 
sustainability 
- Short and long tern 
business opportunities 
and their risks 
Target audieuce: 
Executive Management 
Contents: 
- Summary of all business 
and customer risk 
- Risk-adjusted 
performance 
measurement 
- Trend analysis 
- Business and market 
outlook 
- Status of key initiatives 
Scope 
Consolidated firm-wide 
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3.7.2.4 Environment 
An environment of firm-wide risk management provides the trustworthiness for risk 
management to play a role as a value added creator within an organization. 
Environmental aspects cover culture, training and communications, and performance 
measurement and compensation. 
Culture 
The traditional risk management approach entails other shortcomings, where risk 
management is limited to a risk measurement and risk monitoring function with an 
objective to meet auditors' and regulators' requirements. The ERM framework covers 
the value system of an organization and seeks to ensure the firm's value-added 
enhancement. The behaviour and attitude of a firm's leaders form the organisational 
culture. Consequently, a sound risk management begins from the very top and operates 
in an organization that offers strong accountability and adequate resources to the 
performance of the risk management function. The risk management culture defines the 
breadth and depth of the risk management contributions undertaken by risk takers, risk 
managers and all the employees operating in an organization to ultimately enhance a 
firm's value. 
Training and communication are elements of the ERM framework. Training is needed in an 
organization because of the rapid development of the infrastructural elements of risk 
management described earlier. Best practices of training and communication are the 
following. (i) training and communication should try to balance the objectives of senior 
management, line management, risk takers, and risk managers; (u) senior management, 
business unit management and risk takers should cope with the advances and be 
educated so that the risk management system, among other elements, can be improved 
over time; and (iii) communication is an important factor to ensure that there is a firm- 
wide risk awareness of the roles and responsibilities of the firm wide risk management 
group and all initiatives in a firm. 
An integral part of the ERM system is performance and compensation system that links the 
results of risk-taking activities to performance measurement and compensation. Best 
practices of performance and compensation are as follows: (i) there are risk-adjusted 
returns on economic capital (rather than conventional accounting-based profit and loss 
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calculations); (n) an incentive system aligns individual behaviour with the broader 
corporate objective of maximizing shareholder value; (iii) the compensation system tries 
to minimize risk and maximize performance; and (iv) performance measurement and 
compensation strengthen the risk management role and encourage a forward looking 
approach to the decision-making process to improve a firm's value in the longer-term; 
this in turn, reduces firm failures. Table 3.9 illustrates a basic model of risk-based 
compensation. 
Table 3.9 Basic model of risk based compensation 
Business I Business II 
Notional amount ($ million) 10,000 10,000 
Average tenor 10 1 
Inception and trading revenues $10 $2 
Bonus @ 20% revenue $2 $0.40 
Economic risk capital 1,000 20 
Return on risk capital 0.10% 10,0% 
Business I generates higher revenues but has high economic risk capital due to the 
higher risk, resulting in lower risk-adjusted returns. Therefore, the firm can choose a 
sound strategy and may be better off following strategy II thanks to linking performance 
to risk-adjusted returns and long-term risk- adjusted performance. 
As discussed above, the development of the VaR approach (under normal market 
condition) with its modifications, both in combination with the traditional approaches 
and more sophisticated methods such as the Extreme Value Approach for major 
changes, has been a powerful management tool in modern risk management for bank. 
There are a number of risk-adjustment methodologies for quantification of the risk- 
adjusted returns: (1) the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM); (2) the Arbitrage Pricing 
Theory (API); (3) Risk Adjusted Return on Capital (RARCIC), and (4) the Sharpe Ratio 
Approach. 
The CAPM was developed by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) based on the Portfolio 
Theory, as discussed earlier. This model can be used both for portfolio investment 
decisions and individual security decisions. The risks of asset investments can be 
eliminated by diversification. The investment decision will be made if its expected return 
exceeds a required return as given by 
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Rf'+ (Rm - xygßi 
where, W is the risk free rate of return, Rm is the expected rate of return on the market 
portfolio of risky assets, and ßßi is the hypothetical market volatility beta of the stocks. 
Consequently, the real flaw in the CAPM is that it fails to consider the impact on 
investment decisions of the specific portfolio one actually holds. Still, in the real world, 
no one has the CAPM market portfolio and the portfolios people actually hold differ 
enormously from each other. 
The APT is a generalization of the CAPM that suggests the required rate of return of 
any investment is a linear function of a set of k factors (Ross, 1976). The use of this 
method is limited, however, since it cannot provide a correlation between a prospective 
investment and the portfolio one actually holds. 
The RAROC rule is an important and widely-used alternative to the other three 
methodologies. The RAROC risk adjusted return is formalized as a position's realized 
returns divided by its VaR. 
RAROC =R/ Va% 
The RAROC measures follow the patterns of risk and return. The RAROC measure 
increases when returns rise, and decreases when risk (measured by VaR) rises, and vice 
versa. There are two flaws in this method: (i) mathematically, when an investment has a 
zero risk (i. e, VaR equals zero) then the RAROC will be an infinite number. It will lead 
to a wrong conclusion about assets which management should invest in. Furthermore, 
the RAROC will provide wrong management performance incentives by excessively 
rewarding management or traders favouring very safe assets (i. e., by taking no risk at all). 
The Sharpe (1964) mies that capture risk and return in a single measure are more reliable 
than the previous models. It is very straightforward to implement and can easily be 
programmed into packages for management and regulators The Sharpe rules consist of 
two; the Traditional Sharpe Rules and the Generalized Sharpe Ratio Rules. The Sharpe 
Ratio is the expected differential return (i. e. portfolio return minus benchmark portfolio 
return) divided by the predicted standard deviation. This ratio captures the expected 
differential return per unit of risk associated with the differential expected return and 
6 This RAROC risk adjustment procedure is not the RAROC risk measurement/management system developed by Bankers' Trust (e. g. BT's RAROC 2020 system) 
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thereby takes account of the expected differential between two portfolios (i. e, the new 
and old portfolio). The generalized Sharpe rule is given by the criterion: 
RA>-R +[QRp°"'/aRold -1JRp'd la (1) 
This means the return on assets A, R4 , must 
be at least as great as the expression on 
the right-hand side. 
RAzRDw +[(QRd"°'lcR°d -1XRp' -Rbd)/aJ+ORb la i2) 
where, Rb is non zero and the QRp terms are replaced with 0d, and ERe = RbCW - Rb'd 
This means the required return on the new asset equals the existing portfolio's return 
plus the adjustment for risk (depending on the expected old benchmark return, Rb'd 
plus the change in benchmark return ORb (i. e. changes in financing costs due to 
acquisitions). Introducing the cost of capital and debt, in relative proportion 
K OM /W o1d and (1- KOW / W) the financing cost is as follows: 
Rbr' _(K0 1W°'d)c k +(1-K°'d /W°'d)c" (3) 
where, ckis the cost of capital and cd ((ck) is the cost of debt. We assume this cost is 
given. The change in financing cost is then: 
MRb =(K"am" /W'-K0l /W°'d)ck -cd (4) 
This means that if the capital to assets ratio rises, then the financing cost rises and vice 
versa. 
Under the Generalized Sharpe Rule, Value at risk of the Generalized Sharpe Rule, in 
which 
R4 ZR; M +[cRp^" /ORp'd -1JR; Jd /Q (5) 
can be replaced by Value at Risk, instead of the portfolio standard deviation, so one can 
obtain 
VaR' / VaR°'4 =Q (6) 
The generalized Sharpe rules become: 
R RzR"d +[VaRý ' '/VaR, ' -1jRr la 
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The equation can be completed by introducing tvaR = vaR"`" - vaR°" , so that one 
gets 
Ri >R pld + [AvaR / VaR old 
1 
Dozd !a 
_ 
(8) 
[1 + t)A (vaR, a)]R pd 
This required return is equal to one plus VaR elasticity (i(vaR, a) times R°, d , 
The elasticity of VaR w. r. t a (r7A (vaR, a) is the percentage change in VaR occasioned 
by the acquisition of the position in Asset A divided by the percentage change in the 
portfolio. One acquires a new position of if its return is at least equal to its required 
return, as given by the RHS of equation (8). The required return on the new asset will be 
bigger than the expected return on the existing portfolio if the VaR elasticity is greater 
than zero (i. e. if the VaR increases), and the required asset return will be less than the 
expected portfolio return if the VaR elasticity is less than zero. 
3.8 Bank Indonesia's Risk Management Regulation 
Indonesia's banking industry has just shifted to a new era of modem banking, where 
Bank Indonesia [(http: //www. bi. go. id) (May and September, 2003)], as a bank regulator, 
has put into effect a regulation concerning the Application of Risk Management for 
Commercial Banks since May 2003. It provides guidelines for implementation of risk 
management. Using the best practices of ERM as a benchmark, BI's regulation was 
analysed to gauge the merits of the guidelines given to the banks, and the results of the 
analysis are depicted in Table 3.10. The main drawbacks of the new guidelines relate to a 
failure to establish risk management based on an integrated approach. There are also 
concerns relating to the intentions of the guidelines covering the risk management 
approach, types of risk, types of risk control, organizational structure, and new products 
and activities. These issues should be addressed to ensure that the banks and bank 
regulators allocate their resources efficiently in implementing an integrated risk 
management system. 
120 
Table 3.10 Results of Analysis of Bank Indonesia's Risk Management 
Regulations. 
BI's Regulation Analysis and Suggestions 
1. Considering factor. 1. It is consistent with the ERM approach. It, however, is 
BI has promoted an integrated approach. not followed by dearer guidance in its chapters. The only 
explanation regarding the crucial principle of enterprise risk 
management is noted in the General Review of Elucidation 
of the regulation. 
Suggestion: 
Chapters (not only in the Elucidation) should provide clear 
guidelines for an integrated approach, rather than a 
fragmented approach, to capture all risks across the 
business activities and units of a bank. An integrated 
approach is likely to affect the implementation of all 
elements of the risk management system, such as risk policy 
and strategy, structure of organization, risk reporting 
system, procedures, and risk limits and methodology. 
2 Considering factor. 2 This may imply that well-capitalized banks may take more 
The intention of risk management is to risk, where any additional capital would induce higher risk 
ensure that business activities do not incur activities. In addition, the considering factor of the 
losses exceeding the capacity of the bank regulation should address the major concern of bank 
or that may disrupt the sustainabl ity of regulations, that is systemic risk. 
bank operations. Suggestions: 
a. Risk management is intended to create and sustain the 
banks' value (shareholder value). Accordingly, the risk 
concept includes three dimensions, i. e., opportunity, hazard 
and uncertainty, where the risk management process 
focuses on three areas: n Creating and capitalizing 
profitable opportunities, where a bank has a distinct 
advantage to achieve gains with improved chances of 
success; (u) establishing control systems and corrective 
measures to prevent or mitigate losses resulting from 
changing business environment; and (iii) applying methods 
and techniques to reduce the variance between expected 
financial outcomes and actual returns. 
This means that risk management should not only be 
concerned with the measurement and control of losses 
(hazard) but also analysis of business activities that provide 
opportunities to make returns, under risk-reward principles. 
New guidelines should be stipulated in the section of 
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considering factors and other related chapters. 
b. Systemic risk reason, in the form of a collapse of the 
banking system, being a major concern of bank regulation 
should be stated clearly in the considering factor of the 
provisions. Besides, the bank regulation objective is to 
ensure safety and a sound banking industry, and to avoid 
bank failures and potential financial instability and their 
consequences for the global financial system. 
3. General Review: 3. See number 1 
Banks are expected to integrate all their 
activities into an accurate and 
comprehensive risk management system. 
4. Article 4: 4. The classification is too detailed, which makes risks 
Risk encompasses credit risk, market risk, difficult to measure. 
liquidity risk, operational risk, legal risk, Suggestions: 
reputational risk, strategic risk, and Banks face various risks, each of which can be defined in 
compliance risk. individually descriptive terms. Accordingly, for the purposes 
of the provisions, risks should broadly break down into 
financial risk and strategic risk. Financial risks include credit 
risk, market risk, liquidity risk, operational risk, legal risk, 
and reputational risk. Whilst, compliance risk is essentially a 
form of legal risk. 
5. Article 11: S. This is a crucial activity of risk management, which 
Risk control may be implemented in a should be underscored in article(s) in a broader perspective. 
variety of ways, such as by hedging, the Suggestion: 
use of risk mitigation methods, and the Risk controls should include risk elimination or avoidance 
addition of capital to absorb potential by simple business practices, risk transfer to other 
losses. institutions, and risk management using advanced risk 
management techniques at the firm level commensurate 
with the bank's risk. 
6. Articles 16 to 19: 6. The head of the risk management unit is not required to 
These articles are concerned with be involved in various risk governance and approval 
organizational structure. committees. 
Suggestion: 
The head of the risk management unit should also chair or 
be a member of various risk governance and approval 
committees within the corporation (e. g. market risk 
committee, credit risk committee, and asset/liability 
committee). This is a crucial principle of risk management. 
7-Article 20: 7. The article implies that BI has documented all products 
This article is concerned with a bank's new and activities launched by the banks before May 2003, 
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products and activities. commensurate with the needs of a risk reporting system. In 
reality, this is not the case. 
Suggestions: 
a. BI should review carefully the legacy reports of products 
and activities of the banks to ensure that BI and the banks 
have a proper knowledge of all risks. 
b. Both old products and new products should be well 
documented, both by BI and the banks. 
8. Article 21: 8. See number 7 
Customers shall receive transparent 
information on all risks pertaining to new 
products and activities, whether verbally or 
in writing, to ensure that they understand 
the risks of these new products and 
activities. 
9. Elucidation: General Review 9. The elucidation does not clearly state a preferred risk 
With regard to these provisions, banks are management approach. If BI promotes a comprehensive 
expected to integrate all their activities into risk management approach, then a logical consequence is 
an accurate and comprehensive risk that banks should implement a firm-wide risk management 
management system approach (ERM). However, the regulation does not provide 
a clear statement regarding adoption of the approach. 
Suggestions: 
With regard to these provisions, banks should be expected 
to apply the integrated approach (ERM), which 
encompasses all activities and all business lines and all legal 
entities of a bank. Risks should be measured, aggregated, 
and managed across geographical boundaries and products. 
These requirements should be stipulated in related chapters 
and the general review of elucidation. 
3.9 Conclusions 
From the discussion above can be derived a number of conclusions. Risk management 
is a process to identify, measure and control various risks. Risk management, in 
particular in using sophisticated models and derivatives contracts, is an essential tool for 
bank management where banking business is risk business, but it can be dangerous 
when such tolls are used inappropriately. Risk management should be viewed from 
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both a business unit level and a firm business level using an integrated VaR measure. 
The rationale for enterprise risk management is based on managerial self-interest, the 
tax structure, the cost of financial distress, and the existence of capital market 
imperfections. Modern risk management approaches should complement, and not 
substitute for, the traditional ones. The prerequisite guidelines for banks to implement 
more sophisticated risk management models and provide a sound risk management 
framework have been produced by various national and international bodies. The 
reduced form model for integrating market risk VaR and credit risk VaR is a richer 
method than the add-on VaR. Venkat (2000) offers an integrated approach to risk 
management, namely the ERM framework, which provides a more robust risk 
management framework, but it lacks a theoretical foundation. 
As far as risk measurement is concerned, the risks of banks are measured by the 
probabilities of banks suffering losses. Although different authors classify bank risks in 
different ways, they seem to overlap with each other and are relatively close to each 
other. The risks banks face can be divided into two main groups, such as idiosyncratic 
(or firm level) risk and aggregate or systemic (or strategic) risk. Idiosyncratic risk should 
be controllable by a bank but systemic risk is not. Risks are typically grouped into 
market risk, credit risk, operational risk, legal risk and reputational risk to provide a 
context for the scope of enterprise risk management. The concepts of operational risk, 
legal risk and reputational risk, however, have not been well defined. Internal models 
can be used by institutions to generate regulatory capital (related to both general market 
risk and credit risk), subject to supervisory approval. VaR models have been widely used 
by practitioners and researchers to calculate market risk and credit risk, but they should 
be implemented carefully by taking account of their shortcomings. An extreme value 
approach for VaR, for example, has also been developed to capture catastrophic events. 
The ERM framework has richer properties than the traditional risk management 
approach. The ERM framework is a process to enhance and sustain shareholder value, 
which is consistent with the finance literature, covering the objectives of a firm. The 
ERM framework is defined as an optimal combination of four main elements of risk 
management, comprising strategy, processes, infrastructure and environment. This is a 
complex and dynamic process involving the use of a top-down approach by the agents 
at a bank. Risk management should not be limited to risk measurement and risk 
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monitoring. Best practices of ERM address potential relationships among market, credit 
and operational risk, and manages these risks in a consistent, balanced and integrated 
manner. They lead a firm to maximise risk-adjusted returns by undertaking risk-taking 
activities, to underscore a firm-wide risk profile, and provide greater transparency 
through consistent and comprehensive risk measurement, aggregation and management 
to promote the likelihood of success and prevent bank failures. Best practices of ERM 
involve undertaking risk-taking activities proactively so as to allow a firm to enhance 
overall shareholder value. The objectives of ERM are to link between business strategy 
and risk management strategy, to institute risk governance process, to enhance risk 
management conduct, to establish rational and dynamic boundaries across all risk types, 
and to institute a risk-adjusted performance measurement These can be accomplished 
by. (i) instituting an ERM framework and risk policy; (ii) developing a culture of 
corporate-wide risk management; (iii) enhancing coordination efforts with respect to 
risk management initiatives for market, credit and operational risks; (iv) defining and 
implementing consistent risk measurement, capital allocation and risk-adjusted 
performance measurement methodologies; (v) enhancing risk-related analytical efforts 
to account for market risks and credit risks that overlap for many instruments; (vý) 
balancing quantitative risk measurement techniques with qualitative and common sense 
approaches to scrutinizing risks; (vii) understanding better correlations across risks and 
proactively addressing potential and prospective exposures and risks; and (viii) 
encouraging better cost/benefit decisions on risk mitigation, risk management and risk 
optimisation efforts. 
The ERM framework comprises risk strategy, a risk management process, risk 
management infrastructure and a risk management environment. The ERM framework 
can further be broken down into 14 key elements and will be used as a benchmark in an 
empirical study of the Indonesian banking industry, as discussed in Chapter 4. 
Bank Indonesia's regulation has not clearly stipulated the integrated risk management 
approach that banks should adopt. The regulation should be amended or followed by a 
circular letter which contains more detailed guidelines on the ERM approach so that 
the banks and bank regulators are able to work together to allocate their resources more 
efficiently. It is also worth noting that the successful implementation of ERM is subject 
to the banks' resources, experience, size, and the complexity of their operations. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
EVALUATION OF RISK MANAGEMENT IN 
INDONESIAN BANKING 
4.1 Introduction 
A survey is a procedure in which information is collected systematically about a set of 
sample units or cases, namely people, organisations, objects etc., to draw inferences 
from the results. This chapter describes the empirical survey of the model developed in 
Chapter 3 concerning the ERM approach to investigate the state of Risk Management in 
the Indonesian banking industry. To my best knowledge this is the first study of risk 
management in Indonesia using the ERM approach as a benchmark. 
To achieve this, the following tasks were carried out. 
1. A postal survey using a questionnaire was undertaken, targeted at banks as 
institutions and responding participants who are involved in the risk 
management process at the (relatively- large) sampled banks and Bank 
Indonesia. 
2. Interviews with the officers of some of the sampled banks and the Central Bank 
of the Republic of Indonesia (Bank Indonesia) to secure additional information 
and to clarify some unclear responses. 
This chapter includes four main topics. First, it will discuss the objectives, model 
specification, and empirical methodology adopted, including sampling, data collection, 
questionnaire design, data preparation and data analysis techniques used. Second, it will 
outline the results of the empirical survey. Third, it will present analysis of the responses 
received and provide findings on the state of risk management in the Indonesian 
banking industry. Fourth, it will highlight efforts that can be undertaken to promote a 
more effective risk management system, including a consideration of the unanswered 
questions and imprecisely answered questions in the current practices employed by this 
group of relatively-large banks. In addition, it will describe the problems that can arise in 
implementing risk management, the shortcomings of the current methodology used to 
analyse risk, and the elements of risk management that are missing in the current 
procedures. Finally, conclusions are dawn. 
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4.2 Objectives 
The objectives of the study of bank risk management in Indonesia are broken down 
further, as follows: 
1. To investigate the effectiveness of Enterprise Risk Management as a tool of 
bank management to improve the risk management system and process. 
2. To identify standards, or something like best practices, in risk management in 
banks and groups of banks that are in place in sampled banks in Indonesia. 
3. To elicit the banks' attitudes to and /or preferences for the parameters of each 
aspect of the 14 elements of the ERM framework, which are analysed by 'bank 
attributes' and `respondent attributes'. 
4. To classify subjectively the banks' risks based on certain groups of `risk ratings'. 
5. To explore findings that may have important policy implications for bank 
regulators and banks, in particular in relation to the financial bank 
reorganization model (the FMP model) described in Chapter 5 and analysed in 
Chapter 6. 
4.3 Model Specifications 
To implement the ERM model empirically in Indonesia, several tasks were conducted, 
as described in the next sections. I start the discussions with the elements of the ERM 
model used as a benchmark in the empirical study. 
The ERM model originally suggested by Venkat (2000) is analysed in Chapter 3. The 
model was then combined with the suggestions of Crouchy, Galai and Mark (2001). In 
this regard, I identified 14 elements of an ERM model. The empirical survey was 
inspired by the work of Santomero (1997) who conducted an empirical survey at many 
of the major financial institutions in the USA, including universal banks, commercial 
banks, and major investment banks. He highlights that substantial progress in the risk 
management area within US financial institutions had been made, and that banks had 
invested a lot of funds into risk management systems but that the state of risk 
management was merely at a beginning. 
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The 14 main elements of ERM described in Chapter 3 are tested using the 
questionnaire. The elements listed are best practice characteristics. The characteristics of 
the elements are `Parameter Tested' and are analysed by bank. A series of statistical tests 
were conducted with respect to the parameters tested. The results of the tests are called 
statistics and are presented in tables and figures. In the next sections, the analyses 
outlined cover both `banks' attributes', and `respondents' attributes'. Banks' attributes 
are used as this study is an institutional survey (see Diamantopoulos and Schlegelmilch, 
2000). The respondents' attributes are used in the study on the grounds that the 
respondents, who are representatives of the banks, provide the true market participants' 
preferences, as suggested by Ramos (2000). He notes that the roles of market 
participants are important, especially in current and future eras, because the 
environment is very volatile and changes very rapidly and continuously to achieve 
sustainable financial stability. 
4.4 Empirical Methodology 
Thomas (1996) notes that a survey has four basic, consecutive operations, as follows: 
" Drawing a sample of units from some population 
" Developing and testing using standardised ways to measure these units 
" Applying them to the sample units 
" Drawing inferences for the population from which the sample was drawn. 
The following sections breakdown such operations to cover sampling, survey 
measurement, planning and conducting the survey, data collection, questionnaire design, 
pre-testing, and data preparation. 
4.4.1 Sampling 
Most surveys are based on samples from some population, due to considerations of 
cost, time, confidentiality, accuracy, and the possibility of contamination of population 
members if all the population is included in a survey (Diamantopoulos and 
Schelegelmilch, 2000 and Thomas, 1996). The stratified sample technique was used to 
determine which banks should be included in this study. Banks included in the study 
are banks with relatively-large total assets, and all types of licensed bank are included to 
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provide a representative sample. The banks' financial condition reports, and their names 
and addresses, were gained from Bank Indonesia, Jakarta. Accordingly, 50 banks were 
selected to be included in the study. 
4.4.2 Measurement Techniques 
Thomas (1996) notes that survey measurement needs to be as va, 64 reliable, and unbiased 
as possible. Valid means measures are pure and adequate measures of what they are 
intended to measure. Reliable means they are not subject to large amounts of random 
errors. Unbiased means that the mean values of the measures will, for a large sample, be 
the same as the true mean values for the populations. As described earlier, a 
questionnaire was used employing distinct attitude scales, such as nominal scales, ordinal 
scales, interval scales and ratio scaler. This can be seen in Appendix 4.1. The scales are used 
as a measurement rule to ensure there are relationships between the symbols assigned 
and the responses reflecting the actual relations between the objects with respect to the 
parameters tested (Diamantopoulos and Schegelmilch, 2000), [which are documented 
using the SPSS 11 software package]. Firstly, nominal scales were used by assigning 
numbers as labels for identification and/or classification of an element. Secondly, 
ordinal scales were used which establish an ordered relationship between respondents 
(or banks) or characteristics being measured through transformation of the scale (the 
ordering is maintained). This scale can be used to rank or order the observations. 
Ordinal data may be numeric or non-numeric. Numbers are used where the respondents 
indicate more or less of a given characteristic exists, with various categories or rankings. 
Thirdly, interval scales were used which have all the properties of a nominal and an 
ordinal scale (i. e. equivalence and order) plus the characteristic of equality of intervals 
between adjacent scale values. In this type of scale, the numbers are used to infer the 
extent of differences that exist between the assessed banks (and respondents) with 
regard to a fixed unit measure or particular characteristic. Interval scales must be 
numeric. Fourthly, a ratio scale was used which has all the properties of an interval 
scale (i. e. equivalence, order, equality of intervals) plus an absolute zero point, known as 
the `true' or `natural' zero. 
Numbers assigned can be used to make comparirons between the assessed bank (or 
respondent) - the so-called independent measures - comparing groups in terms of absolute 
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magnitude for a given characteristic; equal ratios between the scale values correspond to 
equal ratios among the assessed banks and units of analysis (i. e. respondents). One 
property of the ratio scale is that it maintains a positively proportionate transformation 
(i. e. if y= cx, c >0). Ratio data must be numeric. It may measure total assets, total 
deposits, capital, total liabilities, etc. in terms of the others. 
As a result, the data will be qualitative and quantitative. Data obtained using nominal or 
ordinal scales are qualitative in nature (qualitative variables); whilst data obtained using 
an interval or ratio scale are quantitative (quantitative variables). The statistical 
techniques which are used are both parametric statistics (i. e. for measures yielding 
metric data, such as intervals and ratios) and non-parametric statistics (i. e. for measures 
yielding non-metric data, such as nominal and ordinal). 
To support these investigations, various statistical tests were carried out where 
appropriate, as outlined in the next sections: 
a. Analysis of Attributes. 
The banks have different attributes (the so-called "Bank Attributes" and 
"Respondent Attributes"). In statistical terms, these variables are referred to as 
`attributes'. The banks were grouped into Domestic Banks and Foreign Banks, and 
also distinguished by type of license, i. e. State Banks, Foreign Exchange Banks, Non- 
Foreign Exchange Banks, Regional Development Banks, Foreign Banks and Joint 
Banks. The banks were also grouped by Total Assets, Total Employees, Total 
Branches, and Years of Risk Management in Place. In addition, the respondents' 
attributes include their positions, level of education, years of training, formal 
education in risk management and years involved in risk management functions. 
These were analysed in percentage terms using the SPSS summary of frequency command 
Testing that different groups come from populations with the same mean was also 
carried out using the One-I qy Anova test. 
b. Analysis of responses. 
The response data collected from the survey is categorized using a range of rankings. 
The overall responses are presented in scores for the characteristics of risk 
management and bank regulation in the form of ordinal data, and will be discussed in 
detail in Section 4.4.5. The mean score for each of the variables was calculated using 
the command custom table in the SPSS Release 11. 
130 
c. The One-sample Chi-Square test. 
This test aims at comparing a set of observed frequencies (i. e. empirical data) with a 
set of theoretical frequencies (i. e. expected frequencies), by testing the Null 
Hypothesis that no difference exists between observed and expected frequencies. 
More specifically, this test was used to find out whether the banks had a definite 
preference for scoring the characteristics of the variables in bank risk management. 
d. The Kruskal-Wallis test. 
This test compares a set of three or more independent samples, and is used to test the 
Null Hypothesis that the independent samples come from the same population with 
the same distribution in the population. The statistical test for comparisons used was 
the Kruskal-Wallis One-way Analysis of Variance (K-W one way ANOVA) using the 
command non parametric k-independent t-test. Summary results of the two-tailed t-test at a 
confidence level of 95% (or at significance level, p-value of 0.05) on each element of 
best practice Enterprise Risk Management, which are analysed by the banks' 
attributes and /or respondent' attributes, are reported below. 
e. The Pearson's Correlation Coefficient R (Pearson's R). 
This test measures the linear relationship (association) between two interval and/or 
ratio variables, and is used to investigate whether there is any association between 
sampled banks' responses to some characteristics of a risk management system. 
f. Subjective risk rating 
A subjective `risk rating' is given on a scale 1 (low level of risk) to 3 (high risk) to 
reflect the responses given regarding the ERM's parameters in order to create a 
probability statement from the responses to the survey. This was conducted 
separately from the measurement techniques described earlier. The scores for each 
element listed are reported in Section 4.7. 
4.4.3 Planning and Conducting the Survey 
Planning and conducting a survey requires a lot of time and effort, including Basing with 
the survey respondents and people who have access to the sample, and the use of 
computing and clerical resources. These depend on whether the research is based on the 
original data or secondary data. Accordingly, a researcher needs to estimate, plan, 
obtain and manage the resources to draw the sample, collect and process the data and 
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anaiyse ana wnte up me results. 1 nis involves the ararung or a time scneauie, pianning 
iterations, and pre-testing the questionnaire. 
4.4.4 Data Collection 
Thomas (1996) suggests that the method of data collection to be used, being the 
medium through which information is elicited and recorded, should include: 
" Face to face interviews 
" Telephone interviews 
" Postal or other self-completion questionnaires 
" Observation of behaviour 
" Physical weighing, measuring and testing 
This thesis uses a postal questionnaire, face-to-face interviews and telephone interviews 
due to cost, access and time considerations. 
4.4.5 Questionnaire Design 
A questionnaire (Appendix 4.1) was used to conduct the postal survey, as suggested by 
Oppenheim (1992). The following requirements must be satisfied when creating 
questionnaires: 
" Make clear who is asking for information, for what purpose and who will have 
access to the information 
" Make clear what each respondent is expected to respond to 
" Decide on away to ensure return of the questionnaire 
" Induce the prospective respondent to respond and return the questionnaire 
" Use instructions and questions which are clearly and unambiguously expressed 
in simple language 
Provide appropriate precoding of boxes or spaces for verbatim replies 
" Make data processing easy 
The questionnaire was designed to elicit the state of art of the Indonesian banks' risk 
management and their corresponding attitudes. To achieve the objectives, the 
questionnaire for this thesis was designed as follows: 
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(a). The banks' and /or respondents' assessments of and attitudes toward different 
parameters of an enterprise risk management system are ranked in terms of their 
importance in risk management. Accordingly, the banks were asked to indicate 
the importance of and preference for the fourteen listed elements of risk 
management, where each element has some characteristics (i. e. parameters) which 
are tested, using various scales, such as nomina4 ordina4 interval and ratio scates 
[(Diamantopolous and Schelgelrnich (2000) and Anderson, Sweeney, and Williams 
(1999)]. In the questionnaire, banks were asked to use all the scales to produce the 
best approximation to their preferences and risk appetites, e. g. 1 (Not important) 
to 5 (Very important); 1 (Most dangerous) to 5 (Least dangerous); 1 (Excellent) to 
5 (Poor); 1 (Extremely significant) to 10 (Extremely insignificant); 1 (Total losses 
less than 2% of capital) to 5 (Greater than 5% of capital); 1 (Always) to 5 (Never); 
and 1 (Very risk averse) to 7 (Very risk seeking). These scales were applied for the 
different parameters of the ERM system tested. 
(b). The banks' risk management concepts and their implementation of specific risk 
management processes, (e. g., for certain categories of risks) were analysed under 
the following headings: Categories of risk and their severity of losses (as a 
percentage of capital); Categories of risk and their severity of losses by department; 
Categories of risk and their management-, Background to the need for risk 
management systems; and Business propositions of the Indonesian banks. 
(c). Banks were also given opportunities to supply specific information or comments in 
some questions to reveal other characteristics of their risk management operations, 
e. g. definitions of market risk, credit risk, and operational risk; type of organization 
structure; and additional information on the application of risk measurement 
models. 
(d). Finally, subjective assessments were undertaken to derive a `Risk rating' for the 
Indonesian banks for each `Element' of the risk management system on a scale 
from 1 (`Low risk) to 3 ('High risk). The results of the study are presented in the 
next sections. 
In addition, interviews with the officers of some of the sampled banks and the Central 
Bank of the Republic of Indonesia (Bank Indonesia), using both face-to-face interviews 
and telephone interviews, were used to elicit additional information and to clarify some 
unclear responses, as noted by Patton (1980): "the purpose of intenrei ng is to find out what is 
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in and on someone else's mind We interview people to find out from them those things use cannot &7ctly 
observe. " 
4.4.6 Pretests 
A pre-test of the questionnaire as a pilot survey was conducted by post on two large 
Indonesian banks operating in London, in March 2002. The feedback was used in 
particular to improve the presentation of the questionnaire. 
4.4.7 Data Preparation 
The stage of the survey between collecting and analysing data involves data preparation. 
This comprises several stages namely, coding, editing, and preparing the data with the 
help of software packages (in this survey, the SPPSS 11 was used). Coding is the 
conversion of verbatim answers, based on pre-coded answers, into computer-readable 
format. For the subjective risk ratings, the answers are converted into "risk rating" 
categories. Editing data covers recording the "no answer" responses and changing any 
data items which appear inconsistent. In this study, the respondents were pre-numbered 
to ease the processing of both the field editing and the central office editing. Once 
ambiguous, inconsistent or missing data were found, the sample of respondent banks 
could be re-contacted. Therefore, data preparation involves entering the coded and the 
edited data into the computer for analysis. 
4.4.8 Data Analysis Techniques 
Parametric and no'rparamet1ic statistical techniques are used in analysing the data collected 
from this survey. The assumption for parametric statistics is that the scores are drawn 
from a normally distributed population; whilst for nonparametric statistics, the statistical 
conclusions are drawn regardless of the shape of the population (Anderson, Sweeney 
and Williams, 1999). 
The statistical hypotheses are as follows: 
(1) The variables follow a normal distribution in the population, and sample data 
are used to test whether this is likely to be the case. Goodness-of-fit tests 
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determine whether the distributions of the variables follow some prespecified 
functional form in the population. 
(2) In terms of the central tendency of the variables, it is hypothesized that the 
mean of the variables has a certain value in the population and sample 
information is used to test whether this is likely to hold true. A statistical test 
(i. e. test of location) is conducted to determine whether a population mean or 
median takes on a particular value. 
(3) With respect to the degree of dispersion in a variable, it is hypothesized that the 
variance of the variable has a certain value in the population, and this is tested 
for using sample data. A statistical test (i. e. test for variability) is used to test 
whether a population variance is of a certain magnitude. 
(4) In terms of dichotomous variables relating to proportions, it is hypothesized 
that only x per cent of the population has certain characteristics [while (100 - x) 
per cent does not]. This hypothesis is tested using the sample data with a test for 
proportion. 
Various analytical approaches were undertaken, such as desciiptit, estimation and hypothesis- 
testing analysis. In general, the reasons for conducting such analyses are: (1) when the 
sample type is subject to a non-probabilistic sampling method, an inferential statistic is 
legitimate; (2) when the variable types are both metric and non-metric measures, both 
parametric and non-parametric procedures are conducted; (3) where the sample has a 
number of sub-samples (i. e. Types of bank license, Total Assets, Respondents' stratum, 
etc., ) various comparative statistical procedures (i. e. `comparisons test or independent test) are 
used to test bias in the results resulting from certain attributes. For example, a two- 
sample and /or k-sample chi-square test for a nominal scale as a basis for comparison 
of different banks' attributes or respondents' attributes and variables of interest can be 
used, and the existence of risk management in different banks is then shown using 
graphs; (4) the existence of a number of variables provides a simultaneous analysis 
resulting in univariate, bivariate and multivariate statistical procedures being undertaken 
for all types of scale (i. e. nominal, ordinal, interval and ratio). In terms of the relationship 
measures, some analysis uses Related Measure Methods but most use the Independent 
Measure Methods, where different units of analysis (i. e. sample elements) were 
compared on a given parameter tested or variable of interest; and (5) the missing values 
of actual data affect the choice of analytical technique because it might affect the 
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comparability of responses. The assumptions made regarding the distribution of values 
in the population are that the values of the variables of interest in the underlying 
population are normally distributed, i. e. that they form a symmetric bell-shaped curve or 
normal distribution. If this is the case, parametric statistics can be used; otherwise the 
use of non-parametric statistics is considered. 
Data collected from the questionnaire survey were analysed to reveal the following: 
i. Banks' attributes, namely type of office, type of licence, total assets, total number 
of employees, total number of branches, years of risk management in place. 
ii. Respondents' attributes (background), namely their education, positions, periods of 
time they were trained, their formal training in risk management, and periods of 
time they have been involved in risk management functions. 
iii. How the framework of risk management used to manage bank risks relates to: 
a. the characteristics of firm-wide, risk management best practices (ERM), 
b. the elements of a bank regulatory regime framework, 
c. the level of bank risk borne by the banks, 
d. and bank reorganization policies (the FMP model). 
Any improvement in respondents' risk awareness and attitudes as a result of 
adopting risk management, and any changes in capital are also investigated. 
iv. How the framework of bank regulation is related to: 
a. The elements of a bank regulatory regime 
b. Optimal bank regulation based on the bank reorganization policies adopted 
v. How the level of risk-based supervision relies on: 
a. The framework of a regulatory regime 
b. The elements of a regulatory regime 
c. Risk levels 
d. The state of risk management 
e. The level of bank capital 
The next sections provide a summary of the results generated by the empirical survey of 
Indonesian banks. 
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4.5 Empirical Survey 
The postal survey was conducted during April - May 2002 in collaboration with The 
Central Bank of the Republic of Indonesia (Bank Indonesia's Head Office, Jakarta). The 
names of the banks and addresses were provided by Bank Indonesia. A total of 50 
questionnaires were posted; 31 responded, resulting in a response rate of 62% of the 
surveyed banks, covering 80.96 % of the Total Assets of commercial banks in 
Indonesia. Since one of the 31 banks is the result of a merger of 4 banks in 1999, the 
original 31 responding banks were reduced to 30 banks. 
The resulting response rate is very high for this type of survey. One may assume that the 
high participation rate was due to the very strong interest which the banks had in taking 
part in this important topic, and also to the involvement of Bank Indonesia. 
4.6 Descriptive Statistics of Attributes 
This section provides descriptive statistics covering the banks' and respondents' details 
and background, as presented in Table 4.1, using the SPSS descnptiw and summary of 
frequencies command. In the following discussions, attributes of the banks and 
respondents are referred to as Bank attributes' and 'Respondent attributes' respectively, 
with the codes of attributes presented in parentheses in Table 4.1. and Table 4.4. 
Respondents who represent their individual banks were originally grouped into 4 
possible positions, i. e. Board of Commissioners, Board of Directors, Heads of 
Department and Staff. There, however, were no "Staff' so this grouping was dropped. 
As the survey results demonstrate, the respondents who filled out the questionnaires 
were mainly Heads of Department (80.6%), followed by members of the Board of 
Directors (12.9%) and then by members of Boards of Commissioners (6.5%). This 
shows that the mid and top levels of bank management have a strong interest in this 
study. This is good and is consistent with the best practice of risk management that risk 
awareness should start from the very top of organizations. The respondents were also 
grouped into their four levels of education. The analysis of frequencies is shown for the 
four groups, with a big percentage (51.6%) of the respondents holding a graduate 
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Table 4.1 Attributes of Respondents 
Frequency in per cent 
Respondent Attributes Frequencies 
Title of Position Board of Commissioners 6.5 
(TOP) Board of Director 12.9 
Head of Department 80.6 
Level of Education Sarjana 51.6 
(LOE) Master 35.5 
Doctor 3.2 
Other 9.7 
Years of training 51 year 51.6 
in risk management 55 years >1 year 32.3 
(YTM) >5 years 16.1 
Formal training College and /or Universities 6.5 
in risk management Professional Development 25.8 
(FTM) Courses 
Seminar and /or Certificate 51.6 
Program 16.1 
Others 
Years involved 51 years 25.8 
in risk management 55 years >1 year 48.4 
(YRM) >5 years 16.1 
None 9.7 
degree (i. e. Sarjana) and 35.5% holding a postgraduate (i. e Masters) degree. In addition, 
most of the respondents (48.4%) had been involved in risk management functions for 
between 1 and 5 years, with only 25.8% of respondents being involved in such activities 
for 1 year or less. The results also show that most of the respondents (51.6%) had 
received training in risk management through Seminars and/or certificates of study, 
with 25.8% being sent on Professional Development Courses. 
A stratified sampling technique was applied to banks included in the study. For this 
purpose, banks were grouped into various categories according to the type of licence 
held and Total Assets were analysed using the SPSS statistical wont summaries command. 
Table 4.2 illustrates such a breakdown. Statistics, using the SPSS summanzes command, 
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show that State Banks are the major banks operating in the Indonesian banking 
industry, followed by Foreign Exchange Banks with shares of Total Assets of 47.07% 
and 31.43% respectively. Consequently, the 50 banks included in the study using 
stratified sampling techniques covered 100% of the Total Assets of State Banks, 92.73% 
of that of Foreign Exchange Banks, followed by 29.62% of total Foreign Banks' assets. 
The total number of banks responding in this study was 31 banks with Total Assets of 
Rp867,275 representing 80.96% of the Total Assets of commercial banks in Indonesia. 
Thus, the results of this survey could be said to be highly representative of the 
Indonesian banking industry. 
Table 4.2 Analysis of Banks Included in the Study 
I ndonesian banks Responding banks 
No Type of License Number 
of 
banks 
% 
Total 
Assets 
(in billions) 
% 
Number 
of 
banks 
% 
Assets 
(in 
billions 
% 
Commercial banks 145 100,0 1,071,230 100,0 31 21,37 867,275 80.96 
1 State Banks 5 3.45 504,218 47.07 4 80,0 504,218 100,0 
2 Foreign Exchange 
Banks 
38 25.21 336,683 31.43 13 34.21 312,220 92.73 
3 Non-Foreign Exchange 
Banks 
42 28.97 22,689 2.12 4 9.50 5,914 26.07 
4 Regional Development 
Banks 
26 17.92 83,562 7.80 4 15.38 10,736 12.85 
5 Foreign Banks 10 6.90 80,045 7.47 3 30.00 23,709 29.62 
6 joint bank 24 16.55 44,033 4.41 3 12.50 10,478 23.80 
*) Including one merger bank 
Source: Bank Indonesia, Financial Publication Report as of 31.12.2000 and Survey. 
The 30 responding banks (i. e., excluding a merger bank) included in this study have the 
attributes shown in Table 4.3, which were analysed using the summaries command in 
SPSS. Most of the responding banks (87.1%) were Domestic Banks and the rest (12.9%) 
were Foreign Banks. Foreign Exchange Banks comprised 41.9% of the responding 
banks, followed by the State Banks, non-Foreign Exchange Banks, and regional 
development banks with roughly the same share (12.9%), and then by joint Banks and 
Foreign Banks with a share of 9.7% each. In addition, most (83.8%) of the responding 
banks have Total Assets of between Rp545 million and Rp47,341 million, Total 
Employees of between 53 and 5,044 (77.4%), and Total Branches of between 0 and 143 
branches (71.0%). Some (29.03%) responding banks had no operational risk 
management in place; while others had no market risk management (22.6%), liquidity 
risk management (19.4%), or credit risk management (16.1%) in place. The operational 
risk figure reflects the slow pace of development of risk management practices even in 
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developed markets, such as in the USA and the UK, as noted by Wilson (2000), 
Crouchy, Galai and Mark (2000) and the British Bankers Association (1998). The 
responding banks which had had liquidity risk management for more than 5 years 
comprised 38.7% of the total, with 35.5% having credit risk management, 22.6% market 
risk management and 19.4% operational risk management for a similar period. 
In addition, the banks included in the survey are attributed by important economic 
indicators, as reported in Table 4.4. Figures show that Indonesian banks' attitudes in 
the form of a willingness to participate in the study of risk management practices was 
correlated with the size of the banks represented by Total Assets, Number of 
Employees and the Number of Branches. 
The responding banks recorded average Total Assets of Rp27,977.0 billion (in 2000), 
whereas for the non-responding banks, the corresponding figure was only Rp5,010.0 
billion. The average number of employees of the responding banks amounted to 4,651 
persons, compared with a figure of 512 persons for non-responding banks. Again, the 
average number of branches was 194 branches for responding banks compared with a 
figure of only 18 branches for non-responding banks. By taking into account these 
important findings, as represented by the three indicators, and the response rate of 
62.0%, one can conclude that the results of this empirical study are highly representative 
of the Indonesian banking industry as a whole. 
Tests of the significance of the differences between the two groups - responding and 
non-responding - were also undertaken. Table 4.4 depicts the results of independent two 
sample with two tailed t-tests at a 95% confidence level using SPSS software, that were used 
to test the rigni rcance of the diferences in the means for Total Assets, number of employees 
and number of branches for the two groups. In the tests, the null hypothesis tested was 
that the trvo population means are equal (HO: #I =, u2); the alternative hypothesis being 
that the means are not equal (H, : 1u, # , u2 ). The tests of directional hypothesis was that 
the means of the responding banks are higher or lower than the non-responding banks: 
(Ho : E[1 S p2) versus (Hl : p, Z p2). The lack of previous research on this important 
topic lead me to postulate an exploratory hypothesis, namely that either there is no 
difference in the means of the response rates or that the mean of responding banks 
was lower than that of non- 
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Table 4.3 Attributes of Responding Banks 
Frequency in per cent 
Bank Attributes Frequencies 
Type of offices Domestic Banks 87.1% 
(TOO) Foreign Banks 12.9 
Type of License Foreign Banks 9.7 
(TOL) State Banks 12.9 
Foreign Exchange Banks 41.9 
Non-Foreign Exchange Banks 12.9 
Joint Banks 9.7 
Regional development banks 12.9 
Total Assets 545 - 47,341 83.8 
(COA) 47,342 - 94,138 6.5 
94,139 -140,935 6.5 
140,936 -187,731 0 
187,732 - 234,528 0 
234,529 - 281,321 3.2 
Total Employees 53 - 5,044 77.4 
(COE) 5,045 -10,036 6.5 
10,037 - 15,027 6.5 
15,028 -20,019 3.2 
20,020 - 25,011 3.2 
25,012 - 30,000 3.2 
Total Branches 0-143 71.0 
(COB) 144-287 12.8 
288 - 431 6.5 
432 - 575 3.2 
576 - 720 0 
721-856 6.5 
Years of market risk 51 years 19.4 
management 5S years Z1 years 35.4 
In place (YOM) >5 years 22.6 
None 22.6 
Years of credit risk S1 years 12.9 
management 55 years Z1 years 35.5 
in place (YOC) >5 years 35.5 
None 16.1 
Years of operational risk S1 years 22.6 
management 5S years z1 years 29.0 
In place (YOO) >5 years 19.4 
None 29.0 
Years of liquidity risk S1 years 9.7 
management 55 years z1 years 32.2 
in place (YOL) >5 years 38.7 
None 19.4 
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responding banks. Accordingly, the means of the responding banks are hypothesised 
higher than the non-responding banks. 
The test results reported in the Table 4.4 indicate that one can reject the null hypothesis 
d branches, and that there is no difference in means in terms of Total Assets, employees an 
also reject the directional hypothesis that the means of responding banks are lower those 
of non-responding banks, at a confidence level of 95% (or p-value <0.05). 
Table 4.4 Sample of Attributes of Responding Banks Compared With Non- 
responding Banks, and Some Test Results 
Indicators Cases Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Standard 
error F 
P- 
value 
(2 tail) 
Pooled 
variance 
estimate 
Separate 
variance 
estimate 
S. 
value 
p } 
value 
p 
Total Assets (Rp bio) 7,206 0.001 1.737 0.089 1.64 0.105 
Responding 31 27,977 55,671 9,999 
Non-responding 18 5,010 5,830 1,374 
Employees 13,321 0,001 2488 0.016 3.273 0.003 
Responding 31 4,651 7,019 1,261 
Non-responding 18 512 417 98 
Branches 10.229 0.002 2120 0.039 2783 0.009 
Responding 31 194 351 63 
Non-responding 18 18 30 7 
Again, the t-tests based on the pooled variance of estimates and separate variance of 
estimates show that the sample variances are different because the F-value is not close 
to unity. As can be seen from the test statistics, the results are highly significant (p < 
0.05) i. e. Total Assets = 0.001; number of employees = 0.001; and number of branches 
= 0.002, at a confidence level of 95% (orp-value < 0.05); therefore the separate variance 
estimate was used. The latter shows that their t-statistics are 0.105; 0.003 and 0.009 
respectively. Accordingly, the null hypothesis that the means of the population - in 
terms of Total Assets, employees and branches - are equal can be rejected. These figures 
provide evidence that the means of the responding and non-responding banks in terms 
of Total Assets, number of employees and number of branches are different. These 
support the conclusion mentioned above that the means of responding banks are higher 
than the non-responding banks. Hence, the responding banks are highly representative 
of the Indonesian banking industry. 
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4.7 Analysis of Responses. 
This section provides a summary of the responses collected from the responding banks 
revealing the state of and attitude towards or preference for the 14 elements of `best 
practices' from the Enterprise Risk Management concepts (ERM), as outlined in 
Venkat (2000); Crouchy, Galai and Mark (2001); and Santomero (1997). As described 
earlier, the 14 elements listed are called `Parameters Tested'. There are some non- 
response parameters tested, e. g., the severity of losses and frequency of losses, yet they 
do not damage my analysis of responses. 
In general, one can conclude that the current state of risk management within the banks 
is very under developed. There are many problems still to be addressed by the banks 
and bank regulators and there are many questions remaining unanswered. In addition, 
banks' attitudes and respondents' attitudes towards the elements of enterprise risk 
management are diverse. Some important findings, which relate to the development of 
the ERM framework and the FMP model and have policy implications, are identified, 
later. 
A summary of the survey results is presented according to the banks' attributes and 
respondents' attributes. The results are organised as follows: 
1. The statistical test for comparisons used was the Kruskal-Wallis One-way ANOVA 
test with mean ranks to detect bias in the results (respondents' attitudes towards 
parameters tested) resulting from banks' attributes and respondents' attributes. The 
null hypothesis is that there is no difference (or the banks and respondents gave the 
same rank) given in the responses by the banks and respondents to the questions 
asked with respect to the element. 
2. The findings are also assessed in the light of the development of the model used in 
Chapters 5 and 6, in particular the development of the FMP model under a robust 
bank regulatory framework. 
3. "Risk rating" analysis is conducted to assess the strength of preference, by bank 
grouping, on each parameter analysed. The responses are converted subjectively into 
scores from 1 to 3 where 1 denotes `Low risk', 2 `Moderate risk', and 3 `High risk' to 
create a probability statement from the responses to the survey. 
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4.7.1 Banks' Attitudes towards ERM 
This section presents the survey results of the parameters tested for the 14 elements 
identified, as summarized in Table 4.5. The detailed results of the K-W One Way 
ANOVA test are reported in Appendix 4.2 (Tables 4.1 to Table 4.14). The results of the 
comparison (dependence) test conducted using the K-W One Way ANOVA are 
summarised in Column 3 (Dependency on Attributes) of Table 4.5. Results reported in 
Appendix 4.2 reveal that almost all of the banks' attitudes towards the parameters tested 
for each element are not statistically significant at a significance level of 95% (or almost 
all have p values > 0.05); since almost all p-values fall in the no rejection area, one 
cannot reject the null hypothesis that the banks' attitudes toward the element tested are 
independent of the banks' attributes. This means also we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that there is no difference (or the banks gave the same rank) given by the 
banks in the ranking of most of the elements. Meanwhile, randomness tests were 
undertaken to test the null hypothesis that these scores are given at random. The values 
of Chi-square and the associated values of significance contained in Table 4.5 underH0 : 
Probability of scores are given at random, are utilized. Figures indicate that the majority 
of the parameters tested associated with Ho are not rejected. 
Table 4.5 Summary of Dependency on Bank Attributes and Main Factors 
Influencing Banks' Attitudes 
No Elements Dependency on bank 
attributes 
Main factors influencing 
banks' attitudes 
1 Risk management philosophy and 
strategy 
Independent YOM 
2 Risk management environment Independent TOL and TOO 
3 Process and control Independent YOL and YOC 
4 Types of financial instruments Independent TOO and TOL 
5 The review system of risk management Independent COE and TOO 
6 Infrastructure Independent TOL and YOC 
7 Separation of duties Independent YOO 
8 Financial instruments valuation Independent YOO 
9 Credit risk measurement Independent TOL, TOO and YOC 
10 Market risk measurement Independent TOIL and TOO 
11 Operational risk measurement Independent COA and YOC 
12 Liquidity risk measurement Independent COE and COA 
13 Limit system Independent TOL and YOC 
14 Data and information systems Independent COA 
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This suggests that the majority of scores are given at random and that the majority of 
banks and /or respondents have equal preferences to scoring, statistically following the 
uniform distribution. In other words, the latter means that the majority of responding 
banks and /or respondents have different preferences but in `roughly' equal frequencies. 
In contrast, an analysis was undertaken to investigate the main factor(s) influencing 
banks' attitudes towards each element (for the p-values < 0.05 meaning those are 
statistically significant at a significance level of 95%). Results shown in Column 4 (Main 
Factors) in Table 4.5 indicate that the main factors influencing banks' attitudes towards 
each element of ERM are Type of Licence (TOL), Type of Office (TOO), and Years of 
Credit Risk Management in Place (YOC). 
4.7.2 Respondents' Attitudes towards ERM 
Similarly, the results of comparison (independence) tests for respondents' attitudes 
towards elements of the ERM using the same statistical technique, as described in 
Section 4.7.1, are highlighted. The complete results of the K-W One Way ANOVA test, 
which are reported in detail in Appendix 4.2 (from Tables 4.1 to Table 4.14) and 
summarized in Table 4.6 reveal that almost all of the respondents' attitudes towards the 
parameters tested for each element are also not statistically significant at a significance 
level of 95% (or almost all have p values > 0.05); since almost all p-values for the 
parameters tested fall in the no-rejection area, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that 
the respondents' attitudes toward the elements tested are independent of the 
respondents' attributes. This means one cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is 
no difference (or respondents gave the same rank) in the responses given by the 
respondents in the ranking of most of the elements. An analysis was also undertaken to 
investigate the main factor(s) influencing the respondent's attitudes towards each 
element (for the p-values < 0.05, meaning those are statistically significant at a 
significant level of 95%). The results shown in Column 4 (Main Factors) of Table 4.6 
indicate that the main factors influencing respondents' attitudes towards each element 
of ERM are Title of Position' (TOP), and `Years Involved in Risk Management 
Systems' (YW. 
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Table 4.6 Summary of Dependency on Respondents' Attributes and Main 
Factors Influencing Respondents' Attitudes 
No Elements Dependency 
on respondent 
attributes 
Main factors influencing 
respondents' attitudes 
1 Risk management philosophy and 
strategy 
Independent TOP and LOE 
2 Risk management environment Independent TOP and FTM 
3 Process and control Independent TOP 
4 Types of financial instruments Independent TOP 
5 The review system of risk management Independent YTM and FTM 
6 Infrastructure Independent TOP and FTM 
7 Separation of duties Independent TOP 
8 Financial instruments valuation Independent YRM and TOP 
9 Credit risk measurement Independent YTM and YRM 
10 Market risk measurement Independent LOE 
11 Operational risk measurement Independent YTM and YRM 
12 Liquidity risk measurement Independent YRM 
13 Limit system Independent FTM and TOP 
14 Data and information systems Independent YRM and TOP 
4.7.3 Findings Relevant to the Development of the ERM Approach and the FMP 
Model 
This section discusses the findings which are relevant to the ERM framework and the 
FMP model described in Chapter 3 and Chapter 5 respectively. Accordingly, findings 
that do not relate directly (i. e., those associated with elements 7,8, and 14) to these two 
chapters are not reported in this thesis. The results are presented in the form of graphs 
(i. e., Figures 4.1 through to 4.38) at the end of this chapter. 
4.7.3.1 Element 1 
(1) Classification of risks by Indonesian banks. 
Many academics and practitioners have suggested different ways of classifying bank 
risks (see Chapter 3). To my best knowledge, this is the first survey of Indonesian banks 
used to explore the categories of bank risk in Indonesia. Banks were asked to classify 
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the different types of risk they face into four different categories of risk. The survey 
results summarized in Figure 4.1, using frequencies command in SPSS 11, provide similar 
conclusions to the earlier studies. Indonesian banks also categorize their risks in a 
number of different ways. Most banks chose Category 2 (35.5%) for the classification of 
their risks, followed by Category 3 (32.26%), Category 1 (29.03%) and finally Category 4 
(3.23%). In summary, most banks chose the classification that always includes market 
risk, credit risk, liquidity risk, operational risk, legal risk and reputational risk. 
Accordingly, I will categorize bank risks in this way to provide a context for analysing 
the scope of bank risks covered within an ERM framework. 
(2) Major bank risks and activities 
Relatively little is known about the main risks faced by banks in Indonesia. With regard 
to this element, an analysis was undertaken using the categories of risk in conjunction 
with their severity of losses (measured as a percentage of capital). Banks were asked to 
indicate the severity of losses caused by every type of risk on a scale of 1 (most severe 
losses) to 10 (least severe losses). The summary of the results reported in Figure 4.2 
using the descriptive command shows that credit risk is the main risk faced by banks in 
Indonesia. This is indicated by the score given by the banks to credit risk in relation to 
their losses (mean score=3.86). This is followed by liquidity risk (mean score=5.32) and 
legal risk (mean score=5.63); whilst operational risk shows the least severe losses (mean 
score=6.04). This result is consistent with the finding of Hall and Santoso (1999), that 
the main risk faced by banks in Indonesia was credit risk. 
In the current survey a closer study was undertaken to examine the risks faced by banks 
in Indonesia by departments. Banks were asked to indicate the severity of losses caused 
by their departments on a scale 1 (most severe losses) to 10 (least severe losses). The 
summary of results reported in Figure 4.3 shows that the credit department is the main 
unit causing the most severe losses in banks in Indonesia (mean score=3.50). This figure 
supports and is consistent with another finding raised before, that the main risk faced by 
banks in Indonesia is credit risk. Accordingly, the main activity of banks in Indonesia 
has been extending loans and this represents the "traditional" bank activity. This is 
consistent with the abundant literature suggesting that, for traditional banks, credit 
activities have been the main activity, resulting in credit risk being the main risk faced by 
the banks. 
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(3) Background to the need for a risk management system. 
An analysis of the background need for a risk management system was undertaken. 
Banks were asked to indicate what important factors contribute to the possible rationale 
for a risk management system, on a scale 1 (not important) to 5 (most important). The 
summary of results reported in Figure 4.4 using the frequencies command shows that the 
most important factor was `meeting the regulatory requirements' (mean score= 4.18), 
followed by `estimating potential losses' (mean score=4.14), and then followed by the 
massive costs of banking distress (mean score=3.96). This suggests that banks in 
Indonesia are still heavily reliant on the bank regulatory bodies when establishing risk 
management systems and are driven by the massive costs of banking distress into having 
a risk management system, so that bank regulators should put into effect requirements 
for a firm wide risk management system. This also leads to a further analysis regarding 
the level of risk (low, moderate and high) assumed. 
(4) Attitudes toward financial risk 
Risk management also relies on the assumption that bank managers are risk averse in 
their business decisions. On the other hand, bank regulation models assume that banks 
are risk neutral. In a test to reveal the banks' degree of risk aversion, the banks were 
asked to indicate how risk averse or risk seeking they are with regard to each of the six 
types of financial risk identified. A seven-point scale, 1 (very risk averse) to 7 (very risk 
seeking), was used. The survey results reported in Figure 4.5 show that banks tend to be 
risk averse, being very risk averse with respect to liquidity risk (mean score = 2.74) and 
very risk taking in respect of credit risk (mean score = 3.63). These figures suggest that, 
overall, banks tend to be risk neutral. Accordingly, the finding is consistent with the 
assumption in bank regulation theory that banks are risk neutral. The result of the tests 
on the banks' risk- taking with respect to credit risk is consistent with the 
aforementioned finding (see Section D2), i. e. that credit risk is the major risk that caused 
the most severe losses. This, however, is not consistent with the ways the sampled 
banks manage their credit risk, as reported in the next section. 
(5) Management of risks 
Although the topic of risk management has been studied by many academics and 
practitioners, to my best knowledge this is the first empirical study of how banks in 
Indonesia manage financial risks. The survey results summarized in Figure 4.7 suggest 
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that most of the sampled banks manage their crrdit risk in a regular and systematic 
manner (mean score = 3.25). To a lesser degree, this is the case for liquidity risk (mean 
score=3.21), market risk (3.00), operational risk (mean sore=2.50), legal risk (mean score 
= 2.48), and finally reputational risk (mean score = 2.31). Although the results are 
consistent with the finding that credit risk is the main risk faced by Indonesian banks, 
still not enough is being done to reduce corresponding losses. Accordingly, a policy 
implication suggested is that banks in Indonesia should review their risk management 
systems, in particular credit risk management in the credit department, to improve their 
performance. 
(6) Business propositions and capital injections 
As a foundation to developing models of optimal bank regulation (see Chapter 5), an 
analysis was conducted to elicit banks' business propositions and the need for capital 
injections to support the financially-ailing banks. Banks were asked to assess what their 
propositions were in running their business, which could be `value added to 
shareholders', `value added to the banks' customers', `value added to the internal 
stakeholders', `value added to the external stakeholders', or all of them. A summary of 
the survey results created, using the frequencies command, as reported in Figure 4.8, 
shows that most banks (70%) prefer the "value added to the shareholders" as their 
business proposition. This is consistent with finance literature, and suggests that the 
proposition can be used in developing a robust regulatory framework for the Indonesian 
banking industry (see Chapter 5). 
Banks were also asked to indicate whether they agree that shareholders should inject 
more capital into an ailing bank, on a scale 1 (strongly agree) to 4 (strongly disagree). 
The survey results reported using the frequencies command depicted in Figure 4.6, suggest 
that most banks agree (51.61%) with the statement, with agreeing (35.48%) very 
strongly. These figures are also consistent with and support the development of a robust 
model of optimal reorganization, as discussed in Chapter 5. The finding is also 
consistent with the fundamental principle of risk management and banking regulation, 
which views bank capital as the final buffer for all bank risks, and argues that 
shareholders should be responsible for injecting new capital into an ailing bank after 
hitting a certain threshold; otherwise the bank regulators will revoke their control rights 
in the bank. 
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(7) Years of risk management in place 
As shown in Table 4.7 and Figure 4.9, many banks in Indonesia do not have market risk 
management in place (22.58%); however, the same proportion have had a risk 
management system in place for more than 5 years. For credit risk management, banks 
that have had the system for more than 5 years take the greatest portion (35.48%), and 
banks that have had the system in place for less than 1 year the least (3.23%), with only 
16.13% of banks having no system. For operational risk management, as noted earlier, 
many banks did not have a system in place (29.03%), with banks having had the system 
for only 1 year recording the highest figure (22.58%). Finally, 38.71% of banks had had 
a liquidity risk management system for more than 5 years, but 19.35% of banks had no 
system. 
(8) Possible cost reductions under a risk management system 
Banks were asked about the possible costs that might be reduced by implementing a risk 
management system. The responses, depicted in Figure 4.10, show that only a few banks 
recognize this benefit of the risk management system. Most banks (22.58%) are aware 
that one cost that can be reduced by risk management is the cost of under-utilization of 
capital. 
Table 4.7 Years of Risk Management in Place 
Type of risk 
Years of risk management 
< 1year 1 year 2 years 3 years 4y ears 5 years >5 years None 
Market risk 3.23 16.13 16.13 12.90 0.00 6.45 22.58 22.58 
Credit risk 3.23 9.68 19.35 9.68 0.00 6.45 35.48 16.13 
Operational risk 0.00 22.58 16.13 6.45 0.00 6.45 19.35 29.03 
Liquidity risk 0.00 9.68 12.90 9.68 3.23 6.45 38.71 19.35 
On the other hand, about 9.68% of Indonesian banks do not recognize the cost- 
reducing benefits of a risk management framework that reduces bankruptcy, debt and 
liquidity costs. Ramos et. al. (2000) suggest that the implementation of a risk 
management system can reduce a number of costs, including bankruptcy costs, the cost 
of debt, fiscal costs, the cost of inappropriate liquidity, and the cost of capital under 
capitalization. Few in the Indonesian banking industry are aware of the potential to 
reduce these costs. 
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4.7.3.2 Element 2 
(1) The level of reliance on bank regulators 
In establishing risk management systems, banks were asked how much they rely on bank 
regulators. The survey results presented in Figure 4.11, indicate that most banks in 
Indonesia are `reliant' (35.28%) or `very reliant' (32.26%) on bank regulators, with only 
3.23% of banks being `not reliant'. This is consistent with the findings described in 
Section 4.7.3.1.3. The policy implication is that bank regulators are uniquely placed to 
provide incentives to promote the development of risk management systems that can 
reduce the roles of regulators and enhance the banks' roles by relying on best practices 
of risk management; since banks basically know more about their risks than regulators, a 
proper incentive system can accelerate a move towards a more self-regulated banking 
system. This, in turn, will help achieve an optimal regulatory regime. 
(2) The use of risk-adjusted returns on capital as performance measurements 
The survey results depicted in Figure 4.12 show that only a few banks use risk-adjusted 
returns on capital for performance measurement purposes. Risk-adjusted returns are 
most popular (25.81%) in the credit risk assessment area and least popular (12.90%) in 
the reputational risk area, whilst 12.9% of banks in Indonesia responded that Bank 
Indonesia has not regulated it. 
(3) The use of risk-adjusted returns on capital within compensation systems 
The survey results depicted in Figure 4.13 show that only a few banks use the risk- 
adjusted returns on capital to determine compensation. There are indications that credit, 
operational and liquidity risk areas use them the most (with the same portion (19.35%)); 
but less so in the reputational risk and legal risk areas (12.90%). Whilst, around 22% of 
banks in Indonesia responded that Bank Indonesia has not regulated it. This, again, 
indicates the reliance of Indonesian banks on bank regulators. 
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4.7.3.3 Element 3 
(1) Commitment of Board of Directors 
Best practice in risk management requires commitment from the Board of Directors. 
The survey results shown in Figure 4.14 indicate that 64.5% of banks always implement 
this principle and 6.45% never implement it. The policy implication is that banks and 
bank regulators still have to urge the very top managers in such organizations to adopt 
the principle so that more of the Boards of Directors will be aware of the risk impact of 
each business activity on the overall risk profile of their firms. 
(2) Assessment process prior to executions 
Use of an assessment process prior to approval or executions is a characteristic of best 
practice in risk management. The survey results summarized in Figure 4.15 show that 
only for new products do more than 66% of banks always implement this best practice. 
For business activities and transactions, only 54.84% of banks always adopt such best 
practice. 
(3) Risk measurement and control approaches to setting risk limits 
The survey results summarized in Figure 4.16 indicate that most (61.29%) banks always 
set credit risk limits, but only 38.71% do so for operational risk. For liquidity risk and 
market risk the figures are 54.84% and 51.61 respectively. On the other hand, 9.68% of 
banks never adopt risk limits. These findings indicate that banks should be encouraged 
to embrace such risk measurements and control losses by setting risk limits 
(4) Risk measurement and control approaches to the setting of concentration 
risk limits. 
The survey results summarized in Figure 4.17 indicate that 48.39% of banks always set 
credit concentration risk limits, but only 29.03% do so for operational risk. Meanwhile, 
banks that adopt such practices for liquidity risk and market risk both account for 
41.94% of the sample respectively. On the other hand, 9.68% of banks never adopt 
such practices. These findings also indicate that banks should be encouraged to embrace 
such risk measurements and control limits to minimise losses. 
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(5) Considerations relevant to the evaluation of risk-taking activities 
The survey results reported in Figure 4.18 indicate that capital regulation is always the 
main consideration in the evaluation of risk-taking activities in 80.65% of banks, 
followed by internal capital allocations (54.84%), the views of rating agencies (35.48%), 
and returns to shareholders (32.26%). 
4.7.3.4 Element 4 
Measurable and controllable products 
The survey results summarized in Figure 4.19 show that senior managers in 41.94% of 
banks always ensure that all risks arising from non-derivatives products can be measured 
and controlled by the existing risk management system. Whilst the survey also indicates 
that 64.52% of banks did not use derivatives products, such as plain vanilla derivatives, 
exotic products, or hybrid products. These results support my findings described in the 
earlier sections that the banks' activities are still mainly traditional. 
4.7.3.5 Element 5 
Role of auditors in ensuring the robustness of risk management 
The survey results summarized in Figure 4.20 show that internal auditors at 38.71% of 
banks always ensure that their risk management systems are robust; 35.48% of banks 
internal auditors often do so, 16.13% of banks internal auditors sometimes do and 
9.68% of banks rarely do. Whilst, the survey also indicates that 32.26% of banks' 
external auditors always ensure that the banks' risk management systems are robust, 
followed by 38.71% who often do, 22.58% who sometimes do, and 6.45% who do 
rarely. These show that both external auditors and internal auditors should be 
encouraged to review the banks' risk management systems more often to ensure that 
they are robust. 
4.7.3.6 Element 6 
(1) Market risk models implemented by Indonesian banks 
Figure 4.21 indicates that the most popular market risk model implemented by the 
banks is the Value at Risk model (adopted by 19.35% of banks), whilst Gap analysis 
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(16.13%), Other models (9.68%) are also popular, along with Gap analysis and duration 
analysis (9.68%). On the other hand, less than 4% of banks had implemented a full mix 
of models. Meanwhile, 12.9% of banks had not implemented any market risk model. 
These results are consistent with the findings described in the earlier sections. 
(2) Credit risk models implemented by Indonesian banks 
Figure 4.22 indicates that the most popular credit risk models implemented by the 
Indonesian banks are Internal Rating Systems (25.81%), Accounting Ratios Approach 
(16.13%), and Portfolio Credit Risk Models (12.90%). Meanwhile, 19.35% of the 
Indonesian banks had not implemented any credit risk model. 
(3) Operational risk models implemented by Indonesian banks 
The survey results summarized in Figure 4.23 indicate that most banks (54.84%) had not 
implemented an operational risk model. In addition, 22.58% of banks had implemented 
models other than causal, parametric and extreme value models. On the other hand, 
only 9.68% of banks in Indonesia had implemented either the causal model or the 
parametric model. 
(4) Liquidity risk models implemented by Indonesian banks 
Figure 4.24 indicates that most banks (51.61%). had adopted Accounting Ratios and 
statistical model approaches. In addition, only 12.9% of banks had implemented models 
other than these. However, 19.35% of banks had no approach. 
4.7.3.7 Element 9 
(1) Indonesian banks' credit risk by product 
The survey results depicted in Figure 4.25 show that 41.94% of banks think loans and 
derivative are the `most dangerous'. In addition, short term securities are also thought 
`dangerous' (48.39%). 
(2) Concentration factors of credit risk 
Survey results reported in Figure 4.26 show that 54.84% of banks think `Groups', and 
`Groups and affiliates' are the main concentration factors of credit risk, followed by 
Economic sectors' (45.16%), `Single corporates' (29.03%), and country risk (19.35%). 
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(3) Factors affecting credit risk 
Survey results reported in Figure 4.27 show that 58.06% of banks think that credit risk is 
always affected by the existence of collateral, and 51.61% of banks think that cash 
collateral is an important influence. 32.26% of banks think that credit risk is affected by 
sharing information and 32.26% of banks also think that credit risk is affected by 
endorsements and insurance. However, banks also think that sometimes credit risk is 
affected by bankruptcy procedures (41.94%), the level of fraud (35.48%), and 
endorsements (35.48%). Meanwhile, banks think that credit risk is often affected by 
interest rates (35.48%), collateral (32.26%), and cash collateral (29.03%). 
4.7.3.8 Element 10 
(1) Foreign exchange risk management 
The survey results reported in Figure 4.28 indicate that 45.16% of banks manage their 
foreign exchange with `Regular, systematic assessments, quantification, and active 
management', yet 22.58% of banks apply `No-regular assessment'. 19.35% of banks 
apply 'Regular, systematic assessments and quantification', and 12.90% of banks apply 
`Regular and systematic assessments'. 
(2) Implementation of foreign exchange risk management 
The survey results reported in Figure 4.29 indicate that 25.81% of banks either adopt an 
`Immediately hedge all exposures policy' for foreign exchange transactions policy, or a 
`Partially hedge' policy, and 19.35% implement an `Immediately hedge a portion of 
exposure and forecast' policy; and 19.35% of banks do Not hedge at all'. 
(3) Interest rate risk management 
The survey results reported in Figure 4.30 indicate that 45.16% of banks manage their 
interest rate risk with `Regular, systematic assessments, quantification, and active 
management', with 25.81% adopting a policy of `Regular and systematic assessments', 
and 16.13% adopting a policy of `Regular, systematic assessments and quantification'. 
`No regular assessments' are made by 12.9% of banks. 
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(4) Implementation of interest rate risk management 
Survey results reported in Figure 4.31 indicate that the implementation of interest rate 
risk management by the Indonesian banking involves 22.58% in adopting a policy of 
`Partially hedge' (22.58%), followed by a policy of `Immediately hedge a portion of 
exposure and forecast' (19.35%), and `Use forecast to decide hedging' (19.35%). 16.13% 
of banks do `Not hedge at all'. 
(5) Implementation of Value of Risk (VaR) for market risk measurements 
Most banks in Indonesia (61.291/6) had not used VaR models for market risk 
measurements. 12.9% of banks, however, implemented Historical Simulation VaR, and 
12.9% also used Variance-Covariance VaIL In addition, Monte Carlo VaR was 
implemented by 3.23% of banks. Historical simulation VaR together with variance- 
covariance VaR was implemented by 3.23% of banks; and Historical Simulation as well 
as Monte Carlo Simulation, and Extreme VaR were implemented by 3.23% of banks. 
1he survey results are presented in Figure 4.32. 
4.7.3.9 Element il 
(1) Categories of operational risk 
The survey results presented in Figure 4.33 indicate that banks think that operational 
risks are mainly caused by Human Acts (Very important = 38.71%, and Important = 
35.48%), followed by Fraud (Important = 48.39% and Very important = 32.26%), 
Inadequate Information Systems (Important = 45.16% and Very important = 25.81%), 
Breaches in Internal Controls (Important = 45.16% and Very important = 25.81%), 
and Technology Risk (Important = 35.48% and Very important = 25.81%). 
(2) Problems in developing operational risk models 
The Indonesian banking industry still faces some difficulties in developing operational 
risk models. The survey results summarized in Figure 4.34 indicate that the banks think 
that the main causal factor is 'No Generally Accepted Model' (Important rating of 
32.26% and Very Important, 25.81'/o), followed by 'No available date (Important, 
25-81% and Very Important, 22-581/6), 'Data Collection' (Very Importantý 29.03% and 
Important, 16.13'Yo), and Tank Indonesia has not regulated' (Very important, 29.03% 
and Important, lZ90%). 
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4.7.3.10 Element 12 
(1) Methods to solve market liquidity risk 
Market liquidity risk is more difficult to handle than funding liquidity risk. The survey 
results reported in Figure 4.35 indicate that to solve market liquidity risk, banks rely 
heavily on the `Maintenance of access to fund providers' (29.03%), followed by the 
`Maintenance of reserve balances with Bank Indonesia' (22.58%), and `Making extreme 
case assumptions about close out loss' (12.90%). 
(2) Factors raising liquidity risk 
The survey results depicted in Figure 4.36 indicate that 32.26% of banks think that the 
main factor raising liquidity risk is the 'Inability to raise adequate fundine, followed by 
the 'Inability to liquidate assets' (19.35/o), and the mixture of the 'Inability to raise 
adequate funding, inability to liquidate assets, and inability to easily offset or unwind 
specific exposures' (16.13%). 
4.7.3.11 Element 13 
(1) Factors influencing adoption of a risk limit system 
The survey results summarized in Figure 4.37 indicate that banks think that the main 
factor influencing adoption of a risk limit system is a 'Firm's Risk Philosophy' 
CImportane rating of 48.39% and Tery Important' of 35.481/6), followed by the 'Overall 
Business Stratee (Important rating of 51.61% and Very Important of 29-031/6), 
Effectiveness at managing risk' (Important rating of 45.16% and Very Important of 
32-260/6), and fmally 'Capital Position' (Important rating of 45.16% and Very Important 
of 25.81%). 
(2) Coverage of limit review system 
The survey results summarized in Figure 4.38 indicate that most banks (61.29%) in 
Indonesia always review `Individual limits', 51.66% always review 'Business limits', 
38.71% `Risk-categories limits', 32.26% `Limit utilization', 22.58% `Limit exemption', 
and 22.58% `Penalty system'. 
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4.7.4 Risk Ratings 
This section provides further analysis of the responses received, as reported in 
Appendix 4.3 (Tables 4.1 to 4.14). The responses, as reported earlier, were converted 
subjectively into three categories, namely I= `Low'; 2= `Moderate'; and 3= `High' risk 
for the parameters tested for each element of the ERM framework. The conversion 
process of the responses was carried out as follows: 
" All parameters tested are assumed equally important for each element of the ERM. 
" The banks' responses are marked subjectively with Sow risk' if the banks' responses 
are fully consistent with, show extremely strong preferences towards, or fully 
comply with the parameters tested of the ERM framework. On the other hand, their 
responses are marked with `high risk' if their responses are not consistent with, 
show truly weak preferences towards, or depart significantly from the characteristics 
of risk management best practices (or parameters tested). Responses which fell in 
between the two categories (low and high), were marked with `moderate risk'. 
" Frequencies of the converted responses (in percentages) for each element, i. e., low, 
moderate and high, for each bank are summed arithmetically across the parameters 
tested by `Type of Office', `Type of License', Total Assets', `Total Employees', 
`Total Branches', and `Years of risk management in place', as reported in Appendix 
4.3. 
" The converted responses are used to re-examine the results reported in previous 
sections (Sections 4.7.1. and 4.7.2) and to evaluate the risk ratings of the distinct 
groups of banks in Indonesia, so that bank regulators and banks can identify and 
resolve the shortcomings of each element of the ERM and thus allocate resources 
more efficiently. 
Analysis of Appendix 4.3 (Tables 4.1 to 4.14) reveals that domestic banks usually receive 
low risk ratings - usually with small differences between moderate risk ratings and high 
risk ratings - with the lowest percentage being recorded (32.82% of all banks, equal to 
37.3% of domestic banks) for Element I and the highest percentage for Element 7 
(73.33%; 84.61/6). For Elements 10,11,12 and 14, however, high risk ratings -are the 
most common; while for Element 2, moderate risk ratings are the most common. In 
contrast, for almost all of the parameters tested, foreign banks mainly receive low risk 
ratings, with the exception of Elements 10 and 14, where high-risk ratings predominate. 
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These results are confirmed by analysis by Type of License. Analysis by type of license 
indicates that almost all the parameters tested for foreign exchange banks, state banks, 
non-foreign banks, joint banks and development banks are graded with low risk ratings, 
as for foreign banks, except for those parameters mentioned above. One can conclude 
that, with respect to the banks' attitudes towards the elements of an ERM, most banks 
(i. e., both domestic and foreign) receive low risk ratings for the majority of elements. 
In addition, the risk rating can also be analysed by size of bank, namely, by relevance to 
Total Assets, Total Employees and Total Branches. Results decisively indicate that the 
size of banks does not materially influence the risk ratings, which are very diverse. Ibis 
is consistent with the results described in Section 4.7.1, where the banks' attitudes 
towards the elements of the ERM are dependent on three attributes namely, Type of 
Office, Type of Ucense and Years of Risk Management in Place, i. e. independent of 
their size. Finally, the results in Appendix 4.3 show that risk ratings are not closely 
linked with years of risk management in place, rather, they are mainly dependent on the 
years of credit risk management in place, a finding also consistent with the variance 
analysis summarized in Section 4.7.1. The policy implications are that, because banks' 
attitudes towards ERM usually receive low risk ratings, they clearly tend to abide by an 
ERM fi-amework, but only if bank regulators put the ERM regulation into effect. By 
taking into account the shortcomings identified in Section 4.7.3, banks, however, clearly 
have only just begun implementing sophisticated risk management systems and tend to 
rely too heavily on bank regulators. As a result, banks regulators should launch a more 
detailed guidance and refocus risk management regulations by embracing the ERM 
fi-amework, as proposed in Chapter 3. 
4.8 Conclusions 
This chapter presents the results of the questionnaire based empirical survey of risk 
management in the Indonesian banking industry based on the ERM framework 
developed in Chapter 3. To my best knowledge, this is the first study of its field for the 
case of Indonesia. Accordingly, this study adds to the empirical literature on risk 
management and bank regulation, especially with respect to developing countries. 
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The empirical survey suggests that banks in Indonesia were very interested in the topic 
of the survey, as shown by the number of banks that took part in the survey and the 
proportion of respondents who were mid and top managers. Moreover, most believe 
that risk management should start from the very top of their organizations, which is 
consistent with the ERM framework. As a result, this survey should encourage bank 
management, at all levels, in Indonesia and bank regulators to dedicate their efforts and 
allocate their resources to ensure that risk management best practices are in place. 1he 
banks, however, typically still embrace the traditional risk management approach, which 
is fragmented in nature, rather than firm-wide risk management, the so-called ERM 
framework. The current state of risk management within the banks is thus still very 
under-developed. The regulation of risk management is also still fragmented in nature, 
as described in Chapter 3. Ibis means that risk management in the Indonesian banking 
system is still sub-optimal, and can be improved by combining all elements of the ERM 
framework, which in turn, can help improve bank regulation by utilising the regulatory 
regime concept described in Chapter 2. 
Some important findings, which relate to the development of the ERM framework and 
the FMP model, as described in Chapter 4, and which have policy implications, are 
identified - see below. There are many problems still to be addressed by the banks and 
bank regulators, as discussed in detail in Section 4.7.3, which indicates decisively that 
banks in Indonesia need guidelines about the ERM framework from bank regulators to 
enhance their performance; in turn, this will increase their probability of success, as 
implied by Basel II, where domestic bank regulators are given discretion to provide 
guidelines and to put into effect the risk-based bank regulations. Such measures would 
help Indonesian bank regulators and banks to rectify the reported shortcomings of each 
element 
In relation to the development of the FMP model, the Indonesian banks' business 
proposition is to enhance shareholder value and the banks believe shareholders should 
inject more capital into ailing banks; this is consistent with the finance and banking 
literature. The banks also claim that the main risk they face is credit risk; this is in line 
with the earlier study by Hall and Santoso (2000). These are of utmost importance to 
the development of the FMP model (discussed in Chapter 5), the empirical study of 
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optimal bank regulation (reported in Chapter 6), and to the development of the ERM 
framework itself (analysed in Chapter 3). 
Ile banks' subjective risk ratings indicate that most foreign and domestic banks are 'low 
risk', although risk ratings are affected by some banks' attributes, such as years of credit 
risk management in place, as shown in Appendix 4.3. The implications are that one can 
identify which banks should be paid more attention by bank regulators and which 
elements of the ERM should be amended or rectified by the banks. 
The policy implications of the empirical analysis are as follows: 
@ Overall, bank regulators and the banks should be encouraged to adopt the best 
practices of firm-wide risk management, and banks need to allocate their resources as 
early as possible to ensure that the elements of the ERM framework are in place to 
improve their performance. Human resources development should be the first priority 
by providing high quality training and education in enterprise risk management since 
they are the real operators of all financial and economic activities. The regulatory 
authorities and banks should encourage efforts to aggregate and integrate measurements 
of bank risks and to use both standardized models and internal models. It is sensible 
to note, however, that the manner of implementation of ERM will depend on the 
banks' resources, experience, size, and complexity of operations. Ibis means that, 
although each bank should adopt the same basic principles of ERM, each is likely to 
move at a different pace to establish an ERM framework. 
(ii) The regulatory authorities should create a risk-based, optimal bank regulation by 
adopting the ERM framework and the regulatory regime concept, as described in 
chapters 3 and 2 respectively. Accordingly, this study tries to identify such an optimal 
bank regulation by studying optimal corrective actions, as discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. 
(iii) A greater coordination between bank regulatory policies and macro economy 
policies is also of utmost importance to achieve sustainable growth and to enhance the 
banks' values and financial stability. 
(iv) With regard to the regulatory regime concept presented in Chapters 2 and ffirther 
analysed in Chapter 5, the policy implications implied by this study are as follows: 
'Me regulatory authorities should refocus their regulatory and supervisory strategies 
by adopting the principles of ERM and the regulatory regime concept. Ibis would 
involve, inter alia, clearly defining the objectives of regulation, and explaining its 
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rationale, integrating and consolidating supervision policies and processes, 
differentiating the form and intensity of regulatory and supervisory requirements 
according to the banks' portfolio risks and quality of internal controls, introducing 
self-select contracts for banks (e. g. the pre-commitment approach), and adjusting 
capital regulation to create incentives for the correct pricing of absolute and relative 
risk. 
" The regulatory authorities also need to create the correct incentives for bank owners 
and bank managers, by aligning the decision makers' incentives within regulated 
banks with those of the objectives of bank regulation. Meanwhile, bank regulators 
should balance their efforts to avoid moral hazard against the incentives of other 
agents (i. e. depositors, rating -agencies, shareholders, debt-holders) by balancing 
efforts to manage systemic risk against efforts to ensure that market players bear the 
costs of imprudent risk taking and have incentives to behave prudently. 
" Bank regulators should much more emphasise on internal risk management, in 
particular credit risk management, than on detailed and prescriptive rules. In 
addition, bank regulation should not be regarded as a substitute for but a 
complement to market discipline by providing greater incentives to the market 
players (i. e. depositors, debt-holders, rating agencies, shareholders) to monitor the 
banks' risks. The results indicate that the implementation of risk management within 
the banks is still sub-optimal and is too reliant on the bank regulators. Accordingly, 
bank regulators should launch detailed risk management regulations. 
Since an ERM framework involves transparency and the fiill disclosure of relevant 
information about bank risks, the regulatory authorities, working together with 
related parties (i. e accounting standards bodies, capital market authorities etc. ) 
should improve risk reporting standards. Ibis can address informational 
asymmetries which, in turn, can enhance the effectiveness of market players. 
" The greater involvement of internal and external auditors in the evaluation of bank 
risk management should clearly be encouraged; and the Indonesian accounting 
standards; and internal accounting and regulatory reporting systems should be 
enhanced to fully disclose the banks' risks. 
" As shown by the results of the "risk rating", risk management in the Indonesian 
banks is still sub-optimal and some elements have "high risk", so that both bank 
regulators and bank management should pay more attention to such elements of an 
ERM. 
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Adverse incentive structures, such as over-reliance on the governmenes 
commitment to hold the exchange rates, which induced imprudent foreign currency 
exposures and over-reliance on the role of the lender of last resort (which create a 
belief that banks would not be allowed to fail), should be resolved. The Central 
Bank should adopt the Bagehot principles in the discharge of its lender of last resort 
functions and the regulatory authorities need to create "prompt corrective action" 
rules,, including bail-out policies, that avoid moral hazard problems, as discussed in 
Chapter 5 and 6. 
Finally, regulatory authorities should do more to encourage good corporate 
governance within the principal-agent relationships which exist between the banks' 
managers and shareholders. Bank managers havc a greater risk appetite than 
shareholders because shareholders will suffer when a bank fails; whilst shareholders 
may have a strong risk appetite in the case of a "gamble for resurrection" strategy 
(or go for broke strategy), as analysed in Chapter 5. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
OPTINUL BANK CORRECTIVE ACTION: THE DYNAMIC 
CONTINGENT CLAIMS MODEL UNDER A ROBUST 
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
5.1 Introduction 
Ibis chapter describes the optimal bank reorganization as a corrective action taken by 
banking authorities. Ibis involves - in theory and practice - the analysis of variables and 
parameters of bank regulation, namely deposit insurance premiums, bailout policy, 
closure rules, and imminence to bankruptcy. In this study, I adopt a model suggested by 
Fries, Mella-Barral, and Perraudin, 1997 (FMP modeD and extend the model to 
embrace the "Regulatory Regime" concept suggested by I. Jewellyn (1999c) to provide a 
framework of a robust regulatory regime. A study of risk-based closure policies under a 
robust regulatory regime to provide efficient regulation and to be consistent with Basel 
II is of utmost important. Furthermore, I also extend the model to study the impact of 
the introduction of risk management on the banks' performance. In Chapter 6,1 
present the empirical study of the reorganization of Indonesian banks using the IMP 
model. 
This study contributes to the literature in the following ways. Firstly, I extend the FMP 
model by examining and combining the properties of the FMP model with the 
regulatory regime concept, which can add to the literature on bank regulation. 
Secondly, I also extend the FMP model to study the structural change caused by the 
impact of the introduction of credit risk management on the banks' performance and, 
accordingly, add to the literature in this area. 
Ibis chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.2 describes the objectives of this chapter, 
Section 5.3 provides the theoretical and practical foundations of the corrective actions 
taken by authorities; Section 5.4 provides analysis of the FMP model with 
modifications, involving the implementation of risk management and its role within a 
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robust regulatory regime. Ibis section covers the derivation of banks' equity values and 
liabilities, the derivation of closure rules, the derivation of an actuarially-fair flat deposit 
insurance premium, bail out models, equity support policies, and structural breaks 
caused by the implementation of risk management and its impact on banks' 
performance; and Section 5.5 concludes. 
5.2 Objectives 
The objectives of this chapter are as foHows: 
1. To provide the theoretical and practical foundations to bank corrective action. 
2. To analyse the Fries, Mell-Barral, and Perraudin (FMP) model of optimal bank 
reorganization / bank corrective actions that can provide a robust regulatory 
regime with a deposit insurance scheme so that regulatory authorities and 
related parties are aware of when and what criteria to use to reorganize ailing 
banks, taking into account all relevant costs, in the form of social costs, 
bankruptcy costs, monitoring costs, and subsidies, so that efficient regulation 
can be achieved. 
3. To examine the closure policies with and without the provision of a subsidy if 
banks' shareholders are unable or unwilling to inject more capital into the 
financially ailing banks. 
4. To examine how the authorities can establish a fair deposit insurance premium. 
5. To examine how the authorities can calculate the Emits of subsidy to be injected 
into the ailing banks that can diminish moral hazard problems. 
6. To study empirically the relationships between the state of risk management 
and optimal bank reorganization for Indonesian banks. 
7. To develop the concept of a regulatory regime under the optimal bank closure 
policies by studying the interactions of its elements. 
8. To derive models of optimal financial reorganization empirically using 
Indonesian bank data. 
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5.3 Background to the Corrective Action 
When a bank experiences financial difficulties, regulators take corrective measures in 
the form of bank reorganization or bank closure. The systemic risk argument, or 
domino effect theory, where problems may spread from one bank to the other banks, 
including healthy banks, may result in a bail out by government and /or taxpayers when 
shareholders are unable or unwilling to inject adequate capital; whilst protection of 
small depositors, as an objective of financial regulation, must be met. This bail-out 
increases the government's budget deficit and is therefore reported to parliament, as 
the representative of the tax payers. For example, for the four countries worst affected 
by the 1997/1998 East Asian Crisis (Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand), the 
costs of bank recapitalization have been estimated at between 19% and 30% of GDP 
respectively (World Bank, 1999). Bank regulators in Indonesia have implicitly adopted a 
blanket guarantee scheme to protect small depositors since the end of 1997, after a 
multi-dimensional crisis hit Indonesia at the start of July 1997, triggered by the decrease 
in the external value of the currency in 1hailand resulting from currency speculation in 
the foreign currency markets. The crisis forced the Indonesian government to bail out 
the ailing banks (nearly all banks) to the tune of Rp164,536 trillion, as described in 
Chapter 1. 
Studies on the benefits of government interventions have been abundant. Diamond 
and Dybvig (1983), most notably, have suggested that there is social welfare to be 
gained from government interventions, and deposit insurance can provide a solution to 
bank runs. Freixas and Rochet (1998) note such a system is established by governments 
to avoid bank panics and their social costs. By implementing a robust closure model, 
the regulators will have a forward-looking policy and the bank supervisors will be more 
vigilant. However, bank interventions and closures of commercial banks are public 
decisionsP even though they can be conducted by private insurance schemes with 
government establishing explicit contingent closure policies, but this is a difficult task, 
as noted by Benston et-al. (1986). On the other hand, massive losses in banking systems 
around the world, in particular in the Indonesian banking industry, have resulted in 
bank regulators pushing to establish optimal bank reorganization policies with a robust 
regulatory regime being used to support a robust and stable financial system. The 
economic rationale for financial regulation and supervision (see Chapter 2) also justifies 
the interventions. In addition, banking regulation can be efficient only when it includes 
185 
closure policies (Freixas and Rochet, 1998). The problem is how, when and using what 
criteria should the regulatory bodies intervene? What are the socially-accepted practices 
and optimal closure policies? If a deposit insurance scheme is used, what is a fair 
deposit premium? If a government ought to subsidize ailing banks, what is the optimal 
subsidy that avoids the moral hazard problem? For countries without such an explicit 
insurance scheme, such as Indonesia, can an optimal corrective action policy / bank 
organisation fill the gap? 
Many articles also discuss the optimal bank closure rules linked to existing deposit 
insurance schemes. In the USA, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), 
under the 1991 FDICI Act has implemented risk-based premium charges and has 
launched guidelines for "prompt correction action" (see Appendix 5.1). Before 1991, 
the FDIC levied flat rate premiums at fixed intervals (i. e. annually) between bank audits 
and forced a reorganization if it found insolvency or negative net worth; now it can 
shut down a bank even if its net worth is below a threshold point; otherwise it lets 
them continue to operate. The closure threshold, as a policy parameter, is indicated by 
a fractional number, a. More specifically, the FDIC will postpone action or forbear if 
the value of assets, A, is greater than the threshold (a) of the net worth, NWI, (or A> 
crNWI), and shut down the bank if A <a NW. As a matter of fact, the FDIC used to 
levy flat rate deposit insurance premia and use capital ratios as triggers for action. 
Academics supporting such practice include Pennachi (1987b). He also suggests using 
audit-based deposit insurance, which relies on an assumption that the authorities 
periodically audit banks and conduct reorganizations if the banks' net assets are found 
negative. 
The effects of deposit insurance premia are still under debate. Matutes and Vives 
(1996b) and Freixas and Rochet (1998) suggest that a flat rate results in moral hazard 
problems, i. e. excessive risk-taking. Chan, Greenbaum and lbakor (1992) note that, 
assuming asynunetric information, fairly priced deposit insurance may not be feasible. 
In contrast, Freixas and Rochet (1995) argue that, in a more general case, fairly-priced 
deposit insurance may in fact be viable under asymmetric information., but that it will 
never completely satisfy the social planner viewpoint. Whilst Bond and Crocker (1993) 
suggest that deposit insurance provides banks with an additional tool for insuring 
depositors, but will always be suboptimal because it reduces the incentive of depositors 
to require banks to generate a self-protection system through capitalization. In 
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addition, different authors argue that a deposit insurance system has a variety of effects 
on the banking industry. Freixas and Rochet (1998) suggest that even though flat rate 
deposit insurance gives the banks an incentive to take more risk, they did not find any 
effects on the equilibrium level of deposits and loan margins. Additionally, Suarez 
(1993a, 1993b), assuming risk neutrality and limited liability of banks, argues that high 
margins on deposits rates will lead the banks to get involved in lower risk. Moreover, 
even if the margin on loans is negative, the banks still want to extend loans (if the banks 
have sufficient leverage through deposits), simply because the banks obtain a subsidy 
via deposit insurance. Gennote and Pyle (1991), focusing their study on the banks' 
portfolio of loans, indicate that deposit guarantees will lead to inefficient investment, 
and that increases in bank capital requirements could not compensate for the increase 
in risk. 
On the other hand, the results of Matutes and Vives (1996a, 1996b) show that deposit 
insurance is desirable, firstly because it prevents market collapse, and secondly because 
deposit insurance may restore the confidence of depositors, which broadens and 
sustains financial markets. However, they also note that the existence of deposit 
insurance makes the banks compete more fiercely, which increases the expected cost of 
failure. Consequently, deposit insurance alone is not a panacea for controlling bank 
failures since it results in excessive risk tiking; instead, it is only an instrument of bank 
regulation which has to be in place with the other instruments, such as risk 
management, capital regulation, reserve requirements, etc., as set out in Chapter 2. 
Specifically, in this thesis, risk management, consistent with Basel II, is analysed in 
rclation to the state variable of the FMP model. 
The drawbacks of a deposit insurance system based on risk-based deposit insurance 
premium rates with audit frequency are as follows: First, the risk-based premium rate 
system still results in cross subsidies from the safer banks to the riskier ones, in that the 
spread between the safest and the riskiest banks is much smaller than that assigned by 
the market to the uninsured debt of banks (Benston and Kauftnan, 1997). Second, the 
capital ratio used in controlling bank failures is questioned and there is also the problem 
of 'boole vs 'economic value' of capital; early studies by some authors, such as Kahane 
(1977), Koehn and Santomero (1980), Kim and Santomero (1988), and Dewatripont 
and Tirole (1999) found that higher compulsory capital ratios imposed by the regulators 
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increased risk-taking by banks yet the FDIC Act itself requires that risk taking can take 
place only in well-capitalized banks. In contrastý Furlong and Keeley (1989), and 
Gennottee and Pyle (1991) took the opposite view. In between those two schools is 
the finding of Calern and Rob (1999), which is that well-capitalized banks tend to 
assume more risk than the moderately well capitalized banks. Third, the value of 
deposit guarantees depends crucially on the period between bank audits. The frequency 
of audits empirically is unobservable, even if the authorities can monitor more or less 
on a continuous basis; as a result the value of deposit guarantees is very sensitive to the 
parameter of audit frequency. In the extreme case, if the audits were costless and can 
be conducted continuously, the guarantee would have zero value as the fall in a bank's 
net worth below zero would immediately trigger appropriate action. Fourth, another 
unattractive feature of the audit-based deposit guarantee models is the assumption of 
symmetric information available to the authorities and shareholders. The models rely 
on the assumption that the equity values correctly reflect underlying asset values. If it is 
the case, bank regulators can infer from the changes in banks' equity prices when their 
assets values hit zero. 
The problem is that if any subsidies are linked to the deposit insurance system, a 
deposit institution should be allowed to choose, in an incentive compatible manner, the 
combination of capital requirements and insurance premiums, as suggested by Chan, 
Greenbaum and lbakor (1992), McCulloch (1981), Pyle (1986) and Ronn and Verma 
(1989). Consequently, it is crucial that the level of capital is quantitatively related to the 
"fair" deposit insurance premium in a risk-adjusted deposit insurance system. More 
specifically, it is necessary to measure the sensitivity of the fair deposit insurance 
premium to the capital ratio, which involves the relationship between the equity values 
and capital ratios. If the sensitivity is low, the regulator should focus on a closure policy 
instrument rather than capital regulation to reduce the overall excess liability of the 
funds. In contrast, if the sensitivity is extremely high, then capital regulation should be 
the main focus. The USA and Canada have embraced such a system that links the 
deposit insurance pren-ýiurns to the other quantitative and qualitative factors 
In the USA, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation implements a risk based 
deposit insurance premium, where a financial institution's deposit insurance premium is 
determined by an institution's deposit insurance rate category. A financial institution 
will first be grouped into one of three categories based on its capital ratio, namely "well 
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capitalized", "adequate capitalized", and "under capitalised", and then will be sub 
grouped into 6 subgroups based on other relevant information, such as the results of 
the last examinations, the changes in the banks' composite ratings, the results of offsite 
statistical analysis and analysis of other pertinent information, leading to its deposit 
insurance premium. The risk-based methodology and tariff schedule of deposit 
insurance premiums in the USA [http//: www. fdic. gov., (2003)] are depicted in 
Appendix 5.1 at the end of this chapter. 
Canada has also adopted a risk- based deposit insurance scheme, [http//: www. cdic. ca., 
(2003)]. The Canadian authorities determine the deposit insurance premium for a 
financial institution based on a system that scores an institution according to two 
criteria, i. e. quantitative factors and qualitative factors. Quantitative factors comprise 
capital adequacy and other financial ratios, such as return on risk-weighted assets, mean 
adjusted net income volatility, volatility-adjusted net income, an efficiency ratio, net 
impaired assets to total capital, an aggregate counterparty assets concentration ratio, real 
estate concentration and aggregate industry sector assets concentration. Qualitative 
factors include examiner ratings, and other information. A bank! s score will determine 
the category of deposit insurance premium rate to be levied on the bank, and these are 
grouped into 4 pren-durn categories. The summary criteria and tariff schedule of deposit 
insurance premiums adopted in Canada are depicted in Appendix 5.2 at the end of this 
chapter. 
An empirical study conducted by Jones and King (1995), for example, revealed that 
most insolvent banks in the USA from 1984 through 1989 would not have been 
considered under-capit&ed and therefore would not have been subject to mandatory 
corrective actions. Accordingly, the capital level must be estimated and measured 
accurately and integrated into the measurement of a fair insurance premium, as 
practised in the USA since 1993, when risk-based deposit insurance premiums were 
introduced. As a result, consideration of their joint effects should be taken prior to 
implementation of this policy because there are cost-push effects to risk that replace 
the banks' costs under the separate regimes of risk based-capital and risk-based deposit 
premiums that may reflect variations in the level of risk. 
In practice, many countries have implemented different closure policies. We can 
basically divide such policies into two extreme closure policies: the late closure policies 
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Gapanese model); and the early closure polices (current American model). Furthermore, 
the different bank closure policies adopted in selected countries are summarized in 
Table 5.1. 
As shown in the table, the triggers used by the governments of Finland, Japan, Norway, 
and Sweden to intensify supervision and to manage liquidity crises in ailing banks are 
deteriorating bank earnings and capital; whilst, the USA focuses only on the capital 
level. 'Me methods of resolving banks' capital shortfalls vary across the countries. The 
regulatory agencies in Japan adopt a more patient approach, by conducting close 
supervision of the banks' operations, which provides opportunities to the ailing banks 
to resolve their capital shortfalls. The three European countries, i. e. Finland, Norway 
and Sweden, implement nationalization, mergers and recapitalisations, lead by the 
government. In Sweden, supervisors implement asset guarantees and recapitalization 
under a restructuring plan. The USA adopts a model whereby the ailing banks are 
urged to seek merger partners; they are also grouped, based on their level of capital, 
into four groups, i. e. "well-capitalized" "undercapitalised", "significantly 
undercapitalised", and "critically undercapitalised". If a bank is classified as critically 
undercapitalised, then the bank is forced into conservatorship and receivership (Federal 
Reserve Board of Governors, 1994 as noted by Gilbert, 1992). The regulatory bodies 
will affect shareholders' rights in the ailing banks in different ways. On the one hand, in 
Japan the government usually fully protects the shareholders' rights; but in Finland, the 
government only partially protects the shareholders, writing-down the shareholders' 
claims on the earnings of the ailing banks. On the other hand, the USA and Sweden 
impose dividend restrictions and substantial restrictions on the issuance of brokered 
deposits by weakly-capitalized banks, but the others do not. 
Meanwhile, Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1993), who studied 104 bank fAures in 24 
countries between 1970 and 199Z suggest a classification of resolution methods used by 
banking authorities. These were as follows: (i) a rescue package (including emergency 
aid by the Central Bank and recapitalization by the shareholders); (H) a take-over by 
other banks (under a "purchase and assumption" regime); (iii) creation of a special 
regime, led by government or the deposit insurance fund (as adopted by the USA, 
Japan and Scandinavian countries); and Civ) liquidation of the aing financial 
institutions. They also suggest that the lessons drawn lead to three conclusions, as 
follows: (a) bank failures are not uncommon, nor are they limited to a few countries, (b) 
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most countries (73 out of 104 countries) have preferred late closure policies; (q) the 
separation of authority between monetary and supervisory agencies is less likely to lead 
to the involvement of taxpayers or other commercial banks in the form of financing 
rescues. 
Past academic and empirical studies focus on two main approaches to handling 
troubled banks, as summarized in Table 5.2. Firstly, the "early closure models" (ECNý, 
as advised by Kane (1986), are adopted by the USA. He suggested a "more vicious 
approach to resolving the insolvent banks". Kane's approach arose due to the lessons 
learned from the Savings and Loans financial debacle in the early 80's, which cost the 
taxpayers 3% of AmericYs output (Weinstein, 1998). Accordingly, under the USA 
Congress mandate (i. e., the FDIC1 Act of 1991), the Fed and the FDIC adopt a 
"prompt corrective action" approach, which requires bank regulators to impose more 
stringent rules on banks when the banks' capital ratios decline and to close promptly 
the banks with capital below critical triggers. A study conducted by Acharya and 
Dreyfus (1989), based on theoretical analysis under the assumption of a competitive 
environment, also concluded that financially-ailing banks should be closed promptly, 
even when the banks' net worth is still positive. Secondly, the "late closure models" 
(LCM or so-called forbearance closure policies, as suggested by Allen and Saunders 
(1993) and Dreyfus etal. (1994), who conducted studies of policies, are implemented by 
Japan and other countries. If the government allows the shareholders to keep their 
licenses and the right to control the ailing banks - due to positive net worth - the 
regulatory bodies gain the benefits in the form of reduced liabilities for the deposit 
insurance corporation; shareholders increase the bank! s distance from closure and 
regulatory bodies' preference to keep the ailing banks alive, is satisfied. Such policies are 
based on a fundamental argument that because there are significant bankruptcy costs 
which are much greater than those involved in other industries, as shown by James 
(1991), the governments liabilities in the form of deposit guarantee values will be 
reduced substantially'. Japan's policies, however, cost its taxpayers about $500 billion 
for bailing out the fAing banks, which was around 10% of Japan's annual output 
(Weinstein, 1998). 
1 This follows the concave Laffer curve effect, whereby the governmenes control over banks should be 
somewhere between two extreme points, which are "die zero governmental control poine' or the 
anarchy situation when the banking system is without regulation, and "the total governmental control 
poine,. Ibc rights of control are given to the shareholders who choose the proper point at which to stop 
or continue controlling the bank. 
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Under this model, the authors were confident theoretically that, by postponing the 
banks' closures, bank regulators will have less liabilities, which in turn means the tax- 
payers would also gain benefits through reduced exposure to bank failures. 
Table 5.2 Past Studies of Closure Policies 
Authors Model specifications Conclusions 
Kane (1986) Empirical model based on the Savings Early Closure 
and Loans fiasco in the '80s policies 
(Acharya and Dreyfus 1heoretical model assuming the Prompt 
(1989), optimal closure rule minimizes the reorganization 
governmenes liability, consisting ofi. policies when a bank 
Ot discounted value of the bank's still has positive net 
losses in the event of fAure; and (ii) assets 
discounted cost of auditing the bank 
minus deposit insurance premia 
Allen and Saunders (1993) Significant bankruptcy costs lead to Late closure policies 
Dreyfus etal. (1994) forbearance closure policies to reduce 
I government liabilities 
1he bankruptcy costs cover externalities in the form of disruption in the financial 
system. James' figure can be adopted and adjusted before it is used in developing 
countries like Indonesia. A recent study of many countries conducted by the World 
Bank (2003) shows that the bankruptcy cost for general firms in Indonesia is 18% of 
the firn-is' estate value. Systen-dc risk will be reduced if deposit insurance is implemented 
and the functions of banks as intermediary agents can be maintained (Hcffemnan, 1999 
and Saunders, 2002). Solvency risk is linked to a number of bank risks (i. e. market risk, 
credit risk, operational risk, legal risk, liquidity risk, and operational risk) so a proper 
valuation of equity is necessary. 
2 The bankruptcy costs of closing banks, the deadweight loss ratio, is 10% of America's insured deposits 
according to the finding of James (1991). In contrast, Pennachi (2002). who conducted a study of 42 
banks in the USA, noted that the bankruptcy cost is very difficult to measure because the FDIC dos not 
have any figure for measuring the bankruptcy costs of banks closed. Consequently, given the rapid 
macroeconomic changes in many emerging countries, including Indonesia, James' finding is regarded as 
a minitnuin figure fbr estimating the bankruptcy costs; and it is likely to be considerably higher given 
that emerging markets have been more risky than developed markets, as noted by Ramos et-al. (M). 
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In other words, under the early closure models, the regulator must generate the "fair" 
deposit insurance premium and the optimal closure rules (i. e. including reorganisation) 
for resolving troubled banks. The models suggest that the regulators should typically 
close down the troubled banks while they still have positive net assets. In contrast, 
under the late closure models (or regulatory forbearance), corrective measures are first 
taken by regulators because of the possibility that they may actually reduce the 
regulators' liabilities in the form of the value of the deposit guarantees given. 
If a government establishes a deposit insurance system, asymmetrical information and 
moral hazard problems soar, whereby banks increase their risk-taking in the form of 
increases in the assets' variance because they also know insured depositors will be bailed 
out at least to the level of de jure protection given, or when they face financial 
difficulties they can ask for aid from the government to inject funds to keep the banks 
liquid'. When a government has a budget constraint on the support of ailing banks, 
then shareholders should inject fresh funds (i. e. capital injection) or a merger should be 
arranged to strengthen its capital; otherwise the bank is closed. 'Me injection of capital 
prevents the regulators from implementing such a closure rule and becomes a 
constraint on closure policy. Ibis condition becomes a contingent rule of the model. 
The latest Basle Accord CTasel ffý provides more discretion to national regulators to 
impose the capital adequacy rules on banks under their authorities and focuses on the 
implementafion of risk management 
In contrast, if a government wishes to keep the fOing banks going, it can lower deposit 
insurance premiums, or even inject fresh money into an ailing bank, the so-called 
bailout policy. The bailout does not constrain the closure policy, but what is the limit? 
Clearly, there must be a limit in which the bailout is just enough to cover the operating 
losses until beyond the closure point of a policy established by government without 
involving a subsidy policy. A subsidy policy to keep alive a financially-ailing bank is 
justified if the authorities implement it carefully, by eliminating the shareholders' 
incentives to increase the volatility of bank earnings by dealing with riskier assets, the 
so-called moral hazard problem, because it may reduce the value of government 
liabilities under the deposit insurance scheme, as noted by Dreyfus ct a]. (1994). The 
lowest possible subsidies under the optimal closure rule can be introduced together 
3 Following Keeley (1990), moral hazard is defined as the tendency for banks to increase assets risk to 
maximize equity value under limited liability. 
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with an attempt to reduce the moral hazard behaviour by levying risk-based deposit 
insurance premiums. 
The concept of a "regulatory regime", as described in Chapter 2, comprises the notion 
of the co-existence of regulatory and supervisory instruments, and the interaction 
among the elements to deliver an optimal system (Llewellyn, 1999c). To my best 
knowledge, this is the first study of the implementation of the concept, with the 
objective of developing bank restructuring under the concept using empirical data from 
Indonesian banks and testing whether this concept is also robust for a developing 
country. 'Mis is also the first study that analyses the empirical relationships between the 
state of risk management of a bank and the bank regulations in the form of bank 
reorganisation using a closure rule policy. 
The study of "best practices" in risk management was inspired by the results of the 
empirical studies of Santomero (1999) and based on the ERM framework suggested by 
Venkat (2000), as discussed in Chapter 3. Financial crises throughout the world 
indicate very clearly two common characteristics: weak internal risk analysis, 
management and control systems; and weak (or even perverse) incentives within the 
financial system generally and financial institutions in particular, as suggested by many 
authors (see e. g. Llewellyn (1999a), Group of 'Mirty (1993), Goodhart et-al (1999) and 
Kaufman (1996). Venkat (2000) also noted that financial institutions were starting to 
admit to two things with respect to bank values: (i) the importance of creating 
shareholder value, requiring both sound risk assessment and risk management, and (2) 
that sound risk assessment increases the likelihood of success, so that it reduces the 
probability of fAure, and limits the uncertainty of overall financial risk. Ibe function of 
capital as a buffer of all bank risks is emphasised, so that it may reduce the probability 
of bank failures. 
Empirical study of the relationship between the required capital ratio and macro 
economic variables -a study covering the micro and macro economic policies - such as 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and inflation rates, is very important to understanding 
the impact of monetary policies and macro economic policies on a bank! s closure point 
and its capital. An empirical study of the relationship between the level of bank capital 
and the annual growth rate of GDP in Spain was conducted by Ayuso, Perez and 
Saurina (2002). From these studies, policy makers, such as the Central Bank, can learn 
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many lessons and in turn can make wiser monetary policies that can help to secure the 
monetary objectives i. e. the stability of the domestic o=ency in the form of a low 
inflation rate and interest rates. The next section describes the characteristics of the 
optimal bank reorganization model. 
5.4 Model 
The model used is the FMP model, initiated by Allen and Saunders (1993), which 
develops the Dynamic Contingent Claims Model to study the optimality of different 
closure policies and their impact on deposit insurance. The next section will discuss the 
different possible closure rules and subsidy policies, as summarized in Table 5.3, which 
arise from the interaction of: @ regulators' attempts to minimize discounted, expected 
bankruptcy costs; and (n) equity-holders' incentives to recapitalise banks. The models 
define subsidy policies for distressed banks that implement socially-optimal closures 
rules at minimum financial cost to regulators and which reduce moral hazard. 
The objectives of these models are to examine the optimality of different closure 
policies and their impact on deposit insurance. The models comprise two basic types: 
@ the endogenous closure rule models; and (H) the endogenous bail out models. Using 
the background set out in the previous section, the analytical features of the models can 
be broken down into the objectives of the two different models (i. e. endogenous 
closure rules without subsidy and with subsidy), the mechanisms, the assumptions, the 
expected results of bank reorganization, and their relationships with the banks' equity 
values. as summarized in Table 5.3. 
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Table 5.3: The Characteristics of the Two Reorganization Policies 
Endogenous closure rules Endogenous closures rules with 
without subsidy subsidy (bail out system) 
Objectives Socially optimal closure and Socially optimal closure and 
reorganization policies to reduce reorganization policies to reduce 
moral hazard without subsidises moral hazard involving government 
subsidises 
Mechanisms (1) Series of interactions (and (1) Series of interactions (and 
choices) of the minimized choices) of the minimized 
discounted values of bankruptcy discounted values of bankruptcy cost 
cost and the cost of monitoring and the cost of monitoring banks 
banks that continue to operate, that continue to operate, 
shareholders' injections, mapping shareholders' injections, mapping 
process of banks' flows of income process of banks" flows of income, 
and deposit insurance premiums. and deposit insurance premiums. (2) 
(2) The interactions and The interactions and relationship of 
relationships of different closure different closure points with 
points (without using subsidies), subsidies, equity values and the state 
with equity values and the state of of risk management 
risk management 
Assumptions (1) Regulators cannot directly (1) Regulators can directly subsidize a 
subsidize a bank to keep it going; bank to keep it going; (2) Authorities 
(2) Authorities levy a flat fair levy a flat fair deposit insurance 
deposit insurance premium; (3) premium; (3) shareholder value 
shareholder value (equity value) is (equity value) is determined by two 
determined by two factors: factors: expected income stream and 
expected income stream and stochastic values of a bank's stock 
stochastic values of a bank's stock price; (4) Deposits and income are 
price; (4) Deposits and income are correlated and follow geometric 
correlated and follow geometric Brownian motion; (5) Boundary 
Brownian motion; (5) Boundary condition that the value of income 
condition that the value of income flows exceeds the expected costs; (6) 
flows exceeds the expected costs; 'Me social bankruptcy cost exceeds 
(6) The social bankruptcy cost the monitoring costs 
exceeds the monitoring costs 
Expected (1) Moral hazard is lower, (2) 1) Moral hazard is higher, (2) 
results Potential government liabilities are Potential government liabilities are 
lower, (3) The relationships higher, (3) The relationships between 
between equity values, bank closure equity values and bank closure points 
points and the state of risk and the state of risk management can 
management can be established for be established for different macro 
different macro economic economic conditions 
1 conditions I I 
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'Me model is based on a basic equation of the cash flow of total net earnings, internally 
generated by a bank! s risky operations, which is available to the bank's shareholders. 
Mathematically the cash flow of a bank is: aaa 
gt -(s+y)D,, 
where, gt is a latent variable that represents the risky interest income; s is the safe 
asset's rate of interest; y is the deposit insurance premium the bank pays the 
government, and D, is the bank! s total deposits. Ibis represents a mapping process of 
the cash flow that will determine a shareholder's value and triggers closure rules. 
lberefore, this study adopts the cash flow approach instead of the asset prices 
approach, see e. g. Pennachy (1987a). Fries, Mell-Barral and Perraudin (1997), however, 
noted that the approaches are not that different. In addition, efficient market theory 
hypothesises that asset prices are the present values of the income streams generated by 
a firm's asset. 'Mis implies that all available information regarding future assets prices is 
impounded in current prices; see for example Malz (2000). One implication is asset 
prices follow a random walk. The motion of asset prices has two parts, which is a drift 
rate and a variance rate. The drift rate is a deterministic rate at which asset prices are 
expected to change over time; whilst, the variance rate is a random change in the asset 
price, proportional to the time elapsed, which is also unobservable '. Ibis means that 
under the random waik hypothesis, the variance rate has a mean of zero and a per- 
period variance equal to a parameter a', called volatility. Accordingly, the error term 
of asset prices is assumed normally distributed with zero mean and constant variance 
a2. Whilst Saunders (2002) suggested also that the values of banks are directly linked 
to bank cash flow, allowing for negative cash flows due to a bank's asset risks. More 
specifically, the null hypothesis is that deposits and equity values are Geometric 
Brownian motion or a diffusion process, which behaves over time like a random walk 
with very tiny increments. 7bis random walk hypothesis of stock prices will be used in 
the development of the FMP model, as discussed in Section 5.4.1, and is tested 
empirically in the Indonesian banking Industry as presented in Chapter 6. 
Ibis is a starting point for fiirther analysis of bank values, including asset prices and 
derivative products, which is well known in the risk management literature. As will be 
seen in the analysis below, a bank's stock price represented by a market stock index is 
4'Me random walk hypothesis is widely used in financial and economics modeling 
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assumed to follow this hypothesis. In addition, from a theoretical point of view, the 
bank's asset value approach is valid, but it does not necessarily mean it can empirically 
be applied in certain countries. This becomes evident if the data availability is limited, as 
in the Indonesian case; see, for example, the obstacles to a study of asset prices and the 
monetary transmission mechanism in Indonesia by Rendra et. al., (2002). They follow an 
approach suggested by Borio et. al. (1994), which is the use of a composite asset price 
index as a proxy for asset prices. 
This market accounting approach, rather than historical cost accounting, has been 
advocated by many academics and analysts, as noted by Benston and Kaufinan (1996) 
and White (1991). Hence, this modelling approach allows for capital injections that can 
be an option for shareholders to choose to keep the bank as a going concern, by 
resolving the initial liquidity crisis or to abandon the shareholders' right to the bank 
earnings. A logical consequence is that the links between the closure points and the 
market value of bank capital can be scrutinized. 
From these models it is possible to derive two main closure policies: (i) the optimal 
closure rule of a social-planner in which the regulators balance the Jump-sum costs of 
bankruptcy (i. e. they depend on the state of the bank's profitability at closure) against 
the costs of monitoring a bank that continues to operate. In this policy, the closure 
would be postponed by regulators when equity-holders are willing to keep the bank 
operating by injecting capital without subsidy from the regulators; and @ subsidy 
policies that keep the bank operating even when equity holders are disinclined to inject 
more capital. 
Having analysed these models, I wish to develop the concept of the Regulatory Regime 
(RR) suggested by Llewellyn (1999c), as discussed in Chapter 2. The seven elements of 
the regulatory regime, such as Rules, Monitoring and Supervision, Incentive Structures, 
Market Discipline and Monitorin& Intervention Arrangements, Corporate Governance 
and Disciplinin& and Accountability of Regulators, are similar to the ingredients of 
these models, as illustrated in Table 5.4. The seven components of the regulatory 
regime should be combined in an overall regulatory strategy and while all components 
are necessary, none alone is sufficient. Should regulatory agencies emphasize only one 
component, this may weaken the overall impact of the regulatory framework. As a 
result, the analysis involves all the seven elements. From the model, fiirther analysis of 
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the regulatory framework can be carried out; in particular, in association with the risk 
and risk management analysis. The contribution of each element can been found from 
the analysis of the model. 
Table 5.4 A Comparison of the Analytical Features of the Optimal Corrective 
Action Models and the Regulatory Regime 
Ilie Elements of the RR Concept The Elements of the FMP Models 
1. Rules - Closure rules 
- Subsidy or bailout rules 
- Capital regulations 
- Principles of risk management 
2. Monitoring and supervision Costs of monitoring 
3. Incentive structures Equity holders'willingness /unwillingness 
to keep banks operating by injecting 
capital. 
Moral hazard problems 
4. Market discipline -Bankruptcy cost generated from the 
externalities in the financial system 
- Stock prices 
-Disciplining of depositors, shareholders 
and regulators induding insurance 
institutions 
- Interest rates 
5. Intervention arrangements -Intervention rules 
-Subsidy rules 
6. Corporate Governance -Equity-holders' willingness to keep their 
banks going 
-1be basic model focuses on total net cash- 
flow available to bank shareholders 
- Principles of risk management 
7. Disciplining and accountability - Subsidy rules 
applied to regulatory agencies. - Socially efficient closure rules 
- Capital regulations 
Source: UeweUyn (1999c) and Fries, McUa-BarraL and Pen-audin. (1997). 
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5.4.1 Endogenous Closure Rule Models without Subsidy. 
Under this model the authorities' choice of when to reorganize banks is determined by 
a trade-off between the discounted value of lump-sum bankruptcy costs and the costs 
of monitoring banks that continue to operate. In this model, I assume that: (i) the 
regulators select an optimal closure rule that balances social bankruptcy costs against 
the flow costs of monitoring the bank if it continues to operate. 1he notion of 
bankruptcy costs is sufficiently broad to include the costs of moral hazard (e. g. asset 
substitution by a bank! s management when its financial condition deteriorates, above all 
in the run up to bankruptcy through excessive risk taking); (ii) the regulators cannot 
directly subsidize banks to keep them operating; (iii) the bank regulators levy on a bank 
a flat rate deposit insurance premium per dollar of deposits; (iv) the risky interest 
income on the bank's loan portfolio and the bank's total deposits are correlated and 
follow geometric Brownian motion, as originally suggested by Black-Scholes (1973), and 
as noted by Dixit (1993) and Lhabitant (2000); (v) the authorities close the bank when 
the bank's performance (i. e. the ratio of the cash flow variable to deposits) hits a certain 
threshold level; and (vi) the agent is assumed risk neutral. 
Recall the basic equation of a bank's cash flow of total earnings: 
gt - 
(s + y)D, (1) 
Suppose that g, and D, are correlated and follow the geometric Brownian motion that 
evolves over time according to some stochastic differential equation': 
5 Geometric Brownian motion (or a diffusion process) can be defined as the changes of a time series in 
both magnitude (in percentages) and direction over the next small time interval that are independent of 
both the percent changes over the last time interval and their levels, so that the next direction of the 
changes wanders away from any starting point but not in any particular direction. This means that a 
bank's assets, liabilities and returns and other time series will, over time, follow a random walk with very 
tiny increments following a stochastic process or probability distribution model. Stochastic or 
probabilistic models are well. known in modeling economic and finance problems, as noted by Edwards 
and Hamson (2002) and Malz (2000), and in risk management problems, as suggested by Lhabitant 
(2000), ie. to model stock price dynamic specifications, since uncertainty follows the random walks 
theorem which is an ever-present feature of real markets. This probabilistic approach was originated by 
Bacbelier (1990) in his doctoral thesis using the Brownian motion (i. e. normally distributed stock prices) 
as a model for fluctuations on the Paris stock market. It is assumed that log-retums are normally 
distributed with constant volatility. Other authors, such as Mcrton (1976ab), Hull and VAlite (1987), 
Scott (1987), Wiggins (1987), and Bates (1996ab) suggest different approaches to modeling asset prices 
which add the jump component to the option pricing models or consider that stock prices and volatility 
levels follow separate correlated stochastic processes. 'Me resulting models provide a better fit to the 
empirical data, but they have two crucial shortcomings, i. e. losing their analytical tractability and difficult 
to implement. Practitioners are very reluctant to adopt them and I will not follow them either for this 
thesis. In my empirical study, as discussed in Chapter 6, the normalityý constant volatility and the jump 
assumptions will be ruled out to allow for non-normal distributions, and the possibility of conditional 
volatility of stock prices over a time series (the dynamic specification), in order to fit the market data 
better by using empirical distribution of the ARCH / GARCH types [following the suggestions of 
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dg, = lilg, dt + a, gtdw, t 
dDt = /jDDdt + adD, 
dW2t 
31 
(2) 
(3) 
where fli, aj, i=9, and D, are constant parameters, dt represents a small 
increment in time, the w, s are standard Brownian motions and dwl,,,, dw, t = pdt are 
random walk components for a constant correlation coefficient, p. Ibis means that 
gt and D, have a random walk component with a probability p that the value of gt 
and D, will increase by a certain rate Ah at any given time period and a probability (I - 
p) that the value of g, and D, will decrease by A. in the same time period. 
In equilibrium, the required return on bank equity, which equals the flow of income 
available to equity-holders plus expected capital gain, is given as 
sUl = gt - 
(s +y)D, +d EUt+ (4) 
dA YA 
where, 
U, market value of the bank's equity 
g, the cash flow of risky interest income 
st required return on equity 
D, the bank's total deposits, and 
d EU,,., y is the expected capital gain. dA A 
The required return is derived from the bank's cash flow earnings to shareholders with 
a stochastic trend of the capital gains of the bank, which allows us to examine the 
relationship between the bank's stock market value, U,, and the current level of the 
state variables g, and D,. Iberefore, the bank's equity as a function of the state 
variable, k, a gf / Dt . where gt and D, are assumed to follow Brownian motion, 
is a 
model which is widely adopted in modelling risk (i. e. asset prices). A more complete 
review of different models describing risk factor dynamics in financial markets is 
presented in Table 5.5, as noted by Lhabitant (2000). Accordingly, I can test the null 
hypothesis based on the theoretical assumption of normally distributed error terms of 
asset prices. Since a firm's stock price depends partially on the error term, then the null 
Brooks (2002) and Lhabitant (2000)]. Ihe reasons are: 01 distribution parameters are much easier to 
estimate using maximum likelihood estimation, so can be viewed as a prediction model; (u) adopting the 
ARCH / GARCH better fits the empirical data capturing the conditional volatility and non-normal 
distribution; (iii) a consistent option pricing model can be derived; and (iv) it is consistent with the best 
practices of risk management in avoiding model risk, which is risk arising from the use of a particular 
model. 
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hypothesis is that the stock prices will be normally distributed. As for deposits, the null 
hypothesis is that deposits will also be normally distributed. Meanwhile, violation of the 
normality assumption for assets prices is consistentwith the empirical finance literature 
leading to the need for tests for non-normality (i. e. conditional normality) using 
standard normality tests (e. g. kutosis, skewness and jarque-Bera tests). The 
development of the theoretical model according to the normality assumption is widely 
adopted in financial and economic modelling. The FMP disturbance (error term) model 
is principally constructed according to the normality assumption. More specifically, the 
null hypothesis is that deposits and equity values are Geometric Brownian motion or a 
diffusion process, which behaves over time like a random walk with very tiny 
increments. Ile hypotheses are tested in the empirical analysis, as discussed in Chapter 
6.3.3. 
Suppose that U, can be written as a twice, continuously differentiable 
function U(g,. D, ), which follows the Taylor series expansion as an approximation 
technique of the stochastic trends [see e. g. Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1998); Malz (2000) 
and Greene (2003)]. Applying Ito's lemma to the expected capital gains, equation (4) 
yields the partial differential equation: 
sUt = gc - (s +y)D, + gtus 
OU' 
+ DtJUD ' 
out 
12 , +92 
'- 
a2Ut 
- - 
2 
+D2a 
1) 
t 
02Ut 
2 019 
t aDt 2 gt2 
Fg ? 2 DD t 
&D 
a2Ut 
, po" CrD OD, (5) 
U, can be written as a function of the variables k, -= 
9; 11Dý, andD, where k, denotes 
the ratio of the cash flow of earnings variable to deposits; the regulators win close the 
bank when k, hits the trigger level k, when U, = 0, and the closure of the bank 
requires its shareholders to stop their claim to the bank! s earnings stream in the absence 
of arbitrage. Since the probability of bankruptcy disappears as k, becomes large, and 
ruling out a bubble (i. e. a jump process in stock prices) in the bank! s stock market value 
at the moment of financial reorganization, then U(g,. D, ) also satisfies the boundary 
conditions given by: 
um ' U(gD, )-Et , -(s+y+e. )D, 
]exp[-s(r-t)]cl, 
kt -+Co 
f 19 
=o 
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Table 5.5 Option Pricing Models and Their Price Dynamic Specification 
Authors Stock price dynamic specification 
Bachellier (1900) Asset prices follow an arithmetic Brownian motion 
(prices -are normally distributed) 
Black ad Scholes (1973); and Asset prices follow a geometric Brownian motion 
Merton (1973) (prices are log-normally distributed) 
Merton (1976ab) Asset prices follow a geometric Brownian motion with a 
jump component 
Hull and White (1987) Volatility follows a geometric Brownian motion 
Scott (1987) Volatility follows a mean-reverting process 
Wiggins (1987) General Wiener process 
Stein and Stein (1991) General Wiener process 
Bates (1996ab) Combines with jumps and volatility diffusion 
Source: Lhabitant (2000) 
Because the state variable k, depends on the cash flow of income and levels of 
kt Mg and. D, the shareholders will receive nothing when the bank is closed. In 
IDt 
other words, if the bank's value depends on the values of g, and D, one can calculate 
the changes in the bank's value, U, = V(k, )D,, caused by the changes in the income 
stream, g, and the changes in the level of deposits, D, by evaluating the derivatives 
of the bank values, written mathematically as follows: 
allt 
= DV' 
g' 
-L = Vp (k, ); a9t 
(75t-)D, 
aut 
=V(ýg5-)-DV'(jgjl-)ýL =V(k, )-kV'(k, ) Mt tt Dt 
The second derivatives yield: 
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a2U 
t 
(i9tt 
V V"(k, ) t2t )t Dt c 
a2Ut 22 
t 
-V, -gt 
It- + V. 9t It +v 
kt 
V"(kt); OD2t DD2tD2D3D 
-t) 
(yt )t 
3t t 
= -Vol 
91 
-Lt- -. 
L' 
V"(kt) 
agtaDt D2D 
(yt )tt 
hence, 
g2 
1 
sUt = g, - (s + y)D, + pgg, V'(kt) + D, pD (V(k, ) - ktV'(kt)) +- 1--V (kt)+ '2 Dt 
2 g2 C12U t of D2 
O'D 
-V (kt) - gtD t 
F" V"(k t2 D' t 
Pall D NtMt D2t tt 
2 
(S - IJD)V(kt) =kt -(S+7)+(PS -#D)ktV'(k, )+-! ýk 
2V' (k (7) 
2tt 
If, in a bank reorganization, the level of a bank's earnings per dollar of deposits, k, hits 
the closure pointý k, and the bank! s shareholders relinquish their claim on the bank's 
earnings cash flow and have limited liability, then the bank's equity value must be zero, 
[Le. U, = VkD, =0 and Vk =0 
Equation (7) is an ordinary differential equation that can be solved when Vk = 0, as 
follows (see e. g. Jacques, 1999; and Karatzas and Shreve (1999): 
2 st 
2Vo (s + y) - k, 2-k, 
'(k, )+ (ps - "D)ktV'(k, )- (r - -"D)V(k, 
)' (8) 
Solutions to the equation are: 
V(k, ) = p(k, ) + q(k, ) (9) 
where, p(k, ) = Ak, ý + Bk, " (i. e. homogenous solution) and, ý and A2 are the two 
22 
roots of the Aý 
Ei 
+A /is - 1ID - 
! ýg-) 
+ (S - jjD) = 0, and that ý<0< 
A2. 
2 22 
Thus, we get 
(s + Y) - k, = (jig -pjý)ktB - (s - pD)kB - (s - lj)A 
a,, x(x - 1) + ax + a2 : -- 
This is the Euler equation that follows the form 
or 
2 aor +(a, -ao)r+a2 
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(s -. ", g 
A=- (S+Y) (S - JUD) 
So we can fmd the solufions, 
p(k, ) 
kt (s + Y) 
(S-10 (S-p") 
pk, 0= Ak; ý + Bký 
Jim k, =--CO 
V(k) =o=k, 
(s + Y) +BP (S--Us) (S-IJD) 
B=-( k, (s + Y) )P (S-JUS) (S-IJD) - 
and we get, 
q(k, ) =-- 
(S + Y) ýt) (11) 
(S-JUS) (S-JUD) 
'Me financial reorganization affects the market value of the bank. Hence, this allows us 
to examine the relationship between the bank! s stock market value and the current level 
of the state variable kt. The hypothesis is that the market value of the stock will 
increase at the moment of financial reorganization. 'Mis may encourage speculators to 
carry out arbitrage actions, which in turn can create bubbles in the bank's market value. 
To model the bank's value, the bubbles are ruled out and the bank will be kept as a 
going concern. As a result, the state variable, k, is assumed unlimited, k, 4 oo, and 
therefore the shareholders' liability value of the net earning flow will be unlimited as 
well. Ibis means that the bank's value should approach the unlimited values because 
the possibility of bankruptcy will be smaller and smaller as k, gets bigger and bigger. 
Ibis is an implementation of the 'going concern concept of a firm' widely known in 
economics and the fmance literature. 
Finally, we get the value of the bank! s equity, U, equals U(k,, D, ) = V(kt)Dt , as a 
function of the state variable k, , by plugging (10) and (11) into (9) to give: 
V(k, )=k, s+y_ ___. 
k S+Y 
S- PS S-flD 
IS-1jz 
S- 
J"D 
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where V, = bank's equity to deposits ratio, A (i. e. probability of increment in time) is 
the negative root ofi 
Fag2 + aD2 
--2pa. 
al, is the Aýak2 /2+ A(lig - IiD - ak2 / 2) - (s -, uD) = 0, and crk -ý V 
instantaneous standard deviation of kI. 
It is clear that the bank's value per rupiah of deposits was derived from the cash flow of 
the bank's earnings and the stochastic trend of the capital gains. From the equation 
above, we can see that the value of a bank is detern-dned by the value of the discounted 
per dollar-of-deposit of the cash flow generated internally through the bank's earnings 
kf S+Y 
under shareholders' unlimited liability, written mathematically as s- Ps S-PD 
Ibis, then, is reduced by the option value linked to the ability of the bank! s 
shareholders, under limited liability, hand over the ownership or the rights of control of 
the bank to the regulators or investors at a closure point k, mathematically represented 
as 
k S+Y in equation 12. Whilst, 
L' 
the probability-weighted 
[ 
S-98 S- 
JUD 
] (k) 
is 
discount factor or value of a claim that yields one dollar where every deposit is insured 
when state variable, k, . hits the authorities' choice of closure point, k, for the first 
time. To prevent the takeover by the regulators and to keep the bank as a going 
concern, the shareholders will either inject fresh funds (i. e. financial reorganization), as 
an effort to improve the bank's cash flow of a financially ailing bank; or abandon the 
bank and hand over the ownership to the regulators or investors with the bank's value 
at zero, in such a way that the kt is getting larger. 
As discussed above, bank value may approach an unlimited value because the possibility 
of bankruptcy will be smaller and smaller as k, gets bigger and bigger, which is 
consistcritwith the going concern principle of a firm. Graphically, the per deposit value 
of the bank, V, becomes asymptotic in k, as k4 oo, as can be seen in Figures 5.1. a 
and 5.1. b. Ibc figures are the results of a simulation using dummy data to show a 
bank! s per deposit equity value, V, the governmenes liability, L (see Equation 13), and 
the subsidy, b(k, ), (see Equation 20). 
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Figure 5.1. a indicates the graph of the bank's equity to deposits ratio, V,, as written in 
(12), which is a function of the state variable, k, when no subsidies are given. If the 
k, hits the trigger closure poin% k, then the bank's per deposit value, V, equals zero. 
In contrast, if the k, 4 co, then the V, asymptotically approaches the unlimited 
liability value, as represented by the straight line part of 
kt S+Y (or line y). 
S-J"g S-JYD 
Note that if the k, is still just above the k, i. e. kt > k, then earnings are negative. 
This means that the shareholders must be moving the point k to a point such as k* 
(or point A) and even k ** (or point B) by injecting fresh funds into the bank to keep 
the bank liquid (see the "closure rules" below for further discussion]. 
At this stage, however, the shareholders face another investment choice, which is 
investment in safe assets (or risk free investment), such as US Government Treasury 
Bills,, so why do they recapitalise the bank? The answer is that the bank! s shareholders 
invest the funds in the ailing bank in the hope of making capital gains, and the 
curvature of V( k, ) increases the likelihood of making capital gains as k, falls toward 
k. 
Figure 5.1. b depicts the closure rule with a subsidy provided by the authorities rather 
than a capital injection from the shareholders. The effect is that the government's 
liabilities increase, so that the bankruptcy cost per unit of deposit becomes C( 
rather than the C(k*) depicted in Figure 5.1 a, at closure point k**. 
5.4.2 Mie Government's liability 
The bankruptcy costs are an important factor because of their potential magnitude and 
also because they can generate significant negative externalities through more 
generalised disruption to the financial system [according to James (1991), this can 
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Figure 5.1 Endogenous Closure Rule and Bailout Models 
a. No Subsidies given 
Yields (*/o) 
0 
b. Subsidy policy adopted 
Yields (%) 
0 
Source: Fries, McUa-Barral and Perraudin (1997). 
L 
kt 
kt 
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Notes on Figure 6.1: 
X= 
kt s from equation (12) S- Pg S- JUD 
y= 
kt S+y from equation (12) 
s- Pg S-j4D 
z Y-e. from equation (13) S-#D 
A= k*; B= k** ;C= C(k and Cl= C(k**) 
amount to about 5% of the insured deposits]. Besides, government has to pay the 
bankruptcy costs. If we take into account the bankruptcy cost C (k) D, and the costs 
that regulators incur when monitoring the bank's activities per dollar of insured 
deposits, ý., prior to closure, then the value of the government's deposit insurance 
liability, M(k,. D, ), is derived using a similar approximation technique to the derivation 
of the aforementioned equity value. 
The value of the governmenes liability arising under the deposit insurance scheme 
equals the value of the deposit insurance premiums received from the insured banks, 
Y 
minus the value of the monitoring costs, 
ý02 
, plus the value of the put S-JUD S-IJD 
options that the regulators have written for the shareholders, 
S+Y-ý. 
- C(k with an agreement to cover the bankruptcy costs, S -. Ug S-JUD 
c(k) and the closure rule, k, being interdependent 
Mathematically, the deposit insurance corporation's claim, is M(k,. D, ) = L(k,, )D,, 
where 
-( 
L(k, )=Y-em+ -S+Y-ý. c(ý .)k, S-PD S-ju 
3S- JUD 
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5.4.3 lUe Actuarially-Fair Flat Deposit Insurance Premium Rate 
Following the suggestions of Fries, Mella-Barrall and Perraudin (1997), an actuarially-fair 
constant deposit insurance premium is derived, since it represents an important factor 
in achieving the optimal closure policies. The actuarially fair, constant deposit insurance 
premium rate, yf , is given by: 
Yf = -(S- JUD) 
ks- 
c(k) 
(ko / k) 
[(S-JUS) 
S-JUD 
_ 
I- (ko /D' 
(14) 
where ko is the level of the state variable at t=0. 
Ibis was derived from the value of a bank! s income flow at t=0, which equals the 
value of the bank without taking into account the limited liability minus the discounted 
value of bankruptcy, c(k and monitoring costs, ý.. Accordingly, the fair 
deposit insurance premium mentioned above is elicited by solving the following 
mathematical equation: 
V(ko) =-k,, 
S+Y (14. a) S-Pir S-PD 
i. e. 
A 01 't ý 
V(ko) = 
ko s- 
c(k) 
io- 4.1- 
1- 
i"- 
(14. b) 
S -PD S- flg S-ßD 
Rearranging equation 14. b gives Yf in closed form. 
5.4.4 Closure Rules 
To model the closure rules, it is also assumed the regulator cannot inject subsidies to 
maintain a troubled bank as a going concern, at closure point, k, and that the rate of 
deposit insurance premia, _V, 
is held constant; and if the shareholders inject new capital, 
it becomes "a binding constraint" (i. e. the authorities postpone closing a bank), on 
banking policy. Furthermore, if regulators act as social planners, they will select k, to 
minimize the discounted, expected lump-sum bankruptcy, and monitoring costs, 
ignoring the additional cost to the insurance corporation (i. e. Government) of taking 
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on the bank's portfolio of deposits and loans. This means that the unconstrdned socially 
optimal closure rule k* * can be written mathematically as: 
k ** =- arg män c(k 
k, 
)( 
k) JUD 
(15) 
where, 
k, 
)z= the value of an asset that pays out one dollar the first time the process k, hits k 
k, and D, ý. 1(s - g) = the capitalised value of an income flow that pays a perpetual 
income stream D, ý.. 
Meanwhile, the constrdned (i. e. depending on equity-holder willingness to recapitalise a 
A 
troubled financial institution) socially optimal closure rule is k =-max where 
k* is the closure rule that maximizes the bank's equity value. This, mathematically, 
follows the partial derivative rules for optimisation Gacques, 1999) of the function of a 
bank's equity value, V, i. e. setting V'(k) equals to 0 and proving the second derivative 
is negative for all k,. 'Ibus given equation 12, and taking a partial derivative of equity 
value V with respect to k ýelds: 
av -1 kt 
+k S+y 
kt 
Tk s-1j, k) k S-Pg S- JUd 
k S+A AI 
S-#9 S-JUD k S-1j, 
A.. 
setang this equals to 0 yields, 
Iberefore, we find the closure rule that maximizes the bank's equity value is 
S-/' k* )C 9 )(S +A 
S'- 
JUD 
assuming the second derivative is negative for all k,. 
(16) 
(17) 
A 
For different parameters' values, the constraint k=k*may or may not bind. For an 
example or when it does, suppose C is independent of k and c)e 1(s - /1, ); then 
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regulators would like to postpone closure indefinitely as k**, the unconstrained socially 
A 
optimal closure rule, equals 0. The constrained optimum k, however, would be k 
In certain circumstances, for example, when bankruptcy costs are independent of 
profitability and monitoring costs are low, the authorities will postpone the closure of 
the bank until after the point at which equity-holders are willing to keep the bank liquid 
by injecting capital. in another form of corrective action, the bank is closed and the 
government liquidates its deposits so that the bank can be sold to investors to keep it 
operating as a going concern. The trade off between closing early to avoid monitoring 
costs and closing late so as to put off meeting the costs of bankruptcy is given by: 
A ** 
)0 
dýw 
and 
dk** (0 
dýo 
where, 
ý. represents monitoring costs and 
(18) 
ýO represents fixed backruptcy costs. 
In other words, if shareholders inject new capital, the optimal unconstrained closure 
point, ý., is increasing in monitoring costs and decreasing in fixed bankruptcy costs 
per dollar of deposits. If the deposit insurance premium, y, is held constant, the 
constrained closure point, k*, is unaffected by changes in either monitoring cost, ý., 
or fixed bankruptcy costs, ý0. If y is adjusted in an actuarially fair manner and is 
increasing in ý. and 4, then k* is increasing in both ý. and eo . 
5.4.5 Enclogenous Bailout Models. 
When the government can inject cash into a troubled bank, subject to parliament's 
(which represents the taxpayers) approval, the shareholders' willingness to supply new 
capital no longer constrains the authorities' choice of whether or not to close the bank. 
The subsidy or bail-out should minimize the budgetary cost of implementing a given 
socially-optimal closure rule. Ibis model can demonstrate that the least expensive way 
to implement optimal closure is to meet the bank's operating losses beyond the point at 
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which closure would occur in the absence of subsidies. It has been applied in the US 
(Fries and Perraudin, 1994) and in Japan (Fries et. al, 1993). 
1he model is designed to provide a socially-optimal closure policy and incentives for 
reducing moral hazard behaviour (such as asset substitution prior to the bank's closure 
and an escalation in risk-taking). It is assumed that- (i) the authorities' unconstrained 
preferred closure point k** is less than the point, ý*, at which equity-holders cease to 
supply capital; (it) regulators have access to tax revenue that they can use to support a 
troubled bank so that the bank survives until k, reaches k**. 
Recall equation (1); the bank's cash flow including subsidies is modelled as follows: 
gt - (s + y)Dt + b(k, )D, (19) 
where b(kt) is a state contingent subsidy function per dollar of deposits that the 
authorities pay to the bank. What is the amount of subsidy (or bailout policy), b. (k, ), 
that implements the closure rule whilst minimizing the deposit insurance corporation's 
finandal liability? 
Let b. (k, ) be a subsidy policy given by: 
b. (k, ) =- 
k, + (s + y) +v Vk, e 
Ck**, k*) 
(20) 
f- 
0 Vkt ý4* 
where v>0 is an arbiftudy chosen small number. 
'nie value of the equity and the deposit insurance corporation's liability when the 
authorities adopt the subsidy policy b. (k, )D,, are U, (k,, D, )=Vj(k, )Dand 
M, (k, Dt L, (kt)D,, i=1,2, respectively for two intervals I, and 
12 k-*, +Oojwhere one value of the bank's equity to deposits ratio equals zero, 
V, (k, ) =0, and the other value, V2(k, ), is as given in equation (12). The value of the 
deposit guarantee corporation's claim per dollar of deposit insured, Li, differs 
significantly from the value obtained without subsidies. The values of the deposit 
insurance liability are then given by. 
k, S+ý. 
and (21) (k, ) =- (k**) t S -JUS S- 1JD 
(C 
! ýD 
) 
)] jk, 
L2 (kt) + S+Y_ý- -c(k** (22) S- PD 
[T-ýs7 
S- 
JUD 
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It should be noted that @ ý*is a reversible switch point in that the possibility remains 
that the bank will recover at any time up to the first occasion on which k, reaches k*; 
and (ii) the net discounted costs of bankruptcy and monitoring are strictly smaller than 
for the case without subsidy, since k** is chosen to minimize these costs. This means 
that subsidizing the bank is actually cheaper for the authorities than letting it close. 
Consequently, for a given deposit insurance premium rate, _y, 
the authorities' deposit 
insurance liability under the subsidy rules, b. (k, ), is strictly less than their liability would 
be if k"<k*, and regulators are unable to subsidize ailing banks i. e. L, (k, ))L(k, 
for the two intervals i=1,2. 
The subsidy or endogenous bailout policies, however, may have negative implications 
for moral hazard since the existence of the "Too Big to Fail" doctrine and the bank's 
managers may take excessive risks, as noted by Freixas and Rochet (1998). In this 
model, the shareholders or managers acting in their employers' interest may have 
incentives to take on additional risk in order to transfer value from the insurance 
corporation to themselves. 
The value of equity per dollar of deposits, V(k, ), given the flow of income to the 
bank's shareholders, f (k, ), is mathematically written as follows: 
V(k, ) = E, 
k +A 
f(k, )Fxp[- s(r - 1)]d, + Fxp[- sA)7(k, +, )) 
(23) 
A 
where Exp[-s(r-t)j equals 
it) 
in equation (12), and r is the random time at which 
k, first reaches the closure rule k. The income flow, f (k, ), is assumed non linear. 
The moral hazard problem, which is always tied up with the timing of closure, exists if 
and only if the closure rule satisfies 
k(( 
S 
*"' Xs + y) (24) S_J"D 
Late closure creates an option value for equity-holders, which makes their claims 
convex in the state-variable; in turn, this permits them to get value from the deposit 
insurance corporation. The subsidy rule, b. (k, ), that (i) supports a given closure rule, 
t, (H) eliminates moral hazard problems, and (th) is fairly priced at the time zero level 
of the state variable, ko. is also set out in the FMP model. Specifically, it is given by. 
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g)[ 
ks L-ýýj 0)'t b. (k, )=y+ 
ko-k s-1j, -S- JUD - 
c(k 
LS- 
JUD 
is 
+S (25) 
where, k is chosen by the regulators to be high or low, which in turn is connected to 
the existence or not of moral hazard problems as defined. This means that: (i) if the 
regulators adopt a given closure rule, k, while charging an actuarially fair constant 
deposit insurance premium, y. ,a moral hazard problem will exist, and (ii) the state- 
contingent subsidy, b. (k, ), that eliminates the moral hazard problems and supports 
the closure rule, k, decreases when the state variable, k, is increasing. Accordingly, if 
the bank's performance is poor, which is represented by the state variable, kt, the 
subsidy will keep the bank's equity greater than the related state variable, k,, and will 
depend on the level of deposit insurance premium, yand closure point, t, chosen by 
the regulator, but moral hazard exists. The subsidy should be treated as an equity 
support scheme adopted by regulators at minimum cost. Certainly, the deposit 
insurance premium may be expected to get higher when the bank's financial 
performance is poor. 
5.4.6 Equity Support. 
For shareholders., the kind of subsidy policies analyzed above may be unattractive 
because they involve considerable intervention by the regulators, who pay the bank 
positive or negative subsidies for a wide range of kt values. To overcome this problem, 
an equity support scheme implemented by the regulators at minimum cost to the 
deposit insurance company can be adopted. Ibis subsidy function b, 7 
(k, ), ensures that 
V(kj) ý: il(k t -ý** 
) for some constant Y7 >0. Whilst minimising the authorities' deposit 
insurance liabilities the subsidy policy b,, (k, ) will be defined br. 
b, 
I 
(k) 
'II(S-1j9)4t 
+S+Y-(S-JUD***+V Vk, ra 
Ck**, kb 
(26) 
0 Vk, ý: kt, 
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where the closure rule with subsidy is: 
kb S+Y 
- i7k"][ S- 
1 
-77] (27) 1S-. ", "g 
and where Y7 >0 is an arbitrarily chosen small number. The value of the bank's equity 
and the deposit insurance corporation's liability under the subsidy rule, bi7(k, ), are 
defined as U, (k,. D, )=V, ((k, )DandM, 
(k,, D, )=L, (k, )D,, i=1,2, respectively for 
the two intervals I, =- 
Lk", kbj, and I2=- 
[k,, 
+oo]. Fries, Mella-Barral and Perraudin 
(1997) also note that: 
V, (kj = 77(k, - k**) (28) 
kt S+Y 
- 
kb 
S+Y k, kt ) V2(k, )= 
-ýUg S-dUD 
[S-P, 
s-juD 
(kj, )+ 
k*' (29) 
Sb 
kt S kt t (30), i. L, 
(kt )= i7(k, -k**)-c(k S- 
JUS 
S- IJD S- 
JUD 
and 
y +[ 
kb S+Y k, k, k,. L2(kt)= C(k 
(i7 
- S- Jug S 
-Jug S- JPUD 
jkb 
k** S- IJD 
q(k6 - ý** 
k, ), 4 
k6 
lbus, 
(31) 
b, (k, ) is the subsidy rule that supports k** and maintains (V(k, )ý: 71(k, -ý* *)while 
imposing the minimum financial liability on the regulator. 
5.4.7 Structural Breaks Caused by Implementation of Risk Management 
The behaviour of a time series could change over time in terms of its mean value or 
volatility because of switching to another style of behaviour, the so-called regime shift 
or regime switch (Brooks, 2002); Greene (2003). A bank! s implementation of risk 
management principles, which involves switching to risk-adjusted processes, may or 
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may not change the function (i. e., intercept and slope) of the state variable, f (k, ). If it 
is assumed that the a bank! s earnings series follows AR(1), then the series will be as 
follows: 
kt = ji, + 01 k, -, 
+, a,, before implementation of risk management changes (32.1) 
kt = P2 + 02 kt-1 + . 02, after 
implementation of risk management changes (32.2) 
where the implementation of risk management changes occurs at time t. Dummy 
variable techniques can be employed to find out the impact of the implementation of 
risk management changes on the bank's earnings, f(kj, where the period after the 
implementation of risk management changes takes a value of one, and the period 
before the implementation of risk management changes take the value of zero. 
In this regard, the null hypothesis is that there is no change in either the intercept or 
the slope caused by the implementation of credit risk management by the Indonesian 
banks. 
5.5 Conclusions 
Government intervention should be a public decision, involving shareholders, 
government and taxpayers. Different countries have adopted different policies to 
reorganizing ailing banks. Past studies suggest that the authorities may either directly 
liquidate an ailing bank or postpone a bank's closure following poor perforniance by 
providing a subsidy, but this may result in an increase in moral hazard behaviour. There 
are two polar bank reorganization (or corrective action) models; early closure policies 
and late closure policies. In reality, most bank reorganizations in the world embrace the 
late closure (or more patient) approach. 
The objectives of bank regulation are to provide protection to small depositors, to 
ensure stability of the financial system, and to support the efficiency of the banking 
industry. On the other hand, efficient banking regulations can be achieved only if they 
include optimal closure policies which prevent moral hazard behaviour, in turn, they 
should enhance bank regulators' accountability. I suggest that an optimal combination 
of the regulatory regime - consisting of rules, monitoring and supervision, incentive 
structures, market discipline, intervention arrangements, corporate governance and 
disciplining and accountability of regulatory agencies - necessary to fulfil the objectives, 
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has been found through the analysis of the FMP's bank reorganization model and the 
elements of a regulatory regime concept 
Bank managements are threatened by interference from shareholders and regulators 
when performance is bad, and are rewarded when performance is good. The 
shareholders will be allowed to continue to control the bank if performance is good (i. e. 
the bank is well capitalized). The threshold for the transfer of control from 
shareholders to creditors or regulators can be interpreted as a closure rule for the bank, 
and shareholders must inject new capital to keep a bank operating as a going concern. 
Regulators also try to control the risk behaviour of banks by using capital requirements. 
The bank! s value can be affected by a prompt correction measure and /or financial 
reorganization to reduce the probability of insolvency, which can limit bank failures and 
externalities which, in turn, will protect depositors and ensure public confidence. 
Yetý Basel II gives more discretion to domestic banking authorities and focuses more 
on the implementation of best practices of risk management to enhance and sustain 
shareholder value (i. e. the bank! s equity value). Ibis creates a gap between the needs of 
efficient banking regulation and the objectives of Basel II. To fill the gap, the FMP 
model under a robust regulatory framework can provide a framework for banking 
regulation. 
Bank closure policies based on the FMP model embrace the following- @ establishing 
series of different possible closure rules and subsidy policies that bank regulators may 
apply-, (it) deriving the optimal closure rule for a social-planner regulator that balances 
the lump-sum costs of bankruptcy (which themselves will typically depend on the state 
of the bank's profitability at closure) against the costs of monitoring a bank that 
continues to operate; (iii) providing information on when the authorities will postpone 
closure of the bank until after the point at which equity holders are willing to keep the 
bank liquid by injecting capital; (iv) providing evidence that when the authorities can 
subsidize ailing banks (i. e. keeping banks operating even when equity-holders are 
disinclined to inject more capital), subsidy rules can be designed to diminish moral 
hazard (i. e. stop "gambles for resurrection'ý; (y) identification of a more realistic 
subsidy rule that eliminates moral hazard only in part of the range of the state variable 
immediately above the regulator's preferred closure point while imposing a minimum 
financial liability on the authorities. A crucial feature of the model, however, is 
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profitability, as represented by the bank! s cash flow of earnings per deposit. Ibis is 
consistent with Repullo (1993), as noted by Freixas and Rochet (1998), who suggests 
two possible detern-dnants of bank closure, i. e. either profitability or early deposit 
, withdrawal signals. A deposit insurance scheme and capital regulations may result in the 
taking of excessive risk, and adversely affect the banking industry, if the deposit 
insurance scheme does not include a fair deposit insurance premium and optimal 
closure rules are not adopted. Risk management policies of a bank determine the 
returns on the risky assets. Structural change analysis, providing a framework for 
analysing the relationship between the implementation of a bank's risk management 
and a bank's earnings, can reveal whether or not it has a positive impact on the bank's 
profitability. 
Optimal bank regulation which aims to achieve certain objectives (see Chapter 2) in an 
efficient manner involves a combination of a number of elements, and the authorities 
should typically allocate more resources to develop the following elements: (1) 
intervention arrangements, including the development of transparent closure rules and 
subsidy policies; (2) monitoring and supervisory systems, involving the prioritisation of 
scare resources ; (3) incentive structures including measures to eliminate moral hazard 
problems; (4) corporate governance arrangements, including measures to raise equity 
holders' willingness to keep their banks going; and (6) the application of risk 
management best practices to enhance shareholder value. 
This chapter contributes to the literature in the following ways. Firstly, the FMP model 
is extended by comparing and combining the properties of the FMP model with the 
regulatory regime concept. And secondly, the FMP model is also extended to study the 
structural changes caused by the impact of the introduction of credit risk management 
on the banks' perfoffnance. 
In Chapter 61 will discuss the empirical study of optimal bank corrective action 
employing the dynamic contingent claims models (FMP model) with a view to 
improving bank regulation in Indonesia. 
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Appendix 5.1 
Deposit Insurance Premium Rates: the USA Method of Calculation 
Capital Group ABC 
1. WcU-capitalized Ob. p. 3b. p. l7b. p. 
Z Adcquately-capitalized 3b. p. 10b. p. 24b. p. 
3. Under capitalized l0b. p. 24b. p. 27b. p. 
1. WeIl-capitalized banks: 
a. Total Risk-based Capital Ratio > 10% and, 
b. Tier I Risk-bascd Capital Ratio > 6% and, 
c. Tier 1 Leverage Capital Ratio > 5%. 
2. Adequatelyýcapitalized banks: 
- Not well capitalized 
. Total Risk-based Capital Ratio > 8% and, 
- Tier I Risk-based Capital Ratio > 4% and, 
- Tier 1 Leverage Capital Ratio > 4%. 
3. Under-capitalized banks: 
Neither well capitalized nor adequately capitalized 
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation assesses deposit insurance premium rates on individual 
institutions, placing each institution in one of nine risk categories using a two-step process based first on 
Capital Ratios (Capital Group Assignment) described above, and then on other relevant information 
(Supervisory Subgroup Assignment). 
Supervisory Subgroup Assignments will assign each institution into one of three subgroups based on the 
corporation's consideration relied on the following factors: 
- Results of the last examination conducted by the Primary Regulator 
Changes in the composite rating provided by the Primary Regulator 
Results of indcpcndcn% joint orconcutrent FDIC examination/mview 
Time elapsed since the last examination 
Results of offsitc statistical analysis of reportcd financial statements 
Analysis of othcrpcrtincnt information. 
Definitions: 
Subgroup A. 
This consists of financially sound institutions with only a few minor weaknesses and gcnerall 
corresponds to the primary federal regulatoes composite rating of "I" or 'T. 
Subgroup B: 
This consists of institutions that demonstrate weaknesses which, if not corrected, could result in 
significant deterioration of the institutions and increased risk of loss to the Bank Insurance Fund (BIF) or 
Saving Association Insurance Fund (SAIF). This subgroup assignment gcnerall corresponds to the 
primary federal regulator's composite rating "N% 
Subgroup C- 
This consists of institutions that pose a substantial probability of loss to the BIF or SAIF unless effective 
corrective action is taken. This subgroup assignment wnerall corresponds to the primary federal 
regulator's composite rating of "4" or "Y'. 
Source: hap: //www. fdic. CQLus (2W3) 
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Appendix 5.2 
Summary of Criteria (or Factors and Score) used in Canada to Determine 
Deposit Insurance irremia 
I Criteria or factors Max. Score 
1. Capital adequacy 5 
2. Assets to Capital Multiple 5 
3. Tier I Risk-based Capital Ratio 5 
4. Total Risk-based Capital Ratio 5 
1. Return on Risk-weighted Asset 5 
2. Mean Adjusted Net Income Volatility 5 
3. Volatility Adjusted Net Income 5 
4. Efficiency Ratio 5 
5. Net Impaired Assets (including Net Unrealized losses to 
Security) to Total Capital 5 
6. Aggregate Counterparty Assets Concentration Ratio 5 
7. Real Estate Concentration 5 
8. Aggregate Industry Sector Asset Concentration 5 
total: Quantitative Score 60 
1 1. Examiner Rating 25 
2. Extent of Adherence to FDIC standards 10 
3. Other Information 5 
total: Qualitative Score 40 
Total Score 100 
Note: 
Premium category is based on a financial instituion's score and the premium associated with each 
premium category and rate as depicted in the following table: 
Premium Categories and Rates 
Scores Premium Categories Premium rates 
80 1 112, Vh of 1%, or 0.0417% 
65-but-(80 2 1/ 12'h of 1%, or 0.0833% 
50-but-(65 3 1/6h of 1%, or 0.1667% 
04 1/3h of I%, or 0.3333% 
Source: http: //www. cdic. ca (2003) 
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CHAPTER SIX 
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF FINANCIAL REORGANIZATION OF 
INDONESIAN BANKS 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the implementation of the model developed in Chapter 5 
entitled "Optimal bank corrective action: the dynamic contingent claims model under a 
robust regulatory framework" based on the IMP model and its extensions, which needs 
some additional specifications and assumptions to enable it to be implemented 
empirically using Indonesian bank data. The model has been used in two previous 
studies: in a study of the US by Fries and Perraudin (1994); and in a study of Japan by 
Fries, Mason and Perraudin (1993). To my best knowledge, this study is the first study 
employing the (extended) FMP model in an analysis of the Indonesian banking 
industry. Hence, this chapter will cover. the model specifications; the results from the 
application of the model developed in Chapter 5; the empirical methodology, the data 
and estimations; the results of statistical tests; parameter estimates; and the results of 
the valuation of deposit insurance guarantees, including the subsidies at different 
deposit insurance premium rates and the imminence of bankruptcy. 
The FMP model implies that optimal bank reorganization involves use of a deposit 
insurance scheme. As suggested when developing the FMP model, the model is based 
on a type of American call option rather than that of a European call option or 
Merton-type model with a certain frequency of audit. The econometric methods 
employed to calculate the parameter estimates are the Maximum Ilkelihood Estimates 
techniques ri. e. GARCH and Vector Auto Regression Processes (VAR)] of a stochastic 
process (or diffusion processes) [see for example Giannopoulos (2000) and Brooks 
(2002)], which are applied to monthly data of stock market prices to estimate the banks' 
equity, and to deposit values to estimate the governmenes liabilities in a deposit 
guarantee scheme, for a set of relatively-large Indonesian banks (including some foreign 
banks). These probabilistic techniques (or stochastic processes) are based on the 
normal distribution assumption for a particular sample and unknown parameters of the 
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sample to estimate its population, so that different samples would result in different 
maximum likelihood estimates (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1998). Maximum likelihood 
techniques were applied since they are consistent and unbiased estimation techniques 
and allow time aggregations of all model parameters by implementing the GARCH 
method [introduced first by Bollerslev (1986) for measuring volatility, as noted by 
Giannopoulos, (2000)]; and Vector Autoregressive Regressions (VAR), including 
Vector Error Correction (VEC) Model, when applicable, for forecasting and estimating 
the parameters (using the EVIEWS 4 software package), as suggested by Brooks 
(2003), Koop (2000), and Greene(2003). 
In this study, the cash flow approach is adopted when calculating a bank's equity value 
and the governmenes liabilities, for a variety of reasons. First, models relying on the 
frequent audit of banks and the financial reorganization of banks when audits reveal 
negative assets [Pennachi (1987b)], which is an option pricing method suggested 
originally by Merton (1977,1978) (the so-called European call option), have two 
drawbacks: the values of deposit guarantees depend crucially on the frequency of audits; 
and the illogical assumption that information available to regulators and shareholders 
regarding the value of equity can be inferred from the perfom-iance of the bank! s equity 
price when the bank's underlying assets reach zero [Fries, Mella-Barral, and Pcrraudin, 
(1997)]. Pennachi's conclusion is that the strong regulation case (Le with capital 
injection from shareholders if audits reveal a negative net assets position) gives values 
comparable to another empirical study by Markus and Shakud (1984) with lower 
deposit insurance premia, whilst weak regulation (i. e. with no adjustment in capital after 
successful audits) creates distinctly higher premia. Second, the empirical data for 
applying the models relying on the asset prices is not readily available. Ibird, the cash 
flow approach adopts a symmetric information assumption where data is available to 
both regulators and investors. In this regard, the mapping process from the state 
variable of eaming cash flows to equity values (which are non-linear functions of the 
state variable to be estimated), where, in the model, the level of the earnings to deposits 
ratio triggers the constrained socially-optimal closure rule, is widely used in financial 
return forecasting, as noted by Malz (2000) and Lhabitant (2000). In the FMP model, 
regulators want to maximize a bank's equity value while nýiinimising the government's 
liabilities. The value of the governmenes liabilities is determined endogenously by the 
regulators' constrained optimal closure rule rather than by the audit frequency chosen 
by the authorities. 
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I estimate the FMP model applied in this empirical study for a sample of relatively-large 
Indonesian banks, using data on their equity market capitalisations on the Jakarta Stock 
Exchange for their equity values, and using deposits data for the governmenes 
liabilities. The calculation of various parameter quantities cover the "fair" deposit 
insurance premium, the value of equity, the value of the deposit insurance guarantee, 
the sociallyý-optimal reorganization /or closure trigger point, and the optimal subsidy. 
In addition., some authors suggest that deposit insurance may have a negative impact on 
banks by inducing them to take more risk. Accordingly, implementation of enterprise 
risk management policies by the Indonesian banks are expected to increase shareholder 
value and to reduce the banks' risk taking, and, in turn, may reduce the probability of 
bankruptcy. As a result, the structural break tests of the implementation of enterprise 
risk management principles and its impact on banks' determinant parameters, is also 
analysed in this chapter. 
Ibis study contributes to the literature in the following ways. Firstly, I use time series 
data over a long period time for relatively-large banks in Indonesia. Ibis is the first 
study of banks' reorganization in Indonesia, so it adds to the empirical literature in this 
area, especially with respect to emerging countries' banking system. And secondly, I 
examine the impact of the implementation of an element of enterprise risk 
management on the banks' determinant parameters and thus add new findings to this 
literature. 
'Me chapter is organized as follows: Section 6.1 provides the introduction; Section 6.2 
sets out the objectives of the chapter, Section 6.3 outlines the model specifications; 
Section 6.4 explains the empirical methodologr, Section 6.5 describes the data and 
estinmtion techniques used; Section 6.6 sets out the results; and Section 6.7 concludes. 
6.2 Objectives 
Ibc objectives of this chapter are as follows: 
1. To implement the optimal financial bank reorganization (FMP) model empirically 
using Indonesian bank data, involving the calculation of the banks' equity values, the 
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govemment! s liabilities, the fair deposit insurance premium, the closure rules, fair 
subsidies, and the banks' imminence of bankruptcy. 
2. To study empirically the relationships between the state of risk management and 
optimal bank reorganization for Indonesian banks. 
6.3 Model Specifications 
To implement the models empirically, several choices had to be made and the 
procedures adopted are set out below. 
6.3.1 Banks' Earnings 
The cash flow of earnings of a bank is assumed to be the total interest income arising 
from credit activities, since the main activity of Indonesian banks is lending, as 
reported in the results of the risk management survey (see Chapter 4) and in the 
analysis of the banks' income, summarized in Table 6.1. These earnings are assumed to 
be paid out instantaneously to shareholders. The bank's risky interest loan income, g, 
and the bank's deposits, Dt, are assumed to be correlated geometric Brownian motions 
and arc estimated by allowing for links between the stochastic process of the banks' 
stock market price and the process for the payment of earnings, under the assumption 
of risk neutrality. However, to allow for non-constant volatility in the stock prices and 
interest rates, stochastic volatility is chosen by applying empirically the GARCH model 
and the VAR model. 
6.3.2 Interest Rates 
Contrary to the IMP model, the risk free interest rate (i. e. the Certificate of Bank 
Indonesia interest rate rather than the rate on Treasury Bills) and the deposit interest 
rate are not assumed constant, allowing actual interest rates to determine the values of 
shareholders' equity and government liabilities. 
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6.3.3 Estimation of the Model 
Recall equations (2) and (3) in Chapter 5, where a bank! s stock market value is a 
function of g, and Dt. The empirical survey tests the null hypothesis that the bank's 
stock prices follow a random walk. The bank's stock market value is a function of the 
two variables g, and D, for some function of VO of a single argument k, =- g, ID, 
where V is the value of the bank! s equity per deposits. 
Accordingly, one needs to test the null hypothesis that the bank's distribution of equity 
values (i. e stock prices) and deposits (i. e. representations of the government's liabilities) 
follow a random walk (or the error terms are normally distributed), where drift 
parameters (i. e. 1j, and JUD) equal the mean with variance = a. and aD , as noted 
in 
equations 11,12, and 13 in Chapter 5). Ibc bank's stock prices and its deposits are 
tested using three approaches, namely the kurtosis, skewness, and jarque-Berra 
normality tests. More specifically, the approaches test that deposits and equity value are 
Geometric Brownian motion (or diffusion processes), which behave over time like a 
random walk with very tiny increments. The results arc presented in Section 6.6-1. 
The violation of the normality assumption is consistent with the finance literature, as 
can be seen in the results that show that most of the banks' stock prices and deposits 
are leptokurtic distributions, which imply changes in the means and variances 
(unconditional variances) leading me to use the GARCH approach (as discussed in 
Sections 6.4.2 and 6-6.1), VAR technique (presented in Sections 6.4.2) and the ADF 
test (as discussed in Sections 6.4.3 and 6.6.2.1). The estimations and the ADF tests are 
followed by cointegration tests, as presented in Sections 6.4.4 and 6.6.2.2. Whilst, 
Granger causality tests in VAR are used to test if a variable either dependent or 
independent, as discussed in Sections 6.4.5 and 6.6.2.3. 
Finally, structural change tests are used to test the impact of the introduction of credit 
risk management, as reported in Sections 6.4.6 and 6.6.5 
To verify the null hypothesis and to estimate the model, consider equation (4) in 
Chapter 5: 
sU, = gt - (s +y)D, +d Ejý+y 
'8 dA 'a 
Ibis equation consists of two parts, i. e. the first is the bank's total earnings and the 
second is the capital gains term, which follows a stochastic process. The latter can be 
written as a Taylor expansion process and yields: 
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Ibis is a second-order differential equation featuring the relationship between the 
bank's per deposit stock market value and the current level of the state variable, k,, and 
has the general solution: 
Vkt = AO + Alkt + AA, ý + A3ktI, (4) 
Taking derivatives in (4) and substituting in (3) yields: 
AO = _(rD + Y) I(S - JUD 
) (5) 
Al =11(s-ljg) (6) 
2 2/2)4A2 (7) (S - YD A JUD (ak /2)hA2 +(ak 
and, 
(S-JUD)A3 PD _ (a 
2/ 2)k A3 + (a 2 12)4A (8) kk3 
where, 
,ý and '12 are the two roots of the quadratic equation, and 1ý '1ý 
0< A2 
* 
6.3.4 Conditions 
Additional conditions for implementing these models are: (a) that the authorities 
conduct a financial reorgmization when a bank's loan interest income, g, per rupiah 
of deposit, falls to a given closure point, k; and (b) that the bank's stock market value 
is free from bubbles, whereby the stock market value of the bank would not jump at 
the moment of financial reorganization, and would not create arbitrage profits for 
speculators. The first assumption implies that, in a financial reorganization, since the 
shareholders relinquish their claims on the bank's earnings, the per deposits value of 
equity, V(k, ), = 0. And, secondly if there is no bubble in the stock market price, then 
as k, 4 oo and V(k, )also4oo, the bank's equity value can be written as: 
U(k, D) = DV(k) -> E, [exp[- s(z - 1)]kg, - (rD)d, 
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where the right hand side is the unlimited liability value of the bank7s cash flow of 
earnings and one gets that U(k, D)=DV(k)->E, 
[exp[-s(z-I)Rg, 
-(rD)d, = 
9t '(S - JUg )- (rD + Y)Dt 
I(S - PD ). The bank's value is expected to increase as the 
bank's cash flow of earnings, k, improves, so that the probability of bankruptcy will 
become smaller and smaller. In other words, V, becomes linear in k, as k, 4 00. The 
bank's per deposit equity values are given in the next section. 
6.3.5 Equity Values 
The bank! s equity value per deposit, assuming risk neutrality, can be calculated, as 
shown in equation 12 in Chapter 5, as follows: 
V(k, ) = 
kt 
s- /is 
S+y k S- 
JUD 
s- dug 
S+y 
s- JUD k 
(9) 
One can conclude that if a bank! s stock market price, deposits, and earnings follow the 
properties of equation (9), then the models can be used to calculate the bank's equity 
value based on the relationships between the cash flow of total earnings and deposits, 
and the market value of the bank. 
Ibesc crucial procedures are included in the calculation of the governmenes liabilities 
too, since calculation of the government's liabilities is essentially a similar type of 
implementation based on the procedures described above. To calculate the value of 
the government's liabilities, there are some differences however, as follows: (i) in the 
calculation of the governmenes liabilities, the government replaces the function of the 
shareholders, so that the earnings of the government are deposit insurance premia; (ii) 
the government incurs monitoring costs in undertaking its monitoring fiinction; and 
(iii) bank failure costs, including disruption to financial stability, are represented by 
bankruptcy costs. As a result, the value of the government's liabilities is calculated, as 
originally shown in equation 13 in Chapter 5, as follows: 
L(kt) y-4. +[ 
S- dUD s- jug 
S+Y-ý. 
- c(k*) 
J"D 
(10) 
FoHowing the suggestion of Fries and Perraudin (1993), 1 assume that economic agents 
(i. e. bank managements) are risk averse, so that we can estimate the parameters of stock 
market prices, deposits and the state variable. This can be achieved by making 
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assumptions about the utility function of the agent and the stochastic endowment 
stream of a representative agent. Hence, suppose there is a representative agent with 
logarithmic utility, and that the endowment stream of the economy at T (T denote 
some date after the end of our sample) is the level at T of an endowment process, M, 
that follows the following stochastic differential equation: 
Xdt = JUMMIdt + CMMIdBl2t 
where, dB12, dBI, = 
Cku, 
and dBl2tdBlOt = CDW. 
(11) 
We also assume that M, is 'news' about the level of consumption at the single date, T. 
With logarithmic utility and a geometric Brownian motion for the endowment process, 
the pricing kernel in this economy equals exp[-a, 2 121-aBI2J. Given this kernel 
assumption, Girsanov's theorem [see Oksendhal, (1985)] implies that the risk-adjusted 
processes for k, and Dare: 
A- = -akam4 - kW)kdi + akkdBlt 't 
(Ijk 
and 
dD. ý-- (JUD-aDam4ýDODdi + aDDdBO, I 
(12) 
(13) 
Finally, I make a critical assumption that a market index of the Jakarta Stock Exchange 
is proportional to the endowment process, M,. 11iis model estimation can be called a 
Continuous Time Capital Asset Pricing Model (C-CAPM), as suggested by Merton 
(1972), where CAPM can not only be derived in a discrete time framework but can also 
be derived in a continuous time framework, under the assumption that trades can be 
executed at any time and that the return-generating process for stock prices is smooth, 
with no jump in prices ri. e. it behaves like a diffusion process (Lhabitant (2000); and 
Greene (2003)], so that it follows Brownian motion. The estimation process will be 
discussed finther in Section 8.4. 
6.3.6 Choice of Closure Point 
If an ailing bank is kept open, the authorities would sell it to investors to keep the bank 
operating as a going concern. However, if the authorities choose to close the bank, and 
it is assumed the government acts as a social planner, the closure rule in a fmancial 
reorganisation is the k which minknizes the expected discounted value of bankruptcy 
cos% ýk ). If closure is feasible and if ýk )>0 for all k, then k= -oo would 
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minimize the expected discounted value of reorganization costs, as set out in equation 
10. In real life, not all financial reorganization rules are feasible; this is consistent with 
the shareholders' limited liability. Recall equation 17 of Chapter 5; the authorities will 
choose a closure rule satisfying the constrainý 
k* , where kA 
S-P )(L--L: -9-)(S PD 
(14) 
Then, k* is a closure rule which maximizes the bank's stock market value per deposit, 
V(k, ), for any given deposit premium rate. The maximized equity value at the optimal 
closure point, k* , with trigger point, k, is a necessary condition which solves the 
optimality problem, as noted by Dixit (1993), and is given bT. 
av(k", k, ) aV(k*, kt) 
ak 
--": 0 and 
L9 k' 
-<0 for all k, (15) 
In other words, the authorities should choose the closure rule, k* , which maximizes 
equity value if they act as a social planner. 
6.3.7 Fair Flat Deposit Insurance Premium Rate 
A fair flat deposit insurance premium rate for a bank subject to the authorities' choice 
of optimal closure, k, is a function of ko (i. e. k, at t= 0), the value of the bank, 
bankruptcy costs, c(k), and monitoring costs, e.. Bankruptcy costs, or so- 
called deadweight costs, are the expected value of administrative and legal costs borne 
by the authorities in reorganizing the bank, when the bank fails to generate earnings. 
The fair flat deposit insurance premium rate, as originally noted at equation 14 Chapter 
5, is derived as follows: 
Yf = -(S- JUD) 
ks 
-c(k 
(k(, / k)' 
+ 
1 
S-flD 
)] 
I- (ko /D' 
231 
6.3.8 Subsidy or Bail Out Rules 
Recall equation (25) in Chapter 5; the subsidy rule given the prevailing deposit insurance 
premium is derived as follows: 
s- 
c(k 0 JUD b. (kt) =y+k ko -k) S-JUg S-UD 
_ýL S- IJD s- Pg 
: I- -'"D +s 
s- 
'a s 
(17) 
Different levels of bail-out or subsidy of a bank can be directly calculated by applying a 
range of possible deposit insurance premium rates. 
6.3.9 Structural Change Caused by Implementation of Risk Management 
Policies 
The implementation of risk management policies can be treated as a structural change 
at the banks, since it should shift the banks management from a "traditional" approach 
to a risk-based approach (i. e. ERM framework), which in turn affects the banks' 
perforniance. A bank's structural change in state variable, k, caused by the 
implementation of risk management policies at t for an AR(l) process under the 
dummy variable technique to capture changes in behaviour (i. e. intercept and slope of 
the k, series), is estimated using two equations as follows: 
kt =. ul + 01k, -, + 1j,, 
before implementation of credit risk management (18.1) 
kt = J"2 + 
02k, 
-, 
+ P2, after implementation of credit risk management (18.2) 
The null hypothesis is that there is no change in either the intercept or the slope caused 
by the implementation of credit risk management by the Indonesian banks. 
6.4. Empirical Methodology 
Ibis section describes the methodology used (accompanied by some theoretical 
background discussion of each methodology) to analyse the related banks' data and to 
estimate the parameters, such as the bank's equity values, the governmenes liabilities, 
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the fair deposit insurance rate, the subsidies, the guarantee values, and the bankruptcy 
imminence, as suggested by Fries and Perraudin (1993). Accordingly, this section 
includes the methodologies used to estimate the relationship between k, D, and V, 
(i. e., the mapping process), and explains the use of GARCH and VAR methods, the 
ADF tests, the Cointegration tests, the Granger Causality tests in VAR, and the 
structural change tests. 
6.4.1 Mapping Process 
Let us consider the state variable, k, for the bank's equity-to-deposits ratio, V,. We 
can obtain k, if we know the parameters of the model by inverting V(k, ) for each 
sample point. The bank's mapping process of state variable, k,, to its equity value was 
found by estimating the parameters yv, PD, k,, and their volatilities. 
If k, is a geometric Brownian motion, then we expect log k,.,, -log k, to be normally 
distributed. Moreover, if k,, D, and V, are correlated, geometric Brownian motions, 
then taking logarithms yields a trivariate Brownian motion. The state variable k, will be 
absorbed at log( k ). As the model suggests, equity value is generated by a mapping 
process of the non-linear cash flow of a bank's earnings. In other words, the value of 
the bank can be observed for any set of the earning process parameters, V, D, and 
k,; so we can derive the exact conditional joint density function of the equity-to- 
deposits ratio, deposits, and market value of the portfolio by making a change of 
variable in the joint density (or joint probability) of deposits, D,, market value of the 
portfolio, M, and k,. Using this density, we can estimate a model of V, D, and k, 
using the exact maximum likelihood technique, as originally suggested by Fisher (1925) 
and discussed in the next section. 
6.4.2 VAR and GARCH Approaches 
The maximum likelihood estimator of the GARCH model is a function of data which 
maximýes (as its names implies) the log likelihood function, as noted by Greene (2003). 
The likehhood function gives the joint probability for the observed sample 
observations, and the maximum likelihood estimator is the function of the sample 
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information which makes the observed data most probable (at least by that criterion). 
71he underlying philosophy of this estimator is the idea of sample information. If the 
density of a sample of observations is completely specified, apart from unknown 
parameters, then the joint density of those observations (assuming they are 
independent) is the likelihood function, written as follows: 
Ibis function contains all the information available in the sample about the population 
from which those observations were drawn. 
In the least squares regression, the disturbance of regression follows a normal 
distribution. If the data are generated by a normal distribution, then the log of the 
likelihood function is 
In Ln In 2z _n Ina' - (D-Mfl)'(D-Mfl). 22 2C2 
It is clear that least squares is the estimator of choice for this model. Maximizing the 
function means minimizing the exponent, which is conducted by least squares for 
and e'e In for a'. 
In the implementation of the IMP model for Indonesian banks, I have used VAR 
models and GARCH models, with the help of the Eviews 4 software package, to 
estimate the parameters with lags of the model, and to allow measurements of 
stochastic volatility in order to explain the banks' stock prices (volatility is not constant) 
and changes of interest rates. 1he use of these methods are more realistic compared to 
the traditional Black-Scholes model, as discussed in the theoretical model in Chapter 
5.4.1. where the volatility is assumed to be constant over the life of the investments. 
The Black-Scholes model assumes that the stock prices follow geometric Brownian 
motion with constant volatility and constant interest rates. However, in real markets, 
volatility of stock prices is far from constant. Hence, if volatility is assumed to be driven 
by some stochastic process, then the Black-Scholes model no longer describes a 
complete market. Besides, as one can see in the descriptive statistics of banks' market 
values and liabilities in Section 6.5, log(V, ) and log(D, ) are not normally distributed. 
Consequently, in my empirical study, I estimate a model of V, D, and k, by using the 
Maximum Likelihood techniques of the VAR model and /or Vector Error Correction 
Model (VEC) [as suggested by Sims (1980) and Utterman (1979,1986) and noted by 
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Greene (2003)] and the GARCH model [following the suggestions of Harvey (1976), 
Brooks (2002), and Lhabitant (2000)]. 
Parameter estimation using Vector Autoregressive Regression (VAR) and /or Vector 
Error Correction Model (ECM) techniques are very simple to use and widely employed 
by researchers, in particular practitioners. These methods, the so-called non-structural 
approaches rather than structural approaches, are used to estimate the relationships 
among several variables or for forecasting interrelated time series and for analysing the 
dynamic impact of a random disturbance on the system of variables. All variables 
included in the VAR are required to be stationary in order to carry out joint significance 
tests on the lags of the variables. Therefore, all data series (i. e. in logarithmic form) are 
subjected to the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tes% which accommodates a serial 
correlation test in the functions under study. 
The main drawback of the VAR approach to modelling is that it is a-theoretical and the 
large number of parameters involved result in the estimated models being difficult to 
interpret. To partially alleviate the problems, there are three statistical tests that could 
be employed: the Granger Causality test (or Block significance test); the impulse 
response test-, and the variance decomposition test. It is worth noting that the Granger 
Causality test does not imply physical causality or a direct linkage between two series or 
that, for example, M is the effect of k. Granger measures precedence and information 
content (or chronological ordering of movements of the series) but does not indicate 
causality in the more common use of the term. Ibis test, however, can only be used to 
test that the model has a statistically significant impact on the future values of each of 
the variables in the system but it is not able to explain the sign (i. e. positive or negative) 
of the relationship or how long these effects require to take place. Such information 
could be obtained by conducting the VAR! s impulse response test and variance 
decomposition test. 
Impulse responses provide information about the responsiveness of the dependent 
variables, i. e. to measure the effects upon the VAR system over time of a unit shock 
applied to the error of the variable. Variance decomposition examines the VAR 
system's dynamics, i. e. to measure a shock applied to a variable itself and its 
transmission to the other variable in the system through the dynamic structure (or over 
time) of the VAP, Both impulse response and variance decomposition provide very 
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similar information. However, both impulse response and variance decomposition are 
very difficult to interpret accurately, as argued by Runkle (1987), due to two reasons: (i) 
the confidence bands (upper Emits and lower limits) around the impulse response and 
variance decompositions should ahvays be constructed; and (ii) the confidence intervals 
are typically very wide so that sharp inferences are impossible. Given their 
impracticality, in this study I do not use the methods. 
The GARCH technique for measuring volatility, which applies maximum likelihood 
techniques', has the advantage tha% under a broad set of conditions, parameter 
estimators are both consistent and (for large samples) asymptotically efficient-, and 
estimates of the variances can be determined as a by-product of the estimation process 
since, as suggested by Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1998), ordinary least-squares estimation 
(OLS) yields estimators that sometimes are inefficient and at other times inconsistent 
Ilie objective of maximum-likelihood estimation techniques is to find the values of the 
unknown parameters (in particular, volatility which is represented by the standard 
deviation), which are most likely to generate the sample observations of a function. 
This is achieved by maximizing the likelihood function given below with respect to each 
parameter. To make this convenient to do, the functions (i. e., the time series) are 
transformed into logarithmic of likelihood functions. The Eviews 4 software package 
has facilities to report the maximum likelihood statistics by using a type of conditional 
model (i. e. con&, 6onal twiance), the Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity 
(ARCM2, as suggested by Engle (1982,1983), and the so-called Generalized ARCH (or 
GARCq model (as suggested by Bollerslev, 1986). Ibis model allows one to apply the 
method of maximum likelihood under the assumption that the errors are conditionally 
normally distributed. 
To illustrate this method, consider a GARCH (qx), which refers to the presence of an 
n-order GARCH term (the first term in parentheses) and an n-order ARCH term. 
However, to simplify the analysis of a GARCH specification, a standard GARCH (1, I) 
is given by: 
I There are three most widely-used econometric techniques: maximum likelihood estimation (MLE); the 
generalized method of moments (GMn; and the Kalman filter. In this study, the MLE is applied. 2 Ilie ARCH model has proven to be useful in studying volatility in many areas, such as inflation [Coulson and Robins (1985)], the term structure of interest rates [Engle, Hendry, and Trumbull (1985)], 
the volatility of stock market returns [Engle, Lilien, and Robins (1987)], and the behaviour of foreign 
exchange markets (Domowitz and Hakkio (1985), to name but a few. The GARCH model has also 
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Mi = k;, v +. -t and 
a2 =w+ae 
2+ fla 2 
62 where, co is the mean; t-, is nevs about the volatility from the previous period, 
measured as the lag of the squared residual from the mean equation (i. e. the so-called 
ARCH term); and Cr2, is the last period's forecast variance (the so called GARCH t- 
term). The likelihood function is given bT. 
n it =_ log(2; r) -I log a2-1 (Mt - k; y)2 
/0.2 
22t2t 
where 
a2= o) +a k; _1 
y)2 + fla 2 t 
(Mt-I - t-I 
Ihis is consistent with the finance (in particular the risk management) literature [see, 
for example, Peterson (1994)], where an agent or trader predicts this period's variance 
by forming a weighted average of a long term average (the constant), the forecast 
variance from last period (the GARCH term), and information (or news) about 
volatility observed in the previous period (the ARCH term). Ibis is also consistent with 
most recent studies of financial markets suggesting that the phenomenon is quite 
common, as noted by Giannopoulos (2000), Brooks (2002), and Greene (2003). 
6.4.3 Augmented Dickey FuUer (ADF) Tests 
The ADF test is an extension of the Dickey Fuller test used to conduct the unit root 
test'. To illustrate the ADF test, let us consider an Autoregressive, AR(1) process 
(Greene, 2003), to model a regression: 
mt: --P+Pmt-i+-'t- 
where # andjo are parameters and e, is assumed to be white noise, where each 
observation is uncorrelated with all other values in the sequence with zero mean and 
constant variance (or error term). M is a stationary series if -1 <P<1- If P=1, 
M is a non stationary series (a random walk with drift); if the process is started at some 
proven to be a simpler way of studying volatility such as in foreign exchange rates [BoUerslev and Ghysels (1996)1; Giannopoulos (2000); Brooks ( 2002). 
3 The Econometric technique used to conduct the unit root test is the well-known Dickey Fuller (DF) 
test, originally introduced by David Dickey and Wayne Fuller P. A. Dickey and W. A. Fuller, 
'Mistribution of the Estimators fbr Autoregressivc Time-Series with a unit root: ' journal of the 
American Statistical Association, vol. 74, pp. 427-431,1979; D. A. Dickey and W. A. Fuller, "Likelihood 
Ratio Statistics for Autoregressive Time Series with a Unit Root: ' Econometrica, vol. 49, pp. 1057-1072, 
1982, and W. A. Fuller, Introduction to statistical Time Series (New York: Wiley, 976]. 
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point, the variance of y increases steadily with time and goes to infinity. If the absolute 
value of p is greater than one, the series is explosive. Consequently, the null hypothesis 
of a stationary series can be evaluated by testing whether the absolute value of P is 
strictly less than one. ADF tests take the unit root as a null hypothesis, HO :p=I and 
the alternative hypothesis is HO :p(1. To implement the estimation of an equation, 
M, 
-, 
is subtracted from both sides of the equation to yield: 
Mt - Mt-, = -a + 
Wt-I + Ct 
where v=p-1, and the null hypothesis and alternative hypotheses are H, ) :y=0 and 
HO :y(0 respectively. 
Different types of series comprise the random walk zitb ddj? form and the trend stafionag 
form. The first form, the random walk form, is actually obtained by imposing ja =0 
and y=0. The series M is said to be integrated Sforder one, denoted by I(1) , if taking a 
first difference produces a stationary process. " A non stationary series is integrated of 
order 4 denoted by I(d), if it becomes stationary after being differenced d times. In 
addition, I follow MacKinnon (1991), as noted by Brooks (2002), to include estimation 
of the response surface using the simulation results, permitting the calculation of 
Dickey-Fuller critical values for any sample size and for any number of right-hand 
variables (or independent variables). The Eviews 4 software package provides these 
MCKinnon critical values for the unit root test. The Augmented Dickey Fuller statistic, 
under the null hypothesis H,, :p=1, is computed as follows: 
AA 
DF, =Y- or 
P-1 
AA 
Est. Std. Error(y) se(p) 
The second type of series is the trend stationary form, described as follows: 
Mt ýP+ PV, -, + Z, , where z, -.: Iz, _, + set 
Consequently, all banks' data series, earnings, g, deposits, D,, state variables, k,, and 
stock price indexes, M, are variables of VAFL The two types of data series were first 
4 Ile stationary process occurs if the stochastic process of a function is fixed in time, hence the effects 
of shocks tend to zero as time passes. If a function is stationary then we can model the process via an 
equation with fixed coefficients that can be estimated from data. In contrast, a non-stationary process 
occurs if the chara tcristics of a stochastic process of a series change over time [Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1998)]. In other words, a stochastic process is said to be strictly stationary if its properties arc unaffected by a change of time origin (or both the mean and variance of a series must be constant), as suggested by Mills (2002) and Mills and Mills (1991). 
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tested for unit roots in the same fashion with commands ViewslSeriesl Unit root 
testlAug, me, 7ted-Diýkg Fu&r testIMax la, 12 
6.4.4 Cointegration Tests 
The next tests used were cointegration tests to determine if a linear combination of the 
banks' series is stationary and then to allow for different methods of regression for 
each bank's series under study. The -aim of these tests is to determine the model of 
estimation to be implemented. Banks' series which are cointegrated, were estimated 
using Vector Error Correction Models (VECM), and series which are not cointegrated 
were estimated using Vector Autoregression (VAR) techniques, with command 
Viewsl VectorAutorrgression or Ermr ComcVon Models (Greene, 2003, and Brooks, 2002). 
Engle and Granger (1987) noted that a linear combination of two or more non- 
stationary series may be stationary [as cited by Maddala (2001), Greene (2003), Gujarati 
(1995)]. If such a stationary linear combination exists, the non-stationary time series are 
said to be cointegrated. The stationary linear combination is called the cointegrating 
equation and may be interpreted as a long-run equilibrium relationship among variables. 
Koop (2000) suggests if two time series have a non-stationary process, which means 
they have unit roots, but some linear combination of them is stationary, then it is said 
that the two time series are cointegrated. The Granger Representation 'Ibeorm says 
that if M, and k, are cointegrated, then the relationship between them can be 
expressed as an Error Correction Model. 
Consider an estimation of a regression of two series of variables, Mt and k,: 
Mt =a+ fik, +e, 
The error term in the above regression model is 
e=M, -a-A, 
It is clear that the errors are just a linear combination of M, and k,. However, M, and 
k, both may exhibit non stationary unit root behaviour such that one would expect the 
error term to also exhibit non stationary behaviour since there is very high 
autocorrelation in the residuals from conventional regression models (Granger and 
Newbold, 1974). This is a well known spurious regression problem, where the two 
series have unit roots so that all regression results might be misleading, where 
conventional statistical tests, such as the F-test and the t -test are not sufficient to take 
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into account such autocorrelation. 'Mis is caused by the fact that they would tend to 
reject the null hypothesis of no relationship, when, in fact, there is none. However, it is 
possible that the unit roots in the M, and g, 'cancel each other out' as the two series 
move together or trend together or there are common trends or co-trending in the 
long run such that the resulting error term is stationary. Ibis may also exist in an 
economic equilibrium phenomenon in the long run after two variables deviate from 
their relationship in the short run. In this case, the cointegration problem vanishes and 
it is valid to run a regression of M, and k,. 
To test whether two non stationary series are cointegrated or not, Eviews 4 software 
package provides the test command: QuicklEsfixate EquadonlLeast Squarr, from the 
VAR window toolbar, and then runs an ADF test on The Re grrssion Residuals with the test 
command: ViexlSbow ResiduallUnit root testIADF testlM= lag, 12. -' In addition, the 
Eviews 4 software package implements VAR-based cointegration tests using the 
methodology developed by Johansen (1991,1995), the so-called Johansen cointegration 
test. The test is basically a unit root test of a residual term of the regression; hence 
Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) unit root tests were applied to the residual regressions 
(Brooks, 2002) with a null hypothesis that a residual of the regression has a unit root. 
1be reason is that the ADF test allows for testing serial correlation of any kind in the 
error term or residual term, whereas in the DF test there is an assumption that there is 
no serial autocorrelation in the error term. lberefore, the ADF test is an expansion of 
the DF test by including lagged changes in the right hand side of M, and k, [Gujarati 
(1995), and Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1998)]. If the two series are cointegrated, this 
means that M, and k, have a long-term relationship which prevents them from 
wandering apart without bounds and would also suggest the absence of a speculative 
bubble (see Section 6.2 regarding the ruled out assumption of the bubble in the stock 
market price, M, ). Ibis is an interesting phenomenon, since many financial market 
observers suggest that stocks have a 'theoretical value' that is determined by 'market 
fundamentals' - that is the discounted value of the firm's future profit. Unusual (or 
wild) swings of the stock prices away from the theoretical values together with 
s Testing for cointegration in regression using a residuals-based approach is an application of the Enee- 
Granger (EG) test Engle-Granger (1987) have tabulated a new set of critical value for this application. The reason that the modified critical values am required is that the test is now operating on the residuals 
of an estimated model rather than on raw data. 
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subsequent abrupt market crashes are often taken to indicate the presence of a 
speculative bubble in the prices series (Brooks, 2002). 
6.4.5 Granger Causality Tests in VAR 
In this empirical study, VAR estimations were followed by Granger causabýy tests in VAR 
esfixaUon, to test whether an endogenous variable can be treated as exogenous using 
command ViewslGroup StadsficslGranger Causa§_O. Estimations in VAR require that all 
series or variables are stationary. VAR is an extension of the Autoregressive (AR) 
model, which has only one dependent variable and is dependent only on lags of itself 
(and possibly a deterministic trend), to the case in which there is more than one 
variable under study. 7IIie simplest VAR model is a bivariate VAR, where there are only 
2 variables, e. g. Y,, and HO, with different combinations of the previous w values of 
both variables, and the error terms, e,, . are white noise disturbance terms with 
E(e,, ) = 0, (i = 1,2), E(e,, e2t) =0' 'his can be extended to more than two variables, 
and thus has more than two equations. The lap of each equation are chosen, e. g. p and 
q, and it is common that p=q for every variable. This model is known as a VAR(P) 
model. 
To illustrate Granger causality in a VAR model, consider two variables or series: 
Mt = a, + 51 t+ 011 M, -, +.... + 
01, 
PMt-'P + fl, I k, -, + 
fl, q k, -'P + el, 
and 
k, =a2 +52t+O,, 
M, 
-, 
+****+02pMt-p +fl12 k, 
-, + 
fl2qkl-p +e2t 
Following the suggestions of Granger (1969) and Sims (1972), Granger-causality tests, 
providing statistics about the causal relationship between Mt and k, and other 
directional effects between kand M,, were conducted. The first equation is to test 
whether k, Granger causes Mt; and the second whether M, Granger causes kt - The 
error terms of the two equations are different, denoted by e, t andr2t - Hence, if the 
original variables series are non stationary (i. e. they have unit roots), then the 
differences of them will be stationary. 
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6.4.6 Suuctural Change Tests 
The structural break test caused by the implementation of credit risk management 
policies was conducted. Recall Equations 18.1 and 18.2; the simple models of the 
impact of the implementation of credit risk management policies of a bank are given 
by: 
k, = ji, + 01k, -, + /j,, 
before implementation of credit risk management-, and 
kt ý Y2 + 02kt-I + #2, after implementation of credit risk management 
To study whether there is indeed an effect, on both either intercept or slope, of the 
implementation of the credit risk management policies on the k, series, a dummy 
variable is created which takes the value of I in months after the implementation of 
credit risk managementý and a value of zero for months preceding the implementation 
of credit risk management by the bank. Hence, to test whether changes in the intercept 
do occur, a new variable called RMDUMMY is created, containing zeros for the period 
before the implementation everywhere and ones after implementations. Whilst, to test 
whether changes in the slope do occur, another new variable kxRMDUMMY is 
created. Regressions of k, to RMDUMMY and k, to kxRMDUMMY are then run in 
EVIEWS 4. 
6.5 Data and Estimation 
'Ibis empirical study vm designed to cover a representative sample of Indonesian 
banks, including some foreign banks due to their significant shares of total assets. 
Statistics relating to the 30 banks included in this study are reported in Chapter 4. 
Monthly data on the banks vm gathered from Bank Indonesia and the Jakarta Stock 
Exchange USXý. 1he monthly observations are limited to the 10 years (i. e. 120 
observations) from January 1991 to December 2000.1his is deemed reasonable as the 
Indonesian banking industry had been deregulated in October 1988 (see Chapter 1), 
where a package of bank deregulations resulted in big changes in the banks' operations 
in terms of their permissible activities, product ranges, and the number of branches 
they could operate. The big changes had resulted in fierce competition in the 
mobBization of funds and lending activities. 
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The banks were chosen so as to give a reasonably representative sample of state banks, 
foreign exchange banks, non-foreign exchange banks, regional banks, and foreign 
banks. By taking into account the merger activities of 4 banks, the original 34 banks 
were reduced to 30 banks. It might be expected that dropping banks from the sample 
may induce sample selectivity bias. It, however, seems there is no better alternative so 
my analysis should be regarded as conditional on this procedure. 
The parameters /variables set out in the theorefical model are as follows: 
V, = Risky loan interest income at time t 
kt =gtl D, attimet 
M= Share price series of each bank obtained from monthly data of the JSX 
D, = Deposits at time t 
V, = Value of Equity at time t 
CpIt = Consumer Price Index at time t 
St = Interest rate on Certificates of Bank Indonesia at time t 
rD = Deposit interest rates at time t 
Ct = Lump sum cost of bankruptcy at time t 
ý#" = Monitoring cost 
rt = Fair flat deposit insurance premium at time t 
Lf = Liability of Government at time t 
1JD = Drift parameter of Deposits 
. ug = Drift parameter of loan interest income 
JUk = 
Drift parameter of state variable g, / D, 
OýD = Volatility of deposits 
ag = Volatility of earnings 
Crk = Volatility of state variable kt 
bt = Subsidy provided by the govemmcnt at time t 
Banks' risky earnings, gt, are monthly loan interest incomes since the main activity and 
the most risky operation is lending, as reported in Table 6.1 at the end of this chapter, 
so that their volatilities can represent the riskiness of the banks' activities. Survey 
results, as reported in Chapter 4, also support this approach, as the main risk of the 
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Indonesian banks is shown to be credit risk created in the Credit Department. 
lberefore, one can conclude that, within the sample period, the Indonesian banks 
acted mainly as financial intermediaries following the Intermediation Approach, rather 
than the Modem Approach or Production Approach identified by other authors. 6 
Deposits of a bank include deposits and savings accounts. Between 1991 and 1997, 
Indonesia had no deposit insurance scheme. Bank regulators in Indonesia have 
implicitly adopted a blanket guarantee scheme (an ad hoc deposit insurance scheme) to 
protect small depositors since the end of 1997, after a multi dimensional crisis hit 
Indonesia in mid July 1997.1 assume that all deposits are insured at face values. 
Monthly data on the stock price of each bank was collected from the Jakarta Stock 
Exchange. The banks' values of equity outstanding were calculated as the number of 
shares multiplied by the stock price. These equity values and deposits are then divided 
by the consumer price index, using a base period of 1989, so one can get values in 
constant price tenns. 
Estimation of the models was conducted using maximum likelihood techniques in 
Eviews 4. Because there is a non-linear relationship between V, (i. e. which is observed) 
and the state variable k, which is not observed, at each evaluation of likelihood it is 
necessary to invert the non-finear relationship. 
To implement the model, deposit interest rates and interest rates on Certificates of 
Bank Indonesia were used. The data was obtained from Bank Indonesia based on the 
banks' monthly reports. Ile choice of the rates on Certificates of Bank Indonesia as 
the benchmark risk free interest rates was due to the fact that Indonesia has not issued 
marketable government securities, such as the USA! s Treasury Bill which has been 
widely used as a benchmark of investment in the USA because they pay market rates of 
6 The intermediation approach is discussed by Bcnston, Hanweck, and Humphrey (1982), and was 
explored empirically by Murray and White (1983) for Canadian credit unions, and Mester (1987) for 
Californian saving and loans. Under this approach, a bank transforms the money borrowed from 
depositors into money lent to borrowers. Ile production approach suggested by Benston (1965ab) 
describes banking activities as the production of services to depositors and borrowers; whilst, the 
modem approach suggested by Mester (1991) describes how banks' activities incorporate risk 
management and information processing and, by relating them to the classical theory of the firm, 
demonstrate how some forms of agency problems are created. 
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interes% are free of default risk, and are marketable in the secondary market (Koch and 
MacDonald, 2000) throughout the whole of the sample period. All these features, 
however, exist in a Certificate of Bank Indonesia. 
Lump sump bankruptcy costs should include legal administrative costs incurred by the 
regulatory authorities in reorganizing the banks. For Indonesia, however this data is not 
readily available. `Ihus, for the empirical analysis, I had to use some approximations i. e. 
I used the bankruptcy cost of general firms, equal to 18% of the firm's estate (World 
Bank, 2003). Ibis number is more than three times the size of the USA! s estimated 
bankruptcy costs, of 5%, so the percentage is regarded as reasonable for the Indonesian 
banking industry. Similarly, the costs incurred in monitoring banks kept open are not 
readily available. I decided, therefore, to adopt the estimates of Acharya and Dreyfus 
(1989) for the costs of monitoring banks in the USA, i. e., 0.2% of the deposit base. 
However, the drift parameters 1JD 9 ps , and Pk and their volatilities were estimated 
freely, without any restriction using the maximum likelihood techniques in Eviews 4. 
These parameters were used to calculate the banks' equity values, the fair flat deposit 
insurance premium, the government liability values, the banks' closure points, and the 
subsidies. 
6.6 Results 
6.6.1 Descriptive statistics 
The results of the empirical study are reported in the form of tables at the end of this 
chapter. Since this is an institutional survey, results are summarized by bank, whereas 
banks" attributes were reported in Chapter 4. Results of the statistical tests of stock 
market prices and deposits in the form of descriptive statistics of equity values and 
deposit liabilities used to estimate the model are reported in Table 6.2. This table 
summarizes the descriptive statistics of the monthly series for the differences in the log 
of the equity values, Log (V, ), and that of the log of the deposits, Log (D, ) which 
represent the estimates of banks' equity values and the government's liabilities 
respectively. Tests were conducted with the help of EVIEWS 4, using the command 
ViewslDesmýfitr StafisficslStats by classtficafionlInSddual sa? Vks. The results show that 
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almost all of the banks' data are definitely not normally distributed, with most banks 
having positive skewness, which implies that the distributions have long, right-hand 
tails. The only banks with negative skewness, which implies that the distribution has a 
long lcft tail, are Bank TSF, -ý for its log liability values, and Bank ABY, for its log equity 
values. The sample distributions of liabilities (or deposits) and equity values of almost all 
banks have a kurtosis value that exceeds 3, which means that the distributions are 
peaked Qcptokurtic) relative to the normal. Only the sample distributions of the equity 
values of Bank LKY and Bank PIX have a kurtosis of less than 3, which shows flat 
distributions (platykurtic) relative to the normal distribution. Another normality test is 
the Jarque-Bera normality test, with the null hypothesis that the distributions of 
deposits and equity values are normally distributed. It also shows that almost all banks 
have statistics with probability (p-values) = 0.0000 at the 5% significant level, leading to 
the rejection of the null hypothesis of a normal distribution for the banks' distributions 
of liabilities and equity values. In addition, the skewness values of the banks' equity 
values and deposits at the 5% significance level lead to the same conclusion that the null 
hypothesis of a normal distribution of the banks' liabilities and equity values are rejected 
except for Bank LKY and Bank PTY, These mean that the null hypothesis that 
deposits and stock prices follow a random walk (or volatility of deposits and equity 
values are normally distributed) is rejected. Accordingly, the null hypothesis that 
percent changes in the deposits (which represent the govemment' s liabilities) and the 
stock prices (which represent the banks' equity values), which are normally distributed 
with means equal to the drift rate parameters, pm and pD, andwith variance equals to 
am -and crD , respectively are rejected at the 5% significant level. 
Given these results, it can be concluded that the distributions of liabilities and equity 
values do not follow the normality assumptions. Ibcsc findings are consistent with the 
conclusions of most of the literature on stock prices distributions; see, for example, 
Giannopoulos (2000), Brooks (2002), Malz (2000), and Greene (2003). Ibese, therefore, 
lead to the use of GARCH models to estimate the parameters to capture the 
leptokurtosis in the unconditional distribution of the banks' stock returns and deposits 
(see Section 6-4.2). Ile model estimations showing the behaviour of deposits and 
equity stock market prices mirror the behaviour of the banks' liabilities (i. e. the 
government's liabilities in the insured banks) and the banks' equities. 
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As reported in Chapter 4, most of the sample banks (i. e. 24 banks) in Indonesia have 
implemented credit risk management. Statitistics of the implementation of credit risk 
management can also be found in Chapter 4. Dummy variable tests (or structural break) 
tests were applied to each bank to test the impact of the shifts in credit risk 
management approach on the banks' state variable, k, following the methodology 
suggested by Brooks (2002) and Malz ( 2000), as discussed in Section 5.6.5. 
6.6.2 Results of Tests 
Ibis section describes the results of tests conducted, and is organized as follows. 
Section 6.6.2.1 covers the Unit Root Tests, Section 6.6.2.2 the Cointegration Tests, and 
Section 6.6.2.3 the Granger Causality Tests in VAR. 
6.6.2.1 Results of the Unit Root Tests 
In this section, the estimation results are presented. Before we carry out an analysis 
using any time series, we have to conduct unit root tests. If unit roots are present but 
cointegration does not occur, then the spurious regression problem exists. In this case, 
we should work with differenced data to avoid such a spurious problem. Recall Section 
6.4.3 of the empirical methodology described earlier, if the original variables series are 
not stationary (i. e. they have unit roots), then the differences (e. g. &k= first 
differenced and A2k= second differenced, etc. ) of k,, D,, M, will be stationary. 
Essentially, these can be calculated by taking differences of the logged kt, Dt, and M,, 
and then multiplying by 100. Eviews 4, however, can help to compute them easily. As 
expected, stationary and non-stationary series are found for different series across the 
banks. As shown in the results of the ADF test summarized in Table 6.3, most banks' 
data series are either first differenced stationary series or unit roots, the so called I(1) 
(i. e. Ak, AM, and AD), or second differenced stationary series, the so called 1(2) (i. e. 
A2k). The remaining data series led to rejection of the null hypothesis of a unit roots 
in the log levels, the so-called 1(0), [i. e. k, Dt, MJ, which means the series are 
stationary, and hence some variables of some banks were not differenced. For 
example, Bank TDFs k, was differenced once since its ADF statistic (-2.58) is larger 
than its critical value (-3.45), which means that the ADF statistic falls in the no rejection 
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area at a significance level of 5%, leading to no rejection of the null hypothesis that the 
series is not stationary (unit root). The bank's k, stationary process is obtained at Ak 
with an ADF statistic of -3.70 and which is less than the critical value of -. 3.45, leading 
to the rejection of the null hypothesis that the series is not stationary. On the other 
hand, Bank KIP's k, series is stationary at the log level of k, since its ADF test =- 
4.85 is less than the critical value = -3.45, meaning that the ADF statistic falls in the 
rejection area leading to the rejection of the null hypothesis that the level data k, is not 
stationary. Similar analysis can be employed with respect to the other banks and the 
other series D, 9 M,, reported in the Table 6.3 so that we can determine whether level 
series data or differenced series data of the banks should be used to run the regressions. 
6.6.2.2 Results of the Cointegration Tests 
Cointegration tests on kt and Dt , as well as on k, and M,, were conducted using the 
Engle-Granger (1987) method (see Section 6.4.4), with the aim of determining whether 
the VAR or VECM model should be employed in the regressions Uohansen (1991, 
1995)] . Ibe results of the Augmented Dickey Fuller Tests on the rrsiduals of the 
rrgrrssions are summarized in Table 6.4, which contains the banks' ADF statistics, their 
critical values and the conclusions. The results indicate that most of the banks' residuals 
of regressions of both k, on D, and D, on M, have ADF statistics which are greater 
than the critical values (or statistically not significant), meaning that the ADF statistics 
fall within the no rejection area, leading to no rejection of the null hypotheses that the 
regression residuals series have unit roots (i. e. are not stationary). Therefore, most of 
the banks' k, and Dt . as well as kt and M, are not cointegrated. This also means that 
the error correction model (i. e. the VEC Model) cannot be estimated, as there are no 
linear combinations of the logs of Landkt, as well as ktand Mt. that would be 
stationary, resulting in the use of a VAR model. For cointegration tests of k, and M,, 
the table shows that only I out of 30 is a cointegrated series [i. e. Bank SRH's, with an 
ADF statistic (-2.99) that is statistically significant and smaller than its critical value (- 
2.89) at a significance level of 51/6], meaning it falls within the rejection area, leading to 
the rejection of the null hypothesis that the series is not stationary; hence we could use 
the VEC Model in this case. 
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Similarly, the table also indicates that there are 8 out of 30 cointegtrated series of k, 
and D, [i. e. Bank TSICs, Bank KIP's, Bank DLICs, Bank LRH's, Bank MJQ's, Bank 
NPTs, Bank USICs, and Bank RPA! s, with their ADF statistics being statistically 
significant and smaller than their critical values [For example, Bank TSICs ADF statistic 
of k, and D, (-3-45) is smaller than its critical value (-2.89), which means it is statistically 
significant at the 5% significance level and falls within the rejection area, leading to 
rejection of the null hypothesis that the series is not stationary, and we should run the 
VEC modeq. Ibis means that the 8 banks' ADF statistics fall within the rejection area, 
leading to rejections of the null hypothesis that the series are not stationary, and hence 
we should also use the VEC Model. 
6.6.23 Results of the Granger Causality Tests 
The results of the Granger causality test (F-test) in VAR of bivariate regressions are 
reported in Table 6.5. It is worth noting again (see Section 6.4.5) that the term 'Granger 
causality' does not mean that movements in one variable physically cause movements in 
another, rather, causality simply implies a chronological ordering of the movements of 
the series. The table indicates that most of the banks' probabilities (p-values) for k and 
M are not statistically significant at the 5% significance level, which means the values fall 
within the no rejection area and hence lead to no rejection of the null hypothesis that 
both k does not Granger cause A and M does not Granger cause the k. Therefore, the 
Granger causality runs two-ways from k to M and from M to k. In other words, the 
past values of k do not correlate with the current values of M, and the past values of M 
do not correlate with the current values of k, which means that for most of the banks k 
and M are independent i. e. both of them can be treated as either endogenous or 
exogenous variables, so that we can run any regressions using VAR techniques on 
them. The banks in question comprise SPW, TSK, JSI, GXT, DLK, LRH, TLR, and 
KRP- 
One-way Granger causality for k and M occurs in only two banks' series, that is in Bank 
SRH's and Bank ABX's. i. e. M Granger causes k and not the other way round, for Bank 
SRH and k Granger causes M and not the other way round for Bank ABX. Ibis is 
because, firstly the p-values of the relationship between M and k for Bank SRH (i. e. 
0.0485) and between k and M for Bank ABX (i. e. 0.0011) are statistically significant at 
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the 5% significance level, meaning the values fall within the rejection area leading to 
rejection of the null hypothesis that M does not Granger cause k for Bank SRH and k 
does not Granger cause M for Bank ABX. And secondly, the P-values of the 
relationship between k and M is 1.232 for Bank SRH and between M and k is 0.422 for 
Bank ABX respectively at the 5% significance level, meaning the values fall within the 
no rejection area, leading to the non-rejection of the null hypothesis that k does not 
Granger M for Bank SRH and M does not Grange cause k for Bank ABX. 'Ibis means 
that the past values of k do not correlate with the current values of M for Bank SRH, 
and M does not correlate with the current values of k for Bank ABX, so that we can 
run VAR models with k as a dependent variable and M as an independent variable for 
Bank ABX and with M as a dependent variable and k as an independent variable for 
Bank SRH. 
More than half of the banks'p-values for k and D are not statistically significant at the 
5% significance level (i. e. p-values > 0.05), which means the values fall within the no 
rejection area and lead to no rejection of the null hypothesis that both k does not 
Granger cause D and D does not Granger cause the k. lberefore, the Granger causality 
runs two-ways: from k to D and from D to k. In other words, we can run VAR 
regressions using either k or D as a dependent variable. The 15 banks include TDF, 
LKY, JSL, RSW, GXT, DLK, KBN, LDO, BKG, ABX, KRP, MJQ, GHZ, RPA, and 
PRM. In addition, there are three banks with p-values being statistically significant (orp- 
values < 0.05), at the 5% significance level, which means the values fall within the 
rejection area, and lead to rejection of the null hypothesis that both k does not Granger 
cause D and D does not Granger cause k. lberefore, the Granger causality runs two- 
ways from k to D and from D to k. In other words, we can also run VAR regressions 
using either k or D as a dependent variable. 'Me banks comprise Bank KIP, Bank 
and Bank MJB. 
One-way Granger causality for k and D occurs for the rest of the 12 banks' series, i. e. 
D Granger causes k and not the other way round. 'Ibis means that for the 12 banks: (i) 
the past values of D correlate with the current k and not the other way round; and (u) 
the p-values of relationships between k and D are greater than 0.05 for the 12 banks at 
the 5% significance level, meaning the values fall within the non-rejection area, leading 
to the non-rejection of the null hypothesis that k does not Granger cause D for the 12 
banks. Ibis means that the past values of k do not correlate with the current values of 
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D for the 12 banks, so that we can run VAR models with D as a dependent variable and 
k as an independent variable. The 12 banks in question are SPW, TSK' SRH, LRH, 
DSP, TLR, EjK, NPT, HEA, USK, FKE, and TUP. 
6.6.2.4 Parameter Estimates 
The parameter estimates of the banks' equity values (Lý, deposits (D), and state 
variables (k) for the 30 individual banks, comprising the standard deviations and 
correlations am, ak, aD, ýk, and ýkD respectively and the betas of k, to M, and 
k, to D,, created using the VAR and VEC Models discussed in the previous 
paragraphs, are presented in Table 6.6. This table also contains the standard errors for 
each parameter, which are presented in parentheses. The relationship analysis between 
the volatility and level of the state variable and those of both equity and deposits could 
explain the links between the three parameters. In this analysis, the crucial parameter is 
the standard deviation of the bank's earnings to deposits, k, i. e. ak. The sample banks' 
ak 9s range from 0.68% per annum, for Bank FKE to 1.26% for Bank TUP. Most 
banks have a. 's of around 1%. An important finding is that the ak's across banks are 
quite different from those of the standard deviations for the log equity values, M, 
depicted in Table 6.2. These decisively show that the mapping process from k, to Mt 
is far from a simple proportional relationship. In other words, because the M, 's are 
not approximately proportional to k,, then the standard deviations of log(k, ) and 
log(M, ) are not roughly equal. This means that deposits are certainly unstable. The 
results of the mapping process for the ratio of earnings to deposits, i. e., k, - (rD+ y), 
as in Equation 9, includes constant, which means that the level of state variable k, is 
most likely to be an important parameter in the FMP model. 
As mentioned earlier, the relationship analysis between the volatility and level of the 
state variable and those of equity explain the links between the three parameters. Most 
banks have different characteristics of the link. For example, Bank TSK, Bank GXT, 
Bank LRH and Bank K" have roughly the same ak 3, W'th a small tem-dnal k, (see 
Table 6.7), and relatively small volatility of equity, a.. On the other hand, Bank SRH, 
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Bank KBN, Bank TLR, and Bank ABX have the relatively same cr., with a big terminal 
k, and relatively big volatility of equity. These findings are consistent with the risk 
management literature, where every bank has a different level of risk. 
Table 6.6 also reveals that most of the parameters for i7m, ak . CrD . 
ýA= 
s 
4D 
9 
AW 
have relatively small variation across banks. Estimates of a. range from 20.01% to 
73.35%, for example, whilst most banks' standard errors for the am's approach 2%, 
except for Bank JSL ( 4-001/6), Bank ABX (8.001/6), and Bank RPA (6.8%). This means 
that almost all estimates are within two standard errors of the average across banks. The 
correlations between k, and M, ýk. , and 
k, and D, ýkD, were analysed to explain how 
the state variable's volatility can affect the bank! s equity value, and the government's 
habilities. The statistics indicate that correlations between k, and Mr (ýkj vary across 
banks. Ibis is not surprising because it is consistent with the large literature that stock 
returns depend on the variance of firms' earnings. Somewhat surprising, however, are 
the figures for the correlations between k, andD, (ýkD), which exhibit only a small 
amount of variation; whilst the beta, fl.., which equals Crk ýLW / CrM $ and 
ýkD which 
equals a. k lam, also vary considerably across banks. The discounted value of the 
k, 
income streams, k*, under risk neutrality is 
S-PS , 
which, for a fixed D,, is 
proportional to /6. As a resul% the flku's are also the "Capital Asset Pricing Model's 
(CAPM) betas", " showing the trade off between the returns and risk of banks' assets if 
they are traded directly. 11-iese findings are also consistent with the finance literature 
and practice, where portfolio analysis has become an important analytical assumption 
used in risk management (see Chapter 3), in particular in risk return analysis, as 
originally suggested by Markowitz (1959) and, in its extension to the aggregate market 
portfolio, by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965b). 
7 The CAPM of finance specifies that, for a given security, rt - r. = a, + fl, (r. -r)+ Cit , where 
k' is the return over period t on security 14, r ri th ar 
. ft 
is the return on a risk-free secu ty, r, is em ket 
return, and k, is the security's beta coefficient. The disturbance is certainly correlated across securities. 
Excess return can be gained when the return on security i exceeds the risk-free rate, k,. Hence, a joint 
estimate of equations is more useful than an individual estimate (see Greene, 2003). This has wide implýcations, both for risk management and bank regulation, in particular for the fisk-based capital 
requirements. 
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6.6.3 Valuations of deposit insurance guarantees, subsidies and bankruptcy 
minence. 
The results of the study show how the subsidy policy interacts with the valuation of 
deposit insurance guarantees and the closure rules that could be represented by the 
imminence of bankruptcy. Table 6.7 depicts one of the most important results, which 
relates to the values of the deposit insurance guarantee per insured deposit (i. e. the 
ratio of the guarantee to deposits in per cent) across the 30 banks under the optimal 
closure rules. The guarantee (i. e. "liabilities'D values vary considerably across the banks, 
ranging from -102.09% for Bank EJK to 758.03% for Bank PRM. Only three banks, 
i. e. Bank KBN,, Bank MJB and BankIDF, have deposit guarantee values ranging from 
7% to 21% of insured deposits. The wide range of deposit guarantee values indicates a 
considerable degree of cross-subsidization when banks pay a zero flat deposit insurance 
premium. I find that most banks have fair deposit insurance premiums at around the 20 
basis points level per annum (or 0.201/6). 8 In addition, with a zero deposit insurance 
premium, the subsidies vary across the banks, approaching 1% of deposits for some 
banks, for example Bank SRH, Bank DSP, Bank NPT, and Bank NPT. 
Furthermore, if shareholders are unable and /or unwilling to inject new capital, the 
results of my study suggest that banks may receive different levels of subsidy for 
different deposit insurance premiums, yf , (i. e. Ob-p; 15b. p; 30b. p; and 50b. p), and for a 
fair flat deposit insurance premium rate, vf (see Table 6.7). These figures represent 
gains to the bankswhen they are moving from a situation of unlimited liability with no 
deposit insurance premia to a condition with a limited liability equity claim (in this case, 
In the USA, the vast majority of banks are currently paying an annual deposit insurance premium close 
to zero (they actually range from zero to 0.27% of insured deposits) [http//: www. fdic. gov., (2W3)]. In 
Canada the deposit insurance prernium rates range from 0.04% to 0.33% (or 4 basis points to 33 basis 
points) [http//: www. cdic. ca., (2003)]. In other countries, the authorities levy annual deposit insurance 
premiums at rates which lie between 0.01% and 0.50% of the insured deposits. A very few levy a higher 
rate, but none requires more than 1% per annum. Some countries, however, choose to levy the annual 
deposit insurance premiums only when a new bank (or the insurance scheme itselo is first established, 
and subsequently only if or when they require further funds to pay compensation or replenish basic 
reserves. Besides, other countries also have a ceiling on the total deposit insurance premium, and the 
limits were the results of agreements between the monetary authorities and the banks before being 
incorporated in legislation. Such ceiling rates are, among others, 0.3% of deposits in the United 
Kingdom, 0.5% in Belgium and 1% in Iceland (McDonald, 1996). 
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not all financial reorganization rules are feasible) at the different deposit insurance 
premiums, as given in equation 14 in Chapter 5. A flat fair deposit insurance premium, 
yf, which eliminates moral hazard problems in an optimal financial reorganization 
where the authorities act as a social planners, induces a lower subsidy than a higher 
deposit insurance premium, y. It is important to note that, as shown in Table 6.7, the 
deposit insurance premium to be levied on the Indonesia banks would be of between 
zero to 30 basis points, ceteris paribus, for an optimal closure policy. In other words, 
there is a positive correlation between the deposit insurance premium and the level of 
subsidy, i. e. if the deposit insurance premium increases, then the subsidy increases. 
Consequently, the authorities could Emit the subsidy provided to an ailing bank to a 
certain level by setting an appropriate flat deposit insurance premium which eliminates 
moral hazard problems and meets social objectives. 
Lessons which can be drawn from these findings, are as follows: First, bail out rules 
could reduce social costs significantly, since an optimal subsidy takes into account the 
deposit insurance premiums, interest rates, banks' performance Ci. e. returns and capital 
values), bankruptcy costs, and monitoring costs. Second, interest rates are important 
factors influencing the value of banks' equity, the government's liabilities, the subsidy, 
and the deposit premiums. A high interest rate would reduce the banks' equity values. 
As a result, high interest rates do not promote the banks' equity values since they 
decrease the net present value of the banks' cash flow of earnings and thus deerease the 
banks' equity values. In addition, high interest rates with high volatility do not promote 
the banks' efficiency, as they would be forced to operate with high margin resulting in 
higher risks being taken. Ibird, if the banks' performances, as measured by, g, D, 
k,, and V,, do not improve significantly, an increase in deposit insurance premium 
beyond a fair deposit insurance premium will worsen the banks' performance, other 
things being equal. Fourth, the authorities could Emit deposit insurance premiums to be 
levied on the Indonesia banks to between zero and 30 basis points, ceteris paribus, 
depending on the banks' performance and financial condition as measured by capital, 
earnings and the level of their risks in an optimal closure policy if the bank regulators 
act as social planners. lberefore, a subsidy given to a financially aging bank could be 
limited. Fifth, since the bail out rules under the social planner approach would be billing 
the tax payers, the subsidy rules should be approved by and reported to parliament and 
incorporated in legislation. 
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The standard deviation of the state variable, Crk, and the terminal ratio k, / k, explain 
the pattern of guarantee values across banks. These together provide a measure of 
imminence to bankruptcy. k. The terminal ratio k, /k measures the distance from the 
closure point k because k, is a geometric Brownian process, so proportional changes 
in k, occur with equal probability whatever the level of the process. As depicted in 
Table 6.7, the terminal k, /k ratio also varies - considerably across the 
banks, ranging 
from 0.15 for Bank TUP to 8.73 for Bank EJK- Most banks (10 banks) have a terminal 
k, /k ratio of between 1 and 1.76, but some banks (7 in total) have ratios of between 
0.20 and 0.51. The annualised measures of the imminence of bankruptcy, measured by 
k, /k plus annualised standard deviation at . which is a probability distance to 
bankruptcy with the standard deviation of k, from the closure pointý also vary widely 
across the banks. I find that the three most likely to face imminent bankruptcy are 
Bank MJB (1.21), Bank USK (1.32), and Bank ABX (1.33); whilst, the three least likely 
to face imminent bankruptcy are Bank EJK (9.51), Bank FKE (6.55), and Bank SRH 
(4.78). The policy implications are that bank regulators should allocate resources to 
monitor more closely the first set of banks and draft action plans to reorganize the 
banks. 
6.6.4 Impact of the Introduction of Enterprise Credit Risk Management 
The durruny variable test for the impact of the implementation of credit risk 
management on the 24 banks' intercepts and slopes of their state variables, k,, which 
tests the null hypothesis that there is no change in the intercept and slope caused by the 
implementation of credit risk management, was adopted. Results of the test of the 
effect of the introduction of credit risk management on the intercept of the banks' k, 
indicated in Table 6.8 show that 23 banks' probabilities (, b. -value) are greater than 0.05 at 
the 5% significance level, leading to a non-rejection of the null hypothesis that there is 
no intercept change; 12 out of the 23 banks have negative coefficients and II have 
positive coefficients. Only for Bank PRM, is the null hypothesis of no change in the 
intercept decisively rejected, which means that its intercept change was caused by the 
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implementation of credit risk management (thep-value = 0.0000, at the 5% significance 
level, and its coefficient = 1.29). 
Results of the test of the effect of the introduction of credit risk management on the 
slope of the banks' k, indicated in Table 6.9 show that 21 banks' probabilities (P-value) 
are greater than 0.05 at the 5% significance level, leading to a non-rejection of the null 
hypothesis that there is no slope change; 10 out of the 21 banks have negative 
coefficients and 13 banks have positive coefficients. Only for Bank MJB, Bank NPT, 
and Bank PRM, is the null hypothesis of no change in the slope decisively rejected, 
which means that the banks' slope changes were caused by the implementation of 
credit risk management (theirp-values are 0.03520; 0.01390; and 0.0000 respectively, at 
the 5% significance level, and their coefficients are 0.01785,0.01737, and 0.00417 
respectively). 
Therefore, within the sample period, most of the implementations of credit risk 
management do not (statistically) significantly affect the state variable, k,. One can 
conclude that the banks' credit risk management does not comply with Basel 11 (i. e. 
more needs to be done to satisfy comprehensive regulatory capital requirements and to 
foster a stronger emphasis on enterprise risk management) as noted by Algorithmics, 
Inc (Risk, Oct. 2003). The authorities should put into effect the regulations concerning 
the implementation of an enterprise credit risk management framework to replace 
traditional credit risk management immediately. 
6.7 Summary and Conclusions 
In this chapter I have analysed a policy of efficient regulation, namely the FMP model 
of optimal closure rules of a social-planner regulator that balances the lump-sum 
bankruptcy costs against the cost of monitoring to keep a bank operating as a going 
concern, using data for the Indonesian banks. I have also analysed a series of different 
possible closure rules and subsidy policies the bank regulators may apply at different 
deposit insurance pretnium rates. The authorities may wish to postpone closing a bank 
if shareholders inject capital and /or the authorities wish to subsidize the bank in such a 
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way as to avoid moral hazard problems created for banks' management and 
shareholders. 
The deposit insurance liabilities incurred by regulators' guarantees have been estimated 
under the FMP model. The FMP model which I adopt uses the American-style option 
model to calculate the authorities' liabilities arising from the provision of depositor 
protection in the form of deposit insurance, rather than the European-style option 
pricing methods originally suggested by Merton (1976a and 1976b), which rely on bank 
audits. Ibis means that the authorities' liabilities are independent of audit frequency, so 
that deposit insurance valuation is not dependent on the arbitrary and unobservable 
frequency of the audit. It also means that asymmetric information problems between 
investors and regulators can be avoided, so that inconsistent assumptions about the 
availability of information concerning banks' prospects between investors and 
regulators are not used. However, my model has important differences compared with 
past studies. Firstly, in the application of the IMP model to the Indonesian banks, I 
have used VAR and GARCH models with the help of the Eviews 4 software package 
to estimate the parameters with lags of the model, to allow for measurement of 
stochastic volatility and to explain the banks' stock prices and liabilities. The use of 
these methods is more realistic compared to the traditional Black-Scholes model, where 
the volatility is assumed to be constant over the life of the investments. As a result, the 
governmenes liabilities (as a proportion of deposits) which arise under the deposit 
insurance scheme, the shut-down level of the state variable, the subsidies involved at 
different deposit insurance premiums, and the banks' imminence to bankruptcy can all 
be calculated. The main determinants of the value of the government's liabilities are the 
volatility parameter of the banks' risky loan earnings per rupiah of depOS'tý crk I and the 
end of sample ratio of the cash flow of banks' risky loan earnings per rupiah of deposits 
(or state variable), k, to the closure pointk. Secondly, I examine the impact of the 
implementation of enterprise risk management framework on the banks' determinant 
parameter. 
The results show that capital is clearly a crucial factor for the banking industry in a 
financial reorganization /recapitalization to restructure the financially ailing banks, 
which is why it has become the primary focus of central bankers and other regulators. 
Another crucial factor is risk management, where the risk-adjusted returns of agents 
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generating sustain-able cash flows to promote and sustain shareholder value will reduce 
the probability of bankruptcy, so that capital requirements can be achieved. The 
injection of new capital is not a panacea for an ailing bank if it does not apply best 
practices of risk management to generate internal earnings to enhance and sustain 
shareholder value. Ibis can be seen as a product of the risk management process, 
which creates a cash flow of earnings. My empirical study suggests that Indonesian 
banks have just begun establishing enterprise risk management best practices (see 
Chapter 4), and a positive impact of their implementation on the state variable, k, at 
most of banks has not yet emerged, as indicated by the Dummy Variable tests. 
The optimal subsidies for Indonesian banks vary widely, indicating a considerable 
degree of cross-subsidization when banks pay a uniform deposit insurance premium (at 
a zero deposit insurance premium rate). Most banks would face a fair deposit insurance 
premium at around the 20 basis points (or 0.21/6) level. For a zero deposit insurance 
premium, the subsidies vary across the banks, approaching 1% of deposits for some. 
Furthermore, the results of my study also suggest that banks may receive different 
levels of subsidy, when shareholders are unable to inject new capital, at different 
deposit insurance premium rates. There is a positive correlation between the deposit 
insurance premium and the subsidy, whereby if the deposit insurance premium 
increases, then the subsidy increases, other things being equal. Moreover the authorities 
face the dilemma that subsidy rules -applied to the banks to diminish the moral hazard 
problem create a conflict between the authorities' objective of closing the banks early 
and the banks' desire to improve performance as the level of profitability and capital 
decreases. Banks categorized as the most likely and least likely to face imminent 
bankruptcy have also been identified. Because the model relies on the banks' data, the 
accuracy of bank reports is a crucial factor in measuring the banks' performance, so 
that the need for proper implementation of accounting standards and reporting 
systems, which is consistent with Basel 11, is paramount. 
1he policy implications of the empirical analysis are as follows: 
@ The Indonesian banks need to focus more on the implementation of the best 
practices of Enterprise Risk Management (E", consistent with the modem 
banking approach that emphasises risk management. Ibis, in turn, will reduce the 
probability of bankruptcy, as implied by Basel II, and enhance shareholder value. 
258 
Since the main determinants of the value of deposit guarantees to a bank are the 
volatility of k, and the ratio of k, at the end of sample to the closure point k, the 
banks and bank regulators should pay more attention to improve this performance 
measure under the ERM framework. 
(ii) The Indonesian authorities should adopt the optimal financial reorganization 
model promoted by IMP. Ibis study has identified the optimal closure rules, the 
bail out rules, the amount of the banks' contributions in the event of bank failure 
in the form of deposit insurance premiums, the govemment's liabilities arising 
from the operation of the deposit insurance scheme, and the banks' imminence of 
bankruptcy, which could all be used to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of 
bank regulation in Indonesia. 
(iii) Bail out rules could be used to reduce social costs significantly, since an optimal 
subsidy policy takes into account the deposit insurance premiums, interest rates, 
banks' performance (i. e. returns and capital values), bankruptcy costs, and 
monitoring costs. 
(iV) Since the bail out rules under the social planner approach would be billing the 
taxpayers, the subsidy rules should be approved by -and reported to parliament, and 
incorporated in legislation. 
(V) It is important that the authorities consider the establishment of an explicit deposit 
insurance scheme to protect small depositors and to reduce systemic risk in the 
form of both bank panics (including healthy banks) and disruptions to the 
payments system. A "fair" flat deposit insurance premium would be around the 20 
basis points level. 
(vi) If a variable rate system is introduced the authorities should limit the deposit 
insurance premýiums to be levied on the Indonesia banks to between zero and 30 
basis points, ceteris paribus, depending on the banks' performance and financial 
condition, as measured by capital, earnings and level of risk. in this case subsidies 
given to financially ailing banks can be limited. 
(vii) Since the imminence to bankruptcy can be identified for each bank, the authorities 
should allocate resources to monitor more closely and draft action plans to 
reorganize those most likely to face imminent bankruptcy, so that regulators can 
supervise the banks more cost effectively. 
(vih)Interest rates are important factors influencing the value of banks' equity, the 
governmenes liabilities, the subsidy, and the deposit insurance premiums. A high 
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interest rate would reduce the value of a bank's equity since it decreases the net 
present value of the banks' cash flow of earnings. In addition, high interest rates 
with high volatility adversely affect the banks' efficiency, as they would be forced 
to operate with high margin resulting in higher risks. Therefore, without prejudice 
to securing its monetary objectives, the monetary authority should try to keep the 
interest rates low and maintain their stability so that they can accommodate the 
achievement of both shareholder value and monetary targets. 
(ix) The bank regulators should refocus their strategies to develop the Indonesian 
banking industry based on the optimal bank regulations derived in this study. 
My study, however, has some limitations, which are as follows: (ý the study does not 
include a study of the correlation between risk-based capital and closure rules to 
measure the sensitivity of the correlations; if the sensitivity level is high we have to 
focus on capital and if the sensitivity is low we should focus on the closure rules; (h) the 
time series data has not been subjected to independent audit; (iii) in the analysis of risk 
management practice, only credit risk management's association with the closure rule is 
examined; (m) the measures of bankruptcy cost and monitoring cost used are based on 
approximations, since there is no readily available data; and (vi) the study does not 
relate the closure rule to macroeconomic variables, such as the growth rate of GDP. 
Given these limitations, further study is necessary in each area to deal with the 
drawbacks noted. 
NJ 
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Table 6.1 Indicators of Ile Main Activities of Indonesian Banks 
in 
No Bank 
Total loan: Total 
asset ratios 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
Operational 
income: Total 
income ratios 
Mean Std. Dev. 
65.43 15.47 
10.99 78.70 
8.98 68.51 
10.90 56.47 
3.76 94.16 
9.24 55.21 
12-03 94.95 
20.02 18.23 
17.16 6ZO2 
7.94 83.98 
6.20 81.11 
9.57 6Z71 
14-28 51.00 
7.61 74.69 
8.67 58.40 
4.71 M89 
1.36 73.25 
81.99 7.47 
19.38 76.62 
4.72 78.61 
4.31 80.64 
9.12 84.84 
3.42 61.96 
Z83 70.88 
12.68 77.90 
10.43 96.00 
86.16 10-79 
99.83 0.80 
99.91 98.92 
96.93 3.71 
Interest income: 
Total income 
Mean 
57.23 
12.56 
13.65 
19.30 
26.49 
10.23 
29.77 
10.47 
17.11 
8.60 
24.57 
11.89 
14.05 
14.28 
8.89 
11.20 
1119 
53.79 
17.98 
10-06 
9.20 
8.99 
5.56 
14.39 
9.99 
IZ08 
8Z90 
97.91 
90.73 
83.80 
Std. Dev. 
1166 
68.77 
54.98 
5Z87 
83.96 
47.69 
91.71 
16.11 
59.36 
67.77 
76.15 
58.25 
43-06 
73.01 
51.59 
67.07 
69.34 
22.62 
70.29 
70-77 
75-50 
64-00 
59.30 
70.79 
75.44 
55.42 
10-46 
1.45 
93.49 
15.79 
Loan interest 
income: Total 
income 
Mean Std. Dev. 
49.32 12.93 
16.69 11.65 
16.25 5.45 
19.13 3.28 
18.51 O. W 
14-18 8.32 
21.20 0.00 
9.90 1.64 
15.44 1.14 
15.72 4.67 
24.90 1.64 
11.15 27.76 
13-60 5.60 
25.93 4.02 
IZ23 0.00 
17.84 Z3.64 
17.36 23.93 
6Z81 22.85 
24-05 1.20 
15.50 20.20 
14-35 0.04 
8.90 O. W 
5.02 0.00 
IZ77 IZ81 
IZ61 O-W 
17.29 0.00 
U38 18-91 
Z5.29 15.91 
78.06 67.57 
65-81 10.62 
Loan interest 
income : Total 
interest income 
Mean Std. Dev. 
85.10 99-98 
13-79 97.96 
28.22 76-09 
26.07 62.41 
17.95 99.86 
21.26 69.68 
11.46 96-59 
18.75 21.96 
8.99 65.43 
18.64 90.82 
16.48 84-74 
14-54 99.87 
14.00 51.29 
32.85 79.87 
15.89 70.92 
20.01 100-00 
15.69 99.49 
38.47 24.33 
22-49 81.86 
18-18 100-00 
15-61 85.28 
5.57 90-11 
2.56 73.72 
18.98 100-00 
11.45 90.06 
16.93 99-95 
76-68 2,4-25 
25.93 16.34 
86.04 72.60 
79.86 10-51 
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TDF 
SPW 
LKY 
TSK 
KIP 
JSL 
RSW 
GXT 
DLK 
SRH 
LRH 
DSP 
PTIX 
KBN 
IDO 
BKG 
ABX 
KRP 
MJQ 
EJK 
MJB 
NPT 
HEA 
USK 
GHZ 
FKE 
RPA 
TUP 
PRM 
Mean 
61.35 
37.58 
42-42 
49.22 
46.05 
47.20 
54.48 
39.99 
47.52 
35-06 
69.09 
6Z37 
45.97 
50.04 
57.29 
M37 
67.17 
64.34 
6ZO5 
65.76 
55.26 
49.03 
61.22 
5Z47 
60.11 
5Z80 
64-34 
25.21 
69.10 
86.73 
Std. Dev. 
14.47 
26.87 
20.28 
24.67 
22.79 
12-38 
26.62 
24-63 
32.78 
11.29 
13.13 
52.87 
15.26 
23.25 
7.21 
14.07 
6.13 
20.72 
16.75 
11.56 
6.33 
10-07 
10.45 
15-95 
9.13 
14.74 
20.72 
15.10 
32.73 
24.25 
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Table 63 Results of the Augmented Dickey Fuller Tests on the FMP model 
No Bank 
I TDF 
lag 
ADF stat 
Crt. Value 
2 SPW 
129 
ADF stat 
Crt Value 
3 IKY 
199 
ý 
1) 
ADF stat 8) 
Crt. Value a) 
4 TSK 
Igg 
ADF stat 
Crt. Value 
5 KTP 
199 
ADF stat 
Cm Value 
6 JSL 
129 
ADF 3tat 
Crt. Value 
7 RSW 
129 
ADF stat 
Crt. Value 
8 GXT 
lag 
ADF stat 
CrL value 
9 DLK 
139 
ADF stat 
CrL value 
10 SRH 
189 
ADF stat 
Crt. Value 
11 LRH 
lag 
ADF stat 
Crt Value 
12 DSP 
lag 
ADF stat 
Crt Value 
13 TIR 
189 
ADF stat 
0.00 0.00 
-Z43 -7.51 
-3.50 -3.51 
a) 
, L) a) 
a) 
0.00 
-ZOI -10.77 
-3-45 -3.46 
0.00 - 
4.20 - 
-3-45 - 
1.00 0.00 
-3.04 -13.74 
-3.46 -3.46 
0.00 1.00 
-1.98 -11.01 
-3-45 -3.46 
0.00 - 
-3.54 - 
-3-45 - 
0.00 0.00 
-1.86 -5.22 
-3.53 -3.54 
0.00 0.00 
-3-16 -11.37 
-3.45 -3.46 
lzoo IZOO zoo 1.00 
-Z58 -3.70 - -1.71 -6.30 
-3.45 -3.45 - -3.45 -3.45 
IZOO MOO 11.00 0.00 1.00 
-2.31 -Z97 -13.34 -1.82 -9.71 
-3-45 -3-45 -3.45 -3.45 -3.45 
12.00 izoo 11.00 0.00 
-1.48 -Z26 -11.49 -Z96 -10.39 
-3.45 -3.45 -3.45 -3.45 -3-45 
0.00 11-00 10-00 zoo 1.00 
-3.76 -1.87 -IZ46 -3.07 -9.06 
-3.45 -3-45 -3.45 -3.45 -3.45 
izoo - - lzoo - 
-4.85 - -3.69 - 
-3.45 - - -3.45 
MOO 11.00 10.00 0.00 - 
-Z39 -ZO7 -3Z73 -4.12 - 
-3-45 -3-45 -3.45 -3.45 - 
izoo 11.00 10.00 0.00 0.00 
-Z61 -Z09 -25.13 -1.53 -IZ08 
-3.45 -3.45 -3.45 -3.45 -3.45 
IZOO 11.00 10.00 0.00 0.00 
-Z40 -1.91 -19.76 -1.57 -12.20 
-3.45 -3.45 -3.45 -3-45 -3.45 
IZOO 11.00 10.00 0.00 ZOO 
-3.29 -1.79 -36.78 -3-51 -10.42 
-3.45 -3.45 -3.45 -4.04 -4.04 
lzoo 11.00 10.00 0.00 0.00 
-Z91 -Z03 49.30 -2.23 -10.82 
-3-45 -3.45 -3.45 -3.45 -3.45 
IZOO 11.00 10.00 0.00 0.00 
-3.13 -Z13 -13-20 _Z88 -11.07 
-3.45 -3.45 -3.45 -3.45 -3.45 
lzoo 11.00 10.00 0.00 0.00 
-Z56 -144 -17.07 -3.20 -11-36 
-3.45 -3.45 -3.45 -3.45 -3.45 
izoo 11.00 10.00 0.00 0.00 
-Z13 -1.65 -48.59 -1.57 -10.37 
-3.45 -3.45 -3-45 -189 -3.45 
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Table 6.3 Results of the Augmented Dickey Fuller Tests on the FMP model 
No Bank 
14 PTX 
lag 
ADF stat. 
Crt. Value 
15 KBN 
lag 
ADF stat. 
Crt. Value 
16 LDO 
lag 
ADF stat. 
Crt. Value 
17 BKG 
lag 
ADF stat. 
Crt Value 
18 ABX 
lag 
ADF stat. 
Crt. Value 
19 I<RP 
lag 
ADF stat. 
Crt. Value 
20 MJQ 
lag 
ADF stat. 
Crt. Value 
21 Ej K 
lag 
ADF stat 
Crt Value 
Z2 MJB 
lag 
ADF stat. 
Crt. Value 
23 NPT 
lag 
ADF stat 
Crt. Value 
24 HEA 
lag 
ADF stat 
Crt Value 
25 USK 
lag 
ADF stat 
Crt Value 
26 GHZ 
lag 
ADF stat 
Crt Value 
M 
a) 
a) 
a) 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
a) 
a) 
a) 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
0.00 
4.95 
-3.52 
0.00 0.00 
-185 -8.95 
-3-47 -3-47 
a) 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
* * * 
* * * 
* * * 
12.00 11.00 10.00 
-120 -2.24 -30.93 
-3.45 -3.45 -3.45 
12.00 MOO 11.00 
-Z20 -1.44 -IZ29 
-3-45 -3.45 -3.45 
izoo 11.00 11.00 
-2.58 -3.84 -10.92 
-3.45 4.05 4.05 
12.00 11.00 10-00 
-Z85 -3.59 -16.38 
-3.45 -4-05 4.05 
lZoo 11.00 10-00 
-Z16 -1.98 -11.43 
-3.47 -3.47 -3.47 
MOO 12.00 11.00 
-3.30 -Z24 -7.66 
-3-45 -3.45 -3.45 
MOO 11.00 10.00 
-Z73 -3.80 -25.33 
-3-45 -4-05 -4-05 
MOO 11.00 
-1.78 -4.39 - 
-3.45 -4-05 - 
MOO 11.00 - 
-0.95 -4.64 - 
-3.45 -3.45 - 
MOO - - 
-4.97 - - 
-3-45 - - 
MOO 11.00 10.00 
-Z69 -3.73 -28.65 
-3-45 -4.05 -4.05 
MOO - - 
-4.13 - 
-3.45 
MOO 11.00 10-00 
-1.89 -1.90 -59.40 
-3-45 -3.45 -3.45 
D AD Afl) 
2.00 ZOO - 
-1.23 -7.68 - 
-3.45 -3-45 - 
0.00 -- 
-3.89 - 
-3.45 -- 
0.00 0.00 - 
-3.14 -lZ39 - 
-3.45 -4-04 - 
0.00 0.00 - 
-Z72 -10.47 - 
-3.45 -3.45 - 
0.00 0.00 - 
-1.92 -10.75 - 
-3.46 -3.46 - 
0.00 0.00 - 
-1.19 -9.48 - 
-3.45 -3.45 - 
0.00 0.00 - 
-Z34 -10.93 - 
4.04 4.04 - 
0.00 0.00 
-3.45 -12-80 - 
-3-45 -3.45 - 
0.00 0.00 - 
-Z84 -M81 - 
-3.45 -3-45 - 
0.00 0.00 - 
-1.23 -8.80 - 
-3-45 -3-45 - 
0.00 0.00 - 
-Z09 -10.58 - 
-3.45 -3.45 - 
0.00 - 
-1.60 -9.96 - 
-3.45 -3.45 - 
0.00 - 
4.53 - 
-3.45 - 
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Table 6.3 Results of the Augmented Dickey Fuller Tests on the FMP model 
No Bank m &M A2M k Ak A'k D AD A2D 
Z7 FKE 
lag 12.00 11.00 - 0.00 0.00 
ADF stat -1.23 -10.05 - -2.85 -8.97 
Crt Value -3.47 -3-47 - -3.46 -3.46 
28 RPA 
lag 6.00 - 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ADF stat. -6.05 - -5.17 - -3.23 -8.15 
Crt Value -3.88 - -3-47 - - -3.47 -3-47 
29 TUP 
lag 12.00 11.00 10.00 0.00 1.00 
ADF stat -1.86 -1.71 -52.47 -1.58 -9.78 
Crt. Value -3.45 -3.45 -3.45 -3.45 -3-45 
30 PRM 
lag 0.00 - - 0.00- 
ADF stat. -4.75 -4.47- 
Crt. Value -3.46 -3.46- 
Notes: 
a) Insufficient observation sin ce the banks had just been listed on 'llie Jakarta Stock Exchange 
* Bank is not fisted on the Jakarta Stock Exchange 
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Table 6.4 Results of Ile Cointegration, Test Based on The ADF Test 
on The Regression Residuals (The Residual-Based Approach) 
No Bank k and M 
ADF stat. Crt. Value 
Conclusions k and D 
ADF stat. Crt. Value 
Conclusions 
1 TDF -Z75 -2.89 NC 
2 SPW -160 -Z89 NC -2.60 -Z89 NC 
3 LKY a) a) -1.66 -Z89 NC 
4 TSK -1.60 -Z89 NC -3.45 -Z89 C 
5 KTP -4.52 -2.89 C 
6 JSL -0.56 -Z89 NC -2.50 -2.89 NC 
7 RSW -Z69 -Z89 NC 
8 GXT -1.25 -2-89 NC -Z40 -2.89 NC 
9 DLK -2-14 -Z89 NC -3.29 -2.89 C 
10 SRH -2.99 -Z89 C -Z84 -Z89 NC 
II LRH -1.64 -Z89 NC -3.18 -Z89 C 
12 DSP -1.84 -Z89 NC 
13 TLR -0.98 -2.89 NC -Z31 -Z89 NC 
14 PTX a) a) - -Z23 -2.89 NC 
15 KBN - -Z26 -Z89 NC 
16 LDO - -Z49 -2.89 NC 
17 BKG - -2-41 -Z89 NC 
18 ABX -2.03 -Z90 NC -Z25 _Z90 NC 
19 KRP -2.31 _Z91 NC -3.25 -Z89 NC 
20 MJQ -3.08 -2.89 C 
21 EJK -1.65 -Z89 NC 
ZZ MJB -1.00 _Z89 NC 
23 NPT -4.93 -2.89 C 
24 HEA -2-04 -2.89 NC 
25 USK -4.06 -Z89 C 
26 GHZ -Z27 -Z89 NC 
27 FKR -Z15 -Z90 NC 
28 RPA -Z63 -3.12 NC -5.27 -Z90 C 
29 TUP -Z36 -Z89 NC 
30 PRM -Z57 -2.90 NC 
Notes: 
* Banks are not listed on the Jakarta Stock Exchange 
a) Insufficient observations since the banks have just been listed on the Jakarta Stock Exchange 
C= Coin tegrated, use VERM 
NC = Not cointeg rated, use VAR 
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Table 6.5 Results of the Granger Causality Tests in VAR on the FMP Model 
No Bank Variables kandM 
F-Stat. Prob. 
Conclusions Variables k and D- 
F-Stat. Prob. 
Conclusions 
1 TDF /a 1.65409 0.09311 A 
m D 1.19810 0.29884 A 
2 SPW k 0.28338 0.75467 A k 0.68698 0.75940 A 
m 0.28722 0.75181 A D Z63870 0.00488 R 
3 LKY k a) a) k 0.50844 0.60282 A 
m a) a) D 0.51683 0.59783 A 
4 TSK k 0.86622 0.42387 A k 0.24562 0.99502 A 
m 0.44187 0.64416 A D 4.59100 0.00001 R 
5 KTP k k 2.35171 0.01193 R 
m D 2.75881 0.00340 R 
6 JSL k 0.17298 0.84142 A k 1.07053 0.39566 A 
m 2.42913 0.09363 A D 1.21728 0.28588 A 
7 RSW k k 1.06196 0.40281 A 
m D 1.31078 0.22872 A 
8 GXT k 0.65033 0.52421 A k 0.81803 0.63137 A 
m 0.53717 0.58618 A D 0.93990 0.51234 A 
9 DLK k 0.08669 0.91704 A k 0.83598 0.61353 A 
m 0.29431 0.74573 A D 1.35341 0.20587 A 
10 SRH k 0.04851 1.23257 A k 0.35870 0.97392 A 
m 0.11713 0.04851 R D Z03508 0.03118 R 
11 LRH k 0.72580 0.49198 A A 0.54174 0.88098 A 
m 2.01188 0.15083 A D Z10322 0.02546 R 
12 DSP k k 1.20477 0.29429 A 
m D 2.61587 0.00535 R 
13 TLR k 0.03267 0.96787 A k 0.81858 0.63082 A 
m 2.70081 0.07236 A D 5.03158 0.00000 R 
14 PTX k a) a) k 2.00680 0.03389 R 
m a) a) D 3.73809 0.00017 R 
15 KBN k k 0.82682 0.62263 A 
m D 1.80542 0.06084 A 
16 LDO k k 0.67481 0.77057 A 
m D 0.78294 0.66623 A 
17 BKG k k 1.32952 0.21844 A 
m D 0.83434 0.61516 A 
18 ABX k 8.31194 0.00111 R k 1.10726 0.37405 A 
m 0.88453 0.42193 A D 1.39675 0.19687 A 
19 KRP k 0.48855 0.61568 A k 1.09270 0.37753 A 
m 0.28504 0.75289 A D 1.22027 0.28390 A 
20 MJQ k - k 0.68346 0.762,54 A 
m - D 1.57935 0.11423 A 
21 EJK k - k 1.09150 0.37831 A 
m - D 3.20109 0.00086 R 
22 MJB k k 3.37300 0.00050 R 
m D 2.06563 0.02831 R 
23 NPT k k 1.82745 0.05689 A 
m D 7.50827 0.00000 R 
24 HEA k k 0.66203 0.78229 A 
m D Z60522 0.00553 R 
25 USK k k 1.78463 0.06432 A 
m D 3.67628 0.00020 R 
67 
Table 6.5 Results of the Granger Causality Tests in VAR on the FMP Model 
No Bank Variables k and M 
F-Stat. Prob. 
Conclusions Variables k and D 
F-Stat. Prob. 
Conclusions 
26 GHZ k k 0.58553 0.84784 A 
m -D 1.56838 0.11767 A 
27 FKE k -k 1.21865 0.29654 A 
m -D 4.53057 0.00006 R 
28 RPA k a) a) -k 1.60017 0.13425 A 
m a) a) -D 1.26259 0.28083 A 
29 TUP k -k 1.19366 0.30190 A 
m -D 6.31918 0.00000 R 
30 PRM k -k 1.05233 0.41837 A 
m -D 1.52853 0.14464 A 
Notes: 
* Banks are not listed on the Jakarta Stock Exchange 
a) Insufficient observations since the banks have just been listed on the Jakarta Stock Exchange 
A= Do not reject the null hypothesis 
R. = Reject the null hypothesis 
The reported F-statitics are the Wald statistics for the following joint null hypotheses: 
01 For k and M. - 
k does not Granger Cause M or all of the slope coefficients of M are zero 
M does not Granger Cause k or all of the slope coefficients of k are zero 
(H) For k and D: 
D does not Granger Cause k or all of the slope coefficients of k are zero 
,k 
does not Granger Cause D or all of the slope coefficients of D are zero 
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Table 6.6 Parameter Estimates in Per Cent 
No Bank am ak aD 1; kM 1; kD '6W 
1 TDF 1.14 3.63 0.16 
- (0-07) (0.002) - (0.92) 
2 SPW 23-54 1.13 113-41 4.52 -0.39 1.21 
(0.02) (0-07) (0.07) (0.23) (0.66) (0.60). 
3 LKY a) 1.02 6.46 -0.76 
a) (0.07) (0.004) - (0.33) - 
4 TSK 32.18 1.00 13.83 3.46 -1.87 -1.99 
(0.02) (0.07) (0-009) (0.32) (0-39) (0.25) 
5 KIP 1.20 6.43 -1.10 
- (0-08) (0-004) - (0.25) - 6 JSL 60.92 1.14 103.29 1.36 1.26 33.47 
(0.04) (07) (0.067) (0.56) (0.22) (0.116) 
7 RSW 1.18 4.80 0.01 
- (0.08) (0.003) - (0.29) - 8 GXT 39.11 1.18 4.71 7.31 -0.53 4.55 
(0-03) (0-08) (0.003) (0.36) (0.37) (0.26) 
9 DLK 23.13 1.12 6.15 1.69 -1.05 -28-66 
(0.02) (0-07) (0-004) (0.24) (0.21) (0.41) 
10 SRH 34.39 1.08 8.20 4.85 -1.13 -10.48 
(0.02) (0.07) (0-005) (0.34) (0.14) (0.28) 
11 LRH 25.50 1.14 7.68 6.30 -0.32 -11.04 
(0.03) (0.07) (0.005) (0.25) (0-50) (0.73) 
12 DSP 1.10 16.68 -2.68 
- (0.07) (0.011) - (0.38) - 13 M 32.05 1.11 8.69 0.20 -1.46 132-77 
(0.23) (0-07) (0-006) (1.40) (0.12) (0.07) 
'14 PTX 2) 1.08 5.99 2) -0.28 2) 
a) (0-07) (0-004) 2) (0.20) a) 
15 KBN - 1.16 8.87 - -1.25 - 
- (0.08) (0.006) (0-19) - 16 LDO - 1.03 17.90 -2.42 - 
- (0-07) (0.012) (0.84) - 17 BKG 1.24 14.11 -3.67 - 
- (0.08) (0.009) (0.46) - 18 ABX 73.35 1.06 7.93 24.96 0.62 15.76 
(0.08) (0-08) (0.006) (0-50) (0.46) (0.27) 
19 KRP 20.01 1.10 4.70 -3.71 -0.95 39.75 (0.02) (0.07) (0.003) (0.20) (0.12) (0-55) 
20 MJQ 1.12 15-59 -2.48 - 
- (0-07) (0.010) (0.28) - 21 EJK - 0.78 9.03 0.16 - 
- (0.05) (0.059) (0.37) - 22 MJB - 0.76 3.54 0.06 
- (0.05) (0.002) (0.31) - 23 NPT - 0.70 2.60 -0.07 - 
- (0.05) (0.002) (0.06) 
24 HFIA - 1.17 17.19 -3.40 
- (0-08) (0.011) (0.24) 
25 USK 0.81 3.93 0.22 
. 05) (0.003) -1 (0.31) 1-I 
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Table 6.6 Parameter Estimates in Per Cent 
No Ba; nTk---T -am ý7 k 
6D 'ýLw 'ýW 
PIN 
26 GHZ 1.11 88-70 - 
(0.07) (0.057) - (0.11) 
27 FKE 0.68 16.76 - -1.13 
- (0-05) (0.013) - (0.27) - 
28 RPA 41-08 0.90 23.29 -0.24 -1.56 31.19 
(0.68) (0.07) (0.019) (0.23) (0.49) (0.82) 
29 TUP 1.26 8.92 - -1.04 
(0.08) (0.006) - (0.12) 
30 PRM 1.25 88.79 - -7.60 
(0.09) (0.067) - (0.74) 
Notes: 
a) Insufficient observations since the bank s had just been listed on The Jakarta Stock Exchange 
- Bank is not listed on the Jakarta Stock Exchange 
Standard error in parentheses 
t7m = Standard deviation of equity values 
17k = Standard deviation ofg, /D, 
O'D = Standard deviation of deposits 
; 
kM = Correlation of k and M 
; 
gD = Correlation ofg and D 
fl&V = CAPMs beta of k and M 
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Table 6.8 Test Results of The Effect of Ile Dummy Variable 
Representing The Introduction of Credit Risk Management on The 
Intercept of State Variable kt 
No Bank Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Probability 
1 TDF -0.03465 0.04408 -0.78607 0.43340 
2 SPW -0.02477 0.10659 -0.23234 0.81670 
3 LKY -0.03093 0.04915 -0.62929 0.53040 
4 TSK 0.00640 0.12969 0.04937 0.96070 
5 KTP 
6 JSL 0.00361 0.09676 0.03731 0.97030 
7 RSW -0.00193 0.05432 -0.03547 0,97180 
8 GXT 0.00693 0.09332 0.07429 0.94090 
9 DLK -0.02147 0.04880 -0.43981 0.66090 
10 SRH 0.00035 0.10715 0.00329 0.99740 
11 LRH -0.02910 0.07886 -0.36898 0.71280 
12 DSP 0.00131 0.08830 0.01484 0.98820 
13 TLR -0.03406 0.05806 -0.58665 0.55860 
14 PTX -0-03525 0.05150 -0.68446 0.49510 
15 KBN -0-04536 0.04989 -0.90923 0.36510 
16 LDO 0.01405 0.08186 0.17166 0.86400 
17 BKG 
18 ABX 
19 KRP 0.00502 0.08623 0.05826 0.95360 
20 MJQ -0.00029 0.08783 -0.00335 0.99730 
21 EJ K 
22 MJB 0.04041 0.18754 0,21547 0.82980 
23 NPT -0-00040 0.23409 -0.00171 0.99860 
24 HEA 0.00633 0.09186 0.06890 0.94520 
25 USK 
26 GHZ 0.01268 0.09110 0.139Z2 0.88950 
27 FKE -0.10147 0.13667 -0.74241 0.45990 
28 RPA 
29 TUP 0-03OZ8 0.184OZ 0.16456 0.86960 
30 PRM 1.28923 0.25629 5.03039 0.00000 
Notes: 
Banks without credit risk management and /or insufficient data as credit risk management 
has just been implemented 
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Table 6.9 Test Results of The Effect of The Dummy Variable 
Representing The Introduction of Credit Risk Management on The 
Slope of State Variable kr 
No Bank Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Probability 
I TDF -0-00256 0.00325 -0.78607 0.43340 
2 SPW -0.00041 0.00521 -0.07871 0.93740 
3 LKY -0-00104 0.00251 -0.41508 0.67890 
4 TSK 0.00056 0.00209 0.26698 0.79000 
5 KTP 
6 JSL 0.00056 0.00116 0.48083 0.63150 
7 RSW 0.00008 0.00294 0.02806 0.97770 
8 GXT 0.00010 0.00039 0.25510 0.79910 
9 DLK -0-00048 0.00134 -0-35895 0.72030 
10 SRH -0-00014 0.00148 -0.09762 0.92240 
11 LRH -0-00093 0.00470 -0.19778 0.94360 
12 DSP -0.00031 0.00136 -0.22922 0.81910 
13 TIR -0.00046 0.00138 -0.33584 0.73760 
14 PTX -0.00131 0.00271 -0.48511 0.62850 
15 KBN -0.00290 0.00308 -0.94099 0.34870 
16 LDO 0.00114 0.00255 0.44556 0.65670 
17 BKG 
18 ABX 
19 I<ap 0.00079 0.00126 0.62667 0.53210 
20 MJQ 0.00073 0.00238 0.30751 0.75900 
21 EJ K 
22 MJB 0.01785 0.00838 2.13062 0.03520 
23 NPT 0.01737 0.00695 Z49756 0.01390 
24 HEA 0.00049 0.01392 0.03509 0.97210 
25 USK 
26 GHZ 0.00131 0.00475 0.27604 0.78300 
27 FKE 0.00667 0.00517 1.28878 0.20090 
28 RPA 
29 TUP 0.00612 0.03804 0.16091 0.87240 
30 PRM 0.00417 0.00065 6.37280 0.00000 
Notes: 
Banks without credit risk management and /or insufficient data as credit risk management 
has just been implemented 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
STRATEGIC CONCLUSIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
7.1 Introduction 
Financial institutions play a vital role in every economy. Ibcir roles have increased due 
to various developments in the last two decades, resulting in additional bank risks. The 
banking industry is well known as the most heavily regulated industry. However, during 
the same period many financial systems have been shown to be fragile, as indicated by 
the cosdy and large scale banking sector problems experienced in many countries, 
including Indonesia. There is an empirical link between financial liberalization and 
financial crises in many countries. Developed and developing countries, including most 
IMV member countries, have experienced significant banking sector problems at some 
stage. Past studies also show that financial crises throughout the world indicate strongly 
two common characteristics; weak internal risk analysis, management and control 
systems, and weak (or even perverse) incentives within the financial system generally 
and financial institutions in particular. Banking crises happened as a result of a complex 
interactive mix of economic, financial and structural weaknesses. These could happen 
anywhere and at any time, and there is no guarantee that such criscs will not recur in the 
future. These findings would appear to be valid for Indonesia as, after financial 
liberalisation in the 1970s and bank deregulation in the 1980s, Indonesia suffered a 
severe financial crisis in 1997. As a result, the authorities should be encouraged to 
embrace the most expeditious and comprehensive rules and standards of bank 
regulation. INs study suggests that the authorities and the banks should allocate their 
resources to implement enterprise risk management and optimal corrective action under 
a robust regulatory regime, to achieve optimal and efficient bank regulation. 
Ibis research has studied risk management in relation to efficient bank regulation in the 
forin of bank financial reorganization. Accordingly, theoretical and practical aspects of 
the structure of bank risk, risk management, enterprise risk management, bank 
regulation, and optimal bank corrective action (financial reorganization) have been 
derived from the literature and two empirical surveys using Indonesian bank data. 1he 
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regulatory regime concept, that emphasizes the need for a broader understanding of 
regulation, is used to relatc bank internal risk management and regulation using the 
threat to close a troubled bank when a bank hits a certain capital threshold. 'Me two 
empirical surveys cover the implementation of an Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) 
framework and optimal corrective action (the IMP model) in Indonesia. They employ 
various statistical techniques (using "'SPSS 11'ý for the ERM empirical study and 
econometric tools, such as maximum likelihood estimates in VAR and GARCH (using 
"Eviews 4') for estimating the IMP model. 
In these respects, this thesis adds to the theoretical literature on risk management and 
bank regulation and to the empirical literature on the state of risk management and bank 
regulation in particular in developing countdes' banking systems. It also highlights how 
(sub-optimal) banking regulation in Indonesia can be improved with a view to 
enhancing social welfare and preventing future financial instability. 
7.2 Conclusions And Key Findings Of The Research 
The literature review shows how risk management has attracted considerable attention 
from bank management and bank regulators. Over the past decade, substantial progress 
has been made in improving risk management techniques and systems applied by 
financial institutions e. g., the adoption of Value at Risk models for measuring market 
risk. Basel 11 stresses three pillars of bank capital regulation i. e., market discipline, 
improved capital standards and supervisory review. This implies that risk management 
plays crucial roles in the three pill=. Regulators would punish a bank if the baWs 
performance is poor and reward those whose risk management is adequate. On the 
other hand, banking regulations can be efficient only when they include closure policies. 
There, however, is no optimal e3dt policy (closure rule) either supporting efficient bank 
regulation within the BIS guidelines or operated by Indonesian bank regulators. 
Regulators must take corrective measures or reorganize the bank, the so-called closure 
rule, under a robust regulatory regime if a bank experiences financial difficulties. In 
practice, many countries have implemented different closure policies. 
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The literature review of bank risk also indicates diverse definitions of bank risk and 
categotisation of bank risk, depending on which analyst one studies. Risk is defined as 
uncertainty about outcomes, which is measured by the probability of making a profit or 
losing money on investments. Bank regulators are concerned mainly with systemic risk, 
financial risk and strategic risk. Bank management are concerned mainly with strategic 
risk and financial risk. Banks, like any other firms, face 'the galaxy of risks' consisting of 
various risks. It, however, could be grouped into 6 categories, i. e., credit risk, market 
risk, liquidity risk, operational risk, legal risk, and reputationalrisk to provide a context 
for establishing the scope of the ERM framework. 
There are two approaches to risk management, i. e., the traditional approach and the 
enterprise risk management framework (ERNý. The ERM framework is distinguished 
from traditional risk management, because the latter is fragmented in nature. This study 
adopts the ERM framework. ERM may be defined as an optimal combination of 
strategy, process, infrastructure and environment, which helps banks make intelligent 
risk-taking decisions prior to committing limited resources and then helps them monitor 
the outcomes of these decisions. This is a complex process involving a top-down 
approach by agents at a bank to enhance and sustain shareholder value. Under the ERM 
framework, bank risk can be viewed as follows: as an 'opportunity' that acknowledges 
the relationship between risk and return; as a 'hazard' that perceives risk as a negative 
event that can produce financial losses; and as 'uncertainty' that views risk as a tool of 
risk measurement e. g., in the form of variance or standard deviation. In this context, 
risk management is a discipline concerning three distinct dimensions, namely upside 
management, being a process to achieve positive gains, downside management, being 
measures to prevent and mitigate losses, and uncertainty management, being methods to 
reduce the variance of outcomes 
The empirical survey on risk management in Indonesia banks, focussing on the 
elements of an ERM, was designed and applied using a questionnaire and subsequently 
analysed using significance test techniques. The empirical survey reveals that banks in 
Indonesia still embrace the traditional risk management approach, that the current state 
of risk management is very undeveloped, that there are many problems still to be 
resolved by the banks and bank regulators, and that banks' attitudes towards the 
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elements of enterprise risk management are diverse. Some important findings have been 
highlighted, as follows: 
(1) Top management at Indonesia banks are aware that risk management should 
start from the very top of a bank. 
(2) The Indonesian banks classify bank risks in different ways. 
(3) The major bank risk is credit risk in conjunction with their credit activities 
widiin credit departments. 
(4) Ile main rationale for a risk management is seen by Indonesian banks as the 
need to meet the regulatory requirements and to estimate potential losses. 
(5) Most Indonesian banks are risk neutral, which is consistent with the IMP 
model. 
(6) The main business proposition of the Indonesian banks is to enhance 
shareholder value; and the banks believe that shareholder should inject more 
capital into an ailing bank. 
(7) Most banks do not know that the implementation of tisk management can 
reduce a number of costs. 
(8) In establishing risk management systems, the vast majority of banks is heavily 
reliant on bank regulators. 
(9) Risk-adjusted returns have not yet been widely used within perfonnancc and 
compensation systems. 
(10) ne banks always set credit risk limits but few banks set credit concentration 
risk limits. 
1) A few banks always ensure that ill risks arising from non-derivatives product 
can be measured and controlled, although most banks did not use derivatives 
products. 
(12) Internal and external auditors do not always ensure that the banks' risk 
m=agement systcms arc robust. 
(13) Some banks use market risk models, including VaR, gap analysis and duration 
analysis. 
(14) For credit risk, most banks implement internal risk rating and accounting ratios 
approaches. 
(15) Most banks had not implemented an operational iisk model. 
(16) Most banks use an accounting ratios approach for liquidity risk management 
purposes. 'f 
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(17) Less than half of the banks manage their foreign exchange risk and interest rate 
risk with regular systematic assessment, quantification and active management. 
They do usually adopt a "hedge all. exposure" policy or a "partially hedge" 
policy. 
(18) Methods to solve market liquidity risk rely heavily on the maintenance of access 
to fund providers and Bank Indonesia. 
The regulatory efforts conducted by Bank Indonesia show that it has a1located resources 
and put into effect requirements relating to the application of risk management 
provisions in mid-2003. It, however, only promotes a traditional approach rather than 
an ERM framework. Banks must not only measure risks and control them, but also 
actively incorporate a1l other necessary aspects of an effective risk management 
framework. An ERM framework represents risk management best practice and has been 
embraced by leading global financial institutions. 
With respect to bank reorganization -a form of government intervention - this should 
be a public decision, involving shareholders, government and taxpayers. Different 
countries have adopted different policies to reorganizing ailing banks. Bank failures are 
not uncommon, nor are they limited to a few countries. There arc two polar bank 
reorganization (or corrective action) models; early closure rule policies and late closure 
policies. In reality, most bank reorganizations in the world embrace the late closure 
approach. Efficient banking regulation can be achieved only if it includes closure 
policies which prevent moral hazard behaviour. The optimal bank corrective action 
policy (or closure policy) aims at achieving cfficient bank regulation, where bank 
regulators act as social planners The cash flow approach of optimal bank corrective 
action adopted in this thesis offers some benefits, namely consistency with the real 
world of financial returns, allowing positive and negative cash flows, and ease of usage. 
'Me shareholders will be allowed to continue to control the bank if the bank is well- 
capitahzecL This means that capital is a crucial factor. Another crucial factor is risk 
management. Accordingly, the injection of new capital is not a panacea for an ailing 
bank if it does not apply the best practices of risk management to generate internal 
earnings to enhance and sustain shareholder value. 
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Optimal bank financial reorganization is analysed within the context of a robust 
regulatory regime. The FMP model implies that optimal bank reorganization requires a 
deposit insurance scheme, which covers capital requirements, closure policies, fair 
deposit insurance rates, and subsidy policies (or bail out policies). 
In the case of Indonesia, the results indicate that most banks face a fair deposit 
insurance premium at the 20 basis points (or 20%) level. For a zero deposit insurance 
premium, the subsidies vary across the banks, approaching 1% of deposits for some. 
Banks may receive different levels of subsidy, when shareholders are unable to inject 
new capital, at different deposit insurance premium rates. There is a positive correlation 
between the deposit insurance premium and the subsidy, whereby if the deposit 
insurance premium increases, then the subsidy also increases. Banks categorized as the 
most likely and least likely to face imminent bankruptcy have also been identified, so 
that bank regulators are enabled to allocate scarce resources more effectively, closely 
monitoring and draffing action plans to reorganize those most likely to face imminent 
bankruptcy. Because the model relies on the banks' data, the accuracy of bank reports is 
a crucial factor in measuring the banks' performance, so that the authorities should 
promote the highest possible accounting standards. The results also show that because 
Indonesian banks are still only at the initial stage of implemcnting sophisticated risk 
management techniques, the adoption of (credit) risk management has yet to impact 
positively on the banking system. 
7.3 Policy Implications 
Optimal bank regulation, which aims to achieve certain objectives in an cffident 
manner, involves a combination of a number of important elements, and the authorities 
should allocate resources to develop these, as follows: 
(1) The Indonesian bank regulators should issue guidelines concerning the 
implementation of firm-widc risk management (EFMý since Indonesian banks 
have only just begun implementation of risk management practices and they rely 
heavily on bank regulators in cstablishing their risk management systems. An ERM 
framework is different from traditional risk management ERM ensures an 
integrated process and system of risk management across business lines, products, 
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and risks at the firm, level. This is consistent with Basel II, although Basel II has 
not explicitly issued guidelines concerning ERM. Additionally, adoption of the risk- 
based capital regulation of Basel II is some way off yet. Accordingly, since the 
ERM framework would affect risk-bascd regulation and supervision, risk-based 
capital regulation, and bank management - in particular the allocation of resources 
to realize the framework - bank regulators should begin now to design the ERM 
framework, to improve the banks' performance, to accommodate the development 
of the banking industry, and to achieve efficient and effective risk-based regulation 
and supervision; this, in turn, will increase financial stability in Indonesia. 
(2) The Indonesian banks need to focus more on the implementation of the best 
practices of enterprise risk management, by taking into account the findings 
mentioned in the previous section, consistent with the modern banking approach 
that cmphasises risk management. This, in turn, win reduce the probability of 
bankruptcy. It is important to note that the manner of implementation of ERM 
should depend on the banks' resources, experience, size, and complexity of 
operations. 
(3) Ile bank regulators should refocus their strategies to develop the Indonesian 
banking industry based on the optimal bank regulations derived in this study. 
(4) Optimal bank reorganization rules aim at enhancing the cfficiency of bank 
regulation. Ilis includes setting-up an explicit deposit insurance scheme, and 
establishing closure and subsidy (or bailout) rules to reduce moral hazard problems 
and to enhance financial stability. 
(5) Since the "fair" deposit insurance premium for banks has been calculated, bank 
regulators may wish to use the 20 basis points figure as a starting point for optimal 
bank regulation, to be adjusted using a combination of quantitative and qualitative 
factors, such as capital ratios and other financial ratios, results of bank 
examinations and other pertinent infortmati n. 
(6) As the optimal bailout can be calculated, the authorities could impose rules 
regarding the limits of a bail out for each bank. This should be approved by and 
reported to parliament, and incorporated in legislation. This, in turn, will improve 
the bank regulators' accountability. 
(7) Since the banks' imminence to bankruptcy have been identified, the authorities 
should allocate their scarce resources to monitor more closely and draft action 
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plans to reorganize those most likely to face imminent bankruptcy. In this way, 
scarce supervisory resources can be allocated more efficiently. 
(8) It is sensible that the authorities consider the establishment of an explicit deposit 
insurance scheme to protect small depositors and to reduce the systemic risk in the 
form of both bank panics (possibly involving healthy banks) and disruptions to the 
payment systems. 
Interest rates influence the value of the banks' equity, the governmenes liab ties, 
the subsidy, and deposit insurance premiums. High interest rates with high 
volatility would decrease the net present value of the banks' cash flow of earnings, 
adversely affect the banks' efficiency, and increase the banks' risks. Iberefore, the 
monetary authority should try to keep interest rates as low as possible and maintain 
their stability so that they can accommodate the achievement of maximum 
shareholder value, without prejudice to the hitting of the monetary target. 
(10) The capital market plays a vital role in every economy, so that the Indonesian 
authorities should encourage the development of a liquid and efficient capital 
market in Indonesia to support financial stability. 
(11) Monetary authorities should provide infonnation, about risks of economic sectors 
to the n=ket pardcipants. 
7.4 Limitations and Future Research 
This study has some limitations, which could be the focus of finther research, listed as 
fonows: 
1. Risk-based capital 
The study does not include a study of the correlation between risk-based capital and 
closure rules. If the sensitivity level of the correlation is high we have to focus on capital 
and if the sensitivity is low we should focus on the closure rules. 
2. Time series data 
Ihe fitne, series data has not been subjected to independent audit. This may obviously 
affect the validity of the results. 
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3. Risk management analysis. 
11is thesis has just studied the principles of an ERM framework. Further study of the 
characteristics /or parameters of each element could be undertaken. In the analysis of 
risk management practice in connection with the FMP model, only credit risk 
managemenes association with the closure rule is examined. This assumes that 
Indonesian banks' major risk is credit risk. Since the structure of bank risk comprises six 
main categories (i. e., market risk, credit risk, liquidity risk, operational risk, legal risk, and 
reputational risk), the association with other risks could also be studied. 
4. Bankruptcy cost and monitoring cost. 
Since there is no readily available data, measures of bankruptcy cost and monitoring cost 
are based on approximations. To increase the accuracy of the financial reorganization 
rules, research on bankruptcy cost and monitoring cost in the Indonesian banking 
industry is cruciaL 
5. Macroeconomic variables 
The study does not relate the closure rules to macroeconomic variables for Indonesia. 
Ilis however might be useful for forecasting purposes so that the authorities could take 
enlightened decisions to maintain financial stability and to balance macroeconomic 
policy with tnicroeconomic policy. 
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RESPONDEN NO: 
RISK MANAGEMENT QUESTIONNAIRE 
Dear Sir or Iýfidam: 
I am Gandjar Mustika a PhD student of the Department of Economics, Loughborough 
University, Leicestershire, LEI I 3TU, England. As you are aware banking is a risk business and 
the quality of bank risk management is a major concern for all modem banks. I am conducting 
risk management research, where you are one of the selected key persons of your bank involved 
in such research. This questionnaire is a part of that process. Your answers will be used for 
research and analytical purposes in in effort to improve risk management systems and control for 
banks, particularly banks operating in Indonesia, and bank regulations; in turn this may reduce 
bank risk of banks in Indonesia. The information provided vvill be kept strictly confidential. 
Before you answer the following questions, please read the instructions carefidly. 11ank you 
for your participation and for assistance in anticipationl 
Signed 
Gandiar Musfika 
INSTRUCTIONS 
L Questions should be answered on behalf of yourself based on your current positions in your bank 
and what you know about bank risks. 
Z All scales should be treated as the best approximation and are designed to indicate your preference 
and risk appetite 
3. Please write in CAPITAIS throughout and tick boxes as follows 0 using black or blue ink 
4. If you choose the 012dLCe anawer, please state your own words 
S. Use additional sheets if needed for additional information 
6. If you make a mist" simply cross it out and continue. 
YOUR NAME AND YOUR BANK Plene complete AU of this section 
Mr 11 Mrs 13 Miss (3 
Surname 
Forename 
Education -0 TY -1Z17W'-&5 iZýior- -65 Other 040 ..................................... Position Board Of Commissioners 0511 Board of Directors 060 Head of Department 070 Staff 
0811 
1"ide of position --------------------- Report to ------------------------ Bank 
--913 Type of licence FO; W)ýW IU-Stat-c-Ban-k-1-1-11-F-0-re-x Bank 1213 Non-forexBank 130 joint 
Bank 1413 DevelopmentBank 150 
Bank's assets Rp --------------- On million) 1613 Banles capital Rp ---------------- (Inmillion) IM and Capital Adequacy Ratio: 180 Total employees ----------- 19[] Domestic branches 
------------ 200 Foreign branches ------------ 
2113 
Office Head Office 220 Branch Z0 Representative Office 240 
Address 
Town 
Province 
Postcode 
304 
I. Risk Management Philosophy and Strategy 
1. Banking is a risk businessl 
Strongly agree 10 Agree 211 Disagree 30 Strongly disagree 40 
2. Which view of risk do you take? Please choose as many as you like and indicate the importance 
using the scale provided (Le. I= Not important; 2= Less important; 3= Fairly important, 4 
Important; and 5= Very important)l 
Risk is an opportunity 10 211 311 40 50 
Risk is a hazard 10 20 30 40 50 
Risk is uncertainty 1 C3 M 30 40 50 
Othu .................... 10 20 30 40 50 
3. Would you be interested in having a risk management system in your bank? Please tick as 
applicablel 
Credit risk: Already have 10 Would consider 211 Would not 311 
Market risk: Already have 10 Would consider 20 Would not 30 
Operational risk: Already have 10 Would consider 20 Would not 30 
Liquidity risk: Already have 10 Would consider 20 Would not 30 
Other ...................... . Already have 10 Would consider 20 Would not 30 Remarks: ..................... 
................................ 
...................... 
...................... 
..................... 
..................... 
..................... 
..................... 
................. 
.................. 
4. Waich phase is your current finand2l risk management system it? 
Credit risk: Implementation 10 Updating 20 Maintenance 313 Other 40 ... 
Market risk: Implementation 10 Updating 20 Maintenance 30 Other 40 ... 
Operational risk Implementation 10 Updating 20 Maintenance 30 Other 40 
Liquidity risk: Implementation 10 Updating 20 Maintenance 30 Other 40 ... 
Other ......... : Implementation 10 Updating 20 Maintenance 30 Other 40 ... 
Remarks ....... ........................ ....... .............. ...... .................. ....... .......... ......... 
5. How long has your bank had a Risk Management System in place? Please use a six scale provided, 
where One year = 1; Two years = 2; Mu= years = 3; Four years = 4; Five Years = 5; More 
than five years = 6; and 7= None) I 
Credit risk ID 211 313 413 50 60 70 
Market risk 10 211 30 40 50 60 70 
Operational risk : 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 
Uquidity risk : 10 20 30 40 513 613 70 
Other ............. : I0 ZI 313 411 50 60 713 
Remarks: ..................................................................................................... 
6. Have you yourself been involved in the financial risk management process ? 
Yes 10 No 20 
7. How long have you been involved in the risk management process ? 
One year 10 Two years 211 11iree years 30 Four years 413 Five Years 
50 More than five years 60 Other 70 ...... months 
8. How long have you been trained in risk management ? 
One year ID Two years 20 Three years 30 Four years 40 Five Years 
50 More than five years 60 Other 70 ...... months 
9. Ihe majority of formal training you received in risk management (select only one response): 
College/University courses 10 Professional Development Courses 20 
Scminars/Certificate programs 30 Other 40 ............................................... 
10. What are the following activities assuming major risk of your bank? Please tick appropriate 
boxest 
Credit risk : Deposits 10 Loans 20 Securities 30 Derivatives 40 Other 50 ......... Market risk : Deposits 10 Loans 20 Securities 30 Deriv-Atives 40 Other 50 ......... 
305 
Opemtional risk : Deposits 10 Loans 20 Securities 30 Derivatives 40 Other 50 
Liquidity risk : Deposits 10 Loans 20 Securities 30 Derivatives 40 Other 50 
Legal risk : Deposits 10 Loans 20 Securities 30 Derivatives 40 Other 50 
Reputational risk: Deposits 10 Loans 20 Securities 30 Derivatives 40 Other 50 
Other ............. : Deposits 10 Loans 20 Securities 30 Derivatives 40 Other 50 
Remarks: ............................................................................. ......................... 
........................................................................................................................ 
11. Have shareholders questioned the Board of Directors on how the bank manages and controls 
risk? 
Very frequently 10 Frequently 211 Sometimes 30 Rudy 40 Never 50 
12. Have shareholders forced to carry out any "risky" transactions? 
Very frequently 10 Frequently 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 50 
13. The Board of Directors must state clearly its corporate risk management philosophy in order to 
impose some guidelines on risk management. Is there a formal written company philosophy 
towards finand2l risk in your bank? 
Yes 10 No 20 
14. How do you find the established philosophy for your bank? 
Excellent 10 Very good 20 Good 30 Fair 40 Poor 50 
15. Ihe baWs written risk philosophy should constitute the strategy for bank's risk bearing capacity, 
and policies relating to the management and control of financial risks. What do you think ? 
Strongly agree I0 Agree 20 Disagree 30 Strongly disagree 40 
16. In your bank, which type of organization structure performs the risk management tasks? Please 
distinguish carefullyl 
Type 1. Board of Directors/CFO/CEO; Risk Policy Committees; Chief Credit risk Officer, 
Market Risk Management; Back Office, Internal Audit, 1, egal, IT, etc.; and Other Senior 
Officers; 10 
Type I Board of Directors/CFO/CEO; Risk Policy Committees; Chief Risk Officer, Chief 
Credit risk Officer, Market Risk Management; Back Office, Internal Audit, Legal, IT, etc.; and 
Other Senior Officers; 20 
Type 3: Board of Directors/CFO/CEO; Chief Risk Officer, Risk Portfolio Analyst; Credit risk 
Officer; Market Risk, Operational risk, Back Office, Internal Audit, Ugal, IT, and Other 313 
Other Type: .................................................................................................. 
................................................................................................................... 
17. Which of the following is the Risk Management Function responsible directly to ? 
Shareholders 10 Board of Directors 20 He2d of Department 30 Other 40 ......... 
18. How do you categotise bank risk? 
Credit risk, operational i* liquidity risk, legal risk, reputational, risk 10 
Credit risk, interest rate rWr, liquidity rWc, price risk, foreign currency translation risk, transaction 
risk, compliance risk, strategic risk, reputation risk 20 
Currency i* commodity risk, default tis]c, concentration risk, execution risL technology risk, 
model risk, legal risk, and reputational risk 313 
Other 413 ................................................................................................... 
.................................................................................................................. 
19. What are the major risks facing your bank? Please choose its many as you like and indicate the 
importance using a five scale provided (Le. I= Not important; 2= Uss important; 3= Fairly 
important; 4= Important; and 5= Very important)l 
Marka risk I0 ZI 30 40 50 
Credit risk 10 211 30 40 50 
Operational risk 10 20 30 40 50 
Uquidity risk ID 211 311 40 511 
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Legal risk 10 M 30 40 50 
Reputational risk 10 M 311 'C3 511 
Other ..................... 10 20 311 40 511 
20. Do you classify risks according to your bank's managernent fimctions? (e. g. Legal department; 
Credit department; IT department etc. ) 
Yes 10 No 211 
Remarks: ........................................................................ 
21. Please rank the following risks of your bank (Le. I= Most dangerous; Dangerous = 2, Less 
dangerous = 3; and Least dangerous = 4)l 
Market risk : 10 20 30 40 
Credit risk ; 10 20 30 40 
Operational risk : 10 20 30 40 
Uquidity risk : 10 20 313 40 
Legal risk : Icl 20 30 40 
Reputational risk : 10 20 30 40 
Other ............. : 10 ZJ 30 40 
22. Can you grade each risk in term of its severity of losses compared to your capital during the 
last five years using a ten scale provided (I = Extrcmcly significant; 10 = Extremely insignificant) 
as of 31/12/2001? 
RISK/SEVERITY 12345678 10 
Market risk : 
Credit risk : 
Operational risk : 
Uquidity risk : 
I, cg2l risk : 
Reputational risk : 
Other ............. : 
Rernarks: .................................................................................................... 
23. Can you describe each risk in term of its frequency during the last five yew using the actual 
-nnual events by writing the number in the spaces provided its of 31/12/2001? 
RISK / EVENTS 15 20 30 50 100 ISO > 250 
Market risk : 
Credit risk : 
Operational risk : 
Liquidity risk : 
Ugal risk : 
Reputation2l risk : 
Other ............. : Remarks: ...................................................................................................... 
24. Can you grade the risk for each business unit in terms of its severity of losses compared to 
your capital during the last five years using a ten scale provided (I = Extremely sigaificant; 10 
Extremely insignificant) as of 31/12/2001? 
Business Unit/Severity 12345678 10 
Credit department : 
Treasury department : 
Accounting depart. : 
Foreign trading dept. : 
I&gd department : 
IT department : 
Other ............. : Remarks: ...................................................................................................... 
25. Can you describe each risk in term of its frequency during the last five years using the actual 
annual events by writing the number down in the spaces provided as of 31/12/2001? 
Business unit/Events 15 20 30 50 100 150 > 250 
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Credit department 
Treasury department 
Accounting depart. 
Foreign trading dept. 
Legal department 
IT department 
Odier ............... Remarks: ............................................................................................... 
26. Can you grade each risk in term of its likelihood severity of losses compared to your capital 
that may occur within the following years using a five scale provided (Le. I= less thin ZYo; 
2=2.5%; 3=5 -10%, 4= 10 - 2Wo; 5= greater dun 200/6) as of 31/12/2001, based on your 
banles calculations? 
RISK Severity of Losses 
One year or less Over one year to five years Over five years 
Market risk : 
Credit risk : 
Operational risk : 
Liquidity risk : 
Legal risk : 
Reputational risk : 
Other ............. : Remarks: ................................................................................................. 
27. Can you grade each risk in term of its likelihood severity of losses compared to your capital 
that may occur within the following years using a five scale provided (Le. I= less dun 2%; 2 
= 2.5%; 3=5 -I(r/o; 4= 10 - 20%; 5= greater thin 201/6) as of 31/12/2001, based on Bank 
Indonesia regulations? 
RISK Severity of Losses 
Market risk : 
One year or less Over one year to five years Over five years 
Credit risk : 
Operational risk : 
Liquidity risk : 
Legal risk : 
Reputational risk : 
Other ............. : Remarks: ................................................................................................. 
28. Do vou insure or hedee the fbHowing risks duritur the Wt five vears? 
Risk Immediately Partially Not Selectively hedge Forecast to 
Hedge hedge hedge and partly forecast decide 
an exposure (4) hedging 
(2) (3) 
Market risk % 
Credit risk % 
Operational 
risk % 
Liquidity risk % 
Lmd risk % 
Reputational I I F- risk % 
29. How risk averse or risk seeking are you vith regard to risks? Please use a seven-point scale 
provided Cle. I= Very risk averse; 2= Risk averse; 3= Rather risk averse; 4= NeUUA- 5 
Rather risk seeking; 6= Risk seeking; and 7= Very risk seeking)l 
Market risk : 10 211 313 413 513 613 70 
Credit risk : 111 M 311 413 511 60 70 
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Operational risk : 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 
Uquidity risk : 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 
1, egal risk : 10 211 311 411 50 60 711 
Reputational risk : 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 
Other ............. :M 20 30 411 50 613 70 
30. How does your bank manage the following risks? Please use a four scale provided (ie. I= No 
regular assessment; 2 Regular and systematic assessments; 3= Regular, systematic assessments 
and quantification; 4 Regular, systematic assessments, quantification, and active nunagement)l 
Market risk : 10 20 30 413 
Credit risk : 113 20 30 40 
Oper2tional risk : 10 20 30 40 
Liquidity risk : 10 20 30 40 
Legal risk : 10 Z3 30 40 
Reputational risk : 10 20 30 40 
Oth ex ............. : 10 ZI 30 40 
31. In your baak, are risks assessed and controlled using different approaches (Of Using fragmented 
risk management approaches) depending on the management of business units or regional 
managements (or different business units responsible for various risks) ? 
Yes 10 No 20 Mix system 30 
Remarks: ............................................................................ 
32. Do you believe that risk management and control activities are adequately funded in your 
organization? (Very well funded = 1; Adequately funded Z- Fairly funded = 3; Poorly fimded 
= 4)l 
Enterprise risk management system ID ZI 311 134 
Credit risk management 10 20 313 114 
Market risk management 10 ZI 311 134 
Uquidity risk management 10 211 30 04 
Operational risk I0 ZI 311 134 
Front and Middle Office Trading room system I0 ZI 30 134 
Others ................. I0 Z3 30 134 Rem2rks: (e. g. the maw component of the expenditure is data and information systems) 
................................................... I .......... I ..................................... 
33. How much does your bank spend on the Mowing tisk nunagement systems in the last SYCRrs (In 
Whon Rp per yeat)? 
2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 
Enterprise risk management system ....... ....... ...... ....... ...... Credit risk management ....... ....... ...... ....... ...... Market risk management ....... ....... ...... ....... ...... Liquidity risk management ....... ....... ...... ....... ...... Front and Middle Office Trading room system ....... ....... ...... ....... ...... Others .............................................. ....... ....... ...... ....... ...... Remarks: (e. g. the main component of the expenditure is data and information systems) ............ 
............................... o .................................................................................. 
34. Which of the following act as background factors increasing your organization's need for a risk 
management ? Please choose as many as you like and indicate the importance using a five scale 
provided (Le. 1= Not important; 2= Uss important 3= Fairly important; 4= Important and 
5= Very important)l 
0 The massive cost of recent financial and banking distress (corporate and banks), including in 
Indonesia 10 211 311 40 50 
0 To meet the forthcoming regulatory requirements for risk measurement and bank capital 10 
211 311 413 50 
309 
0 The need to spread out the tax on the bank products to reduce the effective tax rate in the long 
run 10 ZJ 30 40 50 
0 The need for accurate estimates of potential losses to stay within Emits set internally and by 
regulators 10 20 30 40 50 
0 Management self interest to show the shareholders that the management have given value 
added to the shareholders 10 ZI 30 413 511 
0 We already have a very satisfied risk management system 10 20 311 40 50 
00ther ............................................................ ICI ZI 313 40 50 
Remarks: ...................................................................................................... 
.................................................................................................................. 
35. When your bank incurs a relatively substantial loss because of lapses in or failures of risk control, 
iteventually "bills" theshateholders either by injecting more capital or by diluting equity value 
when the failures become public news. 
Stronglyagree ID Agree 2D Disagree 3D Strongly disagree 4D 
36. In your organization, do you believe that risk management and control systems should be seen 
otily as .... ? Please indicate the importance using a five scale provided (Le. I= Not important; 2 
= Less important; 3= Faily important; 4= Important; and 5= Very important)l 
0A regulatory requirement: 10 20 311 40 50 
0A management tool: 10 213 311 40 50 
Remarks: ...................................................................................................... 
37. Do you agree that before the implementation of particular method of risk measurements and to 
achieve their significant business impacts, your bank must meet three preconditions, among 
others: establishment of risk management organization and processes; incentives to use the results 
of chosen methods; and identification of methods and systems ? 
Strongly agree 10 Agree 20 Disagree 30 Strongly disagree 40 
38. How do you find Bank Indonesia's regulations concerning risk management? 
Market risk : Excellent ID Good 2 13 Fair 313 Poor 413 
Credit risk : Excellent 10 Good 20 Fair 313 Poor 411 
Operational risk : ExceUent III Good 2 13 Fair 311 Poor 40 
liquidity risk : Excellent IID Good 20 Fair 313 Poor 40 
Legal risk : Excellent 10 Good 2 13 Fair 30 Poor 40 
Rcputational risk : Excellent I0 Good 20 Fair 30 Poor 413 
Other ............. : Excellent 
Remarks: ......................... 
10 
........ 
Good 
........... 
20 
....... 
Fair 
......... 
30 
........ 
Poor 
.......... 
413 
........................ 
39. Do you believe that the Bank for International Settlement (BIS) based in Basle, Switzerland is at 
the forefront of risk regulation? 
Strongly agree 10 Agree 211 Disagree 30 Strongly disagree 40 
40.1! hc Bank for International Settlements, Basle, Switzerland is the most powerful shaping 
regulation bodyl 
Strongly agree 10 Agree 20 Disagree 30 Strongly disagree 40 
41. A bank should assess its own risks because a bank knows more about its risks than the regulatory 
bodies (Le. especially Bank Indonesia) dol 
Strongly agree 10 Agree 20 Disagree 313 Strongly disagree 411 
Remarks: .................................................................................................... k 
4Z Is it important that risk analysis, in all its components, be both quantitative (Le. exposures shown 
by the measurement through Management Information System) and qualitative (Le. nature of 
exposure and effective risk management system)? 
Not important 10 Less important 20 Fairly important 311 Important 40 Very 
important 50 
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43. What is the average monthly Earning After Tax and Equity over the five years before your bank 
implemented risk management system (Le. based on conventional accounting record)? Please use 
additional sheetsl 
In mMion Rp 
Months 
Years 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
al bl al b al b al b al b a b a b al b. al bl al b al bl al b 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Note: a= Eatnings after tam b= Equity based on Bank Indonesia regulations 
Rem2rks: .......................................................................... 
44. What is the average monthly Earning After Tax and Equity over the five years after your bank 
implemented rU man2gement system? Plem use additional shectsl 
In million Rp 
Months 
Years 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 9 10 11 12 
a b aI b aI B aI b a b a b a b a bI a b a b a b a b 
2 
3 
4 
51 
. 1 7 71 -1 -1 - Note: a= Earnings after tax. b= Equity based on your own calculations. 
lRemark : (Please indicate whether you have used risk adjusted returns or still use 
conventional accounting)l ........................................................................ 
45. What is the average monthly Capital Adequacy Ratio during the last five years based on your 
own calculations (not Bank Indonesia regulations)? I 
Months 
Years 01 02 1 03 04 05 1 06 07 08 1 09 10 11 1 12 
1 1 1 1 1 
2 
9 U 
3 
4 
5 
- 
1 
Fwmarks: 
46. What is expected average monthly Eaming After Tax and Equity over the next year based on 
Bank Indonesia regulations ? Please use additional sheetsl 
In milhon Rv 
Months 
Year 1 2 3 4 5 61 7 8 9 10 12 
_ - 
al 
- 
b 
- 
al b il bl al bl il bl al bl ij bi 21 bl i lb-l a l 
2002/2W3 T = 
Note: a= Expected camings after tm b= Expected equity based on your own calculations. 
R, emaAs: (Please indicate whether you have used risk adjusted returns or still use 
conventional accounting and difficulties in forecasting)l 
............................................................................................................... 
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47. Wh2t is expected average monthly Earning After Tax and Equity over the next year based on 
your own calculations? Please use additional sheetsl 
In million Rp 
Months 
Year 1 2 3 14 1 51 61 71 81 91 10 1 11 1 12 
2002/2003 
Note: a= Expected earnings after tax. b= Expected equity based on your own 4calculations. 
Remarks: (Please indicate whether you have used risk adjusted returns or still use 
conventional accounting and difficulties in forecasting)l 
.................................................................................................................. 
48. What following costs can risk management system reduce to add value to shareholders? 
Bankruptcy cost 10 Cost of debt 20 Fiscal cost 311 Cost of liquidity 40 
Cost of under utilization of capital 50 Other 50 .......................................... 
49. What is the ultimate objective (or business proposition) of your bank? 
Value added to shareholders 10 Value added to your customers 20 Value added to 
other internal stakeholders 313 Value added to other external stakeholders 40 Other 
511 .................................. o ..................................................... o 
11. Risk Management Environment 
1. Are the following acknowledged and incorporated in your risk management strategy in the 
context of broader corporate-wide objectives? 
New ventures Always 10 Often 20 Sometimes 313 Rarely 40 Never 511 
New products Always ID Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 50 
Trading strategies Always 10 Often 20 Sometimes 313 Rarely 40 Never 511 
Customer initiatives Always 113 Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 50 
How often do you re-examine the links between business purposes, risk-taking capacity sad risk 
management practices? 
Very frequently 10 Frequently 20 Sometimes 30 Seldom 411 Never 50 
3. Does risk strategy clearly state ...... ? Risks to be taken 113 Ile level of risk taking 20 The expected risk-adjusted returns 30 
Other 40 ............................................ 
4. Should the nature and risk lemb be consistent with ........ ? Bank's strategy 10 Organization, people and systems 213 Economic capital level (capital 
at risk) 30 All of them 40 
5. Which of the following have you established? 
Training programs for risk management personnel 10 Risk training programs for all. 
personnel in your bank 211 Risk awareness programs 30 None 40 
Remarks ....................................... 
6. In establishing your risk management system how reliant are you on Bank Indonesia as the Bank 
Regulator or Supervisor? 
Very reliant on Bank Indonesia ID Reliant on Bank Indoncsia 211 Somewhat reliant or' 
BankIndonesia 313 Less rehantonBank Indonesia 411 Not reliant on Bank Indonesia 
50 
Remarks: ..................................................................................................... 
7. Which of the following should top management report risk exposures property to? Mck as many 
as you fikel 
Internal management 113 Shareholders 20 Investors/depositors 30 Bank Indonesia 
411 General public 50 Others 60 ...................................... 
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8. Management accountability for risk control can be encouraged and ensured through: 
Please tick as many as you likel 
0A clear allocation of risk management responsibilities among vzrious senior managers to 
promote and ensure management accountability for risk control 10 
0A comprehensive annual assessment 20 
0 Regulatory reporting system on the effectiveness of risk management systems 30 
0 Method of compensation (salaries and bonuses) which does not encourage risk-taking through 
in adoption of team, divisional or firm performance instead of profitability of the firm! s financial 
transactions and the risk-taker's v-alue added to non-trading activities 40. 
9. In term of environment, the board of director has a responsibilitr. 
0 To install and maintain a satisfactory control system 10 
0 To established its attitude to risk 211 
0 To ensure that appropriate risk education continuous throughout the firm 30 
11 All of the above 40 
10. Do you think your bank has funded the necessary hardware and software, and recruiting and 
retention of the right numbers of people with the appropriate expertise, skill and experience? 
Please indicate using the scale provided (Le. Very wen funded = 1; Adequately funded = 2; Fairly 
funded = 3; Poorly funded = 4)1 
Hardware 
Software 
113 20 311 134 
10 ZI 313 04 
Recruitment and retention for hum-n resources 10 20 30 134 
Renurks: .............................................................................................. 
11. Have you established risk-adjusted returns on economic capitals for performance measurements? 
(Already have 10 Would consider 20 Bank Indonesia has not regulated yet 30 Would 
not 4P 
Matket risk : 10 20 30 40 
Credit risk : 113 20 311 40 
Operational risk : 10 ZI 30 411 
Ilquidity risk : 10 ZJ 313 40 
Legal. risk : 111 20 30 411 
Reput2tional risk : 10 20 30 40 
Other ................ .................... : U] 20 30 40 Remarks: ............ ............................ ....... ........ ............................................... 
12. Have you established risk-adjusted returns for a compensation system (risk-based incentive 
scheme to encourage people to maximize risk-adjusted returns rather than revenues)? 
(Already have 10 Would consider 20 Bank Indonesia has not regulated yet 30 Would 
not 40) 
Nfarket risk : 10 213 30 40 
Credit risk : 113 213 30 40 
Operational risk : 113 20 30 40 
Uquidity risk : 113 20 30 40 
Legal risk : 111 20 30 40 
Reputational. sisk : 111 20 30 40 
M. Process and Control 
1. Does the risk management process start with commitment from the very top (Board of Directors) 
in your organization with regard to the risk impact of each business initiative on the overall risk 
PtOfile Of the firm? Always Ill Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 
50 Remarks: .................................................................... 
Z Risk identification is a sound start of risk management processl Notimportant 10 Lessimportant 20 Fairlyimportant 30 Important 40 V"7 
important 511 
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3. Are risks of the following assessed prior to their approval or execution? (rick. if the answer YES) 
Every transaction Always 10 Often 211 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 50 
New product Always 10 Often 211 Sometimes 30 Rarely 411 Never 50 
Business activity Always 10 Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 413 Never 50 
Other ............ Always 10 Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 511 
4. Do you separate the operational fiinctions of the Front Office from the Nfiddle office and the 
Back office ? 
Yes 10 No 211 
5. Are there written procedures for .....? Tick applicable boxl Front office 10 Nfiddle office 211 Back office 30 
6. Do you use risk measurements and control approaches to setting Emits in respect of? 
Credit risk Always 10 Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 411 Never 511 
Market risk Always 10 Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 511 
Operational risk Ahnys 10 Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 50 
Uquidity risk Akmys I0 Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 50 
Other ........... Always 10 Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 50 
7. Do you use risk measurement and control approaches to control concentration risks in respect 
of? 
Credit risk Always 113 Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 50 
ýdarket tisk Always I0 Often 20 Sometimes 313 Rarely 40 Never '50 
Operational risk Always 10 Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 50 
Liquidity risk Always 10 Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 50 
Other ............ Always 10 Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 50 
8. When your bank evaluates the different risk-taking activities, does yow 
following? Please indicate using a five scale provided Cle. Always = 1; 
= 3; Rarely = 4; and Never = 5)1 
Capital regulations issued by Bank Indonesia 113 20 30 40 
Rating agency constraints 10 20 30 40 
Intemal capital calculations 10 213 311 413 
Returns for Shareholders ID M 30 40 
Remarks: .......................................... 10 20 30 40 
r bank consider the 
Often = Z, Sometimes 
513 
50 
513 
50 
50 
9. Fhs the Board of Directors assigned selected people to the supervisory board/audit committee ? 
Already has 10 Would consider 20 Bank Indonesia has not regulated yet 30 
10. Do the supervisory board members have sufficient background knowledge about the financial 
instruments the company uses or owns, particularly derivatives? 
Very competent 10 Competent 213 Somewhat incompetent 30 Very 
incompetent 40 
11. ffive the members of supervisory board or audit committee undergone appropriate education in 
respect of risk control? 
Already have 10 Would consider 20 Would not 30 
M Types of financial instruments 
1. Has your bank a list of approved financial instruments including derivatives 
Already have 10 Would consider 211 Would not 30 
Z Is each instrument, non-derivatives, plain vanilla derivatives, exotic products, hybrids and derivative products, clearly described ? 
Extremely dear 10 Clear 20 Fairly clear 30 Unclear 40 Extremely unclear 50 
3. Do senior managers ensure that all the risks arising from these approved instruments can be 
measured and controlled by the existing risk management system? 
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Non-dcrivatives Always 10 Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 50 
Plain van& derivatives Always 10 Often M Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 5D 
Exotic products Always 10 Often M Sometimes 30 Rarely 4D Never 50 
Hybrids products Always ID Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 50 
Remarks: 
4. Are all new financial instruments which will be bought and sold examined from the start and 
understood by relevant personnel, including senior managers? 
Always 10 Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 50 
5. Are the risks of the new products integrated into the risk measurement and control system? 
Always 10 Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 50 
6. His the internal auditor understood that the attendant risk of the new financial instruments can 
be measured and controlled before proposing a course of action? 
Alw2ys 10 Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 50 
V. The Review System of Risk Management. 
1. Do the following auditors ensure dut the risk management system is robust? 
Internal auditor Always 10 Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 50 
External auditor Always 10 Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 513 
2. Do the following auditors evaluate the independence and overall effectiveness of the risk 
management function? 
Internal auditor Always 10 Often 20 Sometimes 313 Rarely 40 Never 511 
Extem2l auditor Always 10 Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 50 
3. Do the following auditors ensure that risk controllers and risk takers am complying with 
established risk management policies? 
Internal auditor Always 10 Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 50 
External auditor Always M Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 50 
4. Do the following auditors ensure that proper documentation on the risk management process and 
internal controls am in place? 
Internal auditor Always 10 Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 50 
External auditor Always 10 Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 50 
5. Are the internal auditors' reports sent directly to senior managers and the supervisory board/audit 
committee as a basis for the action to be taken? 
Always 10 Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 50 
Remarks ............................................... 
6. Has the supervisory bond set up an internal audit committee comprising non-executive directors? 
Alreadyhave 10 Wouldconsider 20 Would not 30 
7. Are the fimctions of the audit committee to ensure that the internal control systems are followed? 
Already have 11: 1 Would consider 20 Would not 30 
8. Does the audit committee have access to counterparties? 
Always IC Often M Sometimes 313 Rm-ely 40 Never 513 
VI. Infi=tructure 
1. In terms of risk management tasks, which of the following types of organiz2fion is adopted by 
your bank? Enterprise risk management framework that covers 0 risks across the organization (or 
centraked approach) 113 Fragmented risk management fi: amework that as*s diffe=t risk 
to different business units (distributed approach) 20 
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2. If your bank implemented the enterprise risk management firagework (please continue 
answering questions 3 through 7), which of the following have been established formally? 
Mission, objectives and accountabilitics 10 Information sharing and interdepartmental 
coordination 211 Functions that are responsible for assessing, authorizing, executing, and 
controlling each type of risk 30 Other 40 .................................................. 
3. Can you grade your bank's human resources involved in implementing appropriate enterprise 
risk management framework? 
Very competent 10 Competent 20 Fairly competent 30 Incompetent 40 
Very incompetent 50 
4. Wiich of the following risk management responsibilities are important to your bank? Please 
indicate using the given scales, where I= Not important; 2= Less important; 3= Fairly 
important; 4= Important; and 5= Very importand 
a. Participating in setting target markets and business strategies, and firm risk philosophy 
formulation 10 ZI 30 413 50 
b. Creating an increasing awareness of different types of risks across the firm 10 2D 30 
411 50 
c. Reviewing risk-taking strategies adopted by business units 10 20 30 40 50 
d. Creating and recommending enterprise risk policies and procedures 10 20 30 40 
50 
e. Identifying existing and potential market, credit and operational risks along with potential 
interrelationships across these risks 10 20 30 40 50 
f. Developing, updating and implementing methodologies (e. g. Value at risk-, risk adjusted return 
on capital) `10 20 30 40 50 
g. Communicating risk culture, policies and methodologies across the firm 10 20 30 40 
50 
h. Setting or recommending limits and diversification strategies 10 20 30 40 50 
L Ensuring compliance with the bank's risk policies, limit structures and diversification strategies 
10 Z3 30 40 50 
j. Monitoring overall exposures and risks and reporting on these to senior risk management on a 
frequent basis 10 20 30 40 50 
k. Developing and maintaining risk measurement models and validating valuation models 10 
20 30 411 50 
L Performing enterprise stress testing 10 20 30 40 50 
L Developing capital measurement methodologies and participating in capital-allocation 
decisions 10 20 30 40 50 
m. Assisting the business units in achieving stability of earnings, improving risk-adjustcd returns, 
and enhancing shareholder value contributions through better risk measurement and informed 
risk taking 10 20 30 40 50 
n. None 10 20 30 40 50 
5.7he organizatioa of a firm-wide risk management is established based on risk culture and 
processes to make 6* management into a shareholder value-enhancing activityl 
Strong1y agree I0 Agree 20 Disagree 30 Strongly disagree 40 
6. Has the Board of Directors established in independent risk management function for aging 
and controlling risks? (Already have 10 Would consider 20 Bank Indonesia has not 
regulated yet 30 Would not 40) 1 
Market risk : 111 20 30 40 
Credit risk : 111 20 30 40 
Operational risk : 111 211 30 40 
Uquidity risk : 10 211 30 40 
Legal risk : 111 211 30 40 
Reputatioaal, risk : 111 211 30 40 
Other ................................. : 111 20 30 40 
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7. Who foffni, 12tes and endorses the firm's guidelines and policies on the use of fin2ncial 
instruments within a risk culture? 
Shareholders 10 Board of Directors 20 Head of Department 30 None 40 Other 
50 ..................................... 
8. How do you find the detailed procedures for the financial instruments to prevent inadvertent 
specul2tion? 
Excellent ID Good 2 11 Fair 30 Poor 4 
9. Have the policy makers in your bank decided vhich financial risks to beat and what do you 
tbink? 
Risk that can be eliminated or avoided Excellent 10 Good 20 Fair 30 Poor 4 
Risk that can be transferred Excellent 10 Good 20 Fair 30 Poor 4 
Risk that can be managed at the firm level Excellent 10 Good 20 Fair 30 Poor 4 
10. Do the guidelines cover the general areas of financial policy? 1"ick as many as applic2blel 
Marketrisk 10 Creditrisk 20 Uquidityrisk 30 Oper2tionalrisk 40 Legalrisk 
50 Reputational risk 60 Itgalissues 70 Human resources guidelines 80 
Accounting and reporting systems 90 Management information 100 Internal control 
system 110 
11. What models do you implement in your bank? 
Market tisLa Gap analysis 10 Duration analysis 20 Simulation analysis 30 Value at 
Risk (VaR) models 40 Macroeconomics models 513 Others 60 .......................... Credit risir. Accounting ratios approach 10 Statistical models (e. g. linear probability model, 
the probit and logit models and discriminant analysis) 213 Option pricing models 30 
Credit risk models (eg. mark to market models and default models) 40 Internalrating 
system 50 VaRcreditmodels 60 Others 70 ........................................ 
Operational risk: VaR operational models 10 Parametric approach 20 Causalmodels, 
30 Extreme value models 40 Other 50 .................................... Liquidityrisk: Accounting ratios approach 10 Statistical models Z3 Other 
30 .................................................... 
11 Have you used the same risk measurements method (aggregation approach) across vazious 
hierarchies such as: 
Product types Already have 10 Would consider 20 Would not 30 
Geography Alreadyhave 10 Would consider 20 Would not 30 
Business unit Already have 10 Would consider 20 Would not 30 
Risk type Already have 10 Would consider 20 Would not 30 
V11. Separation of Duties 
I. 17here should be a segregation of duties between the control function (ie. who engages in 
measuring, monitoring, controlling and reporting risk exposures) and the execution function (i. e. 
who generates fisk) which ensures that risk management is in independent function. 
Notimportant 10 Lessimportant 20 Fairlyimportant 311 Important 40 Very 
important 50 
Z There should be a reconcili2tion between front (Le. who involves in risk generation) and back- 
office (i. e. settlement and accounting)l 
Not important 10 Less important 20 Fairly important 30 Important 40 Very 
important 50 
3. Who undertakes the reconciliation? 
Front Office 10 Back Office 20 An independent unit 30 
4. The reconciliation should be carried out regularly and ft-equently on the basis of the volume and 
value of transactionsl 
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Not important 10 Less important 20 Fairly important 313 Important 40 Very 
important SO 
VIII. Finain ial Instruments Valuation 
1. Ilere is a distinction between the adoption of accounting principles for accounting purposes and 
for valuation purposesl 
Not important 10 Less important 20 Fairly important 30 Important 40 Very 
important 50 
2. Are the financial assets valued based on cost or market price? 
Cost 10 Market rate 211 Other 30 .......... 
3. Does the frequency of valuation depend on the following factor(s)? 
Nature of instrument 10 Size 211 Comple3ity 30 Allof them 40 
4. Senior managers determine the policy for obtaining market prices, including the supplier(s) and 
the frequency of markin to marked 
Notimport2nt 10 Lessimportant 213 Fairlyimportant 30 Important 40 VC17 
important 50 
5. Is the valuation carried out independently from those who trade the instruments? 
Always 10 Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 50 
6. Are the valued instruments checked or audited by an independent unit? 
Always 10 Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never SCI 
7. Are the valued instruments checked and audited on a timely basis? 
Always 10 Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 513 
8. Are the quotations obtained from two other financial institutions before your bank is allowed to 
buy the instrument? 
Always 10 Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 50 
9. Are there people in your firm able to value the products/instruments? 
Always 10 Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 50 
10. Are the people in question 9 independent of the risk takers who bought the products originally? 
Yes 10 No 20 
DL Credit Risk 
1. What do you know about credit risk with regatd to your bank? Please indicate using a five scale 
provided CLe. I= Not important; 2= Less important; 3= Fairly important; 4= Important; and 
5= Very important)l 
Credit risk arises from the possibility that a borrower or a counterparty will fad to meet its 
obligations 10 20 30 40 50 
Credit risk arises only from assets activities 10 20 30 40 50 
Credit risk arises from assets activities and off balance sheet activities 10 ZI 30 40 511 
Credit risk can arise if credit analysis and review procedures are not stringent enough 10 20 
311 40 50 
Credit risk can arise from country risk in that a bank may lend fimds to foreign countries 10 
211 30 40 50 
2. What is your definition of credit risk? 
............................................................................................................... 
................................................................................................................ 
.................................................................................................................. 
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3. Credit risk represents what your bank could lose if the borrowers or counter-parties fail to meet 
their obligations under the terms and conditions of financial contracts because of diminished 
ability or willingness to do sol 
Not important 10 ass important 20 Fairly important 30 Important 40 Very 
important 50 
Can your bank! s credit risk be further indicated using a five scale provided (ie. I= Not 
important; 2= Less important; 3= Fairly important; 4= Important; and 5= Very important). 
Issuer risk 10 20 313 40 50 
Counterparty default jisk 10 211 30 40 50 
Sovereign risk 10 20 30 40 513 
Settlement risk 10 213 30 40 50 
Concentration credit risk ID M 30 411 50 
Credit deterioration risk 10 20 30 413 50 
Other ..................... ID 20 30 413 513 
S. Because a credit decision is based on the uncertainty of future cash flows, a bank will extend a 
credit when the probability of repayment exceeds the probability of aon-repaymentl 
Not important 10 Less important ZI Fairly important 30 Important 40 Very 
important 50 
6. It is always useful to examine the credit files of individual banks to assess the quality of specific 
loansl 
Always 10 Often 213 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 513 
7. Why cannot problem loans in general be measured accurately by a bank? Please tick the box 
using a five scale, where I= Not important; 2= Less important; 3= Fay important; 4 
Important; and 5= Very importantl 
Accounting information cannot reveal the problems 10 20 30 40 50 
Disturbance in the economy IC 20 311 411 513 
Variable debtors' perform e 10 20 311 413 511 
Different management IC 23 30 40 513 
Other ..................................................... 10 ZI 311 40 50 Remarks: ...................................................................................................... 
........................ o ......... 0 .... 0o .................................... o.. 0 ....................... 0 ...... 00. 
8. Does your bank apply modem credit portfolio management techniques and credit derivatives to 
m2nage the credit exposures and concentration risks? 
Always M Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 50 
9. Do you use Value at Risk (VaR) models to measure credit riW 
Always I0 Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 413 Never 511 
10. If the answer for question 9 was yes, do you consider the impact of credit quality migrations, 
defaults and correlations? 
Always 10 Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 50 
11. Does your bank periodically cahbrate the internal credit risk scheme against ....... ? 
a. Externally published ratings: Always 10 Often M Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 
Never 5rl 
b. Different credit data sets provided by other vendors: Always 10 Often 20 Sometimes 
30 Rarely 40 Never 50 
12. Which of the Mowing data are incorporated into calculating credit risk exposure? Collater2l. Always 10 Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 50 
Netting provisions Always 113 Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 50 
Obligor relationships Always 10 Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 50 
Obligor domiciles Always 10 Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 50 
Economic sectors Always 10 Often 20 Sometimes 313 Rarely 40 Never 511 
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Internal Rating Migration Always 10 Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 411 Never 50 
Defaults Always 10 Often 211 Sometimes 30 Rarely 41D Never 50 
Recoveries Always I0 Often, 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 50 
Portfolio correlations Always 10 Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 411 Never 50 
Other ..................... Always 10 Often 211 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 50 
13. Please rank your bank's risk of the following products (Le. I= Most dangerous; Dangerous = 2; 
Less dangerous = 3; and Least dangerous = 4)1 
Loans 10 211 30 40 
Short term securities 10 20 30 411 
Other earning assets 10 211 30 40 
Deposits 10 211 311 411 
Other liabilities 10 211 30 40 
Derivative products 10 20 30 411 
Other off-balance sheet items 10 211 30 40 
Other .............................. 10 ZI 30 411 
14. Does your bank pay special attention to concentration factors of credit risk to ensure a proper 
level of exposure? Tick the applicable answer and indicate the importance using a five scale 
provided (Le. 1 = Not important; 2= Less important; 3= Fairly important; 4= Important; and 5 
= Very important)l 
Certain economic sectors 10 20 30 40 511 
Certain groups 10 20 313 40 50 
Certain geographic areas 10 20 30 40 50 
Certain countries 10 20 313 40 511 
Other ........................ 113 20 30 40 50 
is. The approach to credit risk should be different vith regard to the nature of the counterparty/ 
debtor, resulting in the different analysis and monitoring techniques. Please indicate the 
importance using a five scale provided (I = Not important; 2= Less important; 3= Fairly 
important; 4= Important; and 5= Very important)l 
Sit4e corporate firm ID ZI 313 40 50 
Groups and affiliates ID 211 30 40 50 
Governments 10 20 311 40 50 
Country risk 10 M 313 40 511 
Other ................... 113 213 313 411 50 
16. How do you find your banles credit policies and standard procedures? 
Excellent 113 Good 213 Fair 313 Poor 413 
Rma&s: ............................... 
17. How does your bank measure the credit risk of loans? 
Internal credit rating system (your own models): Always ID Often 20 Sometimes 30 
Rarely 40 Never 50 Credit rating as established by Bank Indonesia: Always 10 Often 20 
Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 50 
18. Do you prefer internal credit rating system (or internal models) to Bank Indonesia's credit rating 
system? 
Always 10 Often 20 Sometimes 311 Rarely 40 Never 50 
Remarks: 
...................................................................................................... 
19. Do you know the reason of your answer in question 18? Please indicate the importance using a 
five scale provided (I = Not important; 2= Less important; 3= Fairly important; 4= Important; 
and 5= Very important)l 
7he capital charge will probably decrease under internal model 10 20 30 40 513 
My bank will get a strong competitive advantage 10 20 30 411 50 
Internal model assumes potential costs to this bank 10 20 30 40 513 
1he external supervisions results in a competitive disadvantage 10 20 30 40 50 
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20. Is researching the identity and legal status of a new client part of any credit assessment of new 
counterparties? 
Always 10 Often 20 Sometimes 311 Rarely 40 Never 50 
21. Do you use rating agency as a part of any credit assessment? 
Always 10 Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 50 
22. Are credit lines analysed by staff and altered in accordance with only a client's reputation? 
Always 10 Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 50 
23. Doseniorrnana rs try to reduce counterparty risk by putting in place master netting 
agreements? 
Always 10 Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 50 
24. Credit risk will be affected by the existence of? 
Collateral Always 10 Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 511 
Cash collateral Always 10 Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 50 
Interest Rates Always 10 Often 211 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 50 
Endorsements & insurance Always 10 Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 50 
Sharing of information Always 10 Often 23 Sometimes 313 Rarely 40 Never 50 
Bankruptcy procedures Always 10 Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 50 
Fraud level Always 10 Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 50 
25. How does your bank make decisions on a new loan? Please tick as many as you likel 
Reliant mainly on the analysis of the overall finalocial condition of the debtor ID Reliant on 
accuracy of cash flow trends 20 Realistic projection of the overall economic situation 30 
All of them 411 
26. Does your bank use finandal accounting ratios to measure credit risk, such as univariate 
accounting based credit scoring systems, where decision-makers compare various accounting 
ratios of potential borrowers with industry or group norms? 
Always 10 Often 211 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 50 
27. Does your bank use finand2l accounting ratios to measure credit risk, such as multivatiate models 
where the key accounting variables are combined and weighted to provide either a credit score or 
a profitability compared to a benchmark, to decide whether loan applicants are either rejected or 
accepted? 
Always 10 Often 211 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 50 
28. Does your bank use a model for risk measurement which assumes that a borrower goes bankrupt 
when the mark t value Cle. liquidation) of its assets faMs below its debt obligations to outside 
creditors. Ihis model starts Erom the premise that the value of equity (Le. stock price) can be 
viewed as a call option on the value of a firres assets, and there is a theoretical link between the 
volatility of a firm's assets, and its (unobservable) assets value volatility? 
Always 10 Often 211 Sometimes 30 Rarely 411 Never 511 
29. Do you think that the model in question 28 can be applied in Indonesia? 
Always 10 Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 513 
Remarks: ................................................................................................ 
30. If your answer for question 29 was Never, do you know the reasons? 
7here is no publicly available data I0 'Mere is no internally available data ZI Other 
30 
31. Does your bank use the mortality default rate models for measuring risk that seek to derive 
actuarial-type probrabilities of default fi-om the past data on bond defaults by credit grade and 
years to maturity? 
Always 10 Often ZI Sometimes 30 Rudy 40 Never 50 
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32. Do you think that the model in question 31can be applied in Indonesia? 
Always 10 Often 20 Sometimes 311 Rarely 411 Never 50 
Remarks: 
...................................................................................................... 
33. If your answer to question 32 was Never, do you know the reasons? 
This model needs a sufficiently large size of loan default data base 10 'Mere are no trained 
staff 20 Other 30 ........................ 
34. Does your bank use CreditMetrics@ (1997) that relies upon porffolio models to construct a 
methodology for measuring credit risk? 
Always 10 Often 211 Sometimes 30 Rarely 413 Never 50 
35. If your answer for question 34 was Never, do you know the reasons? 
Most loans do not have a risk rating attached by rating agencies 10 The loan portfolio analyst 
must utilize a proxy measure 20 7he internal ratings are not linked with the public bond 
ratings 30 All of them 40 Other 50 ............................................. 
................................................................................................................... 
36. Does your bank use rating services that classify or rate the quality of a particular debt security into 
broad categories for measuring risk? 
Always 10 Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 413 Never 513 
37. If your answer for question 36 was Never, do you know the reasons? 
7here are only a few firms rated by the rating agencies 10 Unrespectable rating agencies 
20 No rating agencies in Indonesia . 
30 No firms rated by rating agencies 40 Other 
50 ............................................................................................................. 
38. Are you satisfied with your baWs credit risk measurement approach? 
Extremely satisfied 10 Satisfied 20 Dissatisfied 30 Extremely dissatisfied 40 
Remarks: ...................................................................................................... 
39. If you vere dissatisfiedwith the approach, when are you changing the approach? 
One year 10 Two years 20 Mum years 30 Four years 411 Five years 50 
More than five years 60 
X Market Risk 
1. What do you know about market risk? Please indicate using a five scale provided (I = Not 
important; 2= Less important; 3= Fairly important; 4= Important; and 5= Very import2nt)l 
Market risk is the risk to a banVs earnings and stockholders'equity resulting from adverse 
movement3in. market rates or prices 10 20 30 40 50 
Nfarket risk arises only from assets activities 10 20 30 40 50 
Market risk Irises from off balance sheet activities 10 20 30 40 50 
Other ................................................. 10 211 313 413 511 
How do you define market risk? 
................................................................................................................ 
................................................................................................................ 
.................................................................................................................. 
Does your bank employ a mirket risk approach to calculate the minimum capital for mark t risk 
set by Bank Indonesia? 
Always I0 Often 211 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 50 
Which derivatives are used by your bank? Please tick the applicable boxesl Currency forward contracts Always 10 Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 50 
Interest rate swap Always 10 Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 50 
Currency swaps Always 10 Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 50 
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Caps and floors Always 10 Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 50 
Interest rate forward contracts Always 10 Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 50 
Over the counter currency options Always 10 Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 50 
Other .................................. Always 10 Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 50 
5. What problems present in the use of derivatives? Please indicate the importance of the problems 
using a five scale provided (Le. I= Not important; 2 Less important; 3 = Fairly important; 4 
Important; and 5= Very important)l 
Measuring the risk of derivatives : 10 20 30 40 50 
Indonesian accounting guidelines : 10 20 30 413 50 
Lack of expertise within the organization : ID 20 30 40 50 
Inadequate knowledge about the bank's exposures : 10 213 313 40 50 
Valuation of derivatives : 10 20 30 40 50 
Heterogeneity of international accounting guidelines : 10 20 30 40 50 
U-S generally accepted accounting principles : ID 20 30 40 50 
Liquidity risk : 10 20 30 411 50 
Credit risk : 10 20 30 40 50 
Operational risk : 10 20 30 411 513 
Legal risk : 10 20 30 40 513 
Disclosure requirements : 10 20 313 411 513 
Tax issues : 10 Z3 30 40 50 
Transaction costs : 10 W 313 40 50 
Bank Indonesia regulations : 111 211 30 411 50 
Other 
......................................................... . 10 20 313 40 
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Which risk is the primary concern Of Your market risk management? Please indicate the 
importance of the problems using the given scales, where I= Not important; 2= Less important; 
3= Fairly important; 4= Important; and 5= Very importand 
Interest rate risk 10 20 30 40 50 
Equity risk 10 20 30 40 50 
Commodity risk ID 211 313 411 50 
Foreign exch2nge risk 113 20 30 40 50 
Real estate prices ID 211 313 411 511 
Other .................... 10 20 311 411 511 
7. How does your bank mam foreign exchange risks? 
No regular assessment 10 Regular and systematic assessments 20 Regular, systematic 
assessments and quantification 30 Regular, systematic assessments, quantification, and active 
management. 40 
8. How does your bank implement foreign exchange risk management? 
Immediately hedge all exposures 10 Not hedged at all 20 Partially hedge 30 
Immediately hedge a portion of exposure and use forecasts to decide the rest 40 Use forecasts 
to decide hedging 50 
9. How am the exposures to the U. S. Dollar managed? 
Fully exposed 10 I-cgs than W/o covered ZI 51-75% covered 313 More than 75% 
covered 40 Fully covered 50 
10. How does your bank m2na interest rate risks? 
NO regular assessment 10 Regular and systematic assessments 20 Regular, systematic 
assessments and quantification 311 Regular, systematic assessments, quantification, and active 
management. 40 
11. How does your bank implement interest rate risk management? 
Immediately hedge 22 exposures 10 Not hedged at all 211 Partially hedge 30 
Immediately hedge a portion of exposure and use to decide the rest 413 Use interest rate 
forecasts to decide hedging 50 Crute open interest rate positions to generate profits 60 
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1z Market risk can be measured as the potential gain or loss in a position or portfolio that is 
associated with price movements of a given probability over a specified time horizoal 
Strongly agree 10 Agree 20 Disagree 30 Strongly disagree 40. 
13. Has your bank employed intemal. models for market risk? 
Already has 10 Would consider 20 Would not 30 
Explain: ...................................................................................................... 
14. Why does your bank use the internal model? 
Bank knows more about risks dun the others 10 just following the trend 2D Other 311 
.................................................. 
is. Has Bank Indonesia approved your internal model for measuring market risk? 
Already has 10 Has not yet 20 Bank Indonesia hasn't regulated yet 30 
16. Do you prefer internal market risk model to Bank Indonesia's market risk model? 
Always 10 Oftea 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 50 
Remarks: ...................................................................................................... 
17. Do you know the reason of your answer in question 16? Please indicate the importance using a 
five scale provided (1 = Not important; 2= Less important; 3= Fairly important; 4= Important; 
and 5= Very important)l 
Ihe capital charge will probably decrease under internal model ICI 20 30 411 50 
My bank will get a strong competitive advantage 10 20 30 40 50 
Internal model assumes potential costs to this bank 10 20 30 411 50 
The external supervisions results in a competitive disadvantage ID 20 30 40 50 
18. Which approaches arc used in your bank for measuring market risk? 
Gap analysis I [I Duration analysis 20 Statistical analysis 30 Scenario analysis 40 
Portfolio analysis 50 Derivatives models 60 Value at Risk (VaR) models 70 Forecasting 
models 811 Other 90 ........................... Remarks: ..................................................................... 
19. Has your bank employed standardized modclsformark t risk established by Bank Indonesia? 
Alreadyhas 10 Wouldconsider 20 Bank Indonesia has not regulated yet 30 
20. Does your bank use the Value at Risk (VaR) model for measuring market risk? 
Yes 10 No 20 
21. If your answer for question 20 was Yes, then answer all questions from 21 to 28. If your answer 
was No, please proceed to question 29. Who decides the method of VaR measurement? Please 
tick as many as you likel 
Shareholders 10 Board of Directors ZI Head of Department 30 Staff 413 
22. Which VaR approach (s) is adopted by your bank? Please tick as many as you likel 
Historical simulation 10 'Me variance-covariance or portfolio analysis approach 20 Monte 
Carlo Simulation 30 Extreme Value VaR 40 Other 511 .................................... 
23. What parameters should senior managers use in the calculation of VaR in your bank? Please tick 
as many as you likel 
Time horizon 10 ........... days Confidence level 20 .......... % Other 30 ............................ 
24. IlLe shareholders should be swam of the VaR parameters usedl 
Not important 10 Jess important 2c] Fairly important 30 Important 40 Very 
important 50 
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25. A bank should supplement VaR with stress testing to examine the impact of various types of 
fin2nci2l distress (Le. adverse events and worst case scenarios) on the fi=ýs portfolio for 
prudential reasons? 
Always 10 Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 50 
26. Is scenario analysis carried out? 
Daily 10 Weekly 20 Monthly 30 Quarterly 40 None 513 
27. Do the Board of Directors receive periodic reports of the stress tests with recommendations? 
Daily 10 Weekly 20 Monthly 30 Quarterly 40 
28. What does your bank test when undertaking the stress tests? 
Mie test identifies events that could have an unfavourable effect on the institution I0 
1he test assesses the financial ability of the institution to withstand them 20 
29. Does your bank set aside a certain amount of capital to cover possible losses arising from market 
risk? 
NormalVaR I0 ExtremevalueVaR 20 Other 30 ............................... 
30. Is market risk assessment integrated with ......... ? Creditrisk 10 Liquidityrisk 20 Credit risk and liquidity risk 30 Operationalrisk 40 
Credit risk, liquidity risk and operational risk 50 legal risk 60 Credit risk, liquidity risk, 
operational risk and legal risk 70 None 80 Other 90 ......................... 
31. Does your bank validate continually market risk models used? 
Always 10 Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 50 
32 Are you satisfied with your banVs market risk measurement approach? 
Extremely satisfied M Satisfied 20 Dissatisfied 30 Extremely dissatisfied 40 
Remarks: ...................................................................................................... 
................................................................................................................... 
33. If you were dissatisfied with the approach, when are you changing the approach? 
One year 10 Two years 20 7II=e years 311 Four years 413 Five years 50 
More thin five years 60 
34. Which of the following does your bank use market risk models for? 
Pricing l0 Execution 20 Capital calculation Yl Other 10 ................. 
35. If today a US. dollar/Rupiah price of ............. ....... 
/2002), can you forecast a 
range or limits (Le. minimum and maximum prices) over the next 10 days, such that you are 95% 
sure that the U. S. dollar will, not be out side the Emits during the period? 
U. S. dollar mairimum prices will be ......... per rupiah and US. dollar minimum prices will be 
......... per rupiah 
M. Operational Risk 
1. Please rank the following financial risks according to origination? (1= oldest, 6= youngest)l 
Market risk 10 ZJ 30 40 50 60 
Credit risk 10 211 313 40 50 60 
Operational risk 113 20 313 40 511 60 
Liquidity risk 10 20 311 40 513 613 
Legal risk I[] Z3 311 411 511 60 
Reputational risk 10 211 3D 40 50 60 
2. Which of the following fin2ndal risks arise before a bank starts its business? 
Market risk 10 Credit risk 211 Operational risk 30 Liquidity risk 40 Legal risk 50 
Reputational risk 60 
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3. Which the following does operational risk refer to unexpected loss in the operations of your 
bank? Please indicate the importance of the problems using the scale provided (Le. I= Not 
important; 2= Less important; 3 = Fairly important; 4= Important; and 5= Very important)l 
Human acts 10 20 30 40 50 
Inadequate information systems 10 20 30 40 513 
Operational problems 10 211 313 40 50 
Breaches in internal controls 10 Z3 313 40 50 
Fraud 10 20 30 40 So 
Unforeseen catastrophes 10 20 30 40 50 
Execution risk 10 20 30 40 50 
Technology risk ID 20 311 40 50 
Model risk 10 Z3 30 40 50 
Other ........................... ID 20 30 411 50 
4. How do you define operational risk? 
5. Fhs your bank used models to measure operational risk? 
Already has 10 Would consider 20 Would not 30 
6. Which of the following posed handicaps in developing or adopting models for operational risk? 
Please indicate the importance of the problems using a five scale provided (Le. I= Not 
important; 2= Less important; 3= Fairly important; 4= Important; and 5= Very important)l 
Bank Indonesia has not regulated yet 10 20 30 40 513 
No generally accepted models for operational risk ID 20 30 40 50 
No relevant data available ID 20 30 411 511 
Data collection 10 20 30 40 50 
Other ................................................. I0 M 30 40 511 
7. In tem. of losses, how does operational risk compare with mark t risk or credit risk in your bank? 
Very significant 10 Somewhat significant 20 About the sarn 30 Somewhat less 
.. t 40 Very insignificant 511 
8. WW& of the following can operational risk result in for your bank? Please indicate the 
importance of the problems using a five scale provided (Le. I= Not important; 2= Less 
important; 3= Fairly important; 4= Important; and 5= Very important)l 
Actual realized losses 113 20 30 40 50 
Ugal liability 113 20 311 40 513 
Damage to your banVs reputation 10 20 30 40 50 
Loss of revenue 10 20 30 40 50 
Loss of market sham 10 20 30 40 50 
Other ............................. ID 20 30 40 50 
9. Do you prefer internal operational tisk model to Bank Indonesia's model? 
Always 10 Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 50 
10. Do you know the reason of your answer in question 9? Please indicate the importance using a 
five scale provided (I = Not important; 2= Less important; 3= Fairly important; 4= Important; 
and 5= Vezy important)l 
'Me capital charge will probably decrease under internal model 10 20 30 40 50 
My bank will get a strong competitive advantage 10 20 30 40 50 
Internal model assumes potential costs to this bank 10 20 311 40 511 
Ile external supervisions results in a competitive disadvantage 10 20 30 40 50 
11. Are you satisfied with your banks present approach to operational risk? 
Extremely satisfied 10 Satisfied 20 Dissatisfied 30 Extremely dissatisfied 411 
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12. If you were dissatisfied with the approach, when are you changing the approach? 
One year 10 Two years 20 Three years 30 Four years 40 Five years 50 
More than five years 60 
13. Do you think that many of the recent massive losses in banks in Indonesia have been a result 
of ..... ? Please indicate the importance of the problems using a five scale provided (Le. I= Not important; 2= Less important; 3= Fairly important, 4= Important; and 5= Very important)l 
Operational risk 10 20 30 411 SCI 
Market risk 10 20 313 40 50 
Credit risk 113 20 30 413 513 
liquidity risk 10 211 30 40 513 
1, egal risk 10 20 30 40 50 
Reputational risk 10 20 30 40 50 
14. Which of the following operational risks have been quantified? 
Computer system 10 Breaches in credit policies and procedures 20 Breaches in treasury 
policies and procedures 313 Fraud 40 Other 50 ................ 
15. Does your bank implement risk-based decisions for ...... ? lick as applicable for your bank] Transferpricing 10 Economic capital attribution 20 Risk based pricing 30 
None 411 
16. How does your bank quantify the operational risk in the context of capital calculation for risk- 
adjusted performance measurement? 
Revenue volatility measures 10 Expense volatility base 211 VaR models 3D 
Combination of actuarial science and VaR techniques to comprehensive databases of historical 
operational loss events 40 Other 50 .................................................. 
17. Has the management established an internal control system for all business activities? 
Yes 10 No ZI 
Remarks: ......................... 
18. Has the management established an independent risk nunagement function? 
Yes U] No Z3 
19. Do top management and the audit committee ensure that significant weaknesses are resolved 
quickly? 
Always 113 Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Nev" 50 
20. The complexity and /or diversity of financial instruments in your bank have been .....? Complexity: Extremely high I0 High 20 Normal 40 Low 50 
Diversity: Extremely high 10 High 20 Normal 40 Low 513 
21. Ile complexity of information systems Ins been? 
Extremely complex 10 Complex 20 Normal 30 Simple 40 
22- Your banWs operational risk management system is? 
Very sophisticated I0 Sophisticated 20 Normal 311 1&ss sophisticated 411 Inferior 50 
23. Is the number of professionals engaged in derivatives transactions sufficient? 
Abundant I0 Sufficient 213 Less sufficient. . 
30 Insufficient 411 
24. Is the expertise: (Le. experience. skill levels, and degrees of specialization) in derivatives 
transactions sufficient? 
More than sufficient K] Sufficient 213 Less sufficient. . 
313 Insufficient 40 
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25. Is there an adequate system that complies with management policies? 
Data capture Very adequate 10 Adequate 20 Less adequate 30 Inadequate 40 
Processing Very adequate 10 Adequate 20 Less adequate 30 Inadequate 40 
Settlement Very adequate 10 Adequate 211 Iess adequate 30 Inadequate 40 
Internal reporting Very adequate 10 Adequate 20 Less adequate 30 Inadequate 40 
26. Which of the following attributes should accounting standards contribute to? 
Sound risk management practices 10 Enhancing market discipline through transparent 
finandal reporting 20 Facilitating the effective supervisions of banks 30 None 40 
27. In terms of risk reporting systems, which of the following accounting standards have you 
implemented? 
Indonesian's Generally Acceptable Accounting Principles 10 Bank Indonesia's Monthly 
Report Guidance 20 International Accounting Standards Committee's qASC) accounting 
standards 30 Other 40 ..................... 
28. Does your bank divide, for accounting purposes, financial assets into a "banking book " and a 
trading book"? 
Yes 10 No 211 
Remarks: ............................................................................................. 
29. If the answer was yes, is the banking book measured by amortised cost and the trading book 
measured by fair value for capital adequacy purposes? 
Yes 10 No ZI 
30. Are assets held to maturity, originated loans, and most financial liabilities accounted for at 
amottised cost? 
Yes 111 No 20 
31. Are financial liabilities reported at cost? 
Yes 10 No 211 
3Z Arc assets held for trading and assets available for sale, such as purchased loans and certain debt 
and equity securities, accounted for at market value? 
Yes 10 No 213 
Remarks: .................................. 
33. In terms of the bankin book, what proportions of total assets / liabilities? 
It accounts for .......... % of total assets compared ........ % of total liabilities 
34. In terms of the tmding book, what Proportions Of total assets / liabilities? 
It accounts for ........... % of total assets compared ............ % of total liabilities 
35. In respect of the banldng book, Ins your bank used internal models to measure credit risk? 
yes I0 No 20 Has not been regulated yet byBI 30 
36. AM derivatives (if applicable) held for trading accounted for at fair value? 
yes 113 No ZI Notapplicable 313 
37. Are derivatives (if applicable) held for hedging, accounted for at fair value? 
Yes 113 No 20 Not applicable 40 
38. Can the implemented accounting standards reveal the financial rUs involved to improve the 
regulatory Emmework for public disclosure ? 
Nfaiket risk 10 Credit risk 20 Operational risk 30 Uquidity risk 40 Legal risk 5 
13 Reputational risk 60 None 70 ........................... Remarks: .................................................................................................... 
328 
39. Can the implemented accounting standards reveal the fin-nci-I risks involved to improve the 
regulatory framework for supervisory reporting? 
M. arket risk 10 Credit risk 20 Operational risk 30 Liquidity risk 40 Legal risk 5 
0 Reputational risk 60 None 70 ........................... Remarks: .................................................................................................... 
40. 'Which of the following policies are stated in die accounting policies? 
The valuation of assets and liabilities 10 Risk management policies 20 Riskprofiles 30 
Capital components 40 Other 50 ...................... 
MI. Uquidity Risk 
1. For mark t liquidity risk, it is more difficult to handle and more dangerous. Ile risk is 
characterized by the drying up of market liquidity with big bid-ask spreading. Do you have any 
idea how to solve this problem? 
Making the extreme case assumption about close Cut Costs 11: 1 Maintaining access to the 
fimds providers 2: 3 Maintaining reserve balances with Bank Indonesia 30 
2. Uquidity risk is the potential that a finn will be unable to meet its obligations as they fall duel 
What do you think? 
Strongly agree 10 Agree 20 Disagree 30 Strongly disagree 30 
3. How do you define liquidity risk? 
4. What factors raise the liquidity risk of a bank? 
Inability to liquidate assets I (I 
Inability to raise adequate funding from new sources at a reasonable cost (so called funding 
liquidity risk) when a bank faces unpredictable new loan demand or deposit withdrawals 20 
Inability to easily unwind or offset specific exposures in a cost effective manner because of 
inadequate mark t depth or market disruption (so-called mark t liquidity risk) 313 
Other 40 ................................................................................... 
5. Which liquidity risk is more difficult to handle and more dangerous? 
Funding liquidity risk 113 Market liquidity risk ZI 
6. Which liquidity risk do you man, and control? 
Normal liquidity risk that arises from normal day-to-day market operation 10 Niarketcrisi3 
liquidity risk that has systemic implications and is move dangerous risk than the normal risk (due 
to a market crisis when the market has lost its normal level of liquidity and the position can be 
liquidated only by taking much largerlosses than under normal condition) 20 Bothofhem 
30 
7- Ile solvency ratio and liabilities-to-as3ets ratio indicate the banYs equity base and borrowing 
capacity in the money market respectively. A bank with the greater equity and lower financial leverage can raise more debt with less chance of becoming insolvent. What do you think! 
Strongly agree 10 Agree 20 Disagree 30 Strongly disagree: 411 
8. Do you think that a contagion effect as a result of liquidity and credit f0ures can lead to it 
systemic risk in a banking system? 
Strongly agree 10 Agree 213 Disagree 313 Samoy disagree 40 
9. If you use the Value at Risk (VaR) method in rneasuting maiket risk, do you take into account liquidity costs in computing the VaR? 
Always 10 Often 20 Sometimes 30 Ruely 40 Never 50 
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10. Which approaches do you use when measuring market risk using Value at Risk (V&R)? 
01 the Add-on approach by which the VaR mark t is adjusted by adding up the liquidity risk IC 
(H) the VaR market models that take liquidity risk into account in the models by tracing back into 
the VaR m2rket model 20 
Both of them 30 
None 40 
Other 50 ............................................. 
11. How does your bank develop procedures to manage and control liquidity risk? 
By monitoring the differences in maturities between assets and liabilities 10 By an2lysing 
future fimding requirements based on various assumptions, including your banWs ability to 
liquidate positions quickly in advem conditions 20 Both of them 30 
1Z What elements should liquidity risk management have? 
Its expected cash flows (first line of defence) 10 Its capacity to borrow in the market 
(second line of defence) 20 Its stock of high quality readily liquefiable assets (fhird line of 
defence) 30 All of them (34 
13. Have you established contingency procedures to deal with potential liquidity risks that may arise 
from the early termination of contracts, including earlier deposit withdrawals? Already have 10 
Wouldconsider 211 Bank Indonesia has not regulated yet 30 
14. Do you prefer internal liquidity risk model to Bank Indonesia's model? 
Always 10 Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 50 
15. Do you know the rmson of your answer in question 14? Please indicate the importance using a 
five scale provided (I = Not important; 2= Less important, 3= F2irly important; 4= Important; 
and 5= Very important)l 
1he capital charge will probably decrease under internal model 10 20 30 40 50 
My bank will get a strong competitive advantage 10 20 30 40 513 
Internal model assumes potential costs to this bank 10 213 313 40 50 
1he external supervisions results in a competitive disadvantage 10 20 30 40 50 
16. Are you satisfied with your bank's present approach to measuring liquidity risk? 
Extremely satisfied 10 Satisfied 20 Dissatisfied 30 Ex- - elydissatisfied 40 
17. If you were dissatisfied with the approach, when are you changing the 2ppr02ch? 
One year 10 Two years 20 Three years 30 Four years 411 Five years 50 
More than five years 60 
MIL Risk Tim, Systcm 
I. Ffas your bank set a risk litnit system ? 
Already has 10 Would consider 20 Would not 30 
Remarks: 
.................................................. 
2. VAut risk fimit systcm does your bank have? 
3. What limit setting method does your bank adopt? 
Bottom-up method 10 Top-down method 20 
4. Is the risk limit system consistent with the following? Please use a five scale provided (Le. 
provided (Le. I= Not important; 2=I., ess important; 3= Fairly im portant; 4= Important and 
5= Very important)f 
The fires philosophy 10 20 30 40 513 
The firm's overall business strategies 10 ZI 30 40 511 
The effectivenesS at Managing risk 10 W 311 40 50 
The firm's capital position 10 20 30 40 511 
Other .......................................... 111 213 311 411 511 
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5. Is the risk limit system an integrated firm-widc 1. imitS system, LC. evaluated and aggregated at the 
overall corporate level? 
Always 10 Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 50 
Remarks: ................................................................... 
6. VAich of the following does your Emit framework include? 
Volume or notional limits Always 10 Often 20 Sometimes 311 Rarely 40 Never 50 
Risk sensitivity limits Always 10 Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 411 Never 50 
Portfolio level Always 10 Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 50 
Value at Risk Emits Always 10 Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 50 
Stop-loss/advisory Emits Always 10 Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 50 
7. In terms of volume or notional limits, how does your bank express them? 
Ilie maximum permissible currency value of transactions 10 The maximum percentage 
share in relation to overall total volume 20 The maximum net open position 30 The 
maximum concentration of specific groupings of counterparties 40 The .- 
concentration of specific groupings of counterparties 50 Ile maximum concentration of 
specific groupings of industries 60 The maximum concentration of instruments 711 
Remarks: 
......................................................................... 
8. If your bank uses sensitivity limits, does your bank use the various 'greek? 
Delta I0 Gamma 2C] Vega 30 Ileta, 40 Rho 50 I. Ambda. 60 
None of them 70 Other 80 .............. Remarks: ......................................................... 
9. Does your bank use Value at Risk limits? 
Yes 10 No ZI 
10. Does your bank set the limit at? 
Desk level Always 10 Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rardy 40 Never 50 
Business unit Always I0 Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 50 
Division Always 113 Often 211 Sometimes 3D Rarely 40 Never 50 
Enterprise level Always 10 Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 511 
Other ............. Always 10 Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 50 
11. Does your bank set them under? 
Normal market conditions 10 Extreme market conditions 211 Both 30 ................ 
IZ Does your bank set them for major asset classes? 
Interest rates Always ID Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 411 Never 513 
Foreign exchange Always 10 Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 50 
Equities Always 10 Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 50 
Commodit; a Always 10 Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 50 
Real Estate Always 10 Often 20 Sometimes 311 Rarely 40 Never 50 
Other .............. . Always I0 Oftea 211 Sometimes 311 Rarely 411 Never 513 
13. Are the authorized limits in the form of transaction type, term, currency and size allocated to 
individu2ls based upon their expertise and experience? 
Always 10 Often M Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 50 
14. Are the Emit exemptions Cincluding the authorization procedures used, before such transactions 
am executed)? 
Clearly reported to the executive board. Always 10 Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 
PetiodicaUy rcported to the supervisor: Always 10 Often 211 Sometimes 311 Rarely 413 Never 
15. Are there written penalties and disciplinary procedures when the Emits are broken? 
Yes 10 No 20 
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16. How do you define stop/loss limits? 
Acceptable losses within a defined period 10 Acceptable losses in relation to some specified 
level of capital 20 Other 30 ......................................................... 
.................................................................................................................. 
17. Do the senior managers establish stop/loss limits for? 
Individual trader Always 10 Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 50 
Trading group Always 10 Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 50 
18. Is the entire limits process reviewed regularly? 
Always I0 Often 20 Sometimes 313 Rarely 40 Never 513 
19. Does the Emit review system encompass the following? 
Individual Emits: Always I0 Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 411 Never 50 
Business Emits Always 10 Often 20 Sometimes 313 Rarely 411 Never 511 
Risk-category limits Always 10 Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 50 
Limit utilization Always 10 Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 513 
Limit exemptions Always U] Often 20 Sometimes 311 Rarely 40 Never 511 
Penalties system Always 10 Often 20 Sometimes 30 Rarely 40 Never 50 
MV. Data and Information Systems 
1. How does your bank set the information system for risk management activities? 
Fragmented information System Yes 10 No 20 
Integrated information system Yes 10 No Z1 
If your bank uses the integrated system, it captures: 
Transactions Yes I0 No 20 
Position data Yes 10 No 20 
Counterpwy positions Yes 10 No 20 
Real-time mark t data Yes ID No 20 
Modelling assumptions Yes 10 No 20 
Z If the answer to question I above is the integrated system, what elements are in the system? 
Data models and repositories 113 Valuation models 20 Risk calculation engines and 
anglytics 311 Data extraction and infonnation. reporting capabilities 40 Interfaces to 
legacy systems 513 None 60 Other 70 ................................................ 
3. What is the proportion of spending on Enterprise risk management technology compared to total 
the expenditures on Front and Nfiddle Office Trading technology? 
00/0 10 1%-5% ID 5.1% - 101/6 ZJ 10.1%-15% 311 15.1% - 39Y6 40 30% 
- W/o 511 >5(r/o 611 
4. What is proportion of spending on Market risk management technology compared to the total 
expenditures on Front and Middle Office Trading technology? 
0% ID IVo-5% 111 5.1% - 101/6 213 10.1% - 15% 311 15.1%- 301/6 40 3 01/6 
-50% 511 >500/9 60 
5. What is proportion of spending on Credit risk management technology compared to the total 
expenditures on Front and Middle Office Trading technology? 
0% 10 1%-5% 10 5.1% - I(YY6 20 10.1% - 15% 30 15.1% - 30% 40 30% - 5(Yyo 50 >50% 611 
6. What is the proportion of spending on Global limit technology compared to the total 
expenditures on Front and Middle Office Trading technology? 
0 01/0 ID 11/0-5% ID 5.1% - 10% 20 10.1% - 15% 313 15.1%- 30% 40 30 Ya 
- 501/6 50 >501/6 613 
7. Will your bank be investing more in enterprise wide tisk technology over the next five years? 
O'YQ 10 1%-5% 10 5.1% - 101/o 211 10.1%-15% 30 15.1%- 301/4 411 30% 
- 500/0 SO >50% 60 
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8. Can you grade the quality of risk data for risk management in terms of? 
Speed of delivery Excellent 10 Very good 20 Good 30 Fair 40 Poor 50 
Flexibility Excellent 10 Very good 20 Good 30 Fair 40 Poor 50 
Efficiency Excellent 10 Very good 20 Good 30 Fair 40 Poor 50 
User fiiendliness Excellent 10 Very good 20 Good 30 Fair 40 Poor 50 
9. In terms of balancing the 'ideal' infortnation content with current data availability and report 
generation capabilities, can you grade your bank! s reporting system? 
Excellent 10 Very good 2D Good 30 Fair 40 Poor 50 
10. Which of the following are contained in daily reports? 
Limit excess 10 Risk concentrations 20 P&L changes 30 Detailed 
market/credit/operational risk events 40 None 50 Other 60 ........................... 
11. Which of the following are contained in monthly reports? 
Risks profile 10 Performance trend analysis 20 Internal and external business 
environment outlook and risk implication 30 None 50 Other 60 ..................... 
12. Which of the following are contained in quarterly reports? 
Capit2l/resource allocation decisions 10 Earning reliability and sustainability/trend analysis 
20 Short and long term business opportunities and their risks 30 Summary of an 
business and customer risks 40 None 511 Other 611 ....................... 
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Appendix 43 
Table 4.1 Ile Indonesian banks' risk ratings for Element I 
In vercentaires 
B k ib Risk ting an attr utes Low Moderate High Total 
Type of office Domestic banks 32-82 29.08 26.03 87.93 
Foreign banks 6.16 2.96 2.96 12.07 
Total 38.98 32-04 28.98 100.00 
Type of license Foreign banks 5.20 3.77 3.91 12.89 
State bank 5.40 4.73 4.41 14-55 
Foreign exchange banks 12.36 11.44 9.15 32.95 
Non-foreiga exchange banks 4.34 4.61 4.64 13.58 
joint banks 3.40 3.74 3.61 10.74 
Regional development banks 4.85 5.06 5.39 15.30 
Total 35.55 33-35 31.11 100.00 
Total Assets (Rp bio) 545-47,341 32.46 27.23 23.26 82.95 
47,342 - 94,138 2.65 1.93 2.45 7.03 
94,139 - 140,935 2.84 1.55 2.12 6.51 
234,529 - 281,325 1.26 1.38 0.87 3.51 
Total 39.21 32.10 28.69 100.00 
Total employees 53-5,044 29.79 25.13 21.77 XF 
5,045 - 10,036 7-67 2.10 1.48 6.26 
10,037 - 15,027 2-52 1.60 2.77 6.89 
15,028 - 20,019 1.26 1.38 0.87 3.51 
20,020 - 25,011 1.39 0.83 0.92 3.13 
25,012 - 30,000 1.58 1.06 0.88 3.51 
Total 39.21 32.10 28.69 100.00 
Total branches 0-143 27.81 22.52 19.31 69.64 
144-287 5.11 4.51 4.12 13.75 
288-431 2.67 Z07 1.68 6.42 
432-575 1.26 1.39 0.88 3.53 
721-856 Z47 1.70 Z49 6.67 
Total 39.33 . 3Z20 28-47 100-00 Years of market risk <1 5.52 8.88 5.52 19.91 
5< years>1 IZ99 IZ78 IZ99 38.75 
>5 5.63 6.56 5.63 17.82 
None 7.93 7.65 7.93 23.52 
Total 3ZO6 35.87 3ZO6 100.00 
Years of credit risk <I years 4.33 4.97 3.16 17-47 
5<year>l 14.61 13.05 9.60 37.26 
>5 years 16.88 9.49 9.38 35.74 
None 4.02 5.10 5.42 14.53 
Total 39.83 3Z61 27-56 100.00 
Years of operational risk 1 7.24 7.63 9.81 24.67 
S<years>l 9.59 7.94 14.56 3ZO9 
>5 years 7.53 4.25 11.01 22.79 
None 6.75 6.75 6.95 20-45 
Total 31.11 26.56 42.33 100.00 
Years of liquidity risk 1 3.10 4.27 3.05 10.42 
5<Years>l 11.62 12-34 9.00 3Z96 
>5 years 18.01 11.03 10.00 39.04 
None 5.21 6.47 5.91 17.59 
Total 1 37.94 34.10, 27.96 1 100.001 
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Appendix 4.3 
Table 42 The Indonesian banks' risk ratings for Element 2 
In perecentages 
Ba k tt ib t 
Risk rating n a r u es Low Moderate High Total 
Type of office Head Office 22.15 51.95 12.51 86.62 
Branch 10.72 0.44 ZZ2 13.38 
Total 3Z87 52.39 14.74 
Type of license Foreign banks 10.43 0.14 1.47 IZ04 
State bank 5.18 7.36 1.34 13-88 
Foreign exchange banks 8.69 25.21 6.43 40.33 
Non-foreign exchange banks 4.31 6.89 1.65 IZ85 
joint banks Z34 4.65 1.49 8.48 
Regional devrJopment banks 
i 
1.92 8.12 Z37 IZ41 
Total 3Z87 52-39 14-74 100.00 
Total assets (Rp. Bio) 545-47,341 25.91 43-82 13.09 8Z83 
47,342 - 94,138 Z95 3.61 0.75 7.30 
94,139 - 140,935 3.13 2.70 0.74 6.58 
234,529 - 281,325 0.88 2.25 0.16 3.29 
Total 32.87 52-39 14.74 100.00 
Total employees 53-5,044 24.59 39-33 IZ49 7640 
5,045 - 10,036 1.33 4.50 0.60 6.42 
10,037 - 15,027 4.30 Z70 0.30 7.30 
15,028 - 20,019 0.88 Z25 0.16 3.29 
20,020 - 25,011 0.74 1.80 0.74 3.29 
25,012 - 30,000 1.04 1.80 0.45 3.29 
Total 32.87 52.39 14.74 100.00 
Total branches 0-143 22.96 35.71 11.15 69.82 
144-287 4.45 6.92 1.64 13.00 
288-431 1.93 3.90 0.75 6.58 
432-575 0.88 2.25 0.16 3.29 
721-856 Z65 3.61 1.05 7.30 
Total 3Z87 52-39 , 14.74 100.00 Years of market risk <1 4.71 13.21 2.38 20.31 
5<years>l 11-08 21.02 5.38 37-48 
>5 years IZ19 6.61 2.52 21.32 
None 4.88 11.55 4.46 20.89 
3Z87 SZ39 1 14.74 100.00 
Years of credit risk <I Z37 9.15 1.48 13. FO 
5<yeafs>l 9.42 22.84 5.06 37.33 
>5 years 18-73 12-76 4.44 50.33 
None Z34 7.64 3.76 13.74 
Total 3Z87 5Z39 14.74 100.00 
Years of operational risk <1 5.04 15.88 Z93 23.85 
5<years>l 9.26 18.51 4.15 31.92 
>5 years 8.89 7.15 1.99 55.77 
None 7.62 IZ73 5.84 26.19 
Total 30.82 54.27 14.92 100.00 
Years of liquidity risk <1 1.48 7.06 1.33 9.87 
S<years>l 8.27 20.44 4.61 33.31 
>5 years 19.02 15.16 4.89 39.06 
None 4.11 9.74 3.91 1776 
Total 32-87 1 SZ39 14.74 1 
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Table 4.3 Tfie Indonesian banks' risk ratings for Element 3 
In percentaLres 
B k tt ib t 
Risk rating an a r u es Low Moderate High Total 
Type of office Domestic banks 52-37 19-39 17.48 89.24 
Foreign banks 7.80 0.44 2.52 10.76 
Total 60.17 19.83 20.00 100.00 
Type of license Foreign banks 7.23 0.29 2.37 9.89 
State bank 8.27 2.69 Z64 13-60 
Foreign exchange banks 26.09 8.33 7.67 4ZO8 
Non-foreiga exchange banks 7.10 3.88 Z62 13.60 
joint banks 5.45 1.33 0.88 7.66 
Regional development banks 6.04 3.30 3.82 13.16 
Total 60.17 19-83 20.00 100.00 
Total assets (Rp bio) 545-47,341 47.75 18.33 16.92 83.00 
47,342 - 94,138 4.88 0.16 1.76 6.80 
94,139 - 140,935 5.63 0.29 0.88 6.80 
234,529 - 281,3Z5 1.91 1.04 0.45 3.40 
Total 60.17 19.83 20.00 100.00 
Total employees 53-5,044 43-02 16-84 16-33 755 
5,045 - 10,036 4.72 1.49 0.59 6.80 
10,037 - 15,027 4.73 0.31 1.76 6.80 
15,028 - 20,019 1.91 1.04 0.45 3.40 
20,020 - 25,011 Z96 0.14 0.30 3.40 
25,012 - 30,000 Z81 0.00 0.59 3.40 
Total 60.17 19-83 20.00 100.00 
Total branches 0-143 41-13 13.86 14-41 697 
144-287 7.68 3.28 Z64 13-60 
288-431 4.43 1.34 1.03 6.80 
432-575 1.91 1.04 0.45 3.40 
721-856 5.02 0.30 1.48 6.80 
Total 60.17 19.83 20.00 100.00 
Years of market risk <1 10.01 6.42 Z46 18.89 
5<year3>l 20.64 9.41 7.36 37-40 
>5 years 16.69 Z23 4.12 23.04 
None IZ83 1.78 6.06 20-67 
Total 60.17 19.83 20.00 100.00 
Years of credit risk <1 6.20 4.03 3.37 13.60 
5<years>l 20.93 9.09 5.87 35.89 
>5 years 24.49 5.22 6.93 36.64 
None 8.55 1.49 3.83 13-87 
Total 60-17 19.83 20. oo 100.00 
Years of operational risk <I IZ62 6.96 3.49 Z3.07 
5<years>1 17.59 7.42 6.67 31.68 
>5 years IZ96 3.54 3.82 20.33 
None 15.74 Z61 6.57 24.92 
Total 58.91 20.53 20.56 100-00 
Years of liquidity risk <1 4.69 Z39 1.6-1 8.69 
5<years>l 18.59 9.40 6.01 34-00 
>5 years 26.12 6.11 7.81 40.04 
None 10 , 78 192 * 4.58 17.27 
___Total 
60.17 
1 
19 83 1 20.00 1 100.00 
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Table 4.4 The Indonesian ban"' risk ratings for Element 4 
In nercent2ves 
B k ib 
Risk ing 
an attr utes Low Moderate High Total 
Type of office Domestic banks 35.60 18.93 34-01 88.5i 
Foreign banks 9.93 1.19 0.34 11.47 
Total 45-52 20.12 34.35 100.00 
Type of license Foreign banks 9.27 1.19 0.34 10.81 
State bank 6.51 2.92 2.94 12.36 
Foreign exchange banks 19.68 11.26 13.75 44.68 
Non-foreign exchange banks 2.58 2.71 7.44 12.73 
joint banks Z68 0.32 5.77 8.77 
Regional development banks 4.81 1.72 4.11 10.64 
Total 45.52 20.12 34.35 100.00 
Total assets (Rp bio) 545-47,341 37.38 16.97 27.77 82.12 
47,342 - 94,138 1.86 1.25 5.00 8.12 
94,139 - 140,935 4.76 0.34 1.05 6.16 
234,529 - 281,325 1.53 1.55 0.53 3.60 
Total 45.52 20.12 34.35, 100.00 
Total employees 53-5,044 33-03 16.30 27-08 76.41 
5,045 - 10,036 4.35 0.68 0.69 5.71 
10,037 - 15,027 Z21 1.25 3.60 7.06 
15,028 - 20,019 1.53 1.55 0.53 3.60 
20,020 - 25,011 7-55 0.00 1.05 3.60 
25,012 - 30,000 1.86 0.34 1.40 3.60 
Total 45.52 20.12 34.35 100.00 
Total branches 0-143 31.10 15.63 23-09 69.82 
144-287 6.92 1.35 3.99 1Z7.5 
288-431 3.43 0.69 2.09 6.20 
432-575 1.53 1.55 0.53 3.60 
721-856 2.55 0.91 4.66 8.12 
Total 45.52 20.12 34.35 100.00 
Years of market risk <1 4.60 3.93 9.15 17.68 
5<yean>l 16.02 7.63 IZ60 36.25 
>5 years 14.51 5.11 6.80 26.43 
None 10.39 3.45 5.80 19.64 
Total 45.52 20.12 34.35 100.00 
Years of credit risk <1 2.25 1.73 6.83 10.82 
5<years>l 15.81 7.57 IZ13 35.51 
>5 years 21.26 7.36 12.13 40.75 
None 6.20 3.46 3.26 12.92 
Total 45.52 20.12 34.35 100.00 
Years of operational risk <1 8.81 5.73 9.22 23.76 
5<years>1 11.55 4.81 11.51 27.87 
>5 years 11.68 5.67 6.34 23.68 
None 11.21 4.70 8.79 24.69 
Total 43.24 20.90 35-86 100-00 
Years of liquidity risk <1 2.58 2.59 4.29 9.46 
5<years>l 13.82 6.36 7.96 28.13 
>5 years 22.49 8.38 14.39 45.26 
None 6.64 2.79 7.71 17.15 
Total 1 45.52 
1 
20.12 34-35 1 100.001 
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Table 4.5 The Indonesian banks' risk ratings for Element 5 
In perecenatges 
B k ib Risk 
ing 
an attr utes Low Moderate High Total 
Type of office Domestic banks 41.67 27.45 20.42 89.54 
Foreign banks 9.89 0.28 0.30 10.46 
Total 51.56 27.72 20.72 100.00 
Type of license Foreign banks 9.33 0.28 0.30 9.91 
State bank 7.11 3.97 2.53 13.60 
Foreign exchange banks 22.11 10.17 11.93 44.21 
Non-foreign exchange banks 3.38 7.10 0.83 11.31 
joint banks 4.51 0.00 2.85 7.36 
Regional development banks 5.12 6.21 2.28 13.60 
Total 51.56 27.72 20.72 100.00 
Total assets (Rp bio) 545-47,341 41.06 26.04 15.90 82.99 
47,342 - 94,138 3.70 0.00 3.10 6.80 
94,139 - 140,935 3.96 1.13 1.72 6.80 
234,529 - 281,325 2.85 0.56 0.00 3.40 
Total 51.56 27.72 20.72 100-00 
Total employees 53-5,044 36.50 23.80 15.90 7Z71-9 
5,045 - 10,036 4.56 2.24 0.00 6.80 
10,037 - 15,027 1.70 1.13 3.97 6.80 
15,028 - 20,019 2.85 0.56 0.00 3.40 
20,020 - 25,011 3.10 0.00 0.30 3.40 
2.5,012 - 30,000 
1 
2.85 0.00 0.56 3.40 
Total 51.56 27.72 20.72 100.00 
Total branches 0-143 35.92 20.96 12.51 69.39 
144-287 3.72 5.08 4.81 13.60 
288-431 5.12 1.13 0.56 6.80 
432-575 2.85 0.56 0.00 3.40 
721-856 3.96 0.00 2.85 6.80 
Total 51.56 27.72 20.72 100.00 
Years of matket risk <1 7.35 8.21 2.56 18.12 
S<yean>l 20.14 9.33 7.94 37.41 
>5 years 14-44 5.12 4.25 23.81 
None 9.64 5.07 5.96 20.66 
Total 51.56 27.72 20.72 100.00 
Years of credit risk <1 2.27 5.65 3.39 11.31 
5<years>l 19.83 10.46 7.12 37.41 
>5 years 22.66 7.66 6.80 37.11 
None 6.80 3.96 3.40 14.16 
Total 51.56 27.72 20.72 100.00 
Years of operationd risk <1 12.64 9.38 2.63 24.65 
5<years>l 12.91 8.47 7.94 29.32 
>5 years 10.83 6.47 3.83 21.13 
None 13.48 4.38 7.05 24.91 
Total 49.85 28.70 21.45 100.00 
Years of liquidity risk <1 3.96 5,67 0.58 10.20 
S<years>l 13.33 11.57 6.82 31.72 
>5 years 24.36 9.35 6.80 40.52 
None 9.92 1.13 6.52 17.56 
Total 51.56 
1 
27.72 1 20.72 1 100.001 
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Table 4.6 Tlie Indonesian banks' risk ratings for Element 6 
In nercentaires 
B k tt ib 
Risk ing 
an a r utes Low Moderate High Total 
Type of office Domestic banks 55-31 15-74 16.69 87.74 
Foreign banks 10.23 0.79 1.23 IZZ6 
Total 65.55 16.53 17.92 100.00 
Type of license Foreign banks 9.92 0.69 0.90 11.51 
State bank 11.80 1.37 Z33 15.50 
Foreign exchange banks 23.79 4.91 7.89 36.59 
Non-foreiga exchange banks 8.12 1.92 Z17 IZ22 
joint banks 4.85 ZOO 1.60 8.45 
Regional development banks 7.06 5.64 3.03 15-73 
Total 65.55 1653 17-92 100.00 
Total assets (Rp bio) 545-47,341 50.43 15.08 15-09 80-61 
47,342- 94,138 5.86 0.55 1.21 7.62 
94,139 - 140,935 6.73 0.25 0.94 7.92 
234,529 - 281,325 2.52 0.65 0.67 3.85 
Total 65.55 16.53 17.92 100.00 
Total employees 53-5,044 47.64 14.20 13-46 75.30 
5,045 - 10,036 Z80 0.88 1.63 5.31 
10,037 - 15,027 6.34 0.35 1.04 7.73 
15,028 - 20,019 2.52 0.65 0.67 3.85 
20,020 - 25,011 3.33 0.17 0.47 3.96 
25,012 - 30,000 Z92 0.28 0.65 3.85 
Total 65.55 16.53 17.92 100.00 
Total branches 0-143 45.89 IZ21 11.99 70.09 
144-287 5.52 Z33 Z67 10.52 
288-431 5.35 0.91 1.55 7.81 
432-575 2.52 0.65 0.67 3.85 
721-856 6.27 0.44 1.03 7.73 
Total 65.55 16.53 17.92 100.00 
Years of market risk <1 10.30 3.49 3.64 17.43 
5<years>l 24.06 5.03 6.03 35.12 
>5 years 19.43 2.97 3.37 25.78 
None 11.76 5.04 4.87 21.67 
Total 65.55 16.53 17.92 100.00 
Years of credit risk <1 6.71 Z51 2.89 IZIO 
5<years>l 23.40 5.68 6.33 35.41 
>5 years 28.49 4.65 5.58 X73 
None 6.95 3.70 3.11 13.76 
Total 65.55 16.53 17.92 100.00 
Years of operational risk <1 16.27 4.10 5.44 25.82 
5<years>1 18.51 3.90 5.18 27.58 
>5 years 14-12 Z98 Z92 20.01 
None 15.48 623 4.88 26.59 
Total 64.38 17.21 18.41 100.00 
Years of liquidity risk <1 7.28 2.22 Z39 11.89 
5<yean>l 16.87 4.86 S96 27.70 
>5 years 31.69 5.19 5.81 4Z69 
None 9.71 4.27 3.75 17 . 73 
L I Total 1 65.55 1 16.53 17.92 
J 
()0 . 00 1 100.00 
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Table 4.7 The Indonesian banks' risk ratings for Element 7 
Tn nercen2t"s 
Bank attributes 
Risk ing 
LOW Moderate High Total 
Type of office Domestic banks 73.33 3.33 10.00 86.67 
Foreign banks 7.50 3.33 2.50 13.33 
Total 80-83 6.67 12.50 100.00 
Type of license Foreign banks 7.50 0.83 1.67 10-00 
State bank 12.50 0.00 0.83 13.33 
Foreign exchange banks 38.33 0.83 4.17 43.33 
Non-foreign exchange banks 8.33 0.00 1.67 10.00 
joint banks 5.00 2.50 2.50 10.00 
Regional development banks 9.17 
1 
Z50 1.67 13.33 
Total 80.83 6.67 12.50 100-00 
Total assets (Rp bio) 545-47,341 65.00 6.67 11.67 83.33 
47,342 - 94,138 5.83 0.00 0.83 6.67 
94,139 - 140,935 6.67 0.00 0.00 6.67 
234,529 - 281,325 3.33 0.00 0.00 3.33 
Total 80.83 6.67 12.50. 100.00 
Total employees 53-5,044 59.17 6.67 10-83 76.67 
5,045 - 10,036 5.83 0.00 0.83 6.67 
10,037 - 15,027 5.83 0.00 0.83 6.67 
15,028 - 20,019 3.33 0.00 0.00 3.33 
20,020 - 25,011 3.33 0.00 0.00 3.33 
25,012 - 3Q, 000 3.33 0.00 0.00 3.33 
Total 80.83 6.67 IZ50 100.00 
Total branches 0-143 55.83 4.17 10.00 70.00 
144-287 10.00 Z50 0.83 13.33 
288-431 5.83 0.00 0.83 6.67 
432-575 3.33 0.00 0.00 3.33 
721-856 5.83 0.00 0.83 6.67 
Total 80.83 6.67 ZSO 100.00 
Years of market risk <1 15.83 0.00 0.83 16.67 
5<yean>l 27.50 3.33 5.83 36.67 
>5 years 20.00 0.83 2.50 23.33 
None 17.50 Z50 3.33 23.33 
Total 80.83 6.67 lZ5O 100.00 
Years of credit risk <1 9.17 0.00 0.83 10-00 
S<Years>l 30.00 ZSO 4.17 36.67 
>5 years 30.00 0.83 5.83 36.67 
None 11.67 3.33 1.67 16.67 
Total 80.83 6.67 12.50 100.00 
Years of operational risk <1 23.28 0.00 0.86 -24.14 
5<years>1 20.69 Z59 4.31 27.59 
>5 years 17.24 0.00 3.45 20-69 
None 19.83 3.45 4.31 27.59 
Total 81.03 6.03 IZ93 
- 
100.00 
Years of liquidity risk <1 10.00 0.00 0.00 80-83 
5<years>l 24-17 Z50 3.33 30.00 
>5 years 3Z50 0.83 6.67 40.00 
None 14.17 3.33 - ZSO 20*00 Total 80.83 
1 
6- 6]; 12.50 1_ 100.001 
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Table 4.8The Indonesian banks' risk ratings for Element 8 
In percentages 
B k t ib 
Risk rating an at r utes Low Moderate High Total 
Type of office Domestic banks 49.80 16.34 24.18 90.32 
Foreign banks 7.41 0.97 1.29 9.68 
Total 57-22 17.31 25.47 100.00 
Type of license Foreiga banks 7.41 0.97 1.29 9.68 
State bank 8.72 2.29 3.25 14-25 
Foreign exchange banks 25.57 7.51 10.93 44-01 
Non-foreiga exchange banks 5.48 3.92 1.29 10.69 
joint banks 4.20 1.64 1.29 7.13 
Regional development banks 5.84 0.99 7.43 14-25 
Total 57.22 17.31 25.47 100.00 
Total assets OZp bio) 545-47,341 44.92 14-70 22.57 82-19 
47,342 - 94,138 5.19 0.65 1.29 7.13 
94,139 - 140,935 4.85 0.97 1.30 7.13 
234,529 - 291,325 2.26 0.99 0.31 3.56 
Total 57.22 17.31 25.47 100.00 
Total employees 53-5,044 40.37 IZ75 21.94 75.5Z 
5,045 - 10,036 4.55 1.95 0.63 7.13 
10,037 - 15,027 4.86 1.29 0.97 7.13 
15,028 - 20,019 Z26 0.99 0.31 3.56 
20,020 - 25,011 2.59 0.34 0.64 3.56 
25,012 - 30,000 2.59 0.00 0.97 3.56 
Total 57.22 17.31 25.47 100.00 
Total branches 0-143 38.11 10.45 19.37 67.94 
144-287 7.44 3.26 3.55 14-25 
288-431 4.21 1.62 1.29 7.13 
432-575 Z26 0.99 0.31 3.56 
721-856 5.19 0.99 0.95 7.13 
Total 57.22 
. 
17.31 25.47 100.00 
Years of market risk <1 8.74 4.26 4.82 17.81 
5<yean>l 27-66 8.16 8.38 39.19 
>5 years 15-13 Z95 3.88 21.96 
None 10.69 1.95 8.40 21.04 
Total 57.22 , 17.31 25.47 100-00 
Years of credit risk <1 5.19 0.99 4.51 10.69 
5<years>l 21.34 &82 9.03 39-19 
>5 years 23.90 6.20 5.78 35-87 
None 6.79 1.31 6.15 14.25 
Total 57.22 17-31 25-47 100.00 
Years of operational risk <I IZ76 6.79 6.32 25.86 
5<years>l 16.78 5.40 7.38 29.56 
>5 years 13-02 3.06 3.00 19.07 
None 13-76 Z71 9.05 25.51 
Total 56.31 17.96 25.73 100.00 
Years of liquidity risk <1 4.86 1.97 3.85 10.69 
5<years>l 16-81 6.54 8.71 32.06 
>5 years 25.52 7.81 6.10 39.43 
None 10-03 0.99 6.80 17.81 
1 Total 
-- L- 
57.22 
1 
17.31 
. 
25.47 
. 
100.001 
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Table 4.9 Tlie Indonesian banks' risk ratings for Element 9 
In Percentages 
B k t ib t 
Risk rating an a tr u es LOW Moderate High Total 
Type of office Domestic banks 48.69 1&51 20.03 87.23 
Foreign banks 9.12 Z15 1.51 IZ77 
Total 57.80 20.66 21.54, 100.00 
Type of license Foreign banks 8.00 0.88 0.63 9.50 
State bank 8.10 Z36 Z80 13.25 
Foreign exchange banks 22.34 8.45 9.36 40.15 
Non-foreign exchange banks 6.75 3.47 3.58 13.80 
joint banks 5.50 Z19 Z05 9.74 
Regional development banks 7.11 3.32 3.12 13.56 
Total 57-90 20-66 21.54 100.00 
Total assets (Rp bio) 545-47,341 46,98 18.23 18.36 83.57 
47,342 - 94,138 4.21 0.90 1.36 6.48 
94,139 - 140,935 4.10 0.94 1.46 6.50 
234,529 - 281,325 2.50 0.58 0.36 3.45 
Total 57.801 20.66 21.54 100.00 
Total employees 53-5,044 43.10 17.34 16.84 77.28 
5,045 - 10,036 3.89 0.88 1.52 6.29 
10,037 - 15,027 4.39 1.32 1.19 6.90 
15,028 - 20,019 2.50 0.58 0.36 3.45 
20,020 - 25,011 1.96 0.29 0.80 3.05 
25,012 - 30,000 1.96 0.23 0.83 3.03 
Total 57.80 20.66 21.54 100.00 
Total branches 0-143 39.76 15.43 15.19 70.38 
144-287 7.68 Z92 Z90 13.50 
288-431 3.64 0.77 1.76 6.17 
432-575 Z50 0.58 0.36 3.45 
721-856 4.21 0.96 1.33 6.50 
Total 57.80 20.66 21.54 100.00 
Years of market risk <1 10.71 3.76 5.38 19.86 
5<years>1 22.36 7.02 7.24 36.63 
>5 years 13.33 4.15 3.27 20.75 
None 11.39 5.72 5.64 22.76 
Total 57.80 20.66 21.54 100.00 
Years of credit risk <1 6.89 Z39 4.33 13.62 
5<yean>l 21.59 6.90 7.91 36.40 
>5 years 21-32 6.34 5.32 1 32-98 
None 8.00 5.02 3.98 17-01 
Total 57-80 20.66 21.54 100.00 
Years of operational risk <I IZ60 4.30 6.55 23.45 
5<years>l 18-71 5.94 6.59 31-24 
>5 years 10-78 4.36 Z78 17.91 
None 14.57 6.49 6.34 27.40 
Total 56-66 21.09 22-25 100-00 
Years of liquidity risk <1 4.70 1.8; 3.01 9.57 
5<years>l 19.42 6.59 7.60 33.61 
>5 years 23.32 7.07 6.03 36.43 
None 10-36 5.14 4.90 20.39 
Total 1 57.80 20.66 21.54 
1 
100.001 
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Table 4.10 The Indonesian banks' risk ratings for Element 10 
In pcrcentaWs 
Bank attrib te 
Risk ing 
u s Low Moderate High Total 
Type of office Domestic banks 29.74 17.16 41-27 88.16 
Foreign banks 5.00 1.72 5.12 11.84 
Total 34.74 18-88 46-38 100.00 
Type of license Foreiga banks 4.27 0.99 3.40 8.66 
State bank 5.00 3.90 6.57 15.47 
Foreign exchange banks 15.97 9.10 19-30 44.38 
Non-foreiga exchange banks 3.46 1.21 5.18 9.84 
joint banks 2.64 1.26 6.17 10-08 
Regional development banks 
1 
3.39 2.42 5.76 11.57 
Total 34.74 18-88 46.38 100-00 
Total assets (Rp bio) 545-47,341 27.53 14.69 38.73 80.95 
47,342 - 94,138 3.22 1.07 3.76 8.05 
94,139 - 140,935 7-63 1.54 2.55 6.72 
Z34,529 - 281,325 1.36 1.57 1.35 4.28 
Total 34.741 18-88 46.38 100.00 
Total employees 53-5,044 24.49 13-58 35.00 73.67 
5,045 - 10,036 3.04 1.11 3.73 7.88 
10,037 - 15,027 2.90 1.64 3.74 8.27 
15,028 - 20,019 1.36 1.57 1.35 4.28 
20,020 - 25,011 1.35 0.43 0.94 z 
25,012 - 30,000 1.59 0.54 1.63 3.77 
Total 34.74 18.88 46.38 100.00 
Total branches 0-143 27-71 10.95 32-59 66.25 
144-287 4.17 4.41 5.84 14.42 
288-431 3.52 0.98 3.54 8.05 
432-575 1.36 1.57 1.35 4.28 
721-856 2.98 0.96 3.07 7.01 
Total 34.74. 18-88 46.38 100-00 
Years of market risk <1 5.90 2.64 7.42 15.96 
5<years>l 13.58 7.47 16.86 37.91 
>5 years 8.39 4.05 9.98 22.42 
None 6.88 4.72 17-12 23.71 
Total 34.74 , 18.88 46.38 100.00 
Years of credit risk <1 3.17 0.80 6.13 10.11 
S<years>l 11.45 7.65 15.86 34.97 
>5 years 14.10 5.95 16.59 36-63 
None 6.01 4.48 7.80 18.29 
Total 34.74 18.88 46.38 100.00 
Years of operational risk <1 9.94 5.14 9.79 24.87 
5<years>l 8.49 4.72 13.81 27-03 
>5 years 6.09 3.73 9.82 19.64 
None 9.64 5.06 13.76 28.46 
Total 34.16 18.66 47.19 100.00 
Years of liqxidity risk <1 3.69 0.71 3.16 7.55 
S<years>l 10.41 7.89 15.00 33.30 
>5 years 14.44 5.95 1724 37.63 
None 6.21 4.33 
1 
10.98 2152 , Total 34.74 18.88 1 46.38 1 100 
Q 
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Table 4.11 The Indonesian banks' risk ratings for Element 11 
In vercent"es 
Bank attributes 
Risk rating 
Low Moderate High Total 
Type of office Domestic banks 
1 
30.18 19.73 39.29 89.20 
Foreiga banks 4.75 Z26 3.79 10.80 
Total 34.93 21.99 43.08 100.00 
Type of license Foreign banks 3.44 1.62 Z55 7.61 
State bank 4.66 Z47 7.10 14.23 
Foreiga exchange banks 15.89 9.15 16.71 41.75 
Non-foreiga exchange banks 3.02 3.75 5.44 IZ21 
joint banks 3.77 ZIO 4.59 10.47 
Regional development banks 4.15 Z89 6.69 13.73 
Tow 34.93 21.99 43.08 100.00 
Total assets (Rp bio) 545-47,341 29.44 19.04 35.95 84.44 
47,342 - 94,138 2.31 0.75 1.85 4.90 
94,139 - 140,935 Z35 1.50 3.22 7.07 
234,529 - 281,325 0.83 0.70 Z06 3.59 
Total 34.93, 21.99 43.08 100.00 
Total employees 53-5,044 26.76 17.98 33-14 : 77.88 
5,045 - 10,036 Z68 1.06 Z81 6.56 
10,037- 15,027 Z13 0.78 Z42 5.33 
15,028 - 20,019 0.83 0.70 Z06 3.59 
20,020 - 25,011 1.15 0.80 1.42 3.38 
25,012 - 30,000 1.38 0.66 1.22 3.26 
Total 34.93 21.99 43.08 100.00 
Total branches 0-143 24.12 16.26 30.53 70.91 
144-287 5.13 3.06 5.34 13.53 
288-431 Z77 1.09 3.09 6.0r, 
432-575 0.83 0.70 Z06 3.59 
721-856 2.09 0.88 Z05 5.02 
Total 34.93 
. 
21.99 43.08 100.00 
Years of market risk <1 6.48 4.17 8.48 19.14 
5<years>l 12.35 7.34 16.60 36.29 
>5 years 7.81 5.82 8.83 22.45 
None 8.29 4.66 9.17 22.12 
Total 34.93 21.99 43.08 100.00 
Years of credit risk <1 3.24 Z18 6.88 IZ30 
5<years>l 13.19 8.11 16-84 38.14 
>5 years 12-63 7.32 12.75 3Z70 
None 5.87 4.37 6.61 16.86 
Total 34.93 21.99 43-08 100.00 
Years of operational risk <1 8.57 5.03 11.77 Z5.37 
5<years>l 9.39 5.88 IZ84 Z8.11 
>5 years 6.68 5.33 7.65 19.65 
None 10.08 5.76 11.03 26-87 
Total 34-72 21.99 43.29 100.00 
Years of liquidity risk <1 Z99 Z10 5.17 10.26 
5<years>l 11.38 7.07 14.62 33.07 
>5 years 13.55 8.10 14.48 36.13 
None 7.02 4.72 8.81 20.55 
Total 34.93 21.99 1 43.08 100.001 
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Table 4.12 Ilie Indonesian banks' risk ratings for Element 12 
In percentaxes 
B k t ib t 
Risk ating an a tr u es Low Moderate High Total 
Type of office Domestic banks 28.98 24.92 35.52 89.4i 
Foreign banks 6.11 1.91 2.56 10.58 
Total 35-09 26.82 38.09 100.00 
Type of license Foreign banks 4.95 1.19 2.08 8.22 
State bank 5.18 3.87 5.96 15.01 
Foreign exchange banks 16-63 11.11 16.97 44.71 
Non-foreiga exchange banks 1.68 2.79 3.51 7.98 
joint banks 3.63 2.43 3.56 9.62 
Regional development banks 3.03 5.42 6.01 14.46 
1 
Total 35.09 26.82 38.09 100.00 
Total assets (Rp bio) 545-47,341 28-76 22.76 30.30 81.83 
47,342 - 94,138 3.44 0.71 3.35 7.51 
94,139 - 140,935 1.47 1.97 3.48 6.91 
Z34,529 - 281,325 1.42 1.38 0.95 3.75 
Total 35-09 26.82 38.09 100.00 
Total employees 53-5,044 25-69 20.81 27.82 74.32 
5,045 - 10,036 3.07 1.95 2-48 7.51 
10,037 - 15,027 1.96 1.72 3.83 7.51 
15,028 - 20,019 1.42 1.38 0.95 3.75 
20,020 - 25,011 0.69 0.71 1.76 3.16 
Z5,012 - 30,000 Z27 
1 
0.25 1.24 3.75 
Total 35.09 26.82 38.09 100.00 
Total branches 0-143 23.83 18.25 25.28 67.36 
144-287 4.53 4.93 5.00 14.46 
288-431 3.44 1.08 Z99 7.51 
432-575 1.42 1.38 0.95 3.75 
721-856 1.87 1.18 3.87 6.91 
Total 35.09 26.82 38.09 100.00 
Years of market risk <1 5.64 5.65 7.48 18.77 
S<years>l 10.44 &64 14.98 34.07 
>5 years 10.25 6.23 7.45 23.93 
None &76 6.30 8.18 23.24 
Total 35.09 26.82 38.09 100.00 
Years of credit risk <1 3.17 Z55 5.79 11.51 
5<years>l IZ08 11.08 13.21 36.37 
>5 years 15.41 8.01 IZ49 35.90 
None 4.44 5.19 6.60 16.22 
Total 35.09 26.82 38-09 100.00 
Years of operational risk <1 9.33 7.39 10.58 27.31 
5<years>l 7.70 7.35 11.56 26-60 
>5 years 8.26 5.72 5.53 19.51 
None 9.65 6.44 10-49 26.58 
Total 34.94 26.90 38-15 100.00 
Years of liquidity risk <I Z97 3.61 4.68 11.26 
5<years>l 9.54 10.08 13.27 3Z89 
>5 years 15.63 8.01 IZ49 36.12 
None 6.96 5.13 7.65 19.73 
_Total 1 
35.09 
1 
26.82 1 38-09 
1 
100. 
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Table 4.13 Ilie Indonesian banks' risk ratings for Element 13 
In percentaxes 
B k tt ib 
Risk rating an a r utes Low Moderate, High Total 
Type of office Domestic banks 52.56 13-11 21.77 87-44 
Foreign banks 11.32 0.31 0.94 12.56 
Total 63.87 13.42. 22.71 100.00 
Type of license Foreign banks 7.94 0.21 0.66 8.80 
State bank 9.27 2.14 3.52 14.92 
Foreign exchange banks 28.45 4.26 9.87 42.58 
Non-foreiga exchange banks 4.70 3.68 4.52 12.91 
joint banks 7.81 1.20 2.06 1'. 07 
Regional development banks 5.70 1.93 Z09 9.72 
Total 63.87 13.42 22.71 100-00 
Total assets (Rp bio) 545-47,341 51.37 IZ29 18.97 8Z64 
47,342 - 94,138 5.24 0.62 1.66 7.52 
94,139 - 140,935 4.67 0.19 1.23 6.09 
234,529 - 281,325 Z60 0.32 0.84 3.76 
Total 63.87 13.42 22.71 100.00 
Total employees 53-5,044 46.38 12.29 17.87 76.54 
5,045 - 10,036 4.99 0.00 1.11 6.10 
10,037 - 15,027 4.93 0.80 1.67 7.41 
15,028 - 20,019 Z60 0.32 0.84 3.76 
20,020 - 25,011 2.59 0.00 0.38 2.97 
25,012 - 30,000 2.38 0.00 0.85 3.23 
Total 35.09 26.82 38-09 100.00 
Total branches 0-143 41.22 IIA3 16-83 69.47 
144-287 9.65 1.05 2.36 13.06 
288-431 6.03 0.00 1.49 7.52 
432-575 Z60 0.32 0.84 3.76 
721-856 4.38 0.62 1.20 6.20 
Total 63-87 . 13.42 22.71 100.00 Years of market risk <1 11.74 2.75 4.63 19.12 
5<yean>l 25.66 4.45 8.14 38.25 
>5 years 16.10 2.82 4.57 23.49 
None 10.37 3.40 5.37 19.14 
Total 63.87 13.42 22.71 100-00 
Years of credit risk <1 4.58 3.72 3.60 11.90 
5<years>1 Z5.73 4.52 7.50 37.75 
>5 years 25-82 3.44 6.60 35.85 
None 7.74 1.74 5.01 14.50 
Total 63-87 13.42 2Z71 100.00 
Years of operational risk <1 17-69 2.01 6.01 2.5.71 
5<years>l 18.31 4.88 6.24 29.44 
>5 years 13.55 Z69 3.94 20.19 
None 13.66 4.02 6.98 24.66 
Total 63.22 13.60 23.18 1 100.00 
Years of liquidity risk <1 5.49 1.54 Z85 9.88 
5<years>l 20.70 4.41 7.05 32.16 
>5 years 28.16 4.18 7.28 39.61 
None 9.53 3.29 5.53 1835 , Total 1 63.87 13.42 
1 22.71 1 100 
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Table 4.14 Mie Indonesian banks' risk ratings for Element 14 
In iDercentaires 
B k ib 
Risk ating 
an attr utes Low Moderate High Total 
Type of office Domestic banks 16.62 13.16 58.95 88.73 
Foreign banks 2.48 1.36 7.42 11.27 
Total 19.10 14.52 66.37 100.00 
Type of license Foreign banks 1.82 0.23 6.12 8.17 
State bank 1.74 1.59 9.57 IZ91 
Foreign exchange banks 7.21 6.35 29.11 4Z67 
Non-foreiga exchange banks 3.31 1.13 8.29 IZ74 
joint banks Z83 Z94 4.55 10.32 
Regional development banks Z19 Z27 8.74 13.19 
Total 19.10 14.52 66.37 100.00 
Total assets (Rp bio) 545-47,341 16.50 11.34 55.87 83.71 
47,342- 94,138 1.74 1.59 3.38 6.71 
94,139 - 140,935 0.00 1.13 4.83 5.97 
234,529 - 281,325 0.86 0.46 Z29 3.61 
Total 19.10 14.52 66.37 100.00 
Total employees 53-5,044 15.20 9.07 SZ73 77.00 
5,045 - 10,036 1.30 Z27 3.14 6.71 
10,037 - 15,027 1.08 0.45 5.18 6.71 
15,028 - 20,019 0.86 0.46 Z29 3.61 
20,020 - 25,011 0.00 1.13 1.73 Z87 
25,012 - 30,000 0.66 1.13 1.31 3.10 
Total 19.10 14.52 66.37 100.00 
Total branches 0-143 13.66 8.84 48.02 70.52 
144-287 1.54 1.36 9.77 IZ68 
288-431 1.96 Z27 Z48 6.71 
432-575 0.86 0.46 Z29 3.61 
721-856 1.08 1.59 3.81 6.48 
Total 19.10 14.52 
. 
66.37 100.00 
Years of market risk <1 3.91 Z71 13.56 20.18 
5<years>t 7.71 4.32 24.16 36.19 
>5 years 6.38 4.08 IZ09 22.55 
None 1.10 3.40 16.57 21-08 
Total 19.10 14.52 66.37 100.00 
Years of credit risk <1 1.96 1.82 9.65 13.42 
5<years>l 5.72 3.85 25.65 35.22 
>5 years 9.67 6.35 18.82 34-84 
None 1.76 Z50 IZ26 16.52 
Total 19.10 14-52 66.37 100.00 
Years of operational risk <1 5.40 4.47 14.66 24.52 
5<yean>l 4.79 3.52 21.08 29.40 
>5 years 6.62 3.52 9.92 20.06 
None Z71 3.52 19-78 26.01 
Total 19.52 15.03 65.45 100.00 
Years of liquidity risk <I Z39 1.59 6.39 10-37 
5<years>l 3.28 3.41 24.87 31.55 
>5 years 10.81 6.35 20.78 37.94 
None Z62 3.17 14.33 20.13 -* Total 14.52 1 66-37 
1 
1ý0 
Q 
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